Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 1 of 26
`
`IN THE U ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Civil Action o. 1 :19-cv-11586-FDS
`
`V.
`
`FITBIT, LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT FITBIT, LLC'S MOTION
`FORS MMARY JUDGMENT OF INV ALIDlTY OF
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8,277.377 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 2 of 26
`
`TABLE OF CO TENTS
`
`1.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
`
`IL
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Sumrnary Judgtncnt ......................... ........................................................................ 2
`
`Invalidity Under§ 101 ............................................................................................. 2
`
`ST A TEME T OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ................................................. .4
`
`ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 6
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Directed To An Abstract Idea ........................................ 6
`
`The Asserted '377 Patent Claims Do Not Supply /\.n Inventive Concept ............... 8
`
`I .
`
`Utilizing A Back-End Server Was Not lnvcntivc ........................................ 8
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`The Claims Do Not Provide An Enhanced User Interface
`Or lncreased Computing Capacity Or Processing Power .............. I 0
`
`The Claims Do Not " Eliminate Location Based Restraints" ......... 11
`
`The Alleged Elimination Of Location Based Restraints Did
`Not Lead To The Outcomes Dr. Martin Posits .............................. 14
`
`2.
`
`Downloading An Application Was Not lnventivc ..................................... 15
`
`C.
`
`Case Law Supports Fitbit's Request For Summary Judgment .............................. 18
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 20
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 3 of 26
`
`TABLE OF A THORITIES
`
`Aatrix Software, inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1121 (Fe<i. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Am. Axle & Mfg., /11c. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
`967 F.3d 1285 (Fe<i. Cir. 2020) .................................................................................... 8, 17
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 2
`
`Becton Dicki11son & Co. Y. C.R. Bard, inc. ,
`922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. I 990) ............................................................................................. 2
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc. ,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................... 4
`
`BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc. ,
`899 F.3d 128 1 (Fe<i. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 3, I 0, 16
`
`CardioNel, LLC v. !11f0Bio11ic, Inc.,
`816 F. App'x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................... 7, 20
`
`Cellspin Soft. Inc. v. Fitbil, Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1306, 13 16 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................ 3
`
`Celotex Co,p. v. Catretl,
`477 U.S. 3 17 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 2
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass ·n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................... 7
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450U.S.175(198l) ................................................................................................ 3, 10, 17
`
`Electric Power G,p., LLC v. Alstom SA.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 7, 16, 18
`
`Exergen Co1p. v. Brook/ands Inc.,
`No. 12-12243-DPW, 0kt. 124 (D . Mass. Aug. 28, 2015) .................................................. 4
`
`Iverson v. City Of Boston,
`452 F.3d 94 (ISL Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... ····················---- 2
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 4 of 26
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd}
`
`Matsushita £lee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co,p.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) ........................................................................................................... 2
`
`Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc.,
`503 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................................................................................... 13
`
`Palomar Tech., inc. v. MSRJ Sys., LLC,
`No. 18- 10236-FDS, Dkt. 772 (D. Mass. May 28, 2020) .................................................. 20
`
`PerkinElmer, inc. v. intema Ltd.,
`496 Fed. Appx. 65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................. 20
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Co,p.,
`8 11 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................ 13
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. 1t. Comcast Cable Commc 'ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 20 l 7) ................................................................................... 10, 17
`
`Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co.,
`724 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. l 984) ........................................................................................... 2
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § IO 1 ............................................................................................................... 2, 4, 17, 20
`35 u.s.c. § l 12 ......................................................................................................................... 4, 13
`
`35 U.S.C.§ 102 .............................................................................................................................. 17
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ....................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Local Rule 56. l ............................................................................................................................... 4
`
`Ill
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 5 of 26
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,277,377 (the '"377 patent") contains routine clain1 elements that were
`
`combined, piecemeal, in a routine way to distinguish the prior art used by the patent examiner to
`
`reject the claims at least five times during prosecution, on multiple grounds each time. (See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. 8 1 at 1549-54, 1621-34, 1679-87, 1737-45, 1831-43.) As a result, these conventional claim
`
`elements make up claims that are directed to an abstract idea and supply no inventive concept.
`
`This Court already determined that asserted claim J "is directed to the abstract concept of
`
`coUecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information" at Alice step one. (0kt. 219 at
`
`12.)2 Fitbit's expert, Dr. Paradiso, concluded that asserted claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12, which depend
`
`from claim I, are drawn to the same abstract concept and Philips' expert, Dr. Martin, does not
`
`challenge that conclusion.
`
`While the Court noted that at the 12(b)(6) '•stage, it is enough to find [the '377] patent,
`
`coupled with the plausible allegations of the complaint, sufficiently indicates that" the asserted
`
`claims contain an inventive concept at Alice step two, the Court also noted that "those allegations
`
`may well prove to be unsupported" because discove1y may ''reveal that the claims of the '377
`
`patent do not in fact reveal an inventive concept." (Dkt. 2 19 at 15.) That is exactly what happened.
`
`Fact and expert discovery revealed that the allegations Philips relied upon to overcome
`
`Fitbit's Rule I 2(b)(6) motion are unsupported. The purported inventive concepts of the asserted
`
`claims are neither present in the claims nor inventive, but rather, are conclusory statements
`
`regarding conventional, routi11e, and well-understood applications in the art. Thus, the asse1ted
`
`claims also fail Alice step two and Fitbit requests sununary judgment of§ 101 invalidity.
`
`1 AU cited exhibits arc attached to the Declaration of David J. Shaw, filed concurrently herewith.
`2 The briefing and ruling on Fitbit's Rule 12(b)(6) motion only addressed claim 1 because Fitbit's
`Rule 12(b)(6) motion argued that claim 1 is representative and Philips did not dispute that
`argument. (See, e.g. , 0kt. 219 at 9, n.3.) Fitbit reiterates that claim 1 is representative.
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 6 of 26
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL ST NDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Summary Judgment
`
`" The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
`
`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 56(a); see also Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, inc., 922 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1990). A genuine issue ormaterial fact exists if"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
`
`return a verdict for the nonmoving pa1fy." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
`
`( 1986). The movant can succeed by citing to affirmative evidence or by showing that the non(cid:173)
`
`movant cannot establish a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
`
`When the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute
`
`over any material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that there is a genuine factual
`
`issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317, 323-24 ( 1986). But "[t]he mere existence
`
`of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477
`
`U.S. at 252. ln other words, the "opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
`
`metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co1p.,
`
`475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In fact, the court may not simply accept the non-movant's conclusory
`
`statement that a fact is "disputed." Union Carbide Corp. ,,. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571
`
`(Fed. C ir. 1984). Thus, unlike the Rule l2(b)(6) stage, at summary judgment the non-movant must
`
`"demonstrate, through submissions of evidentia1y quality, that a trial worthy issue persists."
`
`lverson v. City Of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006).
`
`B.
`
`Invalidity Under § 101
`
`An invention is generally patentable if it qualifies as a "new and useful process, machine,
`
`manufacture. or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. "[T]his provision contains an important
`
`implicit exception. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable."
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 7 of 26
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`Mayo Coflaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (20 12) (citing Diamo,zd v. Diehr,
`
`450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). ln Alice, the Supreme Court set forth the familiar two-step test «for
`
`distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
`
`that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Co,p .. 573 U.S. at 217.
`
`At step one, the court detennines "whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
`
`patent-ineligible concepts" that is so abstract as to "risk disproportionately tying up the use of[]
`
`underlying ideas." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). If the answer is "yes," as it is here (see
`
`Dkt. 219 at 12), the court continues to step two. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
`
`At step two, courts "examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an
`
`· inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible
`
`application." id. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 80). ln other words, courts ask "[w]hat
`
`else is there in the claims" beyond the abstract idea found at step one. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77. An
`
`" inventive concept" is an "element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the
`
`patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself."
`
`Alice, 573 U.S. al 218; see also Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fe<i. Cir.
`
`2019) ("An inventive concept reflects something more than the application of an abstract idea
`
`using 'well-understood~ routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.'")
`
`(quoting Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software. Inc., 882 F.3d 11 21, 1128 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2018)); BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons. Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 , 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("Claim
`
`limitations that recite conventional, routine and well understood applications in the art arc
`
`insufficient to supply an inventive concept.").
`
`"When examining the individual elements [for an inventive concept], [com1s] consider
`
`whether the clements of a claim arc 'well-understood, routine, [or] conventional.. .. ,,. Exergen
`
`3
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`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 8 of 26
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`Corp. v. Brook/ands Inc., No. 12-12243-DPW, Dkt. 124 at 11 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2015) (quoting
`
`M ayo, 566 U.S. at 79). "When considering the claim as a whole, [courts] must consider the steps
`
`as an ordered combination to determine whether the claims add something to the [abstract concept]
`
`that is not present when the steps are considered separately." Id .
`
`.. Patent eligibility under 35 U .S.C. § 101 is ultimately an issue of law," even where it
`
`"contain[s] underlying issues of fact." Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2018). "When there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the claim element or
`
`claimed combination is well-understood, routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the
`
`relevant field, this issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 1368.
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF 1'~ISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
`
`Fitbit presents the following numbered statement of undisputed material facts pursuant to
`
`Local Rule 56.1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Fitbit may present additional
`
`undisputed material facts or reply to Philips' allegations regarding Fitbit' s statement of undisputed
`
`material facts in its reply brief, if appropriate.
`
`l.
`
`The '377 patent is the only remaining, non-stayed, asserted patent in this case. (See,
`
`e.g., Dkt. 112 (Second Amended Complaint, asserting '007, '233, and ' 377 patents); 0kt. 212 at
`
`12-21 (finding asserted '007 claims invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112); Dkt. 251
`
`(stipulating to stay proceedings with respect to '233 patent given PT AB ' s final written decision
`
`that all asserted claims of the '233 patent are unpatentablc).)
`
`2.
`
`'377 patent claims l , 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are the only remaining asserted claims in
`
`this case. (See, e.g., Ex. 2, 12.)
`
`3.
`
`'377 patent claim l is a method claim and the only remaining asserted independent
`
`claim in this case. (See, e.g., Ex. 2, ,r 2 (listing asse1ted claims); Ex. 3 at els. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
`
`4.
`
`'377 patent claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are each method claims that depend, directly
`
`4
`
`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 9 of 26
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`or indirectly, from claim 1. (Ex. 3 at els. 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
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`5.
`
`Philips· claimed priority date for the ' 377 patent is December 17, 1999. (See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. I at55:13- 16;iJEx.3at I.)
`
`6.
`
`The '377 patent "employs conventional, "off-the-shelf components." (Dkt. 219 at
`
`13; see also Ex. 3, 2:37-40~ Ex. 13 at 39:25-40: 14, 45: 16-4 7:24, 51: 19-54: 10, 183 : I 0-21.)
`
`7.
`
`The device which provides exercise related information of claim I is a generic,
`
`known component. (Ex. 3, 2:59-3:42, 4:19-22, 5:55-6:3, 12:63-13:1; Ex. 13 at 198:6-199:3.)
`
`8.
`
`The web-enabled wireless phone of claim 1 is a generic, known component. (Ex.
`
`3, 3:52-65; Ex. 14 (discussing and picturing conventional cell phones); Ex. 13 at 194:9- 13 .)
`
`9.
`
`Coupling the web-enabled wireless phone to a device which provides exercise-
`
`related infonnation in claim 1 uses generic, known techniques. (Ex. 3, 3:66-4: 18, 6: 14-28, I 0:63-
`
`12:49~ Ex. 13 at 20 1: 13-18.)
`
`10.
`
`Downloading and using the application to render the user interface, receive data,
`
`and display the response in claim 1 use generic, known techniques. (Ex. 3, Abstract, 3: 14-26,
`
`3:44-51, 4:43-5:3, 5: 10-12, 8:3-12, 9:6-9, 9:22-10:61; Ex. 13 at 195:6-9, 195: 12-15, 197:19-22,
`
`199:4-7, 199:10-13, 202:20-24, 205:8-12, 215:9-12, 215:13-17.)
`
`11 .
`
`Sending exercise-related information to an internet server and receiving a
`
`calculated response from the internet server in claim I uses generic, known techniques. (Ex. 3,
`
`6:39-44, 7:46-64; Ex. 13 at 215: 18-216:8.)
`
`12.
`
`A calculation performed by the server based on the exercise-related information in
`
`claim 1 uses generic, known techniques. (Ex. 3, 8: 13-44, 9:22-10:61; Ex. 13 at 216:9- 17.)
`
`13.
`
`The server(s) in claim 1 are generic, known components. (See, e.g., Ex. 3 (never
`
`describing or claiming any specialized server structure or function); Ex. 13 at 215: 18- 19, 216:7-
`
`5
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`

`

`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 10 of 26
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`17
`
`.)
`
`14.
`
`The '377 patent's named inventor, Dr. Roger J. Quy, described the
`
`of the '377 patent and its provisional application as:
`
`(Ex. 13 at 30:8-32:4 (
`
`, 45: I 6-47:24, 51: 19-54: I 0, 183: I 0-21.)
`
`15.
`
`Dr. Martin admitted that the asselted claims encompass embodiments where the
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`web-enabled wireless phone is coupled, via a wired com1ectio1, , to stationary exercise e-quipment
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`such as a treadmi ll. (Ex. I at 132: 11-133:9; see also Ex. 3, els. I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`With respect to Alice step one, this Court has already found that independent claim 1 is
`
`directed towards an abstract concept. (Dkt. 2 19 at 12.) Dependent claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are no
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`different, and Dr. Martin does not dispute Dr. Paradiso's opinion that they are directed to the same
`
`abstract concept as claim 1. With respect to Alice step two, Dr. Martin does not opine that any one
`
`element of the claims is inventive, but rather the ordered combination of elements is inventive.
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`Thus, the only remaining question for the Court to decide is whether the asserted claims'
`
`ordered combination of conventional, off-the-shelf components and known, generic technology
`
`and processes provides any inventive concept. The answer is no, because the alleged inventive
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`concepts to which Dr. Martin points are neither found in the claims nor inventive.
`
`A.
`
`T he Assert ed Clai ms Are Directed To An Abstract Idea
`
`The Court found that '377 patent claim I is directed to "the abstract concept of collecting,
`
`analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information." (Dkt. 219 at 12.) Fitbit's expert, Dr.
`
`Paradiso, agreed with this conclusion. and opined that claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are drawn to the
`
`same abstract concept. (Ex. 15 at Ml 377-385; compare Ex. 3, cl. I with Ex. 3, els. 4, 5, 6, 9, l 2.)
`
`6
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 11 of 26
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`In particular, claims 4, 5, and 6 merely specify the paiticular transmission medium used by
`the web-enabled wireless phone to receive exercise-related information. (Ex. 15 at ,nr 377-379.)
`
`Claim 4 just specifies that the transmission medium includes generic wired and wireless
`
`connections, claim 5 specifies a known infrared connection or radio frequency communication
`
`protocol including a short-range wireless transmission scheme, and claim 6 specifics the known
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`lEEE 802.11 protocol or short-wavelength radio transmission in the JSM band of2400-2480 MHz.
`
`(Ex. 3, els. 4, 5, 6.) Dr. Paradiso opined that these connections were well-known and Dr. Martin
`
`did not dispute this opinion. (Ex. 15 at ~, 1285-309, 347-352, 377-379; Ex. 9, i1,1 199-284.)
`
`Similarly, claims 9 and l 2 merely specify the type of generic, prior art "device which
`
`provides exercise-related information"-i.e .. a known, conventional, generic exercise machine
`
`(claim 9) or a known, conventional, generic sensor (claim 12). (Ex. 3, els. 9, 12; Ex. 15 at i·,1380-
`
`382.) Again, Dr. Paradiso opined that all of these devices were well-known and Dr. Martin did
`
`not dispute this opinion. (Ex. 15 at,r 336-341, 380-382; Ex. 9, 1-;] 199-284.)
`
`Dr. Martin also docs not dispute the Court's conclusion that claim 1 is drawn to an abstract
`
`concept or Dr. Paradiso's opinion that claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 are drawn to the same abstract
`
`concept. (Ex. 1 at 260: 17-261:21; see also Ex. 9, ,14;[ 199-284.) Cfaims directed to collecting,
`
`analyzing, and displaying data are routinely found abstract. See CardioNet, LLC v. Jn.foBionic,
`
`lnc., 8 16 F. App 'x 4 71, 475 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (unpubl ished and non-precedential); Electric Power
`
`Grp., LLC v. Alston, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed . Cir. 2016); Content Extraction &
`
`Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat '! Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, I 347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`Accordingly, the Court should hold that, like claim I , '377 patent asserted claims 4, 5, 6, 9, and
`
`12 are directed to the "abstract concept of collecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related
`
`information" (0kt. 2 19 at 12) and proceed to Alice step two.
`
`7
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 12 of 26
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`B.
`
`The Asserted '377 Patent Claims Do Not Supply An Inventive Concept
`
`The individual elements of claim 1 are generic known processes, implemented in generic,
`
`known devices operating in a conventional way. (See Statement of Material Undisputed Facts
`
`("SUF''), ii 6-13.) In an attempt to save the claims, Dr. Martin posited two alleged inventive
`
`concepts-{!) performing computations utilizing a back-end server to remove "location based
`
`restraints" (Ex. 2, § VIII.B~ Ex. 9, § VIII.G.2.a; Ex. l at 264:9-265: 1 ), and (2) downloading an
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`application to monitor exercise (Ex. 2, § VIILC; Ex. 9, § VIILG.2.b; Ex. I at 264:9-265:1).
`
`However, these concepts are not inventive, and their alleged advantages are untethered from the
`
`claims. See, e.g., Am. Axle & Mfg. , Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2020) (unclaimed advantages over prior art are irrelevant to patent eligibility under Alice).
`
`1.
`
`Utillzing A Back-End Server Was Not Inventive
`
`Dr. Martin claims that one "advantage" or the '377 Patent " includes providing 'significant
`
`application functionality on [a] back-end [server],' which freed up memory and processing
`
`capabilities on the front-end (the web-enabled wireless phone)." (Ex. 2, 272 (quoting '377 Patent
`
`at 4:36-40); Ex. 9, , 205.) Thus, according to Dr. Martin, "as recited by the '377 Patent, memory
`
`became available on the [ web-enabled wireless device] for other purposes, such as an enhanced
`
`user interface, computing capacity, or processing power." (Ex. 2, 11272 ( citing '377 Patent at 4:32-
`
`42); see also Ex. 9, 205 (same).) Dr. Martin only cites the '377 patent for this aspect of his expert
`
`reports-
`
`thus, Dr. Martin relies on the patent's unsupported claims and Philips relies on Dr.
`
`Martin's unsupported claims. (See Ex. 2, iii 272-274; see also Ex. 9, 'Iii 205-207.)
`
`According to Philips and Dr. Martin, the back-end server functionality is found in claim
`
`elements l.g and l.h. (Ex. 3, cl. 1.) Thus, the back-end server functionality is: (1) receiving
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`exercise-related information~ (2) performing a calculation based on the received information, and
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`(3) sending the calculated response-i.e .. receiving data, perfonning a calculation, and sending the
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`8
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 13 of 26
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`result. This basic server functionality was known and understood in the prior an. (SUF, ,r 11-13.)
`
`The only named inventor of the '3 77 patent, Dr. Roger Quy, admitted that he did not invent
`
`(See Ex. 13 at 195 :9-
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`11, 215:18-216: 17.) Dr. Ma1tin tacitly admits this as well.
`
`As just one example, Dr. Paradiso opined that the prior art Hickman reference performed
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`claim elements I .g and l .h using a computer, and it would have been obvious to perform those
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`elements using a mobile phone instead. (See Ex. 15, ,r,r 698-708.) Dr. Martin does not dispute
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`that Hickman discloses performing claim clements l .g and l .h using a computer. (See Ex. 1 at
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`273: 10-23; see also Ex. 9, ,r 126 (disputing only whether Hickman discloses element I .a).)
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`As further examples, Dr. Paradiso collected several other exemplary prior art references
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`disclosing "servers receiving data and perfonning calculations." (See Ex. 15, ii, 3 I0-317 .) One
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`such prior art reference was the Marathon Man device, which was described in a Master' s Thesis
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`in 1998 by MIT student Maria Redin. (See Ex. 16 at 9:20-11:8 (authenticating Marnthon Man
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`thesis paper); Ex. 37 at 30 (Marathon Man thesis paper describing a server for San Francisco
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`marathon that, among other functions, "received the data, saved it to a master log file, and created
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`graphs [i.e., performed calculations] at 5-minute intervals").)
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`Dr. Martin did not rebut that these exemplary references, including Marathon Man, show
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`"servers receiving data and performing calculations" as Dr. Paradiso explained. Rather, Dr. Martin
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`argued that ( 1) the references do not "demonstrate that sending exercise related data over the
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`Internet to back-end servers for further processing, and receiving and displaying calculated
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`responses from such servers using an t1pplication on a web-enabled wireless plume was a well(cid:173)
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`understood, routine and conventional application" (Ex. 9, 280) and (2) the references are missing
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`other clements of the asserted claims (Ex. 9, iMI 281-284; see id. at 282 (arguing that Marathon
`
`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 14 of 26
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`Man did not include a web-enabled wireless phone and did not display the calculated response to
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`the runner on the same device that sent the data). The former-the narrow application of the
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`abstract concept in the context of using an application on a web-enabled wireless phone-is
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`irrelevant because even an allegedly narrow application of an abstract idea is still patent ineligible.
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`See BSG Tech , 899 F.3d at. 1287~ Electric Power G,p., 80 I F.3d at I 354. The latter-
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`the other
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`alleged distinctions of claim 1 over Marathon Man-
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`is irrelevant because "[t]he novelty of any
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`element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
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`whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 10 l categories of possibly patentable subject
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`matter." Diamond, 450 U.S. al 188-89 (internal quotation marks omilted); see also Two-Way
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`i11/edia Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 874 FJd 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir . 2017).
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`Thus, utilizing known, generic back end server functions docs not supply an inventive
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`concept. See, e.g., BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290-91 ("ff a claim's only ' inventi ve concept' is the
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`application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has
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`not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.") (citing Berkheimer,
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`881 F.3d at 1370 (holding claims lacked an inventi ve concept because they "amount to no more
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`than perfonning the abstract idea .. . with conventional computer components")~ Affinity Labs of
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`Te.x., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding a claim lacked an
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`inventive concept because it "simply recites the use of generic features ... as well as routine
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`functions ... to implement the underlying idea")).
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`a.
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`The Claims Do Not Provide An Enhanced User Interface Or
`Increased Computing Capacity Or Processing Power
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`Dr. Martin opined that offloading data analysis to a back-end server made memory
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`available on the web-enabled wireless device for other purposes, such as an enhanced user
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`interface, computing capacity, or processing power. (Ex. 2, 272 (citing '377 Patent at 4:32-42);
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 15 of 26
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`see also Ex. 9, 205 (same).) But none of these results are actually claimed. The claims only
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`specify a generic user interfac~rhey do not posit any functions of that user interface, much less
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`any "enhanced" functions. (See Ex. 3, cl. I.) Worse, the claims say absolutely nothing about
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`computing capacity or processing power. (Ex. 3, els. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12.)
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`b.
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`The Claims Do Not "Eliminate Location Based Restraints"
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`Dr. Ma1tin similarly opined that oftloading data analysis to a server in wireless
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`communication with a wireless web device eliminates "the location based restraints of prior art
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`systems" which "allowed for 'wireless access to and from a wide variety of present medical or
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`health-related instruments and devices, while maintaining the capability of connecting to future
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`such devices."' (Ex. 2, ,i 273 (purporting to quote '377 Patent at 3:52-573); see also Ex. 9, ii 206
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`(same).) Dr. Martin further opined that this alleged inventive concept:
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`allowed for "wireless health-monitoring to the level of accuracy
`previously achieved only by desktop so-called 'wired ' computer
`systems."
`' 377 Patent, 4:27-29. Having a w ireless system was a
`major advantage over the prior art as this invention allowed for
`subjects to be monitored as they moved about freely without the
`constraint of being tethered by a wire.
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`(Ex. 2, ,i 274; Ex. 9, 207.) Dr. Martin again fails to tie these alleged outcomes to the claim
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`limitations. Rather, the claims include multiple embodiments tethering the user to a wired system.
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`Dr. Quy admitted that this ability to allegedly "move[J about freely without the constraint
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`of being tethered by a wire" is
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`51:19-54:10, 183 :10-21.)
`
`(Ex. 13 at 30:8-32:4
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`, 45: 16-47:24; see also id. at
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`The Background of the Invention acknowledges that Dr. Quy's previous patents addressed
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`the same alleged problems in the art as the '377 patent "as well as the need to reduce health care
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`3 The quoted text does not appear in the cited portion of the '377 patent.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 334 Filed 03/02/22 Page 16 of 26
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`costs through providing educational health care infonnation and interactive physiological
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`monitoring in the home environment by means of a user-friend ly, interactive system (see, e.g.,
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`U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,601,435, 6,144,837, and continuations thereof)." (Ex. 3, 2: 1-7.) These prior
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`systems used a ''video game console, or a multimedia player using a conventional television screen
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`as the display device to achieve a system which is simpler to use than systems based on a personal
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`computer." (Ex. 3, 2:8-14.) Importantly, the Background of the Invention admits that prior art
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`systems "allow a ' wireless' distance to be placed betvveen a health measuring unit and a remote
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`monitoring system" and "used cellular telephone technology to increase the wireless health
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`monitoring range." (Ex. 3, 2:22-37.) Thus, neither of these concepts is inventive.
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`The primary advantage or difference bet\veen these prior art systems and the inventions
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`claimed in the '377 patent, according to the '377 patent's specification, is that the prior art systems
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`"are not designed to be used with 'off-the-shetr wireless devices or health measuring equipment"
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`(Ex. 3, 2:37-40.) Dr. Quy expressed a similar understanding, describing the
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`the '377 patent and its provisional application as:
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`14.) In other words, Dr. Quy
`
`admitted that the
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`- -the only allegedly "new" aspect of the '377 patent was
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`Thus, the named inventor himself acknowledged that- -i.e .. what Dr. Martin
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`refers to as
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`was not an inventive aspect of the '3 77 patent.
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`ln any event, the claims of the '377 patent do not require the ability to "move[] about freely
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`without the constraint of being tethered by a wire." Dr. Martin admitted that the asse1ted claims
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`encompass embodiments where the web-enabled wireless phone is coupled, via a wired
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`12
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document