Case 1:21-cv-03468-LTS Document 6 Filed 08/11/21 Page 1 of 5
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`KENT A. ALLEN,
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`Plaintiff,
`-against-
`ANTWAN PATTON (BIG BOI); ANTONIO
`REID (HITCO ENTERTAINMENT); JEFF
`BEZOS (AMAZON),
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`Defendants.
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`1:21-CV-3468 (LTS)
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`ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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`LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
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`Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, asserts claims for alleged appropriation of his ideas for
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`Google and Instagram, and claims based on allegations that he developed numerous internet
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`domain names including Google, Visio, Postmates, Kangaroo, and Amazon. He invokes the
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`diversity of citizenship statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. By
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`order dated July 23, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of
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`fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this
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`action.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is
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`frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
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`relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
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`Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also
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`dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`12(h)(3).
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`Case 1:21-cv-03468-LTS Document 6 Filed 08/11/21 Page 2 of 5
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`While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to
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`construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
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`them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
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`F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in
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`original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –
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`to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the
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`pleader is entitled to relief.
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`The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must
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`include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough
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`factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
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`misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court
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`must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true
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`“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal
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`conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-
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`pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not
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`merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
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`BACKGROUND
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`In three other actions assigned to this Court, Plaintiff Kent A. Allen raised claims similar
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`to those raised here, but named different defendants. See Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 2
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`(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021); Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3457, 2. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021);
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`Allen v. Patton, ECF 1:21-CV-3459, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021). Here, Plaintiff adds “Jeff
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`Bezos (Amazon),” but the complaint alleges no facts regarding Bezos. Other than alleging that
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`2
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`Case 1:21-cv-03468-LTS Document 6 Filed 08/11/21 Page 3 of 5
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`he developed additional domain names, Plaintiff alleges identical facts in all four complaints.
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`The Court therefore assumes familiarity with the complaints in 21-CV-3434, 21-CV-3457, and
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`21-CV-3459 for the purposes of this order.
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`DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Failure to State a Claim
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`The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations that he had the ideas for Instagram and
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`Google, but was not credited or compensated for those ideas as seeking relief for copyright or
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`patent infringement. The Court also construes Plaintiff’s allegations that he was deprived of the
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`ability to profit from registration of various well-known domain names, including the domain
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`names Google, Visio, Postmates, Kangaroo, and Amazon as seeking relief for “cybersquatting.”1
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`The Court dismisses each of these claims for the same reasons it dismissed Plaintiff’s
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`claims in ECF 1:21-CV-3434, 6; ECF 1:21-CV-3457, 6; and ECF 1:21-CV-3459, 6. That is,
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`because Plaintiff does not allege that at any point he created any software or other tangible
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`expression of his ideas or that he holds any copyright, he alleges nothing more than that he had
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`an uncopyrightable idea, and he therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted
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`under the Copyright Act. And because Plaintiff alleges only that he had the idea for something
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`1 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) amends the Trademark Act
`of 1946 to create a federal remedy for cybersquatting – that is, for warehousing and trafficking in
`domain names. The ACPA provides, at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), that:
`A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
`personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard
`to the goods or services of the parties, that person – (i) has a bad faith intent to
`profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark
`under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that – (I) in
`the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
`name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; (II) in the case of a famous
`mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or
`confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; . . . .
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`3
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`Case 1:21-cv-03468-LTS Document 6 Filed 08/11/21 Page 4 of 5
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`like Google or Instagram – not that he actually developed the technology or was issued a patent –
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`Plaintiff fails to state a claim for patent infringement. Finally, because the complaint gives no
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`indication that Plaintiff has a registered trademark for any word, name, slogan, logo, or symbol,
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`that Defendants have infringed any trademark he holds, or that Defendants were involved in
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`preventing Plaintiff from renewing any domain registration, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
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`any Defendant for interfering with his domain registration.
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`B.
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`Frivolousness
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`Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is
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`frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A claim is “frivolous when either: (1) the
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`factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or
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`fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston, 141 F.3d
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`at 437 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to
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`entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011)
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`(finding as frivolous and baseless allegations that set forth a fantastical alternative history of the
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`September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
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`The Court, after reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint, finds that it lacks any arguable basis in
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`law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Plaintiff’s claims that, as an
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`eight or nine-year-old child, he had the ideas for Google and Instagram are baseless, particularly
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`in light of claims Plaintiff has advanced in his other actions. Thus, the Court also dismisses the
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`complaint as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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`In deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court would normally direct Plaintiff to
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`amend his complaint. But the Court finds that the complaint cannot be cured with an amendment.
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`Where an amendment would be futile, leave to amend is not required. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d
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`116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (court may
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`Case 1:21-cv-03468-LTS Document 6 Filed 08/11/21 Page 5 of 5
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`dismiss complaint sua sponte and without providing leave to amend “where the substance of the
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`claim pleaded is frivolous on its face”).
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`C.
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`Litigation History
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`By order dated June 28, 2021, the Court barred Plaintiff from filing future civil actions in
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`this court IFP without first obtaining from the court leave to file. ECF 1:21-CV-3838, 5. The
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`Court issued that filing bar because of Plaintiff’s history of vexatious litigation. ECF 1:21-CV-
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`3838, 4. Because Plaintiff filed this action before the Court issued its filing bar, this action is not
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`subject to it. But the Court reminds Plaintiff that the filing bar remains in effect with respect any
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`future civil actions he files in this court IFP.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for failure to
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`state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
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`Plaintiff has consented to receive electronic service of notices and documents in this
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`action. (ECF 3.)
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`The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
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`not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
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`Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
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`SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: August 11, 2021
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`New York, New York
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`/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
`LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
`Chief United States District Judge
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`5
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