Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`BROADSIGN INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`T-REX PROPERTY, AB,
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`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No.: 1:16-cv-04586 (LTS)
`
`DEFENDANT T-REX PROPERTY, AB’S REPLY TO
`BROADSIGN INTERNATIONAL, LLC’S OPPOSITION
`TO ITS MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
`
`Caryn L. Cross (CC0920)
`FARNEY DANIELS PC
`800 S. Austin Ave., Suite 200
`Georgetown, Texas 78626
`Tel: (512) 582-2828
`Fax: (512) 582-2829
`ccross@farneydaniels.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`T-Rex Property, AB
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 2 of 14
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
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`II. REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
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`III. ARGUMENT........................................................................................................................... 2
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`A.
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`T-Rex and BroadSign Are Not Engaged In An Actual, Direct Dispute ................. 2
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`1.
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`2.
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`The parties communications have not established adverse interests .......... 2
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`BroadSign’s authority is easily distinguishable .......................................... 4
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`B.
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`T-Rex’s Suits Against BroadSign’s Customers Does Not Establish An Actual
`Controversy Between T-Rex and BroadSign .......................................................... 6
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`1.
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`2.
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`BroadSign Has Not Pleaded An Obligation To Indemnify Its Customers . 6
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`BroadSign Does Not Adequately Plead Allegations of Indirect
`Infringement ................................................................................................ 8
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`C.
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`BroadSign Should Not Be Allowed To Amend Its Complaint ............................. 10
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`IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 10
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`ii
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 3 of 14
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
`689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................5
`
`Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Jordache,
`143 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ...............................................................................................8
`
`MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`549 U.S. 118 (2007) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc.,
`441 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................7, 8
`
`Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc.,
`518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................................5
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc.,
`755 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................4, 6, 7
`
`Ours Technology, Inc. v. Data Drive Thru, Inc.,
`645 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Cal. 2009) .......................................................................................8
`
`Proofpoint, Inc. v. InNova Patent Licensing, LLC,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120343 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011) ....................................................7, 8
`
`SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,
`480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd.,
`497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Statutes
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`Uniform Commercial Code..........................................................................................................7, 8
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`Other Authorities
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) .............................................................................................................1, 10
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`
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`iii
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 4 of 14
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`Declaratory Judgment Defendant T-Rex Property, AB hereby submits this reply
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`memorandum of law in support of its Motion to Dismiss BroadSign International, LLC’s
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`Amended Complaint (D.I. 10) For Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 12(b)(1). A declaration of T-Rex’s CEO, Mats Hylin, accompanies this memorandum.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`BroadSign’s opposition confirms that BroadSign is not entitled to the declaratory
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`judgment relief it seeks. Rather, BroadSign’s opposition is, first, based on a misstatement of a
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`number of facts, and second, fails to establish the requisite case or controversy required to
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`support a declaratory judgment action. Once the misstated facts are clarified and put in the
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`proper context, it becomes clear that the parties are not engaged in an actual, direct dispute.
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`Moreover, BroadSign’s remaining arguments—that BroadSign’s customers have requested
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`indemnification, and that BroadSign is subject to a claim of indirect infringement because other
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`suppliers have been sued for direct infringement—are insufficient to support an action for
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`declaratory judgment. Because none of BroadSign’s arguments have merit, or dispel T-Rex’s
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`showing that the requirements for a declaratory judgment action have not been satisfied, T-Rex’s
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`motion to dismiss should be granted.
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`II.
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`REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`BroadSign’s opposition contains a number of factual misstatements concerning the
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`communications that took place between BroadSign and T-Rex. In particular, T-Rex did not send
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`a draft license agreement to BroadSign “without any prior discussion or warning.” BroadSign’s
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`Opp. at 5. Nor did T-Rex “insist[] that BroadSign take a license to the patents-in-suit in order to
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`protect BroadSign and its customers from future lawsuits.” Id.
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`Rather, the parties had a number of communications concerning potential business
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`arrangements, entirely and exclusively at BroadSign’s initiative, which ultimately lead to
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 5 of 14
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`BroadSign’s request to see a sample licensing agreement from T-Rex. Hylin Decl. at ¶¶ 6-15. At
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`no time during those communications, however, did T-Rex insist that BroadSign take a license to
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`the patents-in-suit, threaten litigation against BroadSign, or demand payment from BroadSign.
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`Hylin Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 15.
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`T-Rex and BroadSign Are Not Engaged In An Actual, Direct Dispute.
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`BroadSign attempts to argue that BroadSign and T-Rex have “an actual and substantial
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`controversy sufficient to give BroadSign the right to seek a declaratory judgment.” Opp. Br. at 7.
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`BroadSign’s arguments, however, are based on misstatements of fact. When those misstatements
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`are corrected, it becomes clear that there is no actual or substantial controversy between
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`BroadSign and T-Rex.
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`1.
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`The parties’ communications have not established adverse interests.
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`BroadSign argues that BroadSign and T-Rex “have had ongoing communications that
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`establish their adverse interests.” Opp. Br. at 8. BroadSign attempts to support this argument by
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`alleging that T-Rex threated enforcement of the patents-in-suit, demanded that BroadSign take a
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`license, and continued to attack BroadSign’s customers. Id. BroadSign’s arguments, however,
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`which are either untrue or taken out of context, are not sufficient to entitle BroadSign to seek a
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`declaratory judgment.
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`First, T-Rex never threatened enforcement of the patents-in-suit against BroadSign. As
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`BroadSign admits, BroadSign and T-Rex discussed the patents-in-suit during the past year
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`because of BroadSign’s actions, not T-Rex’s actions. In particular, BroadSign contacted T-Rex
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`in June 2016 to request a meeting to discuss a “potential business agreement.” Declaration of
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`Sandra Beauchesne in Opposition to Defendant T-Rex Property AB’s Motion to Dismiss The
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`Amended Complaint (“Beauchesne Decl.”) at ¶ 15. After BroadSign’s initial contact, the parties
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`2
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 6 of 14
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`met on two occasions (in person and via Skype) and engaged in email communications during
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`which many items were discussed including, inter alia, the history and development of T-Rex
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`and BroadSign, and various areas where the two companies could benefit one another. Hylin
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`Decl. at ¶¶ 6-15. Additionally, the parties discussed the patents-in-suit, including the fact that
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`BroadSign only provided the software used in BroadSign’s clients’ digital signage network (a
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`fact BroadSign now appears to dispute), and that BroadSign alleged it had prior art that could
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`invalidate T-Rex’s patents. Id. Never once during those meetings, or in the exchanged email
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`correspondence, did T-Rex accuse BroadSign’s products of infringing the patents-in-suit, or
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`threaten to bring a law suit against BroadSign. Id. at ¶ 2. Rather, it was BroadSign that was doing
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`the threatening, informing T-Rex that the parties had to reach an agreement or risk facing
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`BroadSign in court.1 Id. at ¶ 10.
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`Second, T-Rex never demanded that BroadSign take a license to the patents-in-suit. Id. at
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`¶ 2. Rather, pursuant to an agenda sent by BroadSign, BroadSign and T-Rex discussed, among
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`other business arrangements, the possibility of entering a license agreement for the patents-in-
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`suit during their July 5, 2016 Skype meeting.2 Id. at ¶ 12. During that discussion (despite her
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`assertions to the contrary), Ms. Beauchesne specifically requested to see a copy of T-Rex’s
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`envisioned licensing agreement, and that is why T-Rex provided a copy of a draft licensing
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`agreement to BroadSign. Id. at ¶ 13. It was neither intended as a demand for BroadSign to take a
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`1 BroadSign also contends—in the form of attorney argument without evidentiary support—that
`because T-Rex has failed to provide BroadSign with a covenant not to sue, or other assurances,
`this supports jurisdiction. BroadSign, however, never asked T-Rex for a covenant not to sue.
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`2 BroadSign’s statement that it “did not request a license or indicate that it wanted to enter into
`such an arrangement with T-Rex” (Opp. Br. at 9) is belied by the agenda that BroadSign sent to
`T-Rex for the parties’ second meeting, which included, inter alia, “aspects for potential
`agreement to be discussed: type (license . . . ), transferability to BroadSign’s clients, patents
`included, duration . . . .” Hylin Decl. at ¶ 12.
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`3
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 7 of 14
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`license, nor even as a request for BroadSign to take a license. Notably, T-Rex did not propose
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`any payment by BroadSign in the licensing agreement, and specifically welcomed feedback by
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`BroadSign. Id.
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`Third, while T-Rex did sue a client of BroadSign shortly after the parties started their
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`discussions concerning a potential business arrangement, this was before it was clear to T-Rex
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`that the parties were focused on the patents-in-suit for the potential business arrangement, and
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`before BroadSign requested, and T-Rex agreed, that T-Rex would not sue any additional clients
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`of BroadSign while the parties were discussing a potential business arrangement. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.
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`Notably, T-Rex informed BroadSign of the lawsuit immediately after it had been filed, and
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`BroadSign still continued to meet with T-Rex to discuss potential business arrangements even
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`after being informed that the lawsuit against BroadSign’s client had been filed. Id. Moreover,
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`even if T-Rex had continued to bring suits against BroadSign’s customers (which it has not), this
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`does not support jurisdiction for BroadSign. See Microsoft, 755 F.3d at 906-07 (finding no
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`jurisdiction where the patentee’s litigation strategy appears to involve suing software users, not
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`software suppliers.”).
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`2.
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`BroadSign’s authority is easily distinguishable.
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`BroadSign relies on a number of cases to support its argument that the communications
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`between T-Rex and BroadSign are sufficient to allow BroadSign to proceed with its declaratory
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`judgment; however, these cases are easily distinguishable. As an initial matter, none of these
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`cases involves a supplier, such as BroadSign, bringing a suit for declaratory judgment because its
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`customers have been sued by the patentee—which essentially is what this case is all about,
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`despite BroadSign’s assertions to the contrary. More importantly, in each of the cases relied on
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`by BroadSign, the patentee had taken specific actions to enforce the patents against the
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`declaratory judgment plaintiffs, including, inter alia, demanding royalties and licensing fees,
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 8 of 14
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`providing infringement charts, sending threatening letters, and suing similarly situated
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`companies. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689
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`F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that patentee “demanded a royalty under its patents”
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`against declaratory judgment plaintiff); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d
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`1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding an actual controversy where the patentee “sought a right to
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`a royalty under its patents based on specific, identified activity by [the declaratory judgment
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`plaintiff] . . . presented [the declaratory judgment plaintiff] with a detailed presentation which
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`identified, on an element-by-element basis, the manner in which . . . the products infringed . . .
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`[and] liberally referred to . . . the need . . . to license those patents.”); Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
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`Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding an actual
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`controversy where the parties had taken adverse legal positions concerning whether the
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`declaratory judgment plaintiff needed to pay royalties for past and future infringement); Micron
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`Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding an actual
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`controversy where patentee sent threatening letters to declaratory judgment plaintiff, sued
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`similarly situated manufacturers, and made public statements confirming its intent to continue an
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`aggressive litigation strategy against similarly situated manufacturers). None of these factors
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`apply here as T-Rex has not taken any action to enforce the patents-in-suit against BroadSign. As
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`discussed above, T-Rex has not threatened BroadSign with litigation and has not demanded that
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`BroadSign enter a license agreement concerning the patents-in-suit. Id. at ¶ 2. Nor has T-Rex
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`asserted the patents-in-suit against any supplier similarly situated to BroadSign. Beauchesne
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`Decl. at ¶¶ 14, 20 and Exhs. K, L, M.
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`5
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 9 of 14
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`B.
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`T-Rex’s Suits Against BroadSign’s Customers Do Not Establish An Actual
`Controversy Between T-Rex and BroadSign.
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`Having failed to establish a direct dispute between it and T-Rex, BroadSign attempts to
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`rely on T-Rex’s patent infringement suits against BroadSign’s customers to establish subject
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`matter jurisdiction. BroadSign’s attempts, however, come up far short.
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`1.
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`BroadSign Has Not Pleaded An Obligation To Indemnify Its
`Customers.
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`Only if a supplier has “an obligation to indemnify their customers, then they would have
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`standing to bring suit.” Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`Critically, BroadSign has not conceded that it has an obligation to indemnify its customers.
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`Rather, BroadSign argues that its customers “have . . . demanded indemnification from
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`BroadSign.” Opp. at 10; see also Beauchesne Decl. Exh. D (“We write to inquire whether
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`BroadSign intends to indemnify HMN in the T-Rex matter pursuant to the license agreement
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`between BroadSign and HMN.”); Exh. I (“JCDecaux hereby provides notice that it seeks
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`indemnification from BroadSign”); and Exh. J (providing “notice of a potential obligation to
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`indemnify.”) (emphasis added). As the caselaw makes clear, a customer’s request for
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`indemnification by itself does not create standing and therefore does not provide a basis for
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`jurisdiction over BroadSign’s declaratory judgment action. Microsoft, 755 F.3d at 904.
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`BroadSign’s attempt to distinguish Microsoft Corp. v. Datatern, Inc. falls flat. While the
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`Court in Microsoft acknowledged that the declaratory judgment plaintiff denied an obligation to
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`indemnify its customers, it is clear that the Court was not relying solely on that reason to deny
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`standing. Id. at 903-05. As the Court explained, it is not a customer’s demand for
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`indemnification that would provide the key to a supplier’s standing in such a case, but instead the
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 10 of 14
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`“merit of the customer request” and whether such a request was “valid.”3 Id. at 904. Here,
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`BroadSign has made no attempt to address the merits or validity of its customers’ requests for
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`indemnification.4 Accordingly, indemnification cannot be a basis for jurisdiction.
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`BroadSign, recognizing the conundrum of not being able to rely on its customer’s
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`requests for indemnification to support jurisdiction and not wanting to concede that it must
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`indemnify its customers, attempts to argue that, when coupled with its other arguments, its
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`deficient indemnification allegations support jurisdiction. Opp. at 10. No support exists for such
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`a proposition (nor does BroadSign attempt to cite any).
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`BroadSign’s argument that it has declaratory judgment standing because it is at risk of
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`being held liable to its customers for indemnification under the Uniform Commercial Code (Opp.
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`3 See also Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 441 F.3d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`(finding no subject matter jurisdiction via an indemnity theory and noting that the declaratory
`judgment plaintiff had not “produced any agreement indemnifying a customer against
`infringement of the patents-in-suit”); Proofpoint, Inc. v. InNova Patent Licensing, LLC, No.
`5:11-CV-02288-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120343, 2011 WL 4915847, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
`17, 2011) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction based merely on a declaratory judgment
`plaintiff’s allegations that it received indemnity requests from its customers, where the plaintiff
`had not “alleged the existence of a valid agreement nor described its supposed obligations”);
`Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys., LLC, Civil Action No. 14-377-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`17176 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (finding that declaratory judgment plaintiff had not demonstrated
`the existence of an actual controversy based on an indemnity theory where the declaratory
`plaintiff was careful not to commit to admitting whether it is obligated to indemnify its
`customers and its allegations showed that it “could be just as compatible with a future effort by
`[the declaratory judgment plaintiff] to deny any indemnity obligation as [it] would be with an
`acknowledgment that one exists.”).
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`4 Even if BroadSign had an obligation to indemnify one of its customers still involved in
`litigation with T-Rex, the proper procedure would be for BroadSign to participate in the
`litigation in the court in which the action is proceeding—not to seek a declaratory judgment
`action in a separate district. See Microsoft, 755 F.3d at 904 (“Importantly, even if there were
`such an obligation—to indemnify a customer already sued by the patentee in Texas—it would
`not justify what Appellees seek here. A case has already been filed against these customers in the
`Eastern District of Texas. Appellees cannot seek a declaration from a New York court on behalf
`of customers they must indemnify where a suit against these very same customers on all the
`same issues was already underway in a Texas court.”).
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`7
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 11 of 14
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`at 11) is equally unavailing. BroadSign makes no attempt to explain how or why the Uniform
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`Commercial Code would provide the clear legal obligation to indemnify customers required to
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`find that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Proofpoint, Inc. v. Innova Patent Licensing,
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`LLC, Case No. 5:11-CV-02288-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120343, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17,
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`2011) (declining to find an actual controversy where plaintiff “has not alleged the existence of a
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`valid agreement nor described its supposed obligations,” but has only indicated that the
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`prosecution activities have “spawned indemnity ‘requests’”); Microchip Tech. Inc. v.
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`Chamberlain Group, Inc., 441 F.3d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Microchip has not produced any
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`agreement indemnifying a customer against infringement of the patents-in-suit.”); Ours
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`Technology, Inc. v. Data Drive Thru, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (declining
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`to find an actual controversy where “the court has been provided with no agreement or other
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`written document evidencing a legal basis for the [customers] to have been indemnified by OTI”
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`and thus the fact that OTI agreed to indemnify them “fails to carry any weight, let alone enough
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`weight to create an adverse legal interest”). Moreover, the case law relied by BroadSign, Golden
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`Trade, S.r.L. v. Jordache, 143 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) does not require a different result.
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`The issue discussed in Golden Trade is whether a party should be allowed to amend its claims.
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`BroadSign, however, makes no attempt to explain how the reasoning applied in deciding whether
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`or not to grant leave to amend a party’s claims is applicable to the analysis of whether or not a
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`declaratory judgment plaintiff has standing to sue in the first instance.
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`2.
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`BroadSign Does Not Adequately Plead Allegations of Indirect
`Infringement.
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`After refusing to concede that it has an obligation to indemnify its customers, BroadSign
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`attempts to argue that it is subject to a claim of indirect infringement by T-Rex because other
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`alleged suppliers have been accused of infringement by T-Rex. BroadSign argues that since T-
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`8
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 12 of 14
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`Rex has sued other alleged suppliers, BroadSign, as a supplier, is subject to infringement claims
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`by T-Rex. Opp. Br. at 11. The alleged suppliers identified by BroadSign, however, were sued
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`solely for direct infringement, not indirect infringement, and it is T-Rex’s current understanding
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`that BroadSign is not a direct infringer. See, e.g., Declaration of Beauchesne at ¶ 2 (“BroadSign
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`supplies hardware and software solutions to its customers, which are considered the end users of
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`these products, including operators of networks of digital displays.”) Accordingly, BroadSign’s
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`reference to the other alleged suppliers falls flat.
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`BroadSign goes on to explain that “the Federal Circuit has held that declaratory judgment
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`jurisdiction resulting from a potential claim of indirect infringement does not require that a
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`patent holder make specific accusations against either the potential direct infringers or indirect
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`infringers.” Opp. Br. at 11. While true, this is inapplicable as T-Rex has never made any
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`accusations, direct or otherwise, against BroadSign. The only reason that T-Rex and BroadSign
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`were engaged in discussions at all was because BroadSign contacted T-Rex out of the blue and
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`requested that the parties meet to discuss a potential business arrangement. Hylin Decl. at ¶ 6.
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`BroadSign’s representatives then took it upon themselves to visit T-Rex in Sweden.
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`The caselaw that BroadSign relies on for this argument is easily distinguishable. In
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`Arkema Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., the parties had a history of litigation against one another
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`regarding the patents and technology at issue. See 706 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This is
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`not the case here. BroadSign and T-Rex have no history of litigation against one another
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`regarding similar patents or technology.
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`Likewise, in ABB Insurance v. Cooper Industries, LLC, the defendant-patentee engaged
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`in threatening activities against the declaratory judgment plaintiff including sending a letter to
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`the plaintiff stating that it would “act vigorously to protect its rights.” 635 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed.
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`9
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 13 of 14
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`Cir. 2011). Again, this circumstance does not apply here as T-Rex has never threatened
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`BroadSign with litigation, by letter or otherwise. In fact, and as discussed above, the only reason
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`that T-Rex began communicating with BroadSign was because BroadSign specifically requested
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`a meeting with T-Rex. Hylin Decl. at ¶ 6.
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`C.
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`BroadSign Should Not Be Allowed To Amend Its Complaint.
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`In a last ditch attempt to save its Complaint, BroadSign argues that the Court should grant
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`BroadSign leave to amend the Complaint to address any deficiencies identified by the Court,
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`rather than granting T-Rex’s motion to dismiss. However, as discussed in detail above, there
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`exists no set of different or additional facts that would allow BroadSign to “show that there is a
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`substantial controversy, between the parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
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`immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
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`Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). Accordingly, BroadSign’s request should be denied.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`BroadSign has failed to establish a case or controversy between BroadSign and T-Rex,
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`and BroadSign’s Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
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`Dated: February 13, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Caryn L. Cross
`Caryn L. Cross (CC0920)
`FARNEY DANIELS PC
`800 S. Austin Ave., Suite 200
`Georgetown, Texas 78626
`Tel: (512) 582-2828
`Fax: (512) 582-2829
`ccross@farneydaniels.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`T-Rex Property, AB
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`Case 1:16-cv-04586-LTS Document 26 Filed 02/13/17 Page 14 of 14
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on February 13, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing filing with
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`the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing via
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`electronic mail to all counsel of record.
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`/s/ Caryn L. Cross
`Caryn L. Cross
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`11
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