Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 1 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FITBIT LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
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`DEFENDANT FITBIT LLC’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PHILIPS’
`MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH A. PARADISO
`REGARDING THE IFIT PRIOR ART SYSTEM (DKT. 305)
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 2 of 14
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`I.
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Pages
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`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
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`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................1
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`III.
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`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................2
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`A.
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`Philips’ Omissions And Inaccuracies Do Not Require PrecludingDr.
`Paradiso’s Expert Testimony ConcerningiFit ..........................................................2
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`1.
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`2.
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`The Documents And Other Evidence Dr. Paradiso Relies Upon
`Are Not Contradictory .................................................................................3
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`The Testimony Of Colleen Logan, Icon’s 30(b)(6) Corporate
`Representative,
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`Reliable For The Purposes For Which Dr. Paradiso Used It .......................6
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`B.
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`Philips’ Complaints About Dr. Paradiso’s Opinion That iFit Discloses
`Element 1.h Go To His Testimony’s Weight, Not Its Admissibility .......................9
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`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
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`IV.
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`i
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 3 of 14
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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`Pages
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`Abbott Biotech. Ltd. v. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
`No. 09-40089-FDS, Dkt. 457 at 10 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2014) ....................................... 2, 9
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`Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
`104 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................... 2, 9
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`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
`509 U.S. 579 (1993) .................................................................................................... 1, 2, 6
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`EveryScape, Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`No. 1-10-cv-11597-RGS, Dkt. 469 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2014) ....................................... 5, 9
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-01197, 2016 WL 4268659 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016) .................................. 8, 9
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`Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
` 254 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................. 8
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`Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc.,
`254 F.R.D. 597, 608 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................................ 8
`
`Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.,
`670 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................. 2
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`Fed. R. Evid. 702 ................................................................................................................... passim
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`
`RULES
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`ii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 4 of 14
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Philips’ Motion to Preclude the Testimony of Dr. Joseph A. Paradiso Regarding the iFit
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`Prior Art System (Dkt. 305) is nothing more than a motion for summary judgment in disguise.
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`While Philips disagrees with Dr. Paradiso’s opinion that the iFit prior art system (“iFit”) discloses
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`claim element 1.h of U.S. Patent No. 8,277,377 (the “’377 patent”), that disagreement is not a
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`proper basis for a Daubert motion.
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`Specifically, Fitbit’s expert, Dr. Paradiso, opined that asserted claims 1, 4-6, 9, and 12 of
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`the ’377 patent are obvious in light of combinations of prior art which include the iFit system as
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`the primary reference. Philips, however, disagrees with Dr. Paradiso regarding whether iFit
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`disclosed ’377 patent claim element 1.h as of the ’377 patent’s priority date.
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`Rather than appropriately leaving that issue for the jury to decide in light of competing
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`expert testimony and facts, Philips asks this Court to step into the role of fact-finder via its Daubert
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`motion. Philips’ only support for such a departure from the norm are a host of omissions and
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`mischaracterizations regarding Dr. Paradiso’s Report and his deposition testimony. Dr. Paradiso’s
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`analysis comparing iFit to claim element l.h, however, is neither flawed nor unreliable and is, in
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`fact, based on substantial facts and data. These include, for example, documents from Icon Health
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`and Fitness (“Icon”), the company that sold iFit, and the deposition testimony of Icon’s 30(b)(6)
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`designee, Ms. Colleen Logan who testified about the iFit system. Accordingly, this Court should
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`deny Philips’ Motion.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`The admission of expert testimony is governed chiefly by Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
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`as explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. See U.S. v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 73
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`(1st Cir. 2002) (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). Under
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`Rule 702, district courts “act as gatekeepers, ensuring that an expert’s proffered testimony ‘both
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`rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.,
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`670 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). Under First Circuit precedent,
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`courts must consider three issues as gatekeepers: (1) whether the proposed expert is qualified; (2)
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`whether the proposed expert testimony concerns scientific, technical, or other specialized
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`knowledge; and (3) “whether the testimony [will be] helpful to the trier of fact, i.e., whether it rests
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`on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the facts of the case.” Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
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`Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476 (1st Cir. 1996).
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`“The focus of the Rule 702 inquiry is on the principles and methodology employed by the
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`expert, not the ultimate conclusions. The court may not subvert the role of the fact-finder in
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`assessing credibility or in weighing conflicting expert opinions.” Abbott Biotech. Ltd. v. Centocor
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`Ortho Biotech, Inc., No. 09-40089-FDS, Dkt. 457 at 10 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2014) (citing Daubert,
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`509 U.S. at 595). On the other hand, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
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`evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means
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`of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, Inc., 509 U.S. at 596.
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Philips’ Omissions And Inaccuracies Do Not Require Precluding Dr.
`Paradiso’s Expert Testimony Concerning iFit
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`Philips maintains that the Court should preclude Dr. Paradiso from testifying about iFit
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`based on Philips’ argument that the evidence Dr. Paradiso cites does not prove that iFit discloses
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`claim element 1.h. (Memorandum at 5.) Specifically, Philips contends that iFit could not have
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`disclosed element 1.h, because iFit could not have sent heart rate information from a treadmill to
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`a server. But Philips’ focus on element 1.h for this point is misguided, because it is element 1.g
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`that requires “sending the exercise-related information to an internet server…” (Ex. 4 (’377
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`patent), cl. 1.) And the evidence cited by Dr. Paradiso in his discussion of element 1.g makes clear
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 6 of 14
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`that
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`.
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`1.
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`The Documents And Other Evidence Dr. Paradiso Relies Upon Are
`Not Contradictory
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`First, Philips alleges that the documents cited by Dr. Paradiso insufficiently support his
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`opinion that iFit discloses
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` (Memorandum at 3-4
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`(discussing Dkt. 308-1 (Opening Paradiso Report) at ¶ 961)). Philips spotlights two isolated
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`pincites from Dr. Paradiso’s discussion of element 1.h as evidence of these purported factual
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`insufficiencies. (Id.) However, these two isolated pincites merely support the text that Dr.
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`Paradiso quoted while discussing element 1.h; Dr. Paradiso specifically referred to his preceding
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`discussion of element 1.g, which demonstrates that
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`:
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`Further, as discussed above,
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`(Dkt. 308-1 (Paradiso Opening Report) at ¶ 961 (emphasis added).) The documents cited at the
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`end of this paragraph contain the text Dr. Paradiso quoted at the end of the quoted paragraph. (See
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`Dkt. 308-3 (ICON000331) at 0343 (noting that
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`.)1
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`Dr. Paradiso’s comparison of iFit to claim element 1.g shows what he meant in the above
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`quote when he said “as discussed above…
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`1 Admittedly the pincites were slightly off, but the cited documents contain the quoted text.
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 7 of 14
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`P Specifically, in the context of element 1.g, Dr. Paradiso discusses Icon’s
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`confirmation thati (Dit. 308-1
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`(Paradiso Opening Report) at | 95]is [is 1
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`a.) Icon’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Colleen Logan,testified that this confirmation,a
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`PY BE (i.c.. before the 377 patent’s
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`alleged December17, 1999 priority date). (Ex. 1 (Logan Dep.Tr.) at 61:16-62:11.) In the context
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`of claim element 1.g, Dr. Paradiso went on to discuss Ms. Logan’s testimony that
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`(0. 305-1
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`(Paradiso Opening Report) at § 953 (citing Logan Dep.Tr. at 53:19-54:2, 99:11-25.) Ms. Logan’s
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`es
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`testimony cited by Dr. Paradisostates:
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`ee
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`__
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`* * *
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`? Logan Dep. Ex. 16 (RFP Proposal) ICON000316 is attached hereto as Ex.3.
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 8 of 14
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`(See Ex. 1 (Logan Dep. Tr.) at 53:19-54:2, 99:11-23.)
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`Finally, Philips ignores yet other discussions of element 1.h where Dr. Paradiso points to
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`still further evidence that
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`Ms. Logan’s testimony that:
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`. Namely, Dr. Paradiso quotes
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`(Dkt. 308-1 (Paradiso Opening Report) at ¶ 962 (quoting Logan Dep. Tr. at 113:7-133).) In the
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`face of all of this evidence that
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`, Philips’ allegation that iFit
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`could not communicate with iFit.com is baseless.
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`But even if Philips were correct and Dr. Paradiso relied on contradictory evidence, that just
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`gives Philips grounds for a productive cross examination. When another Court in this district was
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`faced with the possibility that an expert’s opinion was unsupported by the documents the expert
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`cited and also potentially relied on the incorrect source code, the Court nonetheless refused to
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`exclude the expert testimony. See EveryScape, Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 1-10-cv-11597-RGS,
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`Dkt. 469 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2014) (electronic order). Indeed, in denying the movant’s Daubert
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`motion, that court reasoned that “[i]f Dr. Bystrom used the wrong source code for her analysis of
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`Mok3, Adobe has salubrious fodder for its cross-examination.” Id. The same is true here. While
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`Philips maintains that Dr. Paradiso relied on contradictory documents, the appropriate vehicle for
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`Philips to explore that claim is on cross-examination, not in a Daubert motion.
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`3 These lines of testimony are included in Ex. 1 (Logan Dep. Tr.) attached hereto.
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`5
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`2.
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`The Testimony Of Colleen Logan, Icon’s 30(b)(6) Corporate
`Representative,
`ee. Is
`Reliable For The Purposes For Which Dr. Paradiso UsedIt
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`Second,likely realizing that Dr. Paradiso’s aforementioned discussions of element 1.g and
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`Ms. Logan’s testimony undermineits argument, Philips asserts that Dr. Paradiso’s reliance on Ms.
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`Logan’s testimony is insufficient because Ms. Logan, according to Philips, “disclaimed having
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`any technical knowledge”and hertestimonyis thus “unsupported and divorced from corroborating
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`documents.” (Memorandum at 4-5 (discussing Dkt. 308-1 (Opening Paradiso Report) at §] 962).)
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`Notonly are Philips’ allegations inaccurate, but even if they were accurate, they still would not be
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`a proper basis for excluding expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.
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`Specifically, Ms. Logan’s testimony cited by Philips states that she was ‘(UT
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`en(but she never“disclaimed having any technical knowledge”
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`as Philips alleges. (See Memorandum at4 (citing Dkt. 308-5 (Logan Dep. Tr.) at 16:10-11, 16:5-
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`25, 71:12-24, and 111:17-25.)
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`In fact, it is clear from Ms. Logan’s roles with Icon and her
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`testimony that she had extensive knowledge of the features of iFit’s products and the iFit.com
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`website, which is the knowledge on which Dr. Paradiso relies.
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`In particular, Ms. Logantestified
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`that
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`Se
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`Po (Ex. 1 (Logan Dep. Tr.) at 10:23-12:4.) As explained above, Dr.
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`Paradisorelies on Ms. Logan’stestimony regarding
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`ES0c ith
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`whichshe is intimately familiar. Therefore, if Philips’ claim that Ms. Logan “disclaimed having
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`any technical knowledge”is intended to imply that Ms. Logan disclaimed personal knowledge of
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`the features and functionalities of iFit.com and the iFit exercise machines, that claim is overstated.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 10 of 14
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 10 of 14
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`Further, Philips fails to acknowledge that Ms. Logan was the corporate designee in
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`response to a subpoena served on her employer, Icon.
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`(See Ex. 1 (Logan Dep. Tr.) at 7:5-8:16
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`(acknowledging that she is testifying in response to subpoena marked as Deposition Exhibit 1);
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`Ex. 2 (Logan Dep. Ex. 1; Fitbit subpoena to Icon).) The four topics in Fitbit’s subpoena to Icon,
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`for which Ms. Logan wasdesignatedto testify, were:
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`1. The pre-December 17, 1999 public use, offer to sell, or actual sale
`of any of the implementations and systems identified in Document
`Requests Nos. 1-19.
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`2. Subject matter within and creation of the documents produced in
`response to Document Requests Nos. 1-19.
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`3. The pre-December 17, 1999 operation and functionality of the
`systems identified in Document Requests Nos. 1-19.
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`4. The documents produced in response to Document Requests Nos.
`1-20 above,
`including the authentication and record-keeping
`maintenancethereof.
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`(Ex. 2 (Logan Dep. Ex. 1; Fitbit subpoena to Icon) at 8.) The documents requested by Fitbit’s
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`Document Request Nos. 1-20 relate to, among other things, the features and functionalities of the
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`iFit exercise machines. (Ex. 2 (Logan Dep. Ex. 1; Fitbit subpoena to Icon).) Ms. Logan testified
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`that, in order to prepare for her role as a corporate deponent, she
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`© Es. 1 (Logan Dep. Tr) a
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`112:6-13.)
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`Thus, Ms. Logan’s deposition testimony was based on (1) her own extensive personal
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`knowledge regarding iFit’s features and functionalities, (2) the documents produced by Icon in
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`response to Fitbit’s subpoena, and (3) her conversation with
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`” Philips’ suggestion that her testimony is
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`somehowinsufficient to prove the features and functionalities of iFit is unsupported.
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`7
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`In fact, even Philips’ own cited caselaw, Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., No. 14-cv-01197,
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`2016 WL 4268659, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016) rejected the very argument Philips advances
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`as a basis for excluding Dr. Paradiso’s opinion on the iFit system. There, the movant sought to
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`exclude expert testimony on apportionment because, according to the movant, the expert “ha[d]
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`no reliable foundation for her assumption that each feature of a product is equally valuable.”
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`Finjan, 2016 WL 4268659, at *2. The court, however, rejected that reasoning because the expert
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`telied on the testimony of another witness, “who [had] reviewed, among other evidence,
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`[movant]’s ‘marketing and architectural documents, documents for potential investors, testimony
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`of [movant] engineers, and the expert opinions of [patentee’s] infringement experts.’” Jd. Thus,
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`the expert’s opinion wasbasedon sufficient evidence to survive a Daubert challenge.
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`Likewise, here, Dr. Paradiso bases his opinion on, amongst other items, Ms. Logan’s
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`testimony. For her part, as previously explained, Ms. Logan brought to the deposition both her
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`own personal knowledge and Icon’s corporate knowledge obtained from her investigations and
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`discussion with
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`Bg. Thus,
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`according to the very case Philips cites, Ms. Logan’s testimony is more than a sufficient basis for
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`Dr. Paradiso’s expert opinion thatPe
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`ME. See Finjan, 2016 WL 4268659,at *2-3.
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`The other non-binding opinions out of the Ninth Circuit upon which Philips relies are
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`equally unavailing. See, e.g., Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 830-31 (9th
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`Cir. 2001) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s exclusion of a locomotive expert’s
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`opinion that lacked any documentary or testimonial support); Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor
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`Inc., 254 F.R.D. 597, 608 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
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`(excluding expert
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`testimony on secondary
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 12 of 14
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`considerations due to expert’s lack of sufficient qualifications and experience and failure to
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`provide more than meager reasoning or analysis).
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`B.
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`Philips’ Complaints About Dr. Paradiso’s Opinion That iFit Discloses
`Element 1.h Go To His Testimony’s Weight, Not Its Admissibility
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`As described above, Philips faults Dr. Paradiso for relying on Icon documents and Ms.
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`Logan’s testimony because Philips disagrees with the conclusions Dr. Paradiso drew from that
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`evidence. But “[t]he focus of the Rule 702 inquiry is on the principles and methodology employed
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`by the expert, not the ultimate conclusions.” Abbott Biotech., Dkt. 457 at 10; see also Bogosian,
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`104 F.3d at 476 (Rule 702 concerns the qualifications of the proposed expert and whether the
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`proposed testimony is the proper subject of scientific, technical, or other specialized expertise).
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`Here, Philips does not identify any faulty principles or methodology in Dr. Paradiso’s
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`analysis. Nor does Philips dispute Dr. Paradiso’s qualifications or complain that his opinion that
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`the ’377 patent is obvious in light of iFit combined with other references is not the proper subject
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`of expert testimony. Rather, Philips’ motion is nothing more than a substantive attack on Dr.
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`Paradiso’s conclusion that iFit disclosed element 1.h. Courts have rejected similar summary
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`judgment motions disguised as Daubert challenges, noting that cross-examination is the proper
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`venue for challenging such expert testimony. See, e.g., EveryScape, Inc., No. 1-10-cv-11597-
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`RGS, Dkt. 469; Finjan, 2016 WL 4268659, at *2-3. Philips’ complaint regarding Dr. Paradiso’s
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`opinion that iFit discloses element 1.h is similarly not the proper subject of a Daubert motion.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Fitbit respectfully requests that this Court deny Philips’ motion
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`to preclude the testimony of Dr. Paradiso regarding the iFit prior art system.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 13 of 14
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`Dated: February 23, 2022
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`By:
`
`
`/s/ David J. Shaw
`David J. Shaw (pro hac vice)
`dshaw@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 200
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 451-4900
`Facsimile: (202) 451-4901
`
`Leslie M. Spencer (pro hac vice)
`lspencer@desmaraisllp.com
`Karim Z. Oussayef (pro hac vice)
`koussayef@desmaraisllp.com
`Brian D. Matty (pro hac vice)
`bmatty@desmaraisllp.com
`Henry Ard (pro hac vice)
`hard@desmaraisllp.com
`Eric G. Speckhard
`especkhard@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`230 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10169
`Telephone: (212) 351-3400
`Facsimile: (212) 351-3401
`
`Ameet A. Modi (pro hac vice)
`amodi@desmaraisllp.com
`DESMARAIS LLP
`101 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 573-1900
`Facsimile: (415) 573-1901
`
`Gregory F. Corbett (BBO # 646394)
`gcorbett@wolfgreenfield.com
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco (BBO #681921)
`edimarco@wolfgreenfield.com
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02110
`Telephone: (617) 646-8000
`Facsimile: (617) 646-8646
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Fitbit LLC
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 323 Filed 02/23/22 Page 14 of 14
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that this document is being filed through the Court’s electronic filing system,
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`which serves counsel for other parties who are registered participants as identified on the Notice
`of Electronic Filing (NEF). Any counsel for other parties who are not registered participants are
`being served by first class mail on the date of the electronic filing.
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`
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`/s/ Elizabeth A. DiMarco
`Elizabeth A. DiMarco
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