United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC,
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants
`
`v.
`
`CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
`CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL
`ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL
`ASSOCIATION,
`Defendants-Appellees
`______________________
`
`2016-1077
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`District of Maryland in No. 8:14-cv-00111-PWG, Judge
`Paul W. Grimm.
`
`______________________
`
`Decided: March 7, 2017
`______________________
`
`
`
`IAN NEVILLE FEINBERG, Feinberg Day Alberti &
`Thompson LLP, Menlo Park, CA, argued for plaintiffs-
`appellants.
` Also represented by MARC BELLOLI,
`ELIZABETH DAY, CLAYTON W. THOMPSON, II; ERIC F.
`CITRON, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD.
`
`MATTHEW J. MOORE, Latham & Watkins LLP, Wash-
`ington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also repre-
`
`Page 1
`
`HTC EX. 1032
`HTC v. Ancora
`US Patent No. 6,411,941
`
`

`

`
`
` 2
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`sented by GABRIEL BELL, ADAM MICHAEL GREENFIELD;
`JEFFREY G. HOMRIG, Menlo Park, CA; ROBERT A. ANGLE,
`DABNEY JEFFERSON CARR, IV, Troutman Sanders LLP,
`Richmond, VA; KENNETH R. ADAMO, DAVID WILLIAM
`HIGER, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL.
`______________________
`
`
`
`Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and CHEN, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`PROST, Chief Judge.
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC and Intellectual Ventures
`II LLC (collectively, “IV”) appeal from a final decision of
`the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
`land finding all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,984,081 (“’081
`patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 (“’002 patent”)
`ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and barring IV from
`pursuing its infringement claims of U.S. Patent No.
`6,715,084 (“’084 patent”) under a collateral estoppel (issue
`preclusion) theory.1 For the reasons discussed below, we
`affirm.
`
`I
`IV sued Capital One Financial Corporation, Capital
`One Bank (USA), National Association, Capital One, and
`National Association (collectively, “Capital One”), alleging
`infringement of the ’084 patent, the ’081 patent, and the
`’002 patent (collectively, “patents-in-suit”) in the United
`States District Court for the District of Maryland. In
`response, Capital One asserted antitrust counterclaims
`against IV under the Sherman Act and moved for sum-
`
`1
`IV additionally appealed the district court’s find-
`ing of patent ineligibility of U.S. Patent No. 6,314,409. IV,
`however, withdrew this patent from appeal. IV’s Mot. to
`Withdraw U.S. Patent No. 6,314,409 as an Appellate
`Issue at 2.
`
`Page 2
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`

`

`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`3
`
`mary judgment on IV’s infringement claims, arguing that
`the ’081 and ’002 patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 101.
`In a related proceeding, the United States District
`Court for the Southern District of New York entered a
`partial summary judgment order of ineligibility under
`§ 101 for the ’084 patent. See Intellectual Ventures II,
`LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-cv-3777-AKH,
`2015 WL 1941331, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2015)
`(“JPMC”); J.A. 1343–74. Relying on the JPMC court’s
`partial summary judgment order, Capital One moved for
`summary judgment in the District of Maryland under a
`collateral estoppel theory to bar IV’s infringement action
`on those patents.
`In response to Capital One’s summary judgment mo-
`tions, the district court invalidated the ’081 and ’002
`patents under § 101 and barred IV from proceeding on its
`infringement claims as to the ’084 patent under a collat-
`eral estoppel theory based on the JPMC court’s findings.
`Having granted Capital One’s summary judgment motion
`on collateral estoppel grounds, the District of Maryland
`elected not to independently reach the merits of the ’084
`patent’s eligibility under § 101. After disposing of the
`patents-in-suit, and over IV’s objection, the district court
`certified its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
`dure 54(b) so that this appeal could proceed concurrently
`with Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims in the District
`of Maryland.2 IV filed its appeal. We have jurisdiction
`under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
`
`
`2
`In the related JPMC matter, although the South-
`ern District of New York rendered a finding of invalidity
`at summary judgment as to the ’084 patent under § 101, it
`denied IV’s request for Rule 54 certification and immedi-
`
`Page 3
`
`

`

`
`
` 4
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`II
`On appeal, IV raises a number of issues regarding the
`proceedings below: (1) IV argues that the district court
`abused its discretion by certifying this appeal under Rule
`54; (2) IV appeals the district court’s determination that it
`is collaterally estopped from pursuing its patent in-
`fringement claims as to the ’084 patent; and (3) IV ap-
`peals the district court’s determination that the ’081 and
`’002 patents are invalid under § 101. We take each issue
`in turn.
`
`A
`We review the district court’s decision to certify a par-
`tial final judgment under Rule 54(b) for an abuse of
`discretion. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S.
`427, 437 (1956). On appeal, IV argues that the district
`court erred by merely providing a two-sentence Rule 54(b)
`certification statement without any specific findings or
`reasoning to support its conclusion. IV also asserts that
`because the district court did not make any findings or
`provide a rationale, any deference we owe to the district
`court “is nullified” under Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v.
`Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (4th Cir. 1993).
`Aside from attacking the sufficiency of the district court’s
`reasoning, IV argues that the close interrelationship
`between its infringement claims and Capital One’s anti-
`trust counterclaims weighs against certification. IV
`therefore maintains that we should vacate the certifica-
`tion and remand the appeal.
`Capital One responds that the district court’s express
`finding of “no just reason for delay” supports its decision
`to certify. It also cites the district court’s additional
`certification reasoning in response to IV’s motion to
`
`ate appeal. Thus, IV has not to date appealed the merits
`of that court’s § 101 findings.
`
`Page 4
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`

`

`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`5
`
`vacate the Rule 54(b) judgment. See J.A. 1728 (explaining
`why Rule 54(b) certification would create a more efficient
`use of judicial resources under this case’s facts and proce-
`dural posture). Regarding its counterclaims, Capital One
`argues that the antitrust issues are not sufficiently inter-
`related to IV’s infringement claims because its counter-
`claims implicate IV’s patent portfolio, which encompasses
`roughly 3,500 patents.
`We agree with Capital One that the district court did
`not abuse its discretion in certifying the appeal under
`Rule 54(b). Under that rule, “[w]hen an action presents
`more than one claim for relief . . . the court may direct
`entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than
`all, claims or parties only if the court expressly deter-
`mines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 54(b).
`First, regarding the sufficiency of the district court’s
`findings, we observe that the district court set forth its
`reasoning for certification in two separate, independent
`orders. See J.A. 55 (concluding that “there is no just
`reason for delay[ing]” entry of judgment with the anti-
`trust claims still pending in the initial motion); J.A. 1727–
`28 (weighing the potential benefits of reserving final
`judgment under a Rule 60 motion and concluding that
`judicial economy supports certification). Although the
`district court’s initial ruling did not set forth a lengthy
`analysis in support of certification, it expressly deter-
`mined that there was no just reason for delay. J.A. 55.
`Beyond this, the district court subsequently explained
`why judicial economy supports its initial determination.3
`
`3
`In its reply brief, IV argues—without support—
`that a district court cannot use a subsequent order to
`“cure [the] defect” in its initial analysis. Reply Br. 24–25.
`Not so. The Fourth Circuit merely requires that the
`district court state its findings on the record or in its
`
`Page 5
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`

`

`
`
` 6
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`J.A. 1728. Regarding the sufficiency of its analysis,
`therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
`abuse its discretion because it met the standard set forth
`by the rule.
`Second, we review the extent to which the existence of
`Capital One’s counterclaims affect the analysis. To do so,
`we may consider—among other factors—“the relationship
`between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims.”
`Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1335–36. Here, Capital
`One’s antitrust counterclaims implicate IV’s patent port-
`folio of roughly 3,500 patents. J.A. 3026–27. Yet IV
`asserts only a narrow subset (the patents-in-suit) of that
`broader portfolio. Id. Further, the scope of Capital One’s
`antitrust counterclaims transcends issues of mere in-
`fringement. See id. (alleging, among other things, wrong-
`ful conduct, concealing the scope of its portfolio, and
`demanding excessive licensing rates). Indeed, the mere
`existence of some factual overlap between the parties’
`claims and counterclaims does not necessarily lead to the
`conclusion that the district court abused its discretion.
`See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics
`Research Assocs., 975 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
`(recognizing that the factual overlap on one aspect of a
`counterclaim is not adequate to show an abuse of discre-
`tion). Under these facts, we conclude that the district
`court did not abuse its discretion given the tenuous rela-
`tionship between the claims on appeal and counterclaims
`that remain. We have considered IV’s remaining argu-
`ments, but find them unpersuasive. As a result, we
`affirm the district court and entertain the remaining
`issues on appeal.
`
`
`order. Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1336. This is pre-
`cisely what it did. J.A. 55, 1728.
`
`Page 6
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`

`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`7
`
`B
`We review issues of preclusion de novo, applying the
`law of the regional circuit. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Zenni
`Optical Inc., 713 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Simi-
`larly, we review a district court’s summary judgment
`ruling under the law of the regional circuit, DDR Hold-
`ings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1252 (Fed.
`Cir. 2014). The Fourth Circuit reviews the entry of sum-
`mary judgment de novo. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert
`Cnty. Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth
`Circuit has established five requirements for collateral
`estoppel. See Ramsay v. U.S. Immigration & Naturaliza-
`tion Serv., 14 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring that
`the issue in the prior proceeding be identical, actually
`determined, necessary, final, and that the affected party
`was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
`issue). Here, the parties only dispute the finality re-
`quirement, for which the Fourth Circuit requires a “final
`and valid” judgment. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
`Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2004).
`On appeal, IV challenges the district court’s grant of
`partial summary judgment in which the court determined
`that IV was collaterally estopped from pursuing its patent
`infringement claims as to the ’084 patent. It argues that
`the district court erred because it based its collateral
`estoppel findings on a partial summary judgment order by
`the JPMC court, rather than a final judgment. In support
`of its position, IV cites Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Manu-
`facturing Corp., 294 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In that
`case—applying Seventh Circuit law—we held a partial
`summary judgment order does not meet the finality
`requirement of collateral estoppel. See id. at 1333 (basing
`collateral estoppel necessarily on a decision that is “im-
`mune . . . to reversal or amendment”) (citation omitted).
`We conclude that under Fourth Circuit law, collateral
`estoppel attaches in light of the JPMC court’s partial
`
`Page 7
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`

`

`
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` 8
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`summary judgment order. At the outset, we observe that
`IV’s reliance on Vardon is misplaced because in that case,
`we applied the law of the Seventh Circuit. See Vardon,
`294 F.3d at 1333 (applying an “immune . . . to reversal or
`amendment” standard for collateral estoppel to attach).
`The Fourth Circuit, however, applies a less rigid test of
`finality. See Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th
`Cir. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds). Under Swentek,
`finality neither demands final judgment, nor requires a
`party’s appeal. Id. at 561. Rather, “[f]inality for purposes
`of collateral estoppel is a flexible concept and ‘may mean
`little more than that the litigation of a particular issue
`has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good
`reason for permitting it to be litigated again.’” Id. (cita-
`tion omitted). Indeed, “[a]s long as the prior adjudication
`of the identical issue is conclusive, [the court does not]
`require the issue to be tried again because it lacked the
`formality of an express order and a ‘no just reason for
`delay’ determination.” See id. (noting that a trial judge
`need not enter judgment under Rule 54 and await appeal
`before ascribing a preclusive effect) (citation omitted).
`Applying the Fourth Circuit’s test, we conclude that
`the JPMC court’s partial summary judgment order met
`the finality prong for the purposes of collateral estoppel.
`Here, the JPMC court granted Capital One’s partial
`summary judgment motion after considering the parties’
`briefing and oral argument. 2015 WL 1941331, at *17.
`Indeed, in deciding JPMC, the United States District
`Court for the Southern District of New York “denied as
`moot” additional discovery motions related to the ’084
`patent. Id. Although the district court has not yet en-
`tered its judgment on IV’s claims, it has nothing left to
`resolve absent a reversal and remand on appeal. Because
`this particular issue “has reached such a stage that [the
`district court would] see[] no really good reason for per-
`mitting it to be litigated again,’” the JPMC court’s order
`meets the finality requirement under Fourth Circuit
`
`Page 8
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`

`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`9
`
`precedent. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 561 (citation omitted).
`Thus, we conclude that collateral estoppel attaches as a
`result of the JPMC court’s partial summary judgment
`order invalidating the ’084 patent.
`C
`The Fourth Circuit reviews the grant or denial of
`summary judgment de novo. Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at
`817. Patent eligibility under § 101 is an issue of law that
`we review without deference. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Ama-
`zon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible
`subject matter as follows: “Whoever invents or discovers
`any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
`ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to
`the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C.
`§ 101. In interpreting this statutory provision, the Su-
`preme Court has held that its broad language is subject to
`an implicit exception for “laws of nature, natural phenom-
`ena, and abstract ideas,” which are not patentable. Alice
`Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
`To determine whether the exception applies, the Su-
`preme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry. Specifical-
`ly, a court must determine: (1) whether the claim is
`directed to a patent-ineligible concept, i.e., a law of na-
`ture, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea; and if so,
`(2) whether the elements of the claim, considered “both
`individually and ‘as an ordered combination,’” add enough
`to “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
`eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative
`Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98
`(2012)). Applying this two-step inquiry to claims chal-
`lenged under the abstract idea exception, we typically
`refer to step one as the “abstract idea” step and step two
`as the “inventive concept” step. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC
`v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Page 9
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` 10
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`Under the “abstract idea” step we evaluate “the ‘focus
`of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if
`the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded
`subject matter.” Id. If the claim is directed to a patent-
`ineligible concept, we proceed to the “inventive concept”
`step. For that step we “look with more specificity at what
`the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether
`they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
`the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is di-
`rected.” Id. at 1258 (quoting Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom
`S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
`On appeal, IV challenges the district court’s determi-
`nations that the ’081 and ’002 patents fail under step one
`and step two of Alice under § 101.
`THE ’081 PATENT
`The ’081 patent consists of twenty-nine claims relat-
`ing to methods, systems, and apparatuses for dynamically
`managing eXtensible Markup Language (“XML”) data.
`XML is a specialized mark-up computer language devel-
`oped in the mid-1990s that defines a set of rules for
`encoding documents in both a human- and machine-
`readable format. J.A. 663–64. Given this unique encod-
`ing, XML documents have specific format requirements
`for the data contained in the document, and tags that
`define what data the system stores at each position within
`an XML document. See J.A. 895 (discussing the use of
`nested structures to preserve the relationship of data
`within a given XML document). The ’081 patent explains
`that companies frequently use XML documents to publish
`various types of information that customers and partners
`use, such as invoices, purchase orders, and price lists.
`Because XML users can create their own unique formats
`using these XML rules, not all formats are compatible.
`Therefore, companies attempting to share these types of
`XML documents may find them incompatible with their
`own XML formats. Resolving this conflict, the ’081 patent
`
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`11
`
`contends, was a difficult task that required specialized
`programming skills to manipulate and transfer XML
`documents into the desired format.
`Thus, the ’081 patent identified what its inventor per-
`ceived as a need to “allow[] the user to view and update
`XML documents in different formats, and allow[] the user
`to manipulate the data and perform actions without
`programming skills.” ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 45–48. To
`fulfill this need, the patent describes presenting the user
`with a second document—the “dynamic document”—
`which is based upon data extracted from the original XML
`document. According to the patent, the user can then
`make changes to the data displayed in the dynamic doc-
`ument and the changes will be dynamically propagated
`back into the original XML document (despite the
`acknowledged compatibility problems with such docu-
`ments). Viewed within this framework, we turn to the
`specific language of the claims. For convenience, we
`reproduce claim 21 below.4
`21. An apparatus for manipulating XML docu-
`ments, comprising:
`a processor;
`a component that organizes data components of
`one or more XML documents into data objects;
`a component that identifies a plurality of primary
`record types for the XML documents;
`
`
`4 Although IV did not expressly concede that claim
`21 is representative of the claimed invention, it acknowl-
`edged that the invention “is memorialized in [this claim].”
`Appellants’ Br. 11. Accordingly, we conclude that claim
`21 is representative. See also J.A. 12 (asserting that the
`parties agreed that claim 21 is representative).
`
`Page 11
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
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`a component that maps the data components of
`each data object to one of the plurality of primary
`record types;
`a component that organizes the instances of the
`plurality of primary record types into a hierarchy
`to form a management record type;
`a component that defines a dynamic document for
`display of an instance of a management record
`type through a user interface; and
`a component that detects modification of the data
`in the dynamic document via the user interface,
`and in response thereto modifies a data compo-
`nent in an XML document.
`’081 patent col. 20 ll. 43–61.
`In short, the ’081 patent concerns a system and meth-
`od for editing XML documents. Stripped of excess verbi-
`age, the claim creates the dynamic document based upon
`“management record types” (“MRTs”) and “primary record
`types” (“PRTs”). The inventor coined these terms to
`describe the organizational structure of the data at issue.
`A PRT is a simple data structure that contains unspeci-
`fied data extracted from XML documents and an MRT is
`merely a collection of PRTs. ’081 patent col. 2 ll. 5–12. A
`user interface then displays the dynamic document to the
`user to permit the user to make modifications to the
`document. In response to these changes made to the
`dynamic document, the system somehow modifies the
`underlying XML document.
`1
`We find that, under step one, the claims of the ’081
`patent are abstract. We conclude that the patent claims
`are, at their core, directed to the abstract idea of collect-
`ing, displaying, and manipulating data.
`
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`13
`
`We have held other patent claims ineligible under
`§ 101 for reciting similar data manipulation steps. For
`instance, in Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v.
`Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, we held the concept of
`“1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the
`collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a
`memory” abstract. 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`In particular, the invention there involved extracting data
`from a document, entering the data into appropriate data
`fields, and storing the data in memory. Id. at 1345. In
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),
`we concluded that customizing information and present-
`ing it to users based on particular characteristics is ab-
`stract as well. 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(“Intellectual Ventures I”). And in Electric Power Group,
`we explained that an invention directed to collection,
`manipulation, and display of data was an abstract pro-
`cess. 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the ’081
`patent’s concept related to the collection, display, and
`manipulation of data is similarly abstract.
`According to IV, the ’081 patent provides a concrete
`solution to a problem in computer programming, i.e., how
`to “dynamically manage multiple sets of XML docu-
`ments.” Appellants’ Br. 31 (citation omitted). IV main-
`tains that because the invention relates to a specialized
`computer language—XML—and renders otherwise in-
`compatible documents compatible through a unique
`dynamic document based on MRTs and PRTs, it is neither
`abstract, nor an age-old idea like Alice’s “intermediated
`settlement.” Appellants’ Br. 32 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct.
`at 2359).
`IV’s characterization, however, does not change the
`result. Although IV correctly observes that the ’081
`patent applies to XML documents in particular (rather
`than any other type of document), at best, this limits the
`invention to a technological environment for which to
`apply the underlying abstract concept. But such limita-
`
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
`
`tions do not make an abstract concept any less abstract
`under step one. Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1366.
`As the specification recognizes, companies have frequent-
`ly employed XML documents in routine business transac-
`tions. ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 28–36. Thus, the patent’s
`recitation of XML documents specifically, does little more
`than restrict the invention’s field of use. Such limitations
`do not render an otherwise abstract concept any less
`abstract. Affinity, 838 F.3d at 1259.
`IV’s identification of the ’081 patent’s specific data
`structures and objects (PRTs and MRTs) also does not
`change our analysis under this step. In particular, IV
`argues that the ’081 patent creates these specific data
`structures to interrelate various XML documents in a
`particular way to ensure compatibility of otherwise in-
`compatible documents. IV maintains that these struc-
`tures provide a concrete solution through a component
`that detects modifications to the dynamic document and
`in response thereto, propagates those changes back to the
`underlying XML document. We disagree.
`Although these data structures add a degree of par-
`ticularity to the claims, the underlying concept embodied
`by the limitations merely encompasses the abstract idea
`itself of organizing, displaying, and manipulating data of
`particular documents. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
`LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]ny novelty in
`implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered
`only in the second step of the Alice analysis.”). The PRTs
`and MRTs are, at bottom, broadly defined labels for
`generic data types that transfer data from one type of
`electronic document to another—here, the so-called dy-
`namic document. The resulting dynamic document, in
`turn, is nothing more than an interface for displaying and
`organizing this underlying data. These features, there-
`fore, do not alter our conclusion that the claimed inven-
`tion is directed to the abstract concept of collecting,
`displaying, and manipulating data of particular docu-
`
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
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`15
`
`ments. Having concluded that the invention is drawn to
`an abstract idea, we move to step two.
`2
`In applying step two of the Alice analysis, we “deter-
`mine whether the claims do significantly more than
`simply describe [the] abstract method” and thus trans-
`form the abstract idea into patentable subject matter.
`Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715. We look to see whether
`there are any “additional features” in the claims that
`constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the
`claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to
`an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Those “addi-
`tional features” must be more than “well-understood,
`routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
`With regard to the claims at issue, we perceive no “in-
`ventive concept” that transforms the abstract idea of
`collecting, displaying, and manipulating XML data into a
`patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. Rather,
`the claims recite both a generic computer element—a
`processor—and a series of generic computer “components”
`that merely restate their individual functions—i.e., organ-
`izing, mapping, identifying, defining, detecting, and
`modifying. That is to say, they merely describe the func-
`tions of the abstract idea itself, without particularity.
`This is simply not enough under step two. See Ultramer-
`cial, 772 F.3d at 715–16 (holding the claims insufficient to
`supply an inventive concept because they did not “do
`significantly more than simply describe [the] abstract
`method,” but rather are simply “conventional steps,
`specified at a high level of generality”) (quoting Alice, 134
`S. Ct. at 2357).
`IV argues that the ’081 patent claims, however, un-
`conventionally improve a technological process. The
`claims, according to IV, specify how to manage and modify
`XML documents of varying formats and syntax in a way
`that departed from convention. It argues that the patent
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC V. CAPITAL ONE
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`accomplishes this by creating a “dynamic document”
`based upon the MRTs and PRTs, so the system can modi-
`fy multiple sets of XML data components at once through
`a user interface. We conclude, however, that these data
`structures do not sufficiently transform the abstract
`concept into a patentable invention under step two. In
`particular, the MRTs and PRTs—although technical
`sounding—include generic data types for which the sys-
`tem can store the extracted data. See ’081 patent col. 2
`ll. 4–9 (“A PRT is similar to a relational database table;
`they contain most of the data. An MRT includes a group-
`ing of PRTs; they contain pointers to individual PRT
`records and some calculated data.”). Indeed, as the dis-
`trict court observed, IV set forth particular definitions for
`these terms that describe them as generic data structures.
`See J.A. 29–30 (defining a PRT as “a data type that de-
`fines a data structure to contain data extracted from XML
`documents” and MRT as “a data type that defines a
`collection of primary records types”). The mere fact that
`the inventor applied coined labels to conventional struc-
`tures does not make the underlying concept inventive.
`See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 n.2, 2360 (finding the
`claims abstract despite the recitation of technical-
`sounding names such as “shadow credit record[s]” and
`“shadow debit record[s]”). And the recited dynamic docu-
`ment provides little more than an unspecified set of rules
`for displaying and organizing MRTs in a user interface
`akin to the generic interfaces we have elsewhere ex-
`plained impart no inventive concept. See, e.g., Intellectual
`Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1370 (finding that the recited
`“interactive interface” was not a “specific application of
`the abstract idea that provides an inventive concept”);
`Affinity, 838 F.3d at 1262 (characterizing a “graphical
`user interface” as a “generic feature” of the invention).
`IV next submits that the specific combination of
`PRTs, MRTs, and a dynamic document overcomes the
`previous problem of the “incompatibility of XML docu-
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`ments with different ‘XML syntax[es]’ and different ‘XML
`formats, relational database schemes, and messages
`formats.’” Appellants’ Br. 40 (citing J.A. 168, 1388). In
`particular, IV argues that the claims set forth a unique
`solution to a problem with contemporary XML documents.
`Id. at 45. But the claims do not recite particular features
`to yield these advantages. Although the claims purport to
`modify the underlying XML document in response to
`modifications made in the dynamic document, this merely
`reiterates the patent’s stated goal itself. Nothing in the
`claims indicate what steps are undertaken to overcome
`the stated incompatibility problems with XML documents
`to propagate those modifications into the XML document.
`Indeed, the claim language here provides only a result-
`oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a com-
`puter accomplishes it. Our law demands more. See Elec.
`Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (cautioning against claims
`“so result focused, so functional, as to effectively cover any
`solution to an identified problem”).
`In sum, evaluating these claimed elements either in-
`dividually or as an ordered combination, we conclude that
`they recite no more than routine steps of data collection
`and organization using generic computer components and
`conventional computer data processing activities. Alt-
`hough this patent purports to have met a need in the art
`to “allow[] the user to view and update XML documents in
`different formats, and . . . manipulate the data and per-
`form actions without programming skills,” the claims
`recite nothing inventive or transformative to achieve this
`stated goal. ’081 patent col. 1 ll. 45–48. Thus, taken
`individually or in combination, the recited limitations
`neither improve the functions of the computer itself, nor
`provide specific programming, tailored software, or mean-
`ingful guidance for implementing the abstract concept.
`Alice, 134 S. Ct at 2359. Accordingly, they do not mean-
`ingfully limit the claims to provide the requisite inventive
`concept under step two.
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