Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 1 of 27
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`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
`
`v.
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`
`FITBIT LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
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`
`
`
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`FITBIT’S OPPOSITION TO PHILIPS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
`AND NO INVALIDITY (DKT. 335)
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 2 of 27
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
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`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ..................................................1
`
`PHILIPS’ REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF LITERAL, DIRECT
`INFRINGEMENT BY FITBIT’S USERS IS UNSUPPORTED ........................................2
`
`A.
`
`The Accused Wearables And Fitbit Users Cannot Infringing Claim 1 ...................2
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`Pages
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`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot And Do Not Perform Elements 1.a, or 1.g-
`1.h.................................................................................................................2
`The Asserted Claims Require One Server To Perform
`a.
`Elements 1.a, 1.g, And 1.h, But Fitbit Uses Different
`Servers..............................................................................................2
`
`b.
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`c.
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`d.
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`e.
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`The Asserted Claims Require One Server To Perform
`Elements 1.g and 1.h, But Fitbit Uses Different Servers .................3
`
`The Accused System Does Not Provide A Calculated
`Response ..........................................................................................5
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`Resting Heart Rate Is Not Exercise-Related Information ................6
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`A Wi-Fi Network Is Not A “Wireless Network” Of
`Element 1.g ......................................................................................8
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot Perform Element 1.c .................................................9
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot Perform Element 1.b ...............................................10
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`B.
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`Philips’ Exclusively Circumstantial Evidence Of Alleged Infringement Is
`Insufficient Under Controlling Caselaw ................................................................10
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Cases Cited In Support Of Fitbit’s Motion For Summary
`Judgment Are Applicable; Philips’ Cited Cases Are Not ..........................11
`a.
`Philips’ Cited Cases Are Inapposite ..............................................11
`
`b.
`
`The Cases Cited By Fitbit Are Directly On-Point .........................12
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`The Accused Wearables Do Not Necessarily Infringe And Fitbit
`Does Not Instruct Its Users To Perform The Entire Accused
`Method In The Required Order, But Rather Advises Its Users Of
`Noninfringing Uses ....................................................................................13
`
`i
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 3 of 27
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
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`Pages
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`a.
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`b.
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`c.
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`Fitbit Instructs Its Users How To Use The Accused
`Wearables With A Tablet Or PC, Which Does Not Infringe .........14
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`The Accused Wearables Can Sync Data When The User Is
`Not Exercising And Fitbit Does Not Instruct Its Users That
`Syncing Data While Exercising Is Preferred .................................16
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`The Accused Wearables May Sync Data Without Using A
`Wireless Network...........................................................................18
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`DR. PARADISO PRESENTED ADEQUATE EVIDENCE THAT THE IFIT
`SYSTEM PRACTICES ELEMENT 1.H ...........................................................................18
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`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................20
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`IV.
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`V.
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`ii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 4 of 27
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Pages
`
`Cases
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`ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., Ltd
`501 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)....................................................................... 12, 13, 16, 18
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
` 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ........................................................................................................... 2
`
`Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1990)............................................................................................. 2
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 2
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................... 19
`
`E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,
`473 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................... 12, 14
`
`Finnigan Corp. v. ITC
`180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)......................................................................................... 20
`
`Fleming v. Escort Inc.,
`774 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 20
`
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................... 11, 13
`
`IAP Intermodal, LLC vs. Northwest Airlines Corp.,
`No. 2:04-cv-65, 2005 WL 6217423 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2005) ........................................... 7
`
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`Moleculon Res. Corp. v. CBS, Inc.,
` 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).................................................................................... 9, 11
`
`Noonan v. Staples, Inc.,
` 556 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................ 2
`
`Thomson S.A. v. Quixote Corp.
`166 F.3d 1172 (Fed.Cir.1999).......................................................................................... 20
`
`iii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 5 of 27
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
`
`Pages
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
` 681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).................................................................................. 11, 12
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc.,
` No. 13-1835-RGA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153651 (D. Del. Aug. 6, 2021) .................. 20
`
`Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................... 9
`
`Wonderland Nurserygoods Co. v. Thorley Indus. LLC,
`No. 2:13-cv-00387, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110935 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2015) .............. 20
`
`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ....................................................................................................................... 2
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) ................................................................................................................... 2
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`iv
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 6 of 27
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Philips seeks summary judgment that Fitbit’s users literally, directly infringe the ’377
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`patent’s asserted method claims. (Dkt. 335, 340 at 2-18.) However, use of the nine “Accused
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`Wearables” (see Dkt. 340 at 1, n.1) by Fitbit users does not literally infringe because (1) elements
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`1.a, 1.g, and 1.h must be performed by the same server, but the accused Fitbit system uses multiple
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`different servers to perform the accused steps, (2) the accused “calculated response” of element
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`1.h is not a response to the accused triggering action specified by element 1.g, (3) resting heart rate
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`data is not “exercise-related information” under element 1.h, (4) the Accused Wearables do not
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`sync data over a “wireless network” as required by element 1.g, and (5) Fitbit’s users do not
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`literally practice elements 1.b or 1.c. Further, even putting aside those arguments, Philips presents
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`no evidence that any user has practiced every step of the accused method.1 Nor does Philips allege
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`that the Accused Wearables necessarily infringe—rather Philips admits that Fitbit instructs its
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`users how to use the Accused Wearables in various noninfringing ways, for example, by pairing
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`them with a tablet or PC. Summary judgment of infringement is therefore inappropriate.
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`Philips also seeks summary judgment of no invalidity because iFit allegedly does not
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`disclose ’377 patent element 1.h. (Dkt. 335, 340 at 18-20.) But Philips mischaracterizes the
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`evidence and case law. Summary judgment of no invalidity is also inappropriate.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
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`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
`
`
`1 The only act accused of infringing occurs when a user downloads the Fitbit app to their phone
`and pairs it to their Accused Wearable, then their exercise-related information syncs from the
`Accused Wearable through their phone to the Fitbit back-end datacenter via a wireless network
`while they are exercising, and then they view their Cardio Fitness Score/Level on the phone. (See
`Dkt. 342-1, ¶ 134, 188; see also Dkt. 338-1 at 127:21-128:18, 149:13-150:1, 200:20-201:3.)
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 7 of 27
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`Civ. P. 56(a); see also Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1990). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
`
`return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
`
`(1986). Admissible evidence is required to support summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
`
`When the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute
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`of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show a genuine factual issue for trial.
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`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The
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`court must “view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable
`
`inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).
`
`III.
`
`PHILIPS’ REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF LITERAL, DIRECT
`INFRINGEMENT BY FITBIT’S USERS IS UNSUPPORTED
`
`Claim 1 is the only remaining asserted independent claim, and all other remaining asserted
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`claims depend from claim 1. (Dkt. 342-1, ¶ 2; Dkt. 338-3.) Philips’ request for summary judgment
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`that Fitbit’s users literally, directly infringe the asserted claims is inappropriate on two independent
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`grounds: (1) the Accused Wearables are incapable of infringing and (2) Philips’ exclusively
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`circumstantial evidence of alleged infringement is insufficient under controlling caselaw.
`
`A.
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`The Accused Wearables And Fitbit Users Cannot Infringing Claim 1
`
`Because the Accused Wearables are incapable of infringing claim 1, from which all other
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`asserted claims depend, Philips’ motion should be denied as to all asserted claims.
`
`1.
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot And Do Not Perform Elements 1.a, or 1.g-1.h
`
`The Accused Wearables cannot practice claim elements 1.a, 1.g, and 1.h. That alone
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`justifies denying Philips’ request for summary judgment.
`
`a.
`
`The Asserted Claims Require One Server To Perform Elements
`1.a, 1.g, And 1.h, But Fitbit Uses Different Servers
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`
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 8 of 27
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`First, as explained in Fitbit’s Motion for the Construction of Three Related Claim Terms,
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`which Fitbit incorporates by reference herein, the “server” in element 1.a is the same server as that
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`in elements 1.g-h. (See Dkt. 275, 276.) Under Philips’ infringement theory, by contrast, the server
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`in element 1.a is an Apple or Google server that is completely different from the Fitbit servers to
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`which Philips points to satisfy elements 1.g and 1.h. (See Dkt. 340 at 4-5.) Thus, if the Court
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`adopts Fitbit’s construction, then the accused Fitbit system cannot practice claim 1.2
`
`b.
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`The Asserted Claims Require One Server To Perform Elements
`1.g and 1.h, But Fitbit Uses Different Servers
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`Claim elements 1.g and 1.h read: “g. sending the exercise-related information to an internet
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`server via a wireless network; h. receiving a calculated response from the server, the response
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`associated with a calculation performed by the server based on the exercise-related
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`information….” (Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1.) Philips’ arguments regarding elements 1.g and 1.h (Dkt. 340
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`at 7, 10) ignore the key dispute—in elements 1.g and 1.h, the same server must receive the
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`exercise-related information, perform a calculation “based on” that information, and send the
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`calculated response (i.e., Cardio Fitness Score/Level). (See Dkt. 338-1 at 144:1-145:9; Dkt. 338-
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`3, cl. 1; see also Dkt. 338-8 at 1495, 1598 (amending claim 1 to refer to “the” server in what
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`ultimately became element 1.h).) On the contrary, for the entire damages period, in Fitbit’s
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`accused system, the server array that received data syncs was separate from the server arrays that
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`sent a Cardio Fitness Score/Level to a user. (Fitbit’s Responses to Philips’ Statements of Fact and
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`Fitbit’s Responsive Statements of Fact filed concurrently herewith (“RSF”), ¶¶ 98-99, 112-119;
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`see generally Dkt. 330 at 12-15.) Realizing this, Philips presents a brand new infringement theory.
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`Specifically, Philips now argues that “it is undisputed that whichever server or tier of
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`2 To grant Philips’ motion, the Court must decide that dispute in Philips’ favor. But the Court can
`deny Philips’ motion without deciding that dispute, by adopting any of Fitbit’s other arguments.
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 9 of 27
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`servers that performs the Cardio Fitness Score calculation (the “Calculation Server”) does so using
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`data sent by the Fitbit App during a sync” and “the result of the calculation (the Cardio Fitness
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`Score) is received by the smartphone from the Calculation Server, regardless of whether the Cardio
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`Fitness Score passes through intermediate servers before ultimately being received by the
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`smartphone.” (Dkt. 340 at 11.) This too is incorrect.3 In particular, even under Philips’ new
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`theory, there must be one server or server array that receives the exercise-related information,
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`performs a calculation “based on the exercise-related information,” and sends the Cardio Fitness
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`Score/Level. (Dkt. 340 at 11.)4 This is not how Fitbit’s system works.
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`When a user’s Accused Wearable syncs data, the data are sent to and received by the mobile
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`client tier of servers. (RSF, ¶¶ 98-99.) When this synced data include resting heart rate data, the
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` (RSF, ¶¶ 98-101, 119.) The user’s Cardio Fitness Score is subsequently calculated
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`and then
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`This
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`during a sync. (RSF, ¶ 111.) Yet another separate
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` (RSF, ¶¶ 100-104, 106, 110, 119.)
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`sends a user’s Cardio Fitness Score/Level for display on the Fitbit app. (RSF,
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`¶¶ 112-119.) Specifically, upon receiving an API call for a Cardio Fitness Score/Level, a
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` the user’s Cardio Fitness Score from the database tier,
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`determines the user’s Cardio Fitness Level
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` and sends the
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`3 Worse still, this is a brand new argument that was never presented in Philips’ contentions or
`expert report, and thus should be stricken and ignored. (See Fitbit Ex. 5; Dkt. 342-1.)
`4 Philips’ claim that distance, active minutes, and steps are “exercise-related information” under
`element 1.h (Dkt. 340 at 4, 6, n.6) is irrelevant.
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`(RSF, ¶¶ 104, 106.)
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 10 of 27
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`Cardio Fitness Score/Level for display on the Fitbit app. (RSF, ¶¶ 118-119.)5 There is no overlap
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`among any of these
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` (RSF, ¶ 119.) The following table summarizes the
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`relevant functions of these different
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` in the accused Fitbit method:
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`
`
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`
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`, even via the indirect
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`Thus, there is no
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`method posited in Philips’ new infringement argument. Therefore, the Accused Wearables are
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`incapable of practicing elements 1.g and 1.h (i.e., incapable of infringing), even if Philips’ new
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`theory is considered. That alone warrants denying Philips’ request for summary judgment.
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`c.
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`The Accused System Does Not Provide A Calculated Response
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`Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level are the only alleged “calculated response”
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`of element 1.h. (See Dkt. 342-1, ¶ 134, 188; see also Dkt. 338-1 at 127:21-128:18, 149:13-150:1,
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`200:20-201:3; Dkt. 340 at 12.) But those metrics are not calculated responses.
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`The claim language of elements 1.g and 1.h requires that “receiving a calculated response”
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`occurs in response to “sending the exercise-related information to an internet server”—i.e.,
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`“sending the exercise-related information to an internet server” triggers “receiving a calculated
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`5 Although Cardio Fitness Score and Cardio Fitness Level are determined in different ways on
`different server tiers (RSF, ¶¶ 104, 106, 110, 118, 119), Dr. Martin claims they are “based off of
`the [same] exercise related data” (Dkt. 338-11 at 11598; Dkt. 342-1, ¶ 162).
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 11 of 27
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`response.” This plain meaning is supported by the specification, which consistently refers to the
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`calculated response as a return to the triggering step of “sending the exercise-related information
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`to an internet server.” (See, e.g., Dkt. 338-3, Abstract, Fig. 6, 10:35-38, 10:44-53.) This plain
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`meaning is also supported by the preamble of claim 1, which specifies that the claim relates to a
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`“method for interactive exercise monitoring.” (Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1.) As Fitbit’s expert, Dr. Paradiso,
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`explained, “[i]nteractivity would have implied, to a POSITA, a process of sending a triggering
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`prompt and quickly receiving a related response to that prompt—here, the triggering prompt is
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`‘sending the exercise related information to an internet server’ and the response is ‘receiving a
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`calculated response from the server.’” (Dkt. 342-12, ¶ 283.)
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`Conversely,
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`
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`
` (RSF, ¶ 97.) The data center sending a Cardio Fitness
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`Score/Level is
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`. (RSF, ¶ 118.)6
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`Therefore, the Accused Wearables do not practice element 1.h (i.e., do not infringe) under
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`Philips’ theory. This too warrants denying Philips’ request for summary judgment.
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`d.
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`Resting Heart Rate Is Not Exercise-Related Information
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`Philips’ infringement theory further ignores that under element 1.h, the relevant calculation
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`must be calculated “based on the exercise-related information.” (Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1.) Again, this is
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`not how the Fitbit system works with respect to a Resting Heart Rate Cardio Fitness Score.
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`Fitbit calculates RHR Cardio Fitness Score via the formula:
`
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`
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`6 This also undermines Philips’ argument that, if the preamble is limiting, it is met. (Dkt. 340 at
`3-4.) Specifically, when a Fitbit user views their Cardio Fitness Score/Level, they are not
`practicing “a method for interactive exercise monitoring” (Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1 (emphasis added))
`because the Cardio Fitness Score/Level is not
`.
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 12 of 27
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` None of the inputs to
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`Fitbit’s calculation of RHR Cardio Fitness Score—most importantly
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`—are
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`“exercise-related information.” (RSF, ¶¶ 104-105, 108, 109.)7 Thus, RHR Cardio Fitness Score
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`is not associated with a calculation “based on the exercise-related information.”
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`Philips’ counter-argument strains credulity. Specifically, Philips and its expert, Dr. Martin,
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`argue that the calculation of
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` is “based on”
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` (See,
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`e.g., Dkt. 330 at 18; Dkt. 338-1 at 205:8-207:11, 217:7-219:7.) Philips’ own argument and case
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`cite regarding the meaning of “based on” also contradict this theory. Philips argues that “the plain
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`and ordinary meaning of ‘based on’ should include all inputs to the calculation” and characterizes
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`IAP Intermodal, LLC vs. Northwest Airlines Corp. as “construing ‘based on’ to mean ‘taking into
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`consideration’.” (Dkt. 340 at 13 (citing No. 2:04-cv-65, 2005 WL 6217423, at *10 (E.D. Tex.
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`Sept. 7, 2005).) The
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` does not meet either of these
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`definitions. First, that data is not an “input” to the calculation of
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`, because the
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`7 Dr. Martin refused to say whether resting heart rate is “exercise-related information.” (See Dkt.
`338-1 at 206:4-217:5.)
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`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 13 of 27
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`is calculated. Second, the
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`Therefore, the Accused Wearables do not practice element 1.h (i.e., do not infringe) under
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`Philips’ theory with respect to RHR Cardio Fitness Score/Level. This warrants denying Philips’
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`request for summary judgment with respect to RHR Cardio Fitness Score/Level.
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`e.
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`A Wi-Fi Network Is Not A “Wireless Network” Of Element 1.g
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`Philips argues that a Wi-Fi network is a “wireless network” in the context of claim element
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`1.g. (Dkt. 340 at 7-9.) Philips’ argument is contradicted by the intrinsic evidence.
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`Dr. Paradiso explained that Wi-Fi is not a “wireless network” in the context of the
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`connection between the web-enabled wireless phone and the internet server in element 1.g. In
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`particular, Dr. Paradiso pointed out that the specification repeatedly disparages systems with
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`“location based restraints” that cannot be used “away from home.” (Dkt. 342-12, ¶ 218 (citing
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`’377 patent at 2:15-21; 3:14-20; 3:43-57).) Wi-Fi networks are wired via their modems, and
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`present the same location-based restraints as the prior art systems upon which the ’377 patent
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`claims to improve. Dr. Martin confirmed the location-based restraints of Wi-Fi networks—their
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`range is “on the order of…50 to 100 yards.” (Dkt. 338-1 at 140:11-16.) That is hardly the type of
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`“significantly” extended range that the ’377 patent promises to enable, thereby eliminating location
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`based restraints and allowing users to receive guidance away from home. (See, e.g., Dkt. 338-3 at
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`2:15-21, 3:14-20, 3:52-57, 4:23-26, 6:36-44 and Fig. 1 (phone connected to cellular base station
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`with antenna), 7:46-55 and Fig. 3 (same), 7:65-8:2 (same).)8 In fact, during prosecution, the
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`8 Philips and Dr. Martin argued that an alleged “inventive concept” supporting § 101 validity is
`eliminating such location-based restraints. If a Wi-Fi network is “wireless,” it directly conflicts
`with Philips’ argument for this alleged inventive concept. (See Dkt. 334 at 11-15.)
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`
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`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 14 of 27
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`applicant distinguished the Brown and Root references because they are tethered to a wire and
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`cannot be “taken on a bike ride,” thus “completely defeat[ing]” the “purpose of the invention.”
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`(Dkt. 342-12, ¶¶ 221-222 (discussing ’377 patent file history).)9 Similarly, a Wi-Fi modem is
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`hardwired to a user’s internet jack, so it too cannot be taken on a bike ride, and would completely
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`defeat the purpose of the ’377 patented inventions if it is a “wireless network.” See Moleculon
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`Res. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“the prosecution history can and
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`should, where relevant, be assessed…in properly interpreting claim language”) (citations omitted).
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`Philips argues that claims 5 and 6 support that a Wi-Fi network is a wireless network by
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`referring to the 802.11 standard. (Dkt. 340 at 8.) But claims 5 and 6 pertain to the connection
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`between the web-enabled wireless phone and the device which provides exercise-related
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`information (see Dkt. 338-3); they are irrelevant to the “wireless network” connection between the
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`phone and the “internet server.” In fact, claim element 1.a discusses transmission “over the
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`internet” while element 1.g discusses transmission “via a wireless network.” Different claim
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`language typically indicates a different scope or meaning, see, e.g., Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple
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`Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which further confirms that transmission “via a wireless
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`network” does not include all transmission “over the internet,” as Philips appears to assume. In
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`fact, the claim language requires that the “wireless network” connect all the way to an “internet
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`server.” (Dkt. 338-3, cl. 1.) Philips does not argue that a user’s home Wi-Fi network establishes
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`a wireless connection all the way to the alleged internet servers in Fitbit’s back-end.
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`Syncing data via a Wi-Fi network does not practice element 1.g (i.e., does not infringe).
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`2.
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot Perform Element 1.c
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`With respect to element 1.c, Philips contends that “when the Fitbit App displays a Cardio
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`9 The portions of the file history quoted, cited, and discussed by Dr. Paradiso in this portion of his
`expert report are attached hereto as Fitbit Ex. 4 for reference.
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`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 15 of 27
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`Fitness Score a user interface is rendered on the web-enabled wireless phone” and Fitbit’s users
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`“cause[] the smartphone…to render the user interface.” (Dkt. 340 at 13-14.) But element 1.c does
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`not say “causing a user interface to be rendered,” it says “rendering a user interface.” (Dkt. 338-
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`3, cl. 1.) Philips’ strategic use of passive voice obscures who is literally performing the element.
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`(See Dkt. 269 at 7-9.) Otherwise, Philips would have to admit that the Fitbit application, not
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`Fitbit’s users, literally renders the Fitbit app’s user interface; Dr. Martin and Philips have admitted
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`as much in this case. (RSF, ¶ 123.) Philips should not be granted summary judgment that Fitbit’s
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`users literally infringe claim 1 just two months after arguing that Fitbit’s users do not literally
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`practice element 1.c. (See Dkt. 286 at 12-13 (“…the Fitbit App…does the actual rendering).)10
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`3.
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`Fitbit’s Users Cannot Perform Element 1.b
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`Similarly, Philips’ conclusory argument that Fitbit’s users perform element 1.b (Dkt. 340
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`at 5) ignores Dr. Paradiso’s opinion that the operating system, not Fitbit’s users, couples the
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`Accused Wearable and the user’s phone. (Dkt. 342-12, ¶ 177 (“pairing is implemented and
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`controlled by the mobile phone, tablet, or computer’s operating system”); Dkt. 342-14 at 266:21-
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`269:12 (“…The phone will do the coupling….”)). At most, the Fitbit user causes the “coupling,”
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`but does not literally perform the “coupling” of element 1.b. Thus, there is a material dispute
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`whether Fitbit users literally perform element 1.b. This too warrants denying summary judgment.
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`B.
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`Philips’ Exclusively Circumstantial Evidence Of Alleged Infringement Is
`Insufficient Under Controlling Caselaw
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`Even if the Court finds that users are hypothetically capable of infringing claim 1, summary
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`judgment is still inappropriate because Philips presents no evidence that any Fitbit user actually
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`10 Philips claims that whether Fitbit (via the Fitbit app) or the phone manufacturers (via their
`mobile operating systems) practice element 1.c is moot with respect to its motion. (Dkt. 340 at 14
`n.16.) Quite the opposite—the question of whether Fitbit’s users literally practice every element
`of the claims is the only question the Court must answer to decide Philips’ motion.
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`10
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 16 of 27
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`performed every step of claim 1 in the required order, and Fitbit publicize noninfringing uses. To
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`prove infringement of a method, Philips must prove that Fitbit’s users actually practice the accused
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`method, not merely that they are capable of doing so. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620
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`F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Philips’ alleged evidence falls well short, particularly given its
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`failure to identify direct evidence of a user in the U.S. who performed all of the accused method
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`steps in the required order and the undisputed fact that the Accused Wearables have various
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`noninfringing uses that Fitbit publicizes and does not discourage its users from employing.11
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`1.
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`The Cases Cited In Support Of Fitbit’s Motion For Summary
`Judgment Are Applicable; Philips’ Cited Cases Are Not
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`There are two separate lines of cases regarding summary judgment of infringement or
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`noninfringement of method claims where the patentee does not provide direct evidence of any
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`individual practicing all the steps of the claimed method. Here, the facts closely resemble those
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`of the cases cited by Fitbit, and diverge from those of the cases cited by Philips.
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`a.
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`Philips’ Cited Cases Are Inapposite
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`Summary judgment of infringement based on circumstantial evidence of users practicing a
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`method claim is only appropriate in the narrow circumstances of the cases cited by Philips—
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`Moleculon, Lucent, and Toshiba. (See Dkt. 340 at 2, 16.)
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`In Moleculon, summary judgment of infringement was granted based on extensive sales of
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`the accused products, dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the entire infringing method,
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`and the availability of a solution booklet teaching the entire infringing method. Moleculon Res.
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`Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1996).12 Similarly, in Toshiba, the court
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`affirmed summary judgment of infringement because the accused disc-at-once mode necessarily
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`11 This is especially true when all reasonable inferences are made in Fitbit’s favor, as required.
`12 A careful reading of Moleculon also suggests that every user of the accused Rubik’s Cube game
`necessarily infringed. See Moleculon, 793 F.3d at 1263-4 (excerpting asserted claims).
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`11
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 17 of 27
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`infringed, and the defendant designed the product for use in the disc-at-once mode and
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`recommended that its customers use that mode while advising against using other noninfringing
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`modes. Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1364-6 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`Philips also cites Lucent, a jury verdict review. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580
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`F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). There, the circumstantial evidence suggested that the defendant
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`specifically designed the accused products to practice the claimed invention and instructed its
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`customers to use the accused products in an infringing way. Id. at 1318. “The circumstantial
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`documentary evidence, supplementing [patentee’s] experts’ testimony, was just barely sufficient
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`to permit the jury to find direct infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
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`These opinions reveal the limited circumstances in which summary judgment of
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`infringement of method claims based on circumstantial evidence is appropriate. The accused
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`products must necessarily infringe, or they must be specifically designed to infringe and the
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`accused infringer must instruct its users to employ the infringing mode over noninfringing ones.
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`b.
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`The Cases Cited By Fitbit Are Directly On-Point
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`On the contrary, summary judgment of noninfringement of a method claim is appropriate
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`in the circumstances of the ACCO Brands, E-Pass, and Fujitsu cases, which were extensively cited
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`and discussed in support of Fitbit’s motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. 332 at 6-11.)
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`In E-Pass, the patentee’s evidence did not “teach all of the steps of the claimed method
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`together, much less in the required order.” E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 473 F.3d 1213,
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`1222 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Instead, the evidence showed, “at best, that the [] defendants taught their
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`customers each step of the claimed method in isolation.” Id. Further, “the very same record
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`evidence upon which [plaintiff] attempts to rely also shows that the accused PDAs are general-
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`purpose computing devices that can be used for a variety of purposes and in a variety of ways.”
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`Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement because “it requires too
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`12
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 364 Filed 03/30/22 Page 18 of 27
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`speculative a leap to conclude that any customer actually performed the claimed method.” Id.
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`In Fujitsu, the accused products worked in multiple modes, only