Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 1 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 1 of 18
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`FITBIT LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
`
`FITBIT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`OF INVALIDITYOF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,277,377
`UNDER35 U.S.C.§101 (DKT. 333
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 2 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 2 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Pages
`
`Il.
`
`IIL.
`
`IV.
`
`INTRODUCTION.0...ecccceccccccceeeseesseseesessessenseecaecaeseeceesesseecaecaeceeceseeseecaecaeseaeeaseeecaeeeeenees l
`
`FITBIT DID NOT IGNORE THE ORDERED COMBINATION OF ELEMENTS
`OR EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT
`CONVENTIONAL, WELL-KNOWN, OR ROUTINE—FITBIT ADDRESSED
`THE ONLY ALLEGED INVENTIVE CONCEPTS RAISED BY PHILIPS AND
`DR. MARTIN ..0....ccceeceessesessessensensaecaecaesensesseesaesaecaesensescsessecaecaeseaeesaeeeeeaecaeseseesaeeeeeateareenees 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin’s Factual Allegations Contradict the Evidence................. 3
`
`Philips And Dr. Martin’s Arguments Are Contrary To The Law......ccceceeeeseeserees 3
`
`PHILIPS’ RESPONSESTO FITBIT’S SUF 4§ 6-15 MINCE WORDS
`WITHOUT MEANINGFULLYDISPUTING FITBIT’S FACTUAL
`STATEMENTS... .ececeeceeceeseeseeseeseeseesensensenseecaecaesenseasesceecaecaeceeseaeeaeecaecaeceeceeaeeaeeeeeeaeceeeenees 5
`
`PHILIPS’ IMPROPER RELIANCE ON THE PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED
`CONCEPT OF AN IMPROVED “NETWORK PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE”
`SHOULDBE IGNORED 0000020 oocc ccc cce cee cceseeseeseeseeees see sen see aecoeeesecsseeseecaecaeseeeesaseseesarcaeeeesenees 9
`
`ELECTRIC POWER GROUP REMAINS THE MOSTON POINT CASE........ eee 10
`
`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION Qu. eccceesessesseeteesseceesensensenseesaecaeseassaesecsecaecaecensseaeeseesaecaesenseaeeeeteascarseneeneees 12
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 3 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 3 of 18
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Pages
`
`Cases
`
`Abiomed v. Maquet Cardiovascular,
`2021 WL 4477432 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2021) nce ceeceecsecseseeseeceeceeseeceeeeeereeeeseeseneeenaes 10
`
`Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v.Neapco Holdings LLC,
`967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020)... cccceecsecessesseecsecenseecaeeeseecaeeesueecaecenseeeneceaeeneaeeeneennees 4, 10
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Lid. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)... cc ccceccsecenseesseceeseeseeceeceseeceesesseecaecesaeeeaesenaeeeaeceneeneaeens 11
`
`Anderson v. Kimberly—Clark Corp.,
`570 F.App’x 927 (Fed. Cir, 2014) oo... ceceececeecec cee cee cee seeseecaeeoeeescesaeeseecaecaeceseeaeesersareneeeaes 7
`
`BASCOMGlob.Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........ccccccceceecesscessecesceessececescecoesesseecaecesscecaecenseeceeceseeees 4, 11
`
`BSG Tech LLCv. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 128] (Fed. Cir. 2018)... ccececeecesseecsecenseecaeceeseecaecenseeeeeceeeeseeceesenseeseeeeeeees 4,12
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019)... ceceeceecensenseeseecesseecsecseeecaeessaeecaecenseeeaeceseeteaeeenaenaees 4,12
`
`CosmoKeySols. GmbH & Co. KG v. Duo Sec. LLC,
`15 F.4th L091 (Fed. Cir, 2021) cece eececsecesseecsecseseeceeceeeecaesenseeceeseseeseaeceeaeeeeecereeneasees 11
`
`Diamondv. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) occ cece eececee cee ccnseeseecenseecoeeesseesaecesscesaecesssesaeceesseseeceseesseeceeeeeserseseeseeees 5
`
`Electric Power Grp., LLC vy. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......c..ccccccceccecesseessecenseessececescecaesesseeceecesseecaecenseecaeeeseeees 8, 11
`
`InnovationSci., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 4:18-cv-474, 2021 WL 2075677 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2021) .occcececeeeeseceeeeseeeees 3,7
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)... ccccecesscesseessecenseesaeceneeesaeceeseeeaeceaeseaeceesenseeceeeeneeeeaeeenes 6
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012). eccccceecsecessenseesenseneeceeseesaeceecesseecaesesseecaecenseecaeseaseeeaecenseneeceeeenseeceeenes 5
`
`MonsantoCo. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc.,
`503 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).........0.cccccecceceeccececenseesaecesscesaecessceseecesceeseecesseeseeceseesseeeeseeses 9
`
`ii
`
`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 4 of 18
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(cont'd)
`
`Pages
`
`PalomarTech., Inc. v. MSRI Sys., LLC,
`No. 18-10236-FDS (D. Mass. May 28, 2020) wo...cceccceececeeceeseeceeceeseeceeceeeesseeceeeeneeeeeeseer es 6
`
`Parkerv. Flook,
`437 U.S. 584 (1978). ccceccecccceseeseesessaeseesenseecoeseaseecaecenseesaecenseesaeceeseeseeceasessaeceecesseeeeeeneee es 5
`
`Pernix Ir. Pain DAC v. Alvogen Malta Operations, Ltd.,
`No. 16-139-WCB, 2018 WL 2225113, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81419 (D. Del.
`May 15, 2018)... ccececceceecceccececcee see seeces see seecessee see ceaeeeueeceeeesueeceecesueeceecesseecaecesteeeeeeeseeeeeens 10
`
`Philips North Am., LLC v. GarminInt’l, Inc.,
`No. 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS (C.D. Cal. 2019) ooo. .ccccecccceccsscecessceceeseecseceesaecescecesaecenseecesaeees 8
`
`Prism Techs. LLCv. T-Mobile USA, Inc..,
`696 F.App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ooo. ccccceccsecesssecesseecensceceeseecenseecenseecuseeeneeeecneeeseneeee 4,7
`
`Rothschild Dig. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc.,
`No. 3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47914 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020)............ 7
`
`Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,
`873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir, 2017)... .ccececcessessecenseecsecenseecaeceeseecaeceeseeceeceneeeeeeceeseaeeceeeeseescaeeenes 7
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Comme’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)... ccccececcecceeseececceeseececeeseecoecesscecaecesueesaesesseeseeeeseeesees 4,5
`
`Statutes
`
`B35 U.S.C. § LOL icc cccceccssceccescscenssnsceseecescenssesaeseeceecensensaeseeseecensensueseeceeceeeeeuscesceeseseeneesanseeeeens 2,5
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. S6(C)(1) ....e.c cc ccecce ccc cccccececcesseessecesseessecesscesscessesscecessesssecessesssecsscesssecsesessseesscessteesees 6
`
`ili
`
`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 5 of 18
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Philips’ Opposition (Dkt. 361) does not meaningfully dispute any relevant material fact or
`
`raise any legal argumentsufficient to defeat Fitbit’s request for summary judgment.
`
`With respect to the ordered combination of elements, Philips ignores the arguments in
`
`Fitbit’s opening brief (Dkt. 334). For example, Philips claims that Fitbit never addressed the
`
`alleged inventiveness of the ordered combination of elements, but Fitbit extensively addressed and
`
`rebutted the only alleged inventive concepts Philips andits expert raised.
`
`(Dkt. 334 at 8-18.)
`
`Similarly, Philips claims that Fitbit ignored the named inventor’s testimony from another case not
`
`involving Fitbit and regarding the alleged inventive concept of mobility, but again, Fitbit addressed
`
`that concept (Dkt. 334 at | 1-14) and the testimony is inadmissible hearsay because Fitbit did not
`
`attend and thus, had no opportunity to cross-examine.
`
`Fitbit’s SUF {| 6-13 establish that the claimed components and concepts are all generic
`
`and conventional. Similarly, Fitbit’s SUF {{| 14-15 establish that Philips’ claimed inventive
`
`concepts were not actually inventive and/or claimed. Philips’ “denials” of Fitbits’ SUF {| 6-15
`
`do notactually deny the facts stated by Fitbit. Rather, Philips’ responses pick out individual words
`
`such as “generic”or “conventional” and deny that the cited evidence uses those exact words. But
`
`this Court’s own case law showsthat claim elements are generic or conventional based on their
`
`character, not the specific words in the evidence. Philips also arguesthat its expert opined that the
`
`individual claim elements were not conventional or well-known. But Philips’ expert played
`
`similar word games that did not address the actual opinions of Fitbit’s expert. Most notably,
`
`Philips’ expert emphasized at deposition that the individual elements do not supply an inventive
`
`concept, but rather, the inventive concepts only arise from the ordered combination of elements.
`
`Further, Philips again improperly attempts to insert new, undisclosed contentions(this time
`
`regarding an improved “networkplatform architecture’) to overcome summary judgment.
`
`

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`
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`Finally, Philips argues that the Electric Power Group caseFitbit relied onis distinguishable
`
`because there, the claims did no more than collect, analyze, and present data. But then, Philips
`
`characterizes °377 patent claim 1 as merely gathering data (i.e., collecting data), performing
`
`calculations on data (i.e., analyzing data), and displaying data (7.e., presenting data).
`
`Asserted claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 do nothing more than apply an abstract idea using
`
`conventional, well-understood techniques. Summary judgmentof § 101 invalidity is appropriate.
`
`II.
`
`FITBIT DID NOT IGNORE THE ORDERED COMBINATION OF ELEMENTS
`OR EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT CONVENTIONAL,
`WELL-KNOWN, OR ROUTINE—FITBIT ADDRESSED THE ONLY ALLEGED
`INVENTIVE CONCEPTS RAISED BY PHILIPS AND DR. MARTIN
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin raised two alleged inventive concepts—(1) performing
`
`computations utilizing a back-end server
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`to remove “location based restraints” and (2)
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`downloading an application to monitor exercise. (See Dkt. 334 at 8.) Fitbit rebutted both. (Dkt.
`
`334 at 8-18.) Neither Philips nor Dr. Martin disclosed any other inventive concepts allegedly
`
`inherent in the ordered combination of elements.
`
`(See generally, Dkt. 338-2, §§ 270-278; Dkt.
`
`338-9, ff] 205-211; Dkt. 361.) Thus, Philips’ claims that “Fitbit erroneously ignores whether the
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`ordered combination of elements of the asserted claims are well-understood and conventional” and
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`“Fitbit
`
`ignores overwhelming evidence that demonstrates howthe claimed invention is not
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`conventional, well-known,or routine” are both false.
`
`(Dkt. 361 at 10, 12.) Notably, Philips does
`
`not point out any inventive concept that Fitbit did not address. (See generally Dkt. 361.) Instead,
`
`Philips merely reiterates arguments that Fitbit already rebutted.
`
`(Compare Dkt. 332 at 8-11
`
`(explaining back-end serverfunctionality was not inventive), 11-15 (explaining mobility was not
`
`inventive or claimed), 15-18 (explaining downloading an app to monitor exercise was not
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`inventive) with Dkt. 361 at 13-14 (reiterating alleged benefits of back-end server functionality),
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`17-18 (reiterating alleged benefits of mobility and downloading an app to monitor exercise).)
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`

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`A.
`
`Philips and Dr. Martin’s Factual Allegations Contradict the Evidence
`
`Philips also claims that because Dr. Martin disagrees with Fitbit’s allegations andevidence,
`
`summary judgmentis inappropriate. (Dkt. 361 at 14-18.) But Dr. Martin’s opinions regarding the
`
`alleged inventive concepts contradict the evidence.
`(Dkt. 334 at 8-20.) For example, Dr. Quy
`testified that heaei: upon by Dr. Martin. (See Dkt. 338-13 at 195:9-
`11, 215:18-216:17 (admitting hei«richie Ex.
`1 at
`181:7-12 (admitting heee An “inventors’ admissions
`
`on what they did not invent” indicate that such elements were well understood, routine, and
`
`conventional under A/ice step two. See Innovation Sci., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-
`
`474, 2021 WL 2075677, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May24, 2021).
`
`Philips also claims that Fitbit mischaracterizes Dr. Quy’s testimony regarding mobility.
`
`(Dkt. 361 at 17.) While Philips argues that Dr. Quy’s ownprior systems were limited to telemetry
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`(Dkt. 361 at 17), there is no dispute that the °377 patent’s Backgroundof the Invention admits that
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`other prior art systems “allow a ‘wireless’ distance to be placed between a health measuring unit
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`and a remote monitoring system” and “used cellular telephone technology to increase the wireless
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`health monitoring range” with a mobile phone.
`
`(Dkt. 334 at 12 (quoting Dkt. 338-3, 2:22-37).)
`
`The mobility inherent in a mobile phoneis simplynot an inventive concept. (Dkt. 334 at 11-15.)
`
`B.
`
`Philips And Dr. Martin’s Arguments Are Contrary To The Law
`
`Dr. Martin’s opinionsare also contraryto the lawin many respects. For example, as Fitbit
`
`' Philips also wrongly claims that Dr. Paradiso did not address the alleged inventive concept of
`“monitoring exercise with an application downloaded to a web-enabled phone.” (Dkt. 361 at 15
`(citing Dkt. 338-9 (Martin rebuttal report), §] 208-211).) Cited paragraphs 208-211 of Dr.
`Martin’s rebuttal report relate to his opinion that because claim 1 was allowed over Mault after
`element 1|.a was added, “the °377 patent provided an inventive concept by including the capability
`of downloading an application to a wireless web-enabled phone from a server.” (Dkt. 338-9, §
`210; see generally id., §§| 208-211.) Dr. Paradiso addressed this alleged inventive conceptin his
`rebuttal expert report. (Dkt. 338-10 (Paradiso rebuttal report), 4] 378; see also Dkt. 334 at 15-18.)
`
`3
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`

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`explained in its opening brief, the claimed inventions do nothing more than utilize generic, known
`
`components and/or features (e.g., back-end server functionality such as performing calculations
`
`and receiving data; downloading an app) in a conventional, known way to implementthe abstract
`
`idea ofcollecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information. (Dkt. 334 at 10, 17-18.)
`
`This alone cannot supply an inventive concept. See, e.g., Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927
`
`F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“An inventive concept reflects something more than the
`
`application of an abstract
`
`idea using ‘well-understood, routine, and conventional activities
`
`previously knownto the industry.””); BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290-91
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Ifa claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using
`
`conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-
`
`eligible application of an abstract idea.”) (citing Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370).
`
`Indeed, under
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`Philips’ own cited case law, claims utilizing generic functionality do not satisfy Alice step two.
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
`
`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`There is no evidence that the claims’ use of generic, conventional components and features
`
`“produces ‘a result that overrides the routine and conventional’ use of th{ese] known [components
`
`and features].” Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F.App’x 1014, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`As another example, the allegedly (1) freed up memory and processing capabilities that
`
`supposedly arise from the back-end server functionality and (2) improved data capture, sharing,
`
`and analysis functions and eliminated complex connections and expensive additional components
`
`that supposedly arise from downloading an app, cannot support patent eligibility, because those
`
`results are not actually claimed.
`
`(See Dkt. 334 at 10-11, 16-17.) See Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v.
`
`Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (unclaimed advantages over prior
`
`

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`art are irrelevantto patent eligibility under Alice).
`
`Finally, Philips and Dr. Martin conflate novelty with patent eligibility. (See, e.g., Dkt. 361
`
`at 11 (“Notably, as Dr. Martin points out, Fitbit fails to identify a single prior art device or
`
`disclosure that employed the components in the asserted claims to perform the unconventional
`
`process recited in the asserted claims.”); see also id. at 16.) But as the Supreme Court clearly
`
`stated in Diamondv. Diehr, novelty is irrelevant when determining patent eligibility. 450 U.S.
`
`175, 188-89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any elementor steps in a process, or even of the process
`
`itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter ofa claim falls within the § 101
`
`categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”); see also Two-Way Media, 874 F.3d at 1340
`
`(“Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.’’).
`
`Related, and contrary to Philips’ allegations (Dkt. 361 at 15-17), Fitbit does not exclusively
`
`rely on whether exemplary prior art references disclose the claim limitations, but merely pointed
`
`out that such unrebutted evidence further supports the conventional, routine, and well-understood
`
`nature of the claim elements as described by the specification and namedinventor. (See Dkt. 331
`
`at 9-10, 15-16). This is the exact inquiry that courts undertake in assessing whether the claims
`
`provide an inventive concept. See, e.g.,Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
`
`U.S. 66, 79-80 (2012)(finding priorart “activity previously engaged in byscientists in the field”
`
`was“well-understood, routine, conventionalactivity...[in]sufficient to transform an [abstract idea]
`
`into [being] patent-eligible”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
`
`Il.
`
`PHILIPS’ RESPONSES TO FITBIT’S SUF 4 6-15 MINCE WORDS WITHOUT
`MEANINGFULLY DISPUTING FITBIT’S FACTUAL STATEMENTS
`
`In response to Fitbit’s SUF 4] 6-15, Philips merely plays word games without citing any
`
`contradictory evidence or pointing out why Fitbit’s evidence does not substantively support its
`
`statements of undisputed material fact.
`
`(See Dkt. 361 at 1-9.) Philips does not provide any basis
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`

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`for the Court to find these material facts in genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
`
`Philips’ response to Fitbit’s SUF 4 6 is a prime example. The Court previously found that
`
`“the [°377] patent describes a method that employs conventional, ‘off-the-shelf components.”
`
`(Dkt. 219 at 13.) Philips acknowledgesthat the Court’s ruling is the law ofthe case. (Dkt. 361 at
`
`10 n.2.) Fitbit’s SUF {| 6 quotes that ruling, stating that “[t]he °377 patent employs conventional,
`
`off-the-shelf components.” (Dkt. 334, SUF {| 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Yet Philips
`
`purports to dispute this fact without explanation or contrary evidence. (Dkt. 361 at 2-3.)
`
`As for Fitbit’s SUF 4¥ 7-13, Philips repeatedly intimates that the absence of the word
`
`“generic” from Fitbit’s cited evidence is somehow meaningful.
`
`(See, e.g., Dkt. 361 at 3 (“Philips
`
`disputes [SUF § 7] as not supported by the cited record for the following reasons: The specification
`
`of the °377 patent does not describe the ‘device which provides exercise related information of
`
`claim 1’ as ‘generic.’
`
`...Dr. Quy’s testimony does not describe the ‘device which provides
`
`exercise related information of claim I’ as ‘generic.’”); see generallyid. at 3-8.) However, the use
`
`of use the word “generic”is not required in order to conclude that a componentis generic. Palomar
`
`Tech., Inc. v. MSRI Sys., LLC, No. 18-10236-FDS, Dkt. 772 at 17 (D. Mass. May 28, 2020) (Saylor,
`
`J.). Under the Federal Circuit and this Court’s case law, claim elements are considered “generic”
`
`based on their character, (7.e., being general, non-specific, and/or unspecified), irrespective of word
`
`choice. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1339
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The merefact that the inventor applied coined labels to conventional structures
`
`does not make the underlying concept inventive.”); Palomar Tech., Dkt. 772 at 20 (“For example,
`
`calling something a ‘first workpiece’ or a ‘target intermediate location’ simply applies a generic
`
`label to a very ordinary two-step placementprocess.”). Thus, claim elements can be “indisputably
`
`generic” regardless of whether the specification or the inventor’s deposition testimony includes
`
`

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`the word “generic.” See Prism Techs., 696 F.App’x at 1017 (finding “authentication server,’
`
`‘access server,’
`
`‘Internet Protocol network,’
`
`‘client computer device,’ and ‘database’” were
`
`generic components despite the fact
`
`that
`
`the specification did not
`
`identify them as such).
`
`Moreover, an inventor’s admission that a claim element or component was notinventive as ofthe
`
`priority date reinforces that it is not specific, but rather, “generic” in character. See Innovation
`
`Sci., 2021 WL 2075677, at *7. Fitbit’s SUF 4] 7-13 repeatedly cited Dr. Quy’s admissionsthat
`
`he did not invent the individual elements or components of claim 1, and Philips’ responses
`
`repeatedly acknowledge those admissions. (See Dkt. 334, SUF 4] 7-13; Dkt. 361 at 3-8.)
`
`Philips also repeatedly cites the reports of its expert, Dr. Martin, as evidentiary bases to
`
`dispute Fitbit’s SUF 4" 7-13.
`
`(Dkt. 361 at 3-8.) But an expert’s unsupported statements
`
`contradicting the evidence do not establish that the claimed components and concepts are
`
`unconventional. See Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2017) (holding courts may disregard allegations contradicting patent specification or claims)
`
`(collecting cases, including Anderson v. Kimberly—Clark Corp., 570 F.App’x 927, 931 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014)); Rothschild Dig. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc., No. 3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020
`
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47914, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) (accord). As explained in Fitbit’s
`
`opening brief, Dr. Martin’s expert reports played the same types of word games as Philips in
`
`responding to Dr. Paradiso’s opinionsthat the elements and components ofthe claims are known,
`
`generic, and conventional.
`
`(See, e.g., Dkt. 334 at 9-10 (explaining why “Dr. Martin did not rebut
`
`that these exemplary references,
`
`including Marathon Man, show‘servers receiving data and
`
`performing calculations’ as Dr. Paradiso explained”), 15-16 (explaining why “Dr. Martin did not
`
`dispute that these exemplary references, including Hsu, show ‘downloading an application from a
`
`remote server overthe internet’”’).) Finally, at his deposition, Dr. Martin repeatedly walked away
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 12 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 12 of 18
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`from any opinion that the individual elements of claim | are inventive, emphasizing that only the
`
`ordered combination of elements of claim | is inventive. For example, Dr. Martin testified:
`
`Q. So then is it fair to say that you have not opined that Dr. Quy
`invented any ofthe individual elements ofclaim | of the *377 patent?
`
`A. Again, it’s my opinion thatit’s -- you know,it’s the combination
`of all these parts of claim 1 that constitute the inventive concepts
`here. You know, asking about one particular element or the other in
`isolation ignores that combination.
`
`(Dkt. 338-1 at 107:7-18; see also id. at 106:21-107:6, 113:11-116:20, 123:6-124:3, 124:15-125:4.)
`
`Philips’ only other basis for disputing Fitbit’s SUF 7 is to note that “[t]he specification
`
`contemplates future exercise devices which would not have been ‘known.””
`
`(Dkt. 361 at 3
`
`(citations omitted).) Obviously, the specification does not describe or enable such devices, so
`
`there is no indication that they are not also generic and conventional, nor are these devicesrelated
`
`to Philips’ claimed inventive concepts. And Philips provides no other basis for disputing any of
`
`Fitbit’s SUF §§ 8-13. Thus, Fitbit’s SUF §] 7-13 are conclusively established.”
`
`Philips sole basis for disputing Fitbit’s SUF 4] 14 is misleading at best. Philips claimsthat
`
`“Dr. Quy further described key aspects ofthe ’377 patent” before selectively quoting only part of
`
`an answerthat Dr. Quy gave during a depositionin anothercase that does not involve Fitbit.* (Dkt.
`
`361 at 8-9 (quoting Dkt. 366-1 at 147:2-8).) But Dr. Quy’s complete answer, whichstarts on the
`
`page before Philips’ selective quotation, showsthat he was nottestifying about the °377 patent in
`
`the testimony Philips quoted, but rather, wastestifying about his separate ’191 patent:
`
`Another key element described in the one -- in the '191 patent was
`
`? Fitbit’s SUF {| 6-13 contradict Philips’ claim that Fitbit “has not even tried to address
`conventionality.”
`(Dkt. 361 at 11.) Like “generic,” “conventional” means known and non-
`specific. See, e.g., Electric Power Grp., LLC v. AlstomS.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`(“Nothing in the claims, understoodinlight of the specification, requires anything other than off-
`the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
`presenting the desired information.”). Fitbit explained that applying an abstract
`idea using
`conventional and well-understood techniquesis not inventive. (See Dkt. 334 at 10, 17-18.)
`> Philips North Am., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS(C.D. Cal. 2019).
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 13 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 13 of 18
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`the notion that because backin the late 90s — we’re talking about the
`last century, after all -- the capability of mobile phones and the like
`wasvery limited in terms of processing capability, memory, display
`size, what you could do on a mobile phone. So a key part of my
`invention back in the late 90s or mid 90s was figuring out what could
`be done within the constraints of what was then a nascent web-
`enabled wireless phone. Andthe solution to that was to pusha lot of
`the processing onto the backend server. And that was anotheraspect.
`(Fitbit Ex. 14 at 146:21-147:8 (emphasis added).) Moreover, Philips only appended 16 pages of
`
`this transcript to its Opposition. (See Dkt. 366-1.) The pages that Philips withheld further support
`
`Fitbit’s positions.
`(See Fitbit Ex.
`| at 180:24-181:14 (testifying that before ’377 patent priority
`date, it was commonly understood thatee»
`Andwith respect to Fitbit’s SUF ¥ 15, Philips’ dispute is nonsensical. (Dkt. 361 at 9.) Dr.
`
`Martin testified that claim 1 covers wired connections between the web-enabled wireless phone
`
`and the exercise machines in claim 9, some of whichare stationary exercise machines such as a
`
`treadmill.
`
`(See Dkt. 334, SUF ¥ 15 (citing Dkt. 338-1 at 132:11-133:9).) As a matter of law,all
`
`of asserted dependentclaims4, 5, 6, 9, and 12—which all depend from claim | and are not further
`
`limited to exclude wired connections to the exercise machineslisted in claim 9—also encompass
`
`wired connections between the web-enabled wireless phone and stationary exercise machines such
`
`as a treadmill. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007) (dependentclaims includeall the requirements of the claims from which they depend).
`
`Thus, each of Fitbit’s SUF 4 6-15 are conclusively established. Fitbit’s SUF §j 6-13
`
`establish that °377 patent claim | exclusively comprises generic, known, conventional, off-the-
`
`shelf components. (Dkt. 334, SUF 4 6-13.) Fitbit’s SUF {| 14-15 establish that °377 patent claim
`
`1 does not include any inventive concept related to “interactivity” or “mobility.”
`
`IV.
`
`PHILIPS’ IMPROPER RELIANCE ON THE PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED
`
`is appended to the Declaration of David J. Shaw, filed concurrently herewith.
`1
`* Fitbit Ex.
`Documents that were previously filed are cited herein by their docket numbers.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 14 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 14 of 18
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`CONCEPT OF AN IMPROVED “NETWORK PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE”
`SHOULD BE IGNORED
`
`°377 patent claim | is expressly drawn to “[a] method for interactive exercise monitoring.
`
`”?
`
`(Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1). Now, for the first time and with no evidentiary support, Philips asserts that
`
`“Claim | of the 377 patent is directed to a network platform architecture” and that “the °377
`
`patent is an improvement on the network platform and electronic performance and thus contains
`
`an inventive concept.” (Dkt. 361 at 12-14.) Philips similarly alleges for the first time that in claim
`
`element 1.g, the exercise-related data is sent to an “interactive remote server,’ whereas element
`
`1.g actually specifies an “internet server.” (Compare Dkt. 361 at 12, 19 with Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1.)°
`
`These alleged concepts are not claimed and thus irrelevant. See Am. Axle, 967 F.3d at 1293.
`
`Worse, Philips waived these theories. Pernix Ir. Pain DACv. Alvogen Malta Operations, Lid.,
`
`No. 16-139-WCB, 2018 WL 2225113, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81419, at *12-22 (D. Del. May 15,
`
`2018) (Bryson, J., by designation) (refusing to allow party to oppose summary judgment based on
`
`previously undisclosed theory); see also Abiomed v. Maquet Cardiovascular, 2021 WL 4477432,
`
`*8 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2021) (Saylor,J.) (refusing to consider motion for summary judgment based
`
`on same).
`
`Indeed, neither Dr. Martin’s deposition testimony nor his expert reports contain any
`
`information on, or suggestion of, an inventive “network platform architecture.” (See Dkt. 338-1;
`
`Dkt. 338-2; Dkt. 338-9.) The Court should ignore Philips’ new allegations.
`
`V.
`
`ELECTRIC POWER GROUP REMAINS THE MOST ON POINT CASE
`
`Finally, Philips cites three cases that it claims are analogous—CosmoKeySols. GmbH &
`
`> The ideathat the “internet server” of elements1 .g and 1.h is “interactive,” as Philips claims here,
`undermines Philips’
`infringement argument
`that a Cardio Fitness Score/Level can be the
`“calculated response” of element 1.h, because the Cardio Fitness Score/Level is not interactively
`provided in responseto the data sync of element 1.g. (See, e.g., Dkt. 364 at 5-6, n.6.) Further, the
`idea that the “internet server” of elements 1.g and 1.h is a “remote server,” as Philips claims here,
`undermines Philips’ argumentthat the “remote server” of element 1.a and the “internet server” of
`elements 1.g and 1.h are different servers. (See, e.g., Dkt. 276; Dkt. 291.)
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 15 of 18
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 374 Filed 04/13/22 Page 15 of 18
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`Co. KG v. Duo Sec. LLC, 15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
`
`Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM, 827 F.3d 1341.
`
`(Dkt. 361 at 12-14.)° None of
`
`these cases are on-point.
`
`For example, all three of Philips’ cases involved technically distinct claims from those
`
`here. CosmoKey, 15 F.4th at 1097 (“the focus of the claimed advance is activation of the
`
`authentication function, communication of the activation within a predetermined time, and
`
`automatic deactivation of the authentication function, such that the invention provides enhanced
`
`security and low complexity with minimaluser input.”); Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1299 (claimsrelated
`
`to “correlating two network accounting records to enhancethefirst record”); BASCOM, 827 F.3d
`
`at 1348 (claimsrelated to “filtering content on the internet”). Further, the finding of an inventive
`
`concept
`
`in Amdocs was based on unique circumstances; namely, the court’s construction of
`
`“enhance,” which “necessarily requires
`
`that
`
`these generic components operate in
`
`an
`
`unconventional mannerto achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” 841 F.3d at 1300-
`
`1301. There are no such circumstances here. Finally, the procedural posture wasdifferent in those
`
`cases. CosmoKey, 15 F.4th at 1093 (appeal of judgment on the pleadings); Amdocs, 841 F.3d at
`
`1290 (appeal ofjudgmenton the pleadings); BASCOM,827 F.3d at 1343, 1347 (review of granted
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) motion; standard of review required court to accept patentee’s allegationsastrue).
`
`In contrast, Electric Power Group involved technologically similar claims and the same
`
`summary judgment context, and thus remains the most on point case.
`
`(See Dkt. 334 at 18-20.)’
`
`© These cases are likely the sourceof Philips’ new “network platformarchitecture” argument. See,
`e.g., CosmoKey, 15 F.4th 1091 (related to “network security”); Amdocs, 841 F.3d 1288 (related to
`“distributed architecture”); BASCOM,827 F.3d 1341 (related to a “network’”).
`7 Electric Power Group is not limited to “whetherthe claims are directed to ‘non-conventional and
`non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces””as Philips claim