United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Defendant-Cross Appellant.
`______________________
`
`2013-1378, -1414
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of California in No. 11-CV-6357, Judge
`Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers.
`______________________
`
`Decided: March 3, 2014
`______________________
`
`
`JOHN S. LEROY, Brooks Kushman P.C., of Southfield,
`Michigan, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the
`brief were MARK A. CANTOR, MARC LORELLI, and JOHN P.
`RONDINI.
`
`DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of
`Washington, DC, argued for defendant-cross appellant.
`With her on the brief were BRIAN R. MATSUI and NATALIE
`R. RAM, OF WASHINGTON, DC; MICHAEL A. JACOBS,
`RICHARD S.J. HUNG, and FRANCIS C. HO, of San Francisco,
`California; and BITA RAHEBI, of Los Angeles, California.
`______________________
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 1
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`

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` 2
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
`
`
`Before RADER, Chief Judge, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
`Ancora Technologies, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No.
`6,411,941, which claims methods for verifying that a
`software program on a computer is not there without
`authorization, but is licensed to be there. In December
`2010, Ancora sued Apple Inc., alleging that products
`running Apple’s iOS operating system infringed the ’941
`patent. The United States District Court for the Northern
`District of California construed the claims. Ancora
`Techs., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 11-CV-06357, 2012 WL 6738761
`(N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2012). Ancora stipulated to summary
`judgment of non-infringement under the district court’s
`construction of the claim term “program.” The district
`court subsequently entered final judgment dismissing all
`claims and counterclaims. Ancora appeals the district
`court’s construction of “program,” while Apple cross-
`appeals the district court’s holding that the terms “vola-
`tile memory” and “non-volatile memory” are not indefi-
`nite. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
`BACKGROUND
`The ’941 patent, entitled “Method of Restricting Soft-
`ware Operation within a License Limitation,” describes a
`method of preventing unauthorized software use by
`checking whether a software program is operating within
`a license and stopping the program or taking other reme-
`dial action if it is not. The specification states that meth-
`ods for checking license coverage of software were known
`in the art at the time the inventors applied for the ’941
`patent. But some of those methods were vulnerable to
`hacking, the specification observes, while others were
`expensive and inconvenient to distribute. ’941 patent, col.
`1, lines 19-32.
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 2
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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`3
`
`The specification describes a method that it says over-
`comes those problems. In particular, it discloses using the
`memory space associated with the computer’s basic in-
`put/output system (BIOS), rather than other memory
`space, to store appropriately encrypted license infor-
`mation to be used in the verification process. See, e.g., id.,
`col. 1, line 46, through col. 2, line 5; id., col. 4, lines 45-48;
`id., col. 5, lines 19-24. It states that, while the contents of
`the BIOS memory space may be modified, the level of
`programming expertise needed to do so is unusually high,
`and the risk of accidentally damaging the BIOS and
`thereby rendering the computer inoperable “is too high of
`a risk for the ordinary software hacker to pay.” Id., col. 3,
`lines 4-14. Thus, the inventors stated that their method
`makes use of the existing computer hardware (eliminat-
`ing the expense and inconvenience of using additional
`hardware), while storing the verification information in a
`space that is harder and riskier for a hacker to tamper
`with than storage areas used by earlier methods.
`Claim 1, the only independent claim Ancora asserts,
`is representative:
`1. A method of restricting software operation
`within a license for use with a computer including
`an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS
`of the computer, and a volatile memory area; the
`method comprising the steps of:
`selecting a program residing in the volatile
`memory,
`using an agent to set up a verification structure
`in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the
`BIOS, the verification structure accommodat-
`ing data that includes at least one license rec-
`ord,
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 3
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` 4
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
`
`verifying the program using at least the verifi-
`cation structure
`from the erasable non-
`volatile memory of the BIOS, and
`acting on the program according to the verifica-
`tion.
`Id., col. 6, line 59, through col. 7, line 4.
`The parties have not meaningfully disagreed about
`the ordinary meaning of the claim terms at issue on
`appeal: “program,” “volatile memory,” and “non-volatile
`memory.” But Apple has relied on examples in the speci-
`fication, as well as statements by the applicants and the
`examiner during prosecution, to argue that the terms do
`not have those ordinary meanings in this patent. Specifi-
`cally, Apple has argued that the term “program” (which is
`to be verified for authorization under a license) is limited
`to an application program, i.e., one that relies on an
`operating system in order to run, thus excluding an
`operating system itself. Apple also has argued that the
`terms “volatile memory” and “non-volatile memory” are
`indefinite because an example given in the specification is
`irreconcilable with the ordinary meaning of the terms.
`The district court agreed with Apple on the first point
`(finding non-infringement on that basis) but disagreed
`with Apple on the second (rejecting invalidity for indefi-
`niteness on that basis). Both sides appeal. We have
`jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
`DISCUSSION
`Claim construction and indefiniteness are matters of
`law that this court reviews de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS
`Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Praxair,
`Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`A
`Ancora challenges the district court’s conclusion that
`the term “program” is limited to application programs,
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 4
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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`5
`
`thereby excluding operating systems from the class of
`programs that the claimed method checks for authoriza-
`tion under a license. We agree with Ancora. A claim term
`should be given its ordinary meaning in the pertinent
`context, unless the patentee has made clear its adoption
`of a different definition or otherwise disclaimed that
`meaning. See, e.g., Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am.
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). There is no
`reason in this case to depart from the term’s ordinary
`meaning.
`Apple nowhere seriously disputes that the ordinary
`meaning of the word “program” in the computer context
`encompasses both operating systems and the applications
`that run on them (as well as other types of computer
`programs). And the district court explained that, alt-
`hough the term “program” may have many different
`meanings depending on the context, “to a computer pro-
`grammer” a program is merely a “set of instructions” for a
`computer. Ancora, 2012 WL 6738761, at *7. That clear
`meaning governs here, we conclude, because there is
`nothing sufficient to displace it.
`The claims themselves point against a narrowing of
`the term “program” to application programs. Claim 1
`recites a “method of restricting software operation” (if
`license coverage of the software cannot be verified) and
`refers to the restricted software simply as a “program.”
`’941 patent, col. 6, line 59, through col. 7, line 4. In con-
`trast, independent claim 18, which is not asserted here,
`recites a “method for accessing an application software
`program” and then repeatedly refers to the “application
`software program.” Id., col. 8, lines 31-52 (emphases
`added). Although claim 18 is not a dependent claim, and
`claim differentiation as an interpretive principle is often
`of limited importance, the difference in terminology tends
`to reinforce, rather than undermine, adoption of the broad
`ordinary meaning of “program” by itself.
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 5
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`

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` 6
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
`
`Nothing in the specification clearly narrows the term
`“program.” The general disclosure in the specification
`refers to the to-be-verified software as a “software pro-
`gram,” “software,” or a “program,” without limiting the
`subject matter to particular types of programs. See, e.g.,
`id., col. 1, lines 7, 40; id., col. 2, lines 63, 66. The only
`instances in which the specification discusses using the
`claimed invention to verify application programs are
`found in examples that the specification makes clear are
`not limiting. See, e.g., id., col. 1, line 45 (characterizing
`the example at col. 1, line 46, through col. 2, line 59, as “a
`specific non-limiting example”); id., col. 3, line 33 (describ-
`ing a “preferred embodiment”); id., col. 4, line 66 (charac-
`terizing the preferred embodiment described in columns 5
`and 6 as a “non-limiting example only”). Such examples
`are “not sufficient to redefine the term . . . to have any-
`thing other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” IGT v.
`Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
`2011). Thus, nothing in the specification would lead one
`of ordinary skill in the art to understand that the claims
`use “program” in a sense narrower than its ordinary
`meaning.
`The prosecution history requires more extended dis-
`cussion, but it too does not require a meaning that substi-
`tutes for the ordinary one. In reading the prosecution
`history, it is important to keep in mind the distinction
`between a program whose coverage by a license is being
`checked and a piece of software that embodies the pa-
`tent’s claimed method of checking. The term “program” in
`the claims refers exclusively to the to-be-verified program.
`Indeed, neither the specification nor the claims use the
`term “program” to refer to software (a set of instructions)
`that, when run, performs the claimed verification steps,
`instead referring to the invention as a “method,” “system,”
`or, in one instance, a “license verifier application.” See,
`e.g., ’941 patent, col. 1, lines 6-8; id., col. 2, line 14.
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 6
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`

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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
`
`7
`
`The prosecution-history statements that Apple cites
`are focused on the verifying software, not clearly (or in
`any event relevantly) on the to-be-verified program, and
`so cannot support Apple’s narrowing argument. Specifi-
`cally, the applicants distinguished their invention over a
`combination of two references: one disclosed storage in the
`BIOS memory area by the BIOS software itself; the other
`disclosed software implemented in or through an operat-
`ing system. The applicants explained that their invention
`differed from the prior art in that it both operated as an
`application running through an operating system and
`used the BIOS level for data storage and retrieval—a
`combination that was not previously taught and that an
`ordinarily skilled application writer would not employ:
`[T]here is no suggestion or motivation to combine
`Misra and Ewertz in the manner suggested in the
`Office Action. BIOS is a configuration utility.
`Software license management applications, such
`as the one of the present invention, are operating
`system (OS) level programs. . . . [W]hen BIOS is
`running, the computer is in a configuration mode,
`hence OS is not running. Thus, BIOS and OS lev-
`el programs are normally mutually exclusive.
`. . .
`[T]he present invention proceeds against conven-
`tional wisdom in the art. Using BIOS to store ap-
`plication data such as that stored in Misra’s local
`cache for licenses is not obvious. The BIOS area
`is not considered a storage area for computer ap-
`plications. An ordinary skilled artisan would not
`consider the BIOS as a storage medium to pre-
`serve application data for at least two reasons.
`First, . . . [a]n ordinary person skilled in the art
`makes use of OS features to write data to storage
`mediums. There is no OS support whatsoever to
`write data to the system BIOS. Therefore, an or-
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 7
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`

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` 8
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`dinary person skilled in the art would not consider
`the BIOS as a possible storage medium. . . .
`Second, no file system is associated with the
`BIOS. . . . This is further evidence that OS level
`application programmers would not consider the
`BIOS as a storage medium for license data.
`Amendment dated Feb. 5, 2002, at 6-7, in Appl. No.
`09/164,777 (emphasis added).
`The reference to the invention as a “license manage-
`ment application[]” and the identification of persons of
`ordinary skill in the relevant art as “application pro-
`grammers” who “make[] use of OS features” demonstrate
`that the applicants understood that their claimed meth-
`ods would be implemented as application software, rather
`than lower-level system software. But those representa-
`tions, made in distinguishing prior art, concerned soft-
`ware that implemented the invented method. The to-be-
`verified software is different from the verifying software.
`The statements from the prosecution history on which
`Apple relies do not say that the program being verified
`must be an application program. Even the reference to
`“application data” in describing Misra, even if read to
`refer to data about a to-be-verified program (which is not
`clear), does not distinguish Misra, or limit the present
`claims, on that basis.1
`Other prosecution statements cited by Apple no more
`establish the narrowing it urges. Although Apple makes
`much of language about storing “application data” in the
`BIOS area, Amendment dated Feb. 5, 2002, at 7, nothing
`in the applicants’ statements indicates that the “applica-
`
`1 We do not have before us a contention that the
`verification software must be an “application.” We do not
`address whether such a contention matters in this case or
`has been preserved.
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 8
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`

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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
`
`9
`
`tion” in question is the to-be-verified software, as opposed
`to the verifying software; and in any event, the language
`does not rise to the level of a disclaimer regarding nature
`of the to-be-verified software. Likewise, although the
`examiner stated in his reasons for allowance that “the
`closest prior art systems, singly or collectively, do not
`teach licensed programs running at the OS level interact-
`ing with a program verification structure stored in the
`BIOS,” Notice of Allowability dated Feb. 20, 2002, at 4, in
`Appl. No. 09/164,777, that statement is at worst a slip:
`under the claims, it is indisputably the verifying software
`that interacts with the verification structure. In any
`event, the statement is not the applicants’ statement. See
`Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1345
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (remarks in the examiner’s statement of
`reasons for allowance insufficient to limit claim scope).
`And, as quoted above, the applicants were clear that the
`OS-level language referred to the verifying software.
`Nor, finally, did the applicants represent in the prose-
`cution history, or elsewhere, that verification must occur
`before the to-be-verified program is loaded (so that soft-
`ware for performing verification that depended on a
`running operating system could not verify the operating
`system). To the contrary, the first step in claim 1 is
`“selecting a program residing in the volatile memory,”
`’941 patent, col. 6, line 63, and the examiner understood
`that “software would have to be loaded a priori in order to
`reside in volatile memory.” Office Action dated Jan. 15,
`2002, at 3, in Appl. No. 09/164,777 (emphasis added). The
`specification does describe an embodiment in which the
`verifying software is “a priori running in the computer”
`when a to-be-verified program is loaded into memory.
`’941 patent, col. 2, lines 14-15. But that is part of what is
`merely a “non-limiting example” that is “by no means
`binding.” Id., col. 1, line 45; id., col. 2, line 61.
`We conclude that the district court erred in construing
`“program” to mean “a set of instructions for software
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 9
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`applications that can be executed by a computer.” An-
`cora, 2012 WL 6738761, at *10 (emphasis added).
`B
`In its cross-appeal, Apple challenges the district
`court’s rejection of its contention that the claims at issue
`are invalid because the terms “volatile memory” and “non-
`volatile memory” are indefinite. Under what is now 35
`U.S.C. § 112(b), a claim must be “sufficiently definite to
`inform the public of the bounds of the protected invention,
`i.e., what subject matter is covered by the exclusive rights
`of the patent.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I
`LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Supreme
`Court currently is considering how to refine the formula-
`tions for applying the definiteness requirement. See
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., Sup. Ct. No. 13-
`369, cert. granted, 2014 WL 92363 (Jan. 10, 2014). In this
`case, we think that we can reject the indefiniteness chal-
`lenge without awaiting the Court’s clarification. However
`other circumstances may be evaluated, it suffices to reject
`the challenge in this case that the claim language and the
`prosecution history leave no reasonable uncertainty about
`the boundaries of the terms at issue, even considering
`certain aspects of the specification that could engender
`confusion when read in isolation.
`Most importantly, there is no dispute that the terms
`“volatile memory” and “non-volatile memory” have a
`meaning that is clear, settled, and objective in content.
`Both parties and the district court agreed that, as a
`general matter, “[t]o one of ordinary skill in the art, a
`volatile memory is memory whose data is not maintained
`when the power is removed and a non-volatile memory is
`memory whose data is maintained when the power is
`removed.” Ancora, 2012 WL 6738761, at *4. That mean-
`ing leaves the relevant public with a firm understanding
`of the scope of the claim terms, unless something excep-
`tional sufficiently supplants that understanding. Apple
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 10
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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`11
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`argues that the specification does so. We conclude other-
`wise.
`Apple’s argument rests on the fact that, three times,
`the specification uses language referring to a hard disk as
`an example of volatile memory. ’941 patent, col. 1, line
`21; id., col. 3, line 9; id., col. 4, line 53. All sides agree
`that a hard disk maintains data when the power is re-
`moved and for that reason is not normally referred to as
`“volatile memory.” Apple contends that because “a hard
`disk is a quintessential example of non-volatile memory”
`and “the specification does not explain how a hard disk
`can fall into the category of volatile memory . . . or what
`characteristics differentiate volatile from non-volatile
`memory . . . a person of ordinary skill would not know
`what falls within the scope of the claims.” Cross-
`Appellant Br. at 38.
`We are not persuaded that Apple’s conclusion is
`properly drawn from the passages on which it relies. To
`begin with, the terms at issue have so clear an ordinary
`meaning that a skilled artisan would not be looking for
`clarification in the specification. There is no facial ambi-
`guity or obscurity in the claim term. Moreover, the speci-
`fication nowhere purports to set out a definition for
`“volatile” or “non-volatile” memory, and nothing in it
`reads like a disclaimer of the clear ordinary meaning.
`Under our claim-construction law, a clear ordinary mean-
`ing is not properly overcome (and a relevant reader would
`not reasonably think it overcome) by a few passing refer-
`ences that do not amount to a redefinition or disclaimer.
`In this case, moreover, a skilled artisan would appre-
`ciate that the passages at issue have a possible meaning
`that is not (what would be surprising) starkly irreconcila-
`ble with the clear meaning of “volatile” and “non-volatile”
`memory, which are the claim terms. (The claims do not
`mention a hard disk at all, and the only specific example
`of “volatile” memory set out in the claims is Random
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 11
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`Access Memory (RAM), ’941 patent, col. 8, lines 1-2, which
`all agree is “volatile” in the ordinary sense.) As the
`district court observed, it is well known that a computer’s
`hard disk is routinely used as “virtual” memory to provide
`temporary storage when there is insufficient RAM to
`complete an operation, Ancora, 2012 WL 6738761, at *5,
`in which case (it is undisputed) the data become inacces-
`sible through the usual means once power is removed
`(even if the data can still be found on the hard disk by
`more sophisticated means), Cross-Appellant Br. at 50;
`J.A. 1672. This explanation for the otherwise-perplexing
`example of a hard disk as “volatile” memory finds support
`in the specification’s statement that “the volatile memory
`is a RAM e.g. hard disk and/or internal memory of the
`computer.” ’941 patent, col. 4, lines 53-54 (emphasis
`added). Although oddly phrased, the reference to a “hard
`disk” as an example of RAM suggests that the patentee
`meant to refer to the hard disk only in its capacity as
`supplemental memory in conjunction with the main
`RAM—rather than to assert, in a passing and indirect
`manner, a meaning sharply in conflict with clear usage.
`For those reasons, under the demanding standards for
`displacing as clear an ordinary meaning as exists in this
`case, we doubt that an ordinarily skilled artisan could
`have a reasonable uncertainty about the governing scope
`of the claims—even before completing the claim-meaning
`inquiry by examining the prosecution history. And the
`inquiry must, in fact, continue: an ordinarily skilled
`artisan must consult the prosecution history to confirm
`the proper understanding of a claim term’s meaning,
`especially if other aspects of the inquiry raise questions.
`See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358,
`1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prosecution history . . .
`should always be consulted to construe the language of
`the claims.”); Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
`Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The
`public . . . must look to both the patent specification and
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 12
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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`13
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`the prosecution history, especially where there is doubt
`concerning the scope of the claims.”). And here, the
`prosecution history eliminates any reasonable basis for
`thinking that the patent has adopted a meaning different
`from the clear ordinary one.
`During prosecution, the examiner stated, in a June
`22, 2001 office action, that he was “relying on the stand-
`ard definition of ‘non-volatile’ memory as memory that is
`maintained even when the power is removed from the
`storage system” in rejecting the claims as anticipated.
`Office Action dated Jun. 22, 2001, at 3, in Appl. No.
`09/164,777. In the same office action, the examiner
`rejected the claims for indefiniteness because of the
`specification references to a hard disk as volatile. Id. at 5-
`6. The applicants responded by amending the claims to
`restrict the covered non-volatile memory to a memory
`area of the computer BIOS and did not dispute the exam-
`iner’s understanding of “volatile” and “non-volatile”
`memory in their ordinary meaning (for the anticipation
`rejection). Amendment dated Nov. 14, 2001, in Appl. No.
`09/164,777. The examiner was clearly satisfied both as to
`anticipation and as to indefiniteness, even though the
`amended claim still referred to “volatile” memory stand-
`ing alone (and “non-volatile” areas associated with the
`BIOS), because he allowed the amended claims.
`Depending on important details, this kind of sequence
`has sometimes sufficed for inference of a disclaimer of an
`otherwise-clear meaning. See, e.g., Biogen Idec, Inc. v.
`GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
`2013) (disclaimer arose where the applicants “let[] stand
`an examiner’s narrow characterization of a claim term”
`and “adopt[ed] . . . that characterization to overcome the
`examiner’s . . . rejection”). Here the question asked of the
`prosecution history is much more modest: does it confirm
`the clear ordinary meaning by resolving any doubts about
`whether the patentee had displaced that meaning in the
`specification? We think that the natural meaning of the
`
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` ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`prosecution history—including satisfaction as to definite-
`ness upon making an amendment that effectively made
`clear the applicants’ acceptance of the ordinary mean-
`ing—is just that confirmation.
`Apple invokes a portion of Allen Engineering Corp. v.
`Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
`2002), that involved the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
`(formerly § 112, ¶ 2) that the claim must claim what the
`“applicant regards as his invention.” That requirement is
`distinct from the same provision’s requirement that the
`claim be sufficiently clear to be definite. See Allen, 299
`F.3d at 1348; Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d
`1372, 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Knowlton, 481
`F.2d 1357, 1366 n.7 (CCPA 1973). In any event, this case
`is unlike Allen, where the patentee agreed that the claim
`language did not match what he regarded as his inven-
`tion, as the intrinsic record unambiguously showed, and
`this court denied the patentee’s request to reject the claim
`language’s clear, ordinary meaning. Here, Ancora em-
`braces the claim language’s clear, ordinary meaning, and
`for the reasons we have explained, we do not think that
`the specification and prosecution history establish that
`the applicants regarded their invention as something
`contrary to that meaning.
`Accordingly, the district court was correct to reject
`Apple’s challenge to “volatile memory” and “non-volatile
`memory” as indefinite.
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district
`court’s construction of “program” as limited to application
`programs, affirm the court’s conclusion that the terms
`“volatile memory” and “non-volatile memory” are not
`indefinite, and remand.
`No costs.
`
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`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. APPLE, INC.
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`15
`
`AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
`REMANDED
`
`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1010 Page 15