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`EXHIBIT A
`EXHIBIT A
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`

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`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2021-1864
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`District of Minnesota in No. 0:17-cv-05096-WMW-BRT,
`Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright.
`______________________
`
`Decided: April 11, 2022
`______________________
`
`MICHAEL T. GRIGGS, Boyle Fredrickson, S.C., Milwau-
`kee, WI, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
`by ADAM BROOKMAN, MARRIAM LIN, TIMOTHY NEWHOLM.
`
` KALPESH SHAH, Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Ar-
`onoff, Chicago, IL, argued for defendant-appellee. Also rep-
`resented by SAMUEL RUGGIO.
` ______________________
`
`Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
`STOLL, Circuit Judge.
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
`
`This appeal asks us to resolve numerous issues: valid-
`ity and infringement of various claims of U.S. Patent
`No. 6,638,268; several evidentiary rulings; and the appro-
`priateness of the U.S. District Court for the District of Min-
`nesota’s entry of sanctions against Appellant Niazi
`Licensing Corporation. First, Niazi appeals the district
`court’s determination that all but one of the asserted
`claims of the ’268 patent are invalid as indefinite. We con-
`clude that, when read in light of the intrinsic evidence, a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
`scope of the claims with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
`we reverse that determination and remand for the district
`court to resolve whether Appellee St. Jude Medical S.C.,
`Inc. (St. Jude) has infringed those claims and whether its
`remaining invalidity defenses are applicable. Second, Ni-
`azi appeals the district court’s summary judgment of no in-
`duced infringement of the only asserted claim it did not
`hold indefinite. We agree with the district court that Niazi
`failed to prove direct infringement—a necessary element of
`Niazi’s inducement claim—and therefore affirm that judg-
`ment. Third, Niazi appeals the district court’s sanction ex-
`cluding portions of Niazi’s technical expert and damages
`expert reports because Niazi failed to disclose the predicate
`facts during fact discovery and granting monetary sanc-
`tions. Because Niazi points to no abuse of discretion, we
`affirm the district court’s entry of sanctions. Finally, Niazi
`appeals the district court’s exclusion of portions of its dam-
`ages expert report as unreliable. Because we agree that
`the damages opinion was conclusory and legally insuffi-
`cient, we affirm that exclusion as well.
`BACKGROUND
`I
`Congestive heart failure is a common medical condition
`leading to hospital admission in the United States. Heart
`failure is frequently a result of the left and right sides of
`the heart contracting out of sync. There are different
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
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`3
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`methods available for treating heart failure, such as medi-
`cation or a heart transplant. Another method is resynchro-
`nization therapy, which uses electrical leads (called pacing
`leads) to help keep the two sides of the heart contracting
`with regularity and in sync.
`According to the ’268 patent, at the time of the inven-
`tion, physicians accomplished resynchronization therapy
`by inserting a catheter into the coronary sinus1 and its
`branch veins (i.e., cannulating) to place pacing leads on the
`hearts of patients with heart failure. ’268 patent col. 1
`ll. 29–35. Because the target coronary branch veins arise
`at acute angles to the coronary sinus and because heart
`failure can cause changes in the heart’s anatomy (includ-
`ing, for instance, the location, shape, and size of the coro-
`nary sinus and the branch veins), the specification explains
`that it can be “difficult to pass a lead” into the coronary
`sinus and its branch veins using a catheter. Id. at col. 1
`l. 61–col. 2 l. 11. Recognizing this, the inventor of the
`’268 patent developed a double catheter—i.e., a catheter
`comprising an outer and inner catheter—for cannulating
`the coronary sinus “without significant manipulation,” id.
`Abstract, which he claimed in the ’268 patent.
`Claim 1 (an apparatus claim) and claim 11 (a method
`claim) are representative of the claims on appeal and re-
`cite:
`1. A double catheter, comprising:
`an outer, resilient catheter having shape
`memory and a hook shaped distal end configured
`for cannulation of the coronary sinus with at
`least one curved bend;
`
`
`1 The coronary sinus is a major vein that “forms a
`part of the venous drainage of the heart.” ’268 patent col. 1
`ll. 13–15.
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
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`an inner, pliable catheter slidably disposed in
`the outer catheter and of greater length than the
`outer catheter so that a distal end portion of the
`inner catheter can be extended or retracted from
`a distal end opening of the outer catheter to vary
`the overall length of the double catheter, the in-
`ner catheter having an internal lumen config-
`ured for the introduction of contrast media and
`a pacing lead into the coronary sinus; and
`a mechanism operable from the proximal end of
`the outer catheter for changing the curvature of
`the distal end of the outer catheter.
`. . .
`11. A method for placing an electrical lead in a lat-
`eral branch of a coronary sinus vein using a double
`catheter including an outer catheter and an inner
`catheter slidably disposed inside the outer cathe-
`ter, comprising:
`[1] inserting the catheter into the coronary
`sinus;
`[2] advancing a guide wire through the
`catheter into a coronary sinus lateral
`branch vein;
`[3] advancing the inner catheter out of a
`front end opening of the outer catheter
`along the guide wire into the branch vein;
`[4] inserting the lead through the outer and
`inner catheters to a target location in the
`branch vein; and
`[5] withdrawing the catheter leaving the
`lead in the branch vein.
`Id. at col. 6 l. 62–col. 7 l. 9, col. 7 l. 63–col. 8 l. 9 (emphases
`added to disputed limitations).
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
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`5
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`II
`Niazi sued St. Jude for patent infringement. Niazi ac-
`cused combinations of St. Jude’s products, including the
`CPS Aim™ SL Slittable Inner Catheter (Subselector/Can-
`nulator), of directly infringing the ’268 patent claims, and
`it further accused St. Jude of inducing infringement of the
`’268 patent claims.
`The district court construed numerous terms in
`claims 1, 10–11, 13–15, 18–19, and 23–27 (the “asserted
`claims”) that are relevant to this appeal. First, the district
`court determined that the terms “resilient” and “pliable” in
`independent claims 1, 13, 18, and 24 of the ’268 patent ren-
`dered those claims and their dependents (claims 10, 14–15,
`19, 23, and 25–27) indefinite. See Niazi Licensing Corp.
`v. Bos. Sci. Corp., Case Nos. 17-cv-5094 (WMW/BRT), 17-
`cv-5096 (WMW/BRT), 2019 WL 5304922, at *5–7 (D. Minn.
`Oct. 21, 2019) (Claim Construction Op.). The parties dis-
`pute this determination on appeal.
`The court then considered independent claim 11, the
`only asserted claim that does not recite the terms “resili-
`ent” or “pliable.” The parties first disputed whether the
`term “the catheter” in claim 11 rendered that claim indefi-
`nite based on a lack of antecedent basis in the claim. The
`court determined that the claim was not indefinite, con-
`struing “the catheter” to mean “the double catheter.” Id.
`at *8. This construction, while relevant, is not disputed on
`appeal.
`The parties’ second dispute as to claim 11 concerned
`whether the steps recited in claim 11 must be performed in
`the order recited in the claim, or whether mere perfor-
`mance of all steps (in any order) was sufficient to meet the
`claim. The district court determined that “logic requires
`the steps of [c]laim 11 to be performed in the order listed”
`and accordingly concluded that claim 11 “is infringed only
`when the steps are performed in the order listed.” Id. This
`
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
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`second construction is not meaningfully disputed on ap-
`peal.
`Following fact discovery, the parties exchanged expert
`reports concerning infringement and validity of claim 11,
`as well as the amount of damages for any alleged infringe-
`ment of that claim. St. Jude moved to strike portions of
`Niazi’s technical expert (Dr. Martin Burke) report and its
`damages expert (Brad Carlson) report for improperly rely-
`ing on facts that were not disclosed during fact discovery.
`Regarding Dr. Burke’s report, St. Jude argued that Niazi
`did not disclose facts relating to alleged direct infringe-
`ment—specifically, that Dr. Burke himself had directly in-
`fringed claim 11 using St. Jude’s CPS catheter—which was
`relevant to Niazi’s theory of induced infringement for this
`claim. As to Mr. Carlson’s report, St. Jude argued that his
`reliance on several third-party license agreements to sup-
`port his damages calculation was improper because those
`agreements had not been produced during fact discovery.
`The magistrate judge agreed with St. Jude and, as a
`sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, ex-
`cluded portions of both reports and further precluded
`Dr. Burke from testifying as a fact witness.
` See
`J.A. 140–54. Niazi objected to this decision, but the district
`court judge agreed with the magistrate judge’s decision
`that this undisclosed evidence should be excluded and that
`Dr. Burke should be precluded from testifying as a fact wit-
`ness. Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc.,
`Case No. 17-cv-5096 (WMW/BRT), 2020 WL 1617879,
`at *1–3 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 2020) (Sanctions Op. I).
`Not long thereafter, the district court considered the
`parties’ cross-motions to exclude certain expert testimony
`as unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
`Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
`(1993). Relevant to this appeal, St. Jude moved to exclude
`Mr. Carlson’s damages opinion, arguing that he failed to
`properly apportion damages to the value attributable to
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
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`7
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`claim 11’s method. The district court agreed, reasoning
`that Mr. Carlson’s opinion failed to “apportion” between in-
`fringing and noninfringing uses and improperly included
`leads in the royalty base. Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude
`Med. S.C., Inc., Case No. 17-cv-5096 (WMW/BRT),
`2020 WL 5512507, at *9–11 (Sept. 14, 2020) (Daubert Op.).
`The district court accordingly held Mr. Carlson’s opinion
`inadmissible. Id.
`The parties thereafter cross-moved for summary judg-
`ment on numerous issues, but only one of those—the issue
`of induced infringement of claim 11—is relevant here. Ni-
`azi submitted a declaration from Dr. Burke in support of
`its summary judgment motion. In St. Jude’s view,
`Dr. Burke’s declaration recounted various factual asser-
`tions that the magistrate judge previously ordered ex-
`cluded. After the parties were unable to resolve the dispute
`regarding the scope of Dr. Burke’s declaration, St. Jude
`moved to enforce the magistrate judge’s exclusion order
`and sought monetary sanctions. The magistrate judge
`agreed with St. Jude, ordering all “facts disclosed by
`Dr. Burke that were not disclosed by the fact discovery
`deadline be stricken” from his declaration. J.A. 220 (Hr’g
`Tr. 63:15–19). The magistrate judge also awarded St. Jude
`attorney fees and costs associated with its motion to en-
`force
`the exclusion order.
` J.A. 220–21
`(Hr’g
`Tr. 63:20–64:3). Niazi objected to this decision, but the dis-
`trict court judge affirmed the magistrate judge’s exclusion
`order and award of sanctions. Niazi Licensing Corp.
`Inc., Case No. 17-cv-5096
`v. St. Jude Med. S.C.,
`(WMW/BRT), 2020 WL 3638771, at *4 (D. Minn. July 6,
`2020) (Sanctions Op. II).
`The district court then addressed the merits of the in-
`duced infringement issue. As a result of the various exclu-
`sion orders (and a ruling on inadmissibility of certain
`evidence that is not challenged on appeal), Niazi’s induced
`infringement case rested on St. Jude’s instructions for use
`(IFUs) for its CPS catheter. The district court determined
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
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`that Niazi “failed to present evidence to support either” di-
`rect infringement or that St. Jude possessed specific intent
`to encourage another’s infringement, both of which are nec-
`essary to impose liability for induced infringement. Niazi
`Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., Case No. 17-cv-
`5096 (WMW/BRT), 2021 WL 1111074, at *8 (D. Minn.
`Mar. 23, 2021) (Summary Judgment Op.).
`As to direct infringement, the district court determined
`that the IFUs required the performance of the claim steps
`in an order different than that required by the claims and,
`therefore, that doctors performing the steps in the IFUs did
`not directly infringe claim 11 as a matter of law. Id.
`at *4–7. The district court also determined that there was
`no material dispute of fact as to the intent element. The
`court explained that, not only did St. Jude’s IFUs “substan-
`tively differ” from the claimed method, but many of the
`steps recited in the IFUs were “optional,” thus negating
`specific intent to induce. Id. at *7. The district court ac-
`cordingly entered summary judgment of no induced in-
`fringement of claim 11 in St. Jude’s favor and dismissed
`St. Jude’s counterclaim of invalidity for that claim.
`Niazi appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1295(a)(1).
`
`DISCUSSION
`On appeal, Niazi challenges: (1) the district court’s de-
`termination that claims 1, 10, 13–15, 18–19, and 23–27 are
`invalid as indefinite; (2) the district court’s summary judg-
`ment of no induced infringement of claim 11; (3) the district
`court’s imposition of sanctions against Niazi under Federal
`Rule of Civil Procedure 37 excluding portions of
`Dr. Burke’s and Mr. Carlson’s expert reports and awarding
`monetary sanctions for violating that order; and (4) the dis-
`trict court’s exclusion of Mr. Carlson’s opinion as unrelia-
`ble under Daubert. We address each in turn.
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
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`9
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`I
`We begin with Niazi’s assertion that the district court
`erred in holding that the terms “resilient” and “pliable”
`render claims 1, 10, 13–15, 18–19, and 23–27 invalid as in-
`definite. For the reasons below, we agree with Niazi, and
`accordingly, we reverse.
`
`A
`Definiteness is a statutory requirement for patentabil-
`ity. Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2,2 a patent’s specification
`must “conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
`ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
`the applicant regards as his invention.” A claim is indefi-
`nite only if, when “read in light of the specification” and
`“prosecution history,” it “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable
`certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the in-
`vention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). Definiteness is a question of law
`that we review de novo. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire
`Pharms., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`As the Supreme Court explained in Nautilus, language
`has “inherent limitations.” 572 U.S. at 909. The reasona-
`ble certainty standard exists to strike a “delicate balance,”
`“afford[ing] clear notice of what is claimed” while recogniz-
`ing such inherent limitations. Id. (quoting Festo Corp.
`v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
`731 (2002)). “Otherwise there would be ‘[a] zone of uncer-
`tainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter
`only at the risk of infringement claims.’” Id. at 909–10
`
`2 Because the ’268 patent does not contain any claim
`with an effective filing date on or after September 16, 2012,
`the applicable version of § 112 is the one preceding the
`changes made by the America Invents Act.
` See
`Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29
`§ 4(e), 125 Stat. 284, 297 (2011).
`
`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
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`(alteration in original) (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Bin-
`ney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)). While the legal
`test for definiteness “does not require that a potential in-
`fringer be able to determine ex ante if a particular act in-
`fringes the claims,” Nevro Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 955 F.3d
`35, 40 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the public notice function underly-
`ing this patentability requirement demands that a pa-
`tentee apprise the public “of what is still open to them,”
`Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 909 (quoting Markman v. Westview
`Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996)). This serves
`an important policy goal—providing clarity such that a per-
`son of ordinary skill in the art could determine whether or
`not an accused product or method infringes the claim. See
`Meds. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 853 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (quoting Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline
`PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The definite-
`ness requirement thus “mandates clarity, while recogniz-
`ing that absolute precision is unattainable.” Nautilus,
`572 U.S. at 910.
`While there must be objective boundaries, “we have ex-
`plained that ‘a patentee need not define his invention with
`mathematical precision in order to comply with the defi-
`niteness requirement.’” Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co.
`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 936 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
`(quoting Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d
`1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Indeed, patentees often use
`“[d]escriptive words . . . to ‘avoid[] a strict numerical
`boundary to the specified parameter.’” Braintree Lab’ys,
`Inc. v. Novel Lab’ys, Inc., 749 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
`2014) (third alteration in original) (quoting Pall Corp.
`v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
`1995)). And we have recognized that “[c]laim language em-
`ploying terms of degree has long been found definite where
`it provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when
`read in the context of the invention.” Interval Licensing
`LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`

`

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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
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`True, descriptive words (or terms of degree) in a claim
`may inherently result in broader claim scope than a claim
`defined with mathematical precision. But a claim is not
`indefinite just because it is broad. See, e.g., BASF Corp.
`v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (reiterating, after Nautilus, that “breadth is not in-
`definiteness” (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
`Corp., 402 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); Ultimax Ce-
`ment Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339,
`1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (determining, pre-Nautilus, that a
`claim term, “even if construed to be as broad as the district
`court construed it to be, does not render the claim insolubly
`ambiguous”); Cap. Sec. Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp.,
`725 F. App’x 952, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining, post-
`Nautilus, that broad claim language did not render the
`claim indefinite when read in light of the written descrip-
`tion). For purposes of the definiteness inquiry, the problem
`patentees face by using descriptive words in their claims is
`not the potential breadth of those claims. It is whether the
`use of descriptive phrasing in the claim results in a claim
`that “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
`skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nauti-
`lus, 572 U.S. at 901.
`To that end, we have time and again had the occasion
`to consider the definiteness of claims containing descrip-
`tive words or terms of degree. For example, in Sonix Tech-
`nologies, we considered whether the phrase “visually
`negligible” rendered indefinite claims directed to systems
`and methods for using a graphical indicator (like a barcode)
`to encode information on the surface of an object, the pur-
`ported improvement over the prior art being a “visually
`negligible” graphical indicator. 844 F.3d at 1371–73. We
`explained that, while this phrase was a term of degree, the
`claim language itself provided “an objective baseline
`through which to interpret the claims”—whether it could
`be seen by the normal human eye. Id. at 1378. In other
`words, it was not a “purely subjective” phrase that failed to
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
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`inform a person of ordinary skill about the claim scope with
`reasonable certainty. Id. The written description, like-
`wise, provided objective boundaries, including exemplary
`designs and specific examples of visually negligible graph-
`ical indicators as well as a specific requirement that the
`indicator be negligible to human eyes. Id. at 1379. We also
`found it highly relevant that the examiner understood this
`phrase throughout prosecution, as did both parties’ experts
`during the course of litigation. Id. at 1379–81. Accord-
`ingly, we held that the phrase “‘visually negligible’ [wa]s
`not a purely subjective term” and that the claims were not
`invalid as indefinite. Id. at 1381.
`Our decision in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010), is similarly instructive.
`There, we determined that use of the term “not interfering
`substantially” did not render a claim invalid as indefinite.
`The claim at issue required that the linkage group in a
`chemical compound was “not interfering substantially”
`with the ability of that compound to hybridize with a nu-
`cleic acid. Id. at 1329. We explained that, while the claims
`did not define “not interfering substantially” with mathe-
`matical precision, the intrinsic evidence provided guide-
`posts for a skilled artisan to determine the scope of the
`claims. Id. at 1335. This evidence included certain depend-
`ent claims, which recited exemplary linkage groups that
`would not interfere substantially with hybridization, and
`additional exemplary linkage groups found in both the
`written description and prosecution history that, likewise,
`would not interfere substantially with hybridization. Id.
`at 1334–35. In other words, the intrinsic evidence provided
`a skilled artisan with examples with which she could com-
`pare an allegedly infringing product to determine whether
`any interference with hybridization was substantial.
`By contrast, we have determined that terms of degree
`render a claim indefinite where the intrinsic evidence (or
`extrinsic evidence, where relevant and available) provides
`insufficient guidance as to any objective boundaries for the
`
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
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`13
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`claims—including where the claims are “purely subjective”
`such that their scope cannot be determined with reasona-
`ble certainty. A classic example is the term “aesthetically
`pleasing,” which we determined
`in Datamize, LLC
`v. Plumtree Software, Inc. rendered claims drawn to the
`“look and feel” of an interface screen invalid as indefinite.
`417 F.3d 1342, 1345, 1349–56 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The scope
`of the claim changed depending on a person’s subjective de-
`termination as to whether the interface screen was “aes-
`thetically pleasing.” We explained that “[w]hile beauty is
`in the eye of the beholder, a claim term, to be definite, re-
`quires an objective anchor.” Id. at 1350. After considering
`the intrinsic record and extrinsic evidence, we concluded
`that there was nothing supplying “some standard for meas-
`uring the scope of the phrase,” id. at 1351, and accordingly
`affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of invalid-
`ity for indefiniteness, id. at 1356. We drew a similar con-
`clusion as to the claim phrase “unobtrusive manner that
`does not distract the viewer” in Interval Licensing.
`766 F.3d at 1371–74.
`The claims at issue in Intellectual Ventures I, LLC
`v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. likewise employed a term of degree—
`“QoS requirements.” 902 F.3d 1372, 1375–76, 1381–82
`(Fed. Cir. 2018). We determined this term was “purely
`subjective,” leaving a skilled artisan unable to determine
`the scope of the claim with reasonable certainty. Id.
`at 1381–82. The patent described “QoS requirements” as
`“defined by what network performance characteristic is
`most important to a particular user.” Id. at 1381. The pa-
`tent further characterized it as “a relative term, finding dif-
`ferent meanings for different users.” Id. We concluded,
`based on the intrinsic record, that this term rendered the
`claims invalid as indefinite because it was “purely subjec-
`tive” and depended “on the unpredictable vagaries of any
`one person’s opinion.” Id. (quoting Datamize, 417 F.3d
`at 1350–51).
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
`
`Ultimately, patent claims with descriptive words or
`terms of degree “must provide objective boundaries for
`those of skill in the art” in the context of the invention to
`be definite. Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371; Intellec-
`tual Ventures I, 902 F.3d at 1381. As with any question of
`claim construction, the intrinsic record—the patent’s
`claims, written description, and prosecution history—
`along with any relevant extrinsic evidence can provide or
`help identify the necessary objective boundaries for claim
`scope. Guangdong, 936 F.3d at 1360 (collecting cases).
`B
`With this background, we now consider the terms at
`issue here—“resilient” and “pliable.” We agree with Niazi
`that the intrinsic record and extrinsic evidence inform a
`skilled artisan, with reasonable certainty, of the meaning
`of “resilient” and “pliable.” The terms are broad, but they
`are not uncertain. The district court erred in holding oth-
`erwise.
`Starting with the term “resilient,” claim 1 recites “an
`outer, resilient catheter having shape memory.” ’268 pa-
`tent col. 6 ll. 62–65 (emphasis added). The claim language
`itself provides guidance on what this term means—the
`outer catheter must have “shape memory,” id. (claim 1) and
`“sufficient stiffness,” e.g., id. at col. 8 ll. 13–27 (claim 13).
`Numerous dependent claims further inform the meaning of
`this term by providing exemplary resilient materials of
`which the outer catheter could be made. See, e.g., id.
`at col. 8 ll. 33–34 (claim 16 reciting “wherein the outer
`catheter is made of a braided silastic”); id. at col. 9 ll. 4–5
`(claim 21 reciting same).
`The written description provides similar guidance, ex-
`plaining that the outer catheter has a “braided design,” id.
`at col. 5 ll. 4–6, and is made of materials like silastic or sim-
`ilar materials such that the outer catheter has “sufficient
`shape memory to return to its original shape when un-
`distorted,” id. at col. 4 ll. 21–23. It further explains that
`
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
`ST. JUDE MEDICAL. S.C., INC.
`
`15
`
`resilience provides for “torque control and stiffness.” Id.
`at col. 3 ll. 11–13, col. 5 ll. 4–6. Thus, a person of ordinary
`skill reading the claims and written description would
`know of exemplary materials that can be used to make a
`resilient outer catheter, i.e., one that has shape memory
`and stiffness such that it can return to its original shape.
`Turning to the term “pliable,” the claims recite “an in-
`ner, pliable catheter slidably disposed in the outer cathe-
`ter.” E.g., id. at col. 6 ll. 66–67 (claim 1) (emphasis added).
`While the claim language provides less guidance on the
`meaning of pliable, the written description contains nu-
`merous examples of a “pliable” inner catheter. For exam-
`ple, the written description explains that relative to the
`resilient outer catheter, the inner catheter “is constructed
`of a more pliable, soft material such as silicone.” Id.
`at col. 3 ll. 13–15; see id. at col. 5 ll. 14–16. It further ex-
`plains that the inner catheter “has no longitudinal braid-
`ing, which makes it extremely flexible and able to conform
`to various shapes.” Id. at col. 5 ll. 13–18. Thus, the written
`description provides an exemplary material that can be
`used to make a pliable inner catheter, explaining that the
`inner catheter is more flexible than the outer.
`Taken as a whole, we conclude that the intrinsic record
`“is sufficient to dispose of” the indefiniteness issues as to
`the terms “resilient” and “pliable.” Guangdong, 936 F.3d
`at 1361. The intrinsic record provides objective boundaries
`by which a skilled artisan could determine the scope of the
`claims. That puts this case in line with our decisions in
`Sonix Technologies and Enzo Biochem, where we held that
`examples in the written description helped provide suffi-
`cient guidance to render the claims not invalid as indefi-
`nite. The terms “resilient” and “pliable” are not purely
`subjective terms like those in Datamize, Interval Licensing,
`and Intellectual Ventures I, resulting in a variable claim
`scope depending on the particular eye of any one observer.
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`NIAZI LICENSING CORPORATION v.
` ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC.
`
`We note that extrinsic evidence further supports our
`conclusion. Niazi introduced dictionary definitions of both
`terms to demonstrate that the claims are not indefinite.
`Consistent with the claims and written description, “resil-
`ient” is defined as “returning to the original form or posi-
`tion after being bent, compressed, or stretched.” J.A. 2963
`(quoting Resilient, Dictionary.com, https://www.diction-
`ary.com/browse/resilient). The same is true for “pliable,”
`which is defined as “easily bent, flexible; supple.” J.A. 2966
`(quoting Pliable, Dictionary.com, https://www.diction-
`ary.com/browse/pliable). These definitions confirm that
`the terms “resilient” and “pliable” would have had broad
`but understood meanings to a skilled artisan.
`We are unpersuaded by St. Jude’s arguments to the
`contrary. St. Jude argues that the written description is
`inconsistent in how it describes “resilient” and “pliable.”
`E.g., Appellee’s Br. 21–23, 28–30. On appe