Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 1 of 26
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`Plaintiff,
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`_______________________________________
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`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
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`Defendant.
`_______________________________________)
`
`
`v.
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`FITBIT LLC,
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`
`Civil Action No.
`19-11586-FDS
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`
`
`SAYLOR, C.J.
`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
`CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`This is an action for patent infringement. Plaintiff Philips North America LLC has sued
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`defendant Fitbit LLC, asserting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 271 for infringement of three patents of
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`which Philips is the owner and assignee. The patents at issue concern technology related to
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`connected-health products, such as wearable fitness trackers. The scope of the case has been
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`narrowed to Claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 of Patent 8,277,377 (“the ’377 patent”).1
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`The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. Philips has moved for partial
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`summary judgment of direct infringement by Fitbit’s customers and on the ground that the patent
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`is not rendered obvious based on prior art. Fitbit has moved for summary judgment of
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`noninfringement, invalidity, and lack of joint or induced infringement. The parties have also
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`1 In addition to the ’377 patent, this case originally concerned infringement of three other patents owned by
`Philips: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,013,007 (“the ’007 patent”); 7,088,233 (“the ’233 patent”); and 6,976,958 (“the ’958
`patent”). Philips has since withdrawn its allegations of infringement of the ’958 patent. The Court’s claim-
`construction order rendered invalid all asserted claims of the ’007 patent. And proceedings related to the ’233 patent
`are stayed pending any appeal of the PTAB decision. Therefore, only the ’377 patent is currently at issue.
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 2 of 26
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`filed several motions to strike. For the following reasons, Fitbit’s motion for summary judgment
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`of invalidity will be granted, and the remaining motions for summary judgment and motions to
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`strike will be denied as moot.
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`I.
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`Background
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`The following facts are undisputed except as otherwise noted.
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`A.
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`Factual Background
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`1.
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`The Parties
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`Philips North America LLC is the owner of several patents concerning connected-health
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`technologies. (’377 patent). Fitbit LLC develops, manufactures, and sells connected-health
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`products.
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`2.
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`The ’377 Patent
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`The ’377 patent is titled “Method and Apparatus for Monitoring Exercise with Wireless
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`Internet Connectivity.” (’377 patent at Title). It concerns “monitoring of living subjects.” (Id.
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`col. 1 ll. 35-36). More particularly, it concerns “health-monitoring of persons where measured or
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`input health data is communicated by a wireless device to and from a software application
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`running on an internet-connected server and where the same may be studied and processed by
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`the software application, a health professional, or the subject.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 36-41).
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`The patent provides for a “method and apparatus . . . for wireless monitoring of exercise,
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`fitness, or nutrition by connecting a web-enabled wireless phone to a device which provides
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`exercise-related information, including physiological data and data indicating an amount of
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`exercise performed.” (Id. at Abstract). It further provides that “[a]n application for receiving the
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`exercise-related information and providing a user interface may be downloaded to the web-
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`enabled wireless phone from an internet server” and that “[t]he exercise-related information may
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`be transmitted to an internet server, and the server may calculate and return a response.” (Id.).
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 3 of 26
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`The patent identifies two “complementary” systems that embody the invention. (Id. col.
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`2 l. 64). The first embodiment “may be employed to manage the disease state or condition of a
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`patient” by “employ[ing] a health monitoring device.” (Id. col. 2 ll. 66-67; id. col. 3 ll. 1-2).
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`That device would provide data by a wireless connection “for processing via the internet[,]
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`including a review by a physician or other health care professional if required.” (Id. col. 3 ll. 3-
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`5). For example, a diabetic could connect a blood-glucose monitor to a wireless web device,
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`download data to a diabetes-management company’s server, and receive guidance concerning his
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`next meal. (Id. col. 3 ll. 14-20).
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`The second embodiment enables implementation of a “health or lifestyle management
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`plan” by allowing “[v]arious health parameters, such as those relating to nutrition or exercise,
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`[to] be entered into a health monitoring device” and to be wirelessly communicated to a server.
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 6-11). In this embodiment, “the system may be employed to monitor the
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`physiologic status of a healthy subject while eating, exercising, or performing other activities.”
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 33-36). For example, an individual following an exercise program could attach a
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`wireless web device to an exercise machine, send data from that machine over the Internet to the
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`server of a health and fitness company, and receive personalized responses from that company.
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 21-27).
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`The claimed priority date for the ’377 patent is December 17, 1999.
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`As the litigation has progressed, the claims have narrowed to encompass only Claims 1,
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`4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 of the ’377 patent. The parties agree that Claim 1 is a method claim and the
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`only remaining independent claim in this case. (Id. col. 13). Claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are
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`method claims that depend, directly or indirectly, on Claim 1. (Id. cols. 13-14). Claim 1 is as
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`follows:
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 4 of 26
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`1. A method for interactive exercise monitoring, the method comprising the steps
`of:
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`a. downloading an application to a web-enabled wireless phone directly
`from a remote server over the internet;
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`b. coupling the a [sic] web-enabled wireless phone to a device which
`provides exercise-related information;
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`c. rendering a user interface on the web-enabled wireless phone;
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`d. using the application, receiving data indicating a physiologic status of a
`subject;
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`e. using the application, receiving data indicating an amount of exercise
`performed by the subject;
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`f. wherein at least one of the data indicating a physiologic status of a
`subject or the data indicating an amount of exercise performed by the
`subject is received from the device which provides exercise-related
`information, and wherein the data indicating a physiologic status of a
`subject is received at least partially while the subject is exercising;
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`g. sending the exercise-related information to an internet server via a
`wireless network;
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`h. receiving a calculated response from the server, the response associated
`with a calculation performed by the server based on the exercise-related
`information; and
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`i. using the application, displaying the response.
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`(Id. col. 13 ll. 23-47).
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`
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`In its claim-construction order, the Court ruled that the phrase “indicating a physiologic
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`status of a subject” would be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. (Order at
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`34).
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`3.
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`The Accused Products
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`The accused products are the Fitbit Alta HR, Blaze, Charge 2, Charge 3, Inspire HR,
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 5 of 26
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`Ionic, Versa, Versa 2, and Versa Lite.2
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`B.
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`Procedural Background
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`On July 22, 2019, Philips filed this action against Fitbit. The second amended complaint
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`asserts three counts of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, involving the ’007 patent
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`(Count 1); the ’233 patent (Count 2); and the ’377 patent (Count 3).
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`On July 22, 2021, the Court issued its memorandum and order on claim construction. In
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`that decision, it concluded, among other things, that a means-plus-function claim term in the
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`’007 patent—“means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of time-
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`stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver”—is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack
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`of corresponding structure for the claimed function.
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`Fitbit moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
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`granted. On August 10, 2021, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. On August 24, 2021,
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`Fitbit filed its answer and asserted six counterclaims, seeking declaratory judgments of invalidity
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`and non-infringement.
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`Philips and Fitbit have now cross-moved for summary judgment. Philips has moved for
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`partial summary judgment of direct infringement by Fitbit’s customers and a finding that the
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`patent is not rendered obvious based on prior art. Fitbit has moved for summary judgment of
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`noninfringement, invalidity, and lack of joint or induced infringement.
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`The parties have also filed various motions to strike relating to the motions for summary
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`judgment. Philips has moved to strike portions of the expert report of Dr. Joseph A. Paradiso
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`and Fitbit’s expert rebuttal reports. It has also moved to preclude the testimony of Dr. Paradiso
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`2 The Court denied Philips’s motion for leave to file supplemental infringement contentions to cover four
`new products: the Charge 4, Versa 3, Inspire 2, and Sense.
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`5
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 6 of 26
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`on Daubert grounds. Fitbit has moved to strike portions of the expert reports of Dr. Tom Martin
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`and Dr. Michael P. Akemann.
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`II.
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`Standard of Review
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`The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
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`to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822
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`(1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). Summary
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`judgment shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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`movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue is
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`“one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the
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`nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.”
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`Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). In
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`evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must indulge all reasonable inferences in
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`favor of the nonmoving party. See O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).
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`When “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set
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`forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
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`Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party may
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`not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,” but instead must “present
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`affirmative evidence.” Id. at 256-57.
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`Because “[a] patent shall be presumed valid,” 35 U.S.C. § 282, a defendant arguing
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`invalidity must prove that defense by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
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`Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011). This heightened burden applies even at the summary
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`judgment stage. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254 (“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
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`the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
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`burden.”). The Federal Circuit has indicated that this presumption applies with full force when
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 7 of 26
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`the invalidity challenge is brought under the “abstract ideas” exception to § 101. Cellspin Soft,
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`Inc. v. Fitbit Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This presumption reflects the fact that
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`the Patent and Trademark Office has already examined whether the patent satisfies ‘the
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`prerequisites for issuance of a patent,’ including § 101.”) (quoting Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at
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`95-96).
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`III. Analysis
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`A.
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`Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`As noted, Fitbit has moved for summary judgment on the issue of invalidity under 35
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`U.S.C. § 101.
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`An invention is generally patentable if it qualifies as a “new and useful process, machine,
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`manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, “this provision contains an
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`important implicit exception. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
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`patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (citing
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`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). In applying that exception, a court “must
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`distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that
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`integrate the building blocks into something more.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
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`U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`The framework for making that distinction involves a two-step process. At step one, the
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`court determines “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible
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`concepts” that is so abstract as to “risk disproportionately tying up the use of [] underlying
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`ideas.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). If step one is answered
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`affirmatively, the court continues to step two. At step two, the court looks for an “inventive
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`concept,” namely “an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the
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`patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.”
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`7
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`Id. at 217-18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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`1.
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`Representative Claim
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`As an initial matter, the Court must determine which claims of the ’377 patent should be
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`analyzed in order to resolve the pending motion. The remaining claims at issue are Claims 1, 4,
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`5, 6, 9, and 12, and Fitbit contends that each asserted claim is invalid under § 101. “Courts may
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`treat a claim as representative in certain situations, such as if the patentee does not present any
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`meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not found in the
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`representative claim or if the parties agree to treat a claim as representative.” Berkheimer v. HP
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`Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
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`F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307,
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`1316 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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`The parties have not agreed to treat any particular claim as representative, although Fitbit
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`asks the Court to analyze Claim 1. (Def. Invalid. Mem. at 1 n.2). Philips has not presented any
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`argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations other than those included in
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`Claim 1. Accordingly, the Court will assume that Claim 1 is representative.
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`2.
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`Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept
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`The Court must first determine if the claims in question are “directed to” a patent-
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`ineligible abstract idea.3 Fitbit contends that the ’377 patent is directed to the abstract idea of
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`collecting and analyzing exercise-related data and presenting that data to a user.
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`Because “[a]t some level, all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws
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`of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotation marks
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`3 For the sake of simplicity, the Court will use the term “abstract idea” to describe non-patentable subject
`matter, although the label is imprecise and the prohibition also extends to matters such as “laws of nature” and
`“natural phenomena.” See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 9 of 26
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`and citation omitted), “it is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying
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`the claim; [the court] must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is
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`directed to.” Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In pursuing that inquiry, “the claims are
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`considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded
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`subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015). Although “the specification may . . . be useful in illuminating whether the claims are
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`‘directed to’ the identified abstract idea . . . any reliance on the specification in the § 101 analysis
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`must always yield to the claim language.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d
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`759, 767-69 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
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`Delineating the bounds of the “abstract ideas” category has proved somewhat elusive. At
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`one end of the spectrum, the case law makes clear that algorithms and mathematical formulas
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`expressing “fundamental truths” are squarely within the realm of unpatentable abstract ideas.
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`See Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972); Parker v.
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`Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)). However, abstract ideas are not limited to “preexisting,
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`fundamental truths that exist in principle apart from any human action.” Id. at 220 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). A patent merely covering an application of an otherwise general
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`practice, even a complex practice, may be directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Bilski v.
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`Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (holding that “[t]he concept of hedging [financial
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`transactions]” was a patent-ineligible “abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson
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`and Flook”).
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`No clear boundaries have been drawn around the category of ineligible abstract ideas. In
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`fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the creation of categorical rules for determining patent-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 10 of 26
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`ineligible subject matter. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609 (refusing to conclude that business-process
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`claims at issue were categorically unpatentable). Instead, courts “have found it sufficient to
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`compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in
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`previous cases.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also
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`Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“[W]e need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract
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`ideas’ category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction
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`between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue
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`here. Both are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.”). Claim
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`1 of the ‘377 patent must therefore be placed in context within the case law.
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`The decision in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016) is analogous. There, the court explained that claims reciting concepts of “collecting,”
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`“analyzing,” and “presenting” data—either individually or collectively—“fall into a familiar
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`class of claims” directed to patent-ineligible concepts:
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`Information as such is an intangible. Accordingly, we have treated collecting
`information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change
`its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas. In a similar
`vein, we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their
`minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
`processes within the abstract-idea category. And we have recognized that merely
`presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
`information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation),
`is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.
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`Id. at 1353-54 (internal citations omitted; emphases added).
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`The claims at issue in Electric Power recited receiving, analyzing, and displaying power-
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`grid data. See id. at 1351-52. The court found that they were directed to an abstract idea because
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`“[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a
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`specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive
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`technology for performing those functions.” Id. at 1354. They “focused on the combination of
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`those abstract-idea processes,” which rendered the claims directed to patent-ineligible concepts.
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`Id.
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`The same can be said about Claim 1 of the ’377 patent. It recites a series of steps
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`comprising gathering data (by “downloading” an application to a wireless phone, “coupling” that
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`phone to a device that provides exercise-related data, and “receiving” data concerning the
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`physiologic status of the subject and the amount of exercise performed by the subject); analyzing
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`that data (by wirelessly “sending” the exercise-related data to a server and “receiving” a response
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`from the server that is calculated based on that data); and showing the results (by “displaying”
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`the response from the server). (’377 patent col. 13 ll. 25-47). In other words, it recites nothing
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`more than the collection, analysis, and presentation of information, which have been found—
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`individually and collectively—to be abstract concepts. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353-54
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`(collecting cases). It does not recite “inventive technology for performing those functions.” Id.
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`at 1354.
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`Accordingly, the Court finds that Claim 1 of the ’377 patent is directed to the abstract
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`concept of collecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information.
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`3.
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`Step Two: Inventive Concept
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`Having concluded that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, the asserted claim must be
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`examined for a sufficiently “inventive concept” to “transform” the abstract idea into a “patent-
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`eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
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`That examination requires the court to “consider the elements of each claim both
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`individually and as an ordered combination.” Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks and citation
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`omitted). The inquiry searches for “an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to
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`ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
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`concept] itself.” Id. at 217-18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “An inventive
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`concept reflects something more than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-understood,
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`routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Cellspin, 927 F.3d at
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`1316 (quoting Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018)). “The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
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`understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of
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`fact.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. Ultimately, “whether a claim recites patent eligible subject
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`matter is a question of law which may contain underlying facts.” Id.
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`Philips contends that Fitbit has not shown that the ordered combination of elements in
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`Claim 1 of the ’377 patent was well-understood, routine, and conventional at the time of the
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`invention. According to Philips (and its expert, Dr. Martin), Claim 1 includes two inventive
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`concepts: (1) performing computations utilizing a back-end server to remove location-based
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`restraints, and (2) monitoring exercise with an application downloaded to a web-enabled wireless
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`phone. (Martin Report at 165).
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`According to Dr. Martin, the first alleged inventive concept is as follows:
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`The ’377 Patent [ ] provided the inventive concept of offloading the data analysis
`to a server in wireless communication with a web-enabled wireless phone. By
`providing significant application functionality on the back end, less memory and
`processing capabilities became necessary on the WWD [wireless web device]
`(i.e., on the “front-end”). Thus, as recited by the ’377 Patent, memory became
`available on the WWD for other purposes, such as an enhanced user interface,
`computing capacity, or processing power.
`
` .
`
` . . [B]y eliminating the location-based restraints of prior art systems by arranging
`the data processing components such that the data analysis was offloaded to a
`server that was in wireless communication with a wireless web device, the ’377
`Patent also allowed for “wireless access to and from a wide variety of present
`medical or health-related instruments and devices, while maintaining the
`capability of connecting to future such devices.” . . .
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`[T]his inventive concept allowed for “wireless health-monitoring to the level of
`accuracy previously achieved only by desktop so-called ‘wired’ computer
`systems.” . . . Having a wireless system was a major advantage over the prior art
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 13 of 26
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`as this invention allowed for subjects to be monitored as they moved about freely
`without the constraint of being tethered by a wire.
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`(Id. at 166-67).
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`Fitbit asserts that Claim 1 does not include the elimination of location-based restraints,
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`and, in fact, encompasses a wired connection. It reasons that because some of Claim 1’s
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`dependent claims (such as Claim 4) contemplate a wired connection, Claim 1 must be broad
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`enough to include wired connections as well. Similarly, it points to Dr. Martin’s opinion that the
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`wireless network in claim element 1.g includes wi-fi (with a wired router and short range), which
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`does not eliminate location-based restraints.
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`Fitbit further contends that utilizing a back-end server is not an inventive concept at all,
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`because the basic server functionality was known and understood in the prior art. It also
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`contends that eliminating location-based restraints is not an inventive concept, as the background
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`of the invention contemplates existing systems that “allow[ed] a ‘wireless’ distance to be placed
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`between a health measuring unit and a remote monitoring system” and “used cellular telephone
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`technology to increase the wireless health monitoring range.” (’377 patent col. 2 ll. 23-28).
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`Finally, it asserts that Dr. Martin’s opinion, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine issue
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`of material fact.
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`According to Dr. Martin, the second inventive concept is as follows:
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`[A]nother advantage of the ’377 Patent included downloading an application to a
`wireless web-enabled phone from a server. . . . [F]unctionality of WWDs in [ ]
`1999 was limited, in part, because WWDs had little memory and processing
`capability, which consequently limited the capabilities of the WWD when used
`alone. However, the asserted claims allowed for the downloading of applications
`to the WWD in connection with health monitoring devices to perform improved
`data capture, sharing, and analysis functions without the need for complex
`connections or expensive additional components. . . .
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`
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`13
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 14 of 26
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`(Martin Report at 167).4
`
`
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`Fitbit contends that there is nothing inventive about the generic, known way an
`
`application is downloaded. It points to prior art references identified by Dr. Paradiso that
`
`disclosed downloading an application from a remote server over the Internet. It further asserts
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`that Dr. Martin’s argument that downloading an application “improved data capture, sharing, and
`
`analysis functions without the need for complex connections” is untethered from the claims and
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`contradicted by the specification, which discusses adapter hardware with wired connections.
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`Finally, it contends that Dr. Martin conflates § 102 novelty with § 101 subject-matter eligibility.
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`(See Def. Invalid. Mem. at 17).
`
`
`
`To resolve those disputes, the Court must look to the case law. In its prior opinion on
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`Fitbit’s motion to dismiss, the Court primarily compared two Federal Circuit cases: Electric
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`Power and Bascom. Those cases remain the principal guideposts here, although the Court now
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`has the benefit of a complete evidentiary record on summary judgment.
`
`In Electric Power, the Federal Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment based
`
`on § 101 subject-matter ineligibility where the claims at issue provided for collecting, analyzing,
`
`and displaying power-grid data. 840 F.3d at 1351-52. The precise language of the claim offers a
`
`useful comparison here:
`
`A method of detecting events on an interconnected electric power grid in real time
`over a wide area and automatically analyzing the events on the interconnected
`electric power grid, the method comprising:
`
`receiving a plurality of data streams . . . ;
`
`receiving data from other power system data sources . . . ;
`
`
`4 It is unclear whether the second alleged inventive concept is “monitoring exercise with an application
`downloaded to a web-enabled phone,” (See Pl. Opp’n at 15) or “downloading an application to a wireless web-
`enabled phone from a server.” (See Martin Report at 167). Philips and its expert have asserted both inconsistently.
`In any event, that discrepancy does not change the outcome of the Court’s decision.
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`
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 15 of 26
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`receiving data from a plurality of non-grid data sources;
`
`detecting and analyzing events in real-time from the plurality of data
`streams from the wide area based on at least one of limits, sensitivities and
`rates of change . . . ;
`
`displaying the event analysis results and diagnoses of events and
`associated ones of the metrics from different categories of data and the
`derived metrics in visuals, tables, charts, or combinations thereof, the data
`comprising at least one of monitoring data, tracking data, historical data,
`prediction data, and summary data;
`
`displaying concurrent visualization of measurements from the data streams
`and the dynamic stability metrics directed to the wide area of the
`interconnected electric power grid;
`
`accumulating and updating the measurements from the data streams and
`the dynamic stability metrics, grid data, and non-grid data in real time . . . ;
`and
`
`deriving a composite indicator of reliability that is an indicator of power
`grid vulnerability and is derived from a combination of one or more real
`time measurements or computations of measurements from the data
`streams and the dynamic stability metrics . . . .
`
`Id. at 1351-52. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground of ineligibility,
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`observing that the “most significant additional limitations . . . are those that limit the claim[s] to
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`monitoring and analyzing data in the context of electric power grids.” Id. at 1352.
`
`
`
`The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the patent failed at both steps one and two of
`
`Alice. It reasoned as follows:
`
`[T]he claims do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and display of
`available information in a particular field, stating those functions in general terms,
`without limiting them to technical means for performing the functions that are
`arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology. The
`claims, defining a desirable information-based result and not limited to inventive
`means of achieving the result, fail under § 101.
`
`Id. at 1351.
`
`Like Electric Power, Claim 1 is directed to the abstract concept of collecting, analyzing,
`
`and displaying information. Again, for comparison, it provides:
`
`
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`15
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 401 Filed 09/01/22 Page 16 of 26
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`A method for interactive exercise monitoring, the method comprising the steps of:
`
`downloading an application to a web-enabled wireless phone directly from
`a remote server over the internet;
`
`coupling the a [sic] web-enabled wireless phone to a device which
`provides exercise-related information;
`
`rendering a user interface on the web-enabled wireless phone;
`
`using the application, receiving data indicating a physiologic status of a
`subject;
`
`using the application, receiving data indicating an amount of exercise
`performed by the subject;
`
`wherein at least one of the data indicating a physiologic status of a subject
`or the data indicating an amount of exercise performed by th