Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 1 of 16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
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`v.
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`FITBIT, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`
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`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-FDS
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`LEAVE TO FILE GRANTED ON
`January 14, 2022 (Dkt. 282)
`
`
`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
`TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF NOVEMBER 16, 2021 EXPERT REPORT OF
`JOSEPH A. PARADISO AS TO PREVIOUSLY WITHHELD PRIOR ART
`AND INDEFINITNESS DEFENSES
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 2 of 16
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`FITBIT FAILS TO EXPLAIN HOW INCORPORATING BY REFERENCE
`UNSPECIFIED PRIOR ART FROM AN IPR PETITION NOT YET FILED MEETS
`THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF LOCAL RULE 16.6(D) .............................. 1 
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`LOCAL RULE 16.6(D) REQUIRES IDENTIFICATION OF PRIOR ART, INCLUDING
`PRIOR ART USED TO ASSERT INVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 .................... 2 
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`FITBIT’S ALLEGED “DISCLOSURE” OF THE DISPUTED PRIOR ART WAS
`NOTHING OF THE SORT AND DID NOT PUT PHILIPS ON NOTICE THAT FITBIT
`INTENDED TO ASSERT THE PRIOR ART AGAINST THE ’377 PATENT. ............... 5 
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`FITBIT HAS LONG BEEN AWARE THAT PHILIPS CONTENDED THAT CLAIM 1
`APPLIED TO MORE THAN ONE SERVER .................................................................... 7 
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`FITBIT WAIVED ANY INDEFINITENESS CHALLENGES TO THE ’377 PATENT . 9 
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 3 of 16
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases 
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`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`932 F.Supp.2d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ...................................................................................... 10
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`Better Mouse Co., LLC v. SteelSeries ApS,
`No. 2:14-cv-198, 2016 WL 3611560 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) .............................................. 4, 5
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`BioCell Tech. LLC v. Arthro-7,
`No. 12-00516, 2013 WL 12131282 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) ................................................ 10
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software,
`700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 10
`
`iFLY Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GmbH,
`No. 2:14-cv-1080, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92550, 2016 WL 3680064 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24,
`2016) ........................................................................................................................................... 5
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`INAG, Inc. v. Richar, LLC,
`No. 2:16-cv-00722, 2021 WL 1582766 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2021) ............................................ 10
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................. 10
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`Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc.,
`417 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ...................................................................................... 7
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`O2 Micro Int’l. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.,
`467 F.3d 1355 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 6
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`Pactiv Corp. v. Mutisorb Techs., Inc.,
`No. 10 C 461, 2013 WL 2384249 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2013) ...................................................... 6
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`Philips North Am. LLC v. Fitbit LLC,
`No. 19-11586, 2021 WL 5417103 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2021) ................................................ 3, 4
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`Verinata Health, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C,
`12-865, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116382, 2014 WL 4100638 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014) .......... 5
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`Other Authorities 
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`Allergen,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041, at *24....................................................................................... 5
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`ii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 4 of 16
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`Fresenius Med. Care Holdings Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90856, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006) ......................................... 1
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`Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-cv-03587-WHO,
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21413 (N.D. Cal Feb. 20, 2015) ........................................................... 5
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`Fujifilm,
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21413, at *98-100 ................................................................................. 5
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`Maxell Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283, at *16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2021) ............................................ 3
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`Maxell,
`2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283, at *16................................................................................... 3, 4
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`iii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 5 of 16
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`Fitbit’s Opposition to Philips’s Motion to Strike Portions of the November 16, 2021 Expert
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`Report of Joseph A. Paradiso fails to provide any justification for Fitbit’s failure to disclose in its
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`initial invalidity contentions eleven1 different prior art references that Dr. Paradiso relied upon in
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`his report. Nor does Fitbit explain its failure to move to amend those invalidity contentions.2 It
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`would be highly prejudicial to effectively allow Fitbit to amend its invalidity contentions at this
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`late stage without even an attempt at showing good cause for the amendment. This is particularly
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`so since Fitbit successfully opposed Philips’s motion to amend its own infringement contentions
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`principally on the basis of delay. See Dkt. 173, 254. Further, Fitbit’s repeated attempts to argue
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`that Philips suffered no prejudice because Philips allegedly “had notice” of the prior art in question
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`rings hollow, especially in light of this Court’s ruling that even though Philips did notify Fitbit of
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`Philips’s intention to amend its infringement contentions early on, such notification was “without
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`legal effect”. See Dkt. 254 at 8-9.
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`Fitbit Fails to Explain How Incorporating by Reference Unspecified Prior Art From
`An IPR Petition Not Yet Filed Meets the Disclosure Requirements of Local Rule
`16.6(d)
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`Fitbit fails to cite to any case law that suggests an accused infringer can skirt local rule
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`patent disclosure requirements by incorporating by reference future petitions for inter partes
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`review. Fitbit’s citation to Fresenius is inapposite not only because the incorporation by reference
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`was to a previously filed request for reexamination, but also because the accused infringer
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`identified the reference at issue in their invalidity contentions as being relevant prior art and also
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`provided a claim chart in response to an interrogatory request. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings
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`1 Fitbit apparently does not dispute that three of the fourteen references identified in Philips’s motion should be
`stricken from Dr. Paradiso’s report. Specifically, Fitbit decided to “withdraw[] its reliance on . . . U.S. Patent No.
`5,689,825 (“Averbuch”), U.S. Patent No. 6,311,058 (“Wecker”), and U.S. Patent No. 6,493,758 (“McLain”)”. Fitbit
`Opposition at 1.
`2 As of January 18, 2022, Fitbit has still not moved to amend its invalidity contentions and Philips is unaware of any
`intention by Fitbit to do so.
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`1
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 6 of 16
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`Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90856, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006).
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`Despite this “clear intent to rely on” the anticipation defense in question, the court in Fresenius
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`still noted that it was “well within [the] Court’s discretion” to strike the defense due to the accused
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`infringer’s failure to seek leave to amend its invalidity contentions. Id. at *22. The court chose not
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`to, in large part because of the “inexplicable” decision by the patent holder to wait until “the very
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`last possible moment to move to strike [the] defense”. Id. at *21. Here, there was certainly not
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`“clear intent” by Fitbit to rely on the Vaisanen reference, and Philips brought its motion to strike
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`promptly after the service of Dr. Paradiso’s opening report.
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`Further, as explained in Philips’s opening brief, if such disclosure satisfied Local Rule
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`16.6(d), parties could always avoid the Local Rules’ requirement to show good cause to amend
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`invalidity contentions by simply filing an IPR petition including whatever new prior art references
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`the party decided to rely on. See Philips’s Brief at 10. Fitbit offers no rebuttal to this point. And,
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`not surprisingly, Fitbit does not offer any justification for why the Vaisanen reference could not
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`have been identified in its initial invalidity disclosures, much less make a showing of good cause.
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`Therefore, the Court should grant Philips’s motion to strike with respect to the Vaisanen
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`reference.
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`Local Rule 16.6(d) Requires Identification of Prior Art, Including Prior Art Used to
`Assert Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`Even assuming for sake of argument that Dr. Paradiso’s discussion of the remaining ten
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`undisclosed references is truly only in reference to Fitbit’s invalidity challenge under § 101, these
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`references were also never disclosed for that purpose. Notably, Fitbit does not dispute that Local
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`Rule 16.6(d)(4)(F) requires the accused infringer to disclose “[a]ny asserted ground of invalidity
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`based on patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101”. Instead, Fitbit appears to claim that because the
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`Local Rule does not use the words “prior art” in conjunction with 35 U.S.C. § 101, accused
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 7 of 16
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`infringers’ only duty under Local Rule 16.6(d)(4) is to disclose that they are asserting invalidity
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`under § 101 and nothing more. Such an interpretation would strip Local Rule 16.6(d)(4) of all
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`meaning and purpose as it would not serve to “require parties to crystallize their theories of the
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`case” in relation to any alleged § 101 invalidity theories. Philips North Am. LLC v. Fitbit LLC, No.
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`19-11586, 2021 WL 5417103, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2021) (Dkt. 254) (quoting O2 Micro Int’l.
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`Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 n. 12 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Indeed, the mere
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`identification that a party was asserting a defense under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would have already been
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`required by the pleadings. The local rule requires more.
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`Further, Fitbit misrepresents the only case law it cites regarding whether prior art asserted
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`for the purpose of demonstrating § 101 invalidity must be disclosed. Specifically, Fitbit quoted
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`Maxell for the alleged proposition that courts refuse to strike undisclosed references used only in
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`support of § 101 challenges even in districts that “have local patent rules that require parties to
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`disclose in their invalidity contentions a detailed explanation of any grounds of invalidity under §
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`101.” Fitbit Opposition at 10 (quoting Maxell Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283,
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`at *16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2021)). However, Maxell (a case from the Eastern District of Texas)
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`was distinguishing cases from other districts that had such local patent rules, and in which courts
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`had granted motions to preclude such references being used. Maxell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`136283, at *16. In fact, one of the three districts Maxell was distinguishing was the Northern
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`District of California which has almost word-for-word identical local patent rules regarding
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`disclosing § 101 invalidity theories as this District. Compare L.R. 16.6(d)(4)(F) (“[T]he accused
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`infringer shall make the following disclosures: . . . Any asserted grounds of invalidity based on
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`patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . of any of the asserted claims.”) with N.D. Cal. Patent
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`L.R. 3-3(d) (“[E]ach party opposing a claim of patent infringement, shall serve on all parties its
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 8 of 16
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`“Invalidity Contentions” which shall contain the following information: . . . Any grounds of
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`invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . of any of the asserted claims.”). In contrast, the Eastern
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`District of Texas Local Patent Rules do not require disclosure of § 101 invalidity theories. See
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`Maxell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136283, at *16; E.D. Tex. Local Patent Rule 3-3. Thus, Maxell
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`suggests that disclosure of § 101 prior art is mandatory in Districts, like the District of
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`Massachusetts, that have such local patent rules, which is the exact opposite of what Fitbit cited
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`Maxell for. See Fitbit Opposition at 10.
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`Fitbit’s citation to Allergan does them no better. To begin with Allergen is another Eastern
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`District of Texas case. Thus even if it did deal with prior art asserted to demonstrate § 101
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`invalidity (which it did not), its holding would not be applicable because, as discussed above, the
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`Eastern District of Texas’s Local Patent Rules do not require disclosure of § 101 invalidity
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`theories. Further, in Allergen, Judge Bryson noted that determinations as to whether to exclude
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`undisclosed prior art offered for purposes such as showing the state of the art “are necessarily case-
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`specific depending on the nature of the prior art reference, the purposes for which it is proposed to
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`be used, and the risk, in the particular circumstances of the case, of jury confusion.” Allergen, Inc.
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`v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041, at *22 (E.D. Tex.
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`Aug. 3, 2017). Here, unlike in Allergen, each of these three factors weigh in favor of exclusion.
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`First, Allergen was a bench trial and thus Judge Bryson reasoned there was no risk of jury
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`confusion. Id. at *23. In contrast, this case is set to be tried before a jury, and having Dr. Paradiso
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`discuss these prior art references in relation to § 101 invalidity gives rise to the “substantial risk
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`that jurors will perceive those [prior art references] as similar to the elected patent” and be swayed
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`by them when determining obviousness. Better Mouse Co., LLC v. SteelSeries ApS, No. 2:14-cv-
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`198, 2016 WL 3611560, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016). Second, the majority (seven of ten) of the
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 9 of 16
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`prior art references at issue are patents, which Allergen noted “can present a greater risk that the
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`use of the references will ‘bleed over’ from background information to use as invalidating
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`references.” Allergen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225041, at *24. In contrast, the prior art at issue in
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`Allergen was composed of journal articles, not patents or patent applications. Id. Finally, Fitbit’s
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`purpose of offering the prior art references at issue is a transparent effort at inserting a backdoor
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`obviousness challenge which would serve “to circumvent the disclosure rules and invite the jury
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`to consider the reference for an improper purpose”. Id. at *23. And even if Fitbit truly only intends
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`to rely on these references to show the state of the art for purposes of demonstrating § 101
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`invalidity, the Local Rules still require disclosure of such references as discussed above.
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`Thus, under Fitbit’s own cases3, the Court should grant Philips’s motion to strike as to
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`these references.
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`Fitbit’s Alleged “Disclosure” of the Disputed Prior Art Was Nothing of the Sort and
`Did Not Put Philips on Notice that Fitbit Intended to Assert the Prior Art Against
`the ’377 Patent.
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`Fitbit does not dispute that it never disclosed the remaining disputed nine prior art
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`references as being prior art to the ’377 Patent. In fact, none of the references were even
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`mentioned in the portions of Fitbit’s invalidity disclosures devoted to the ’377 Patent apart from
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`Fitbit’s long block quotation of the ’377 specification that happens to mention the Heinonen
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`reference (U.S. Patent No. 5,772,586) in passing. See Dkt. 261-1 at 82-83. Merely quoting the
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`specification of the ’377 Patent was not enough to put Philips on notice that Fitbit intended to
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`3 Fitbit’s citation to Fujifilm, iFLY, and Verinata Health are also distinguishable as none dealt with prior art asserted
`to demonstrate § 101 invalidity. See Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-cv-03587-WHO, 2015 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 21413 (N.D. Cal Feb. 20, 2015); iFLY Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GmbH, No. 2:14-
`cv-1080, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92550, 2016 WL 3680064 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2016); Verinata Health, Inc. v.
`Sequenom, Inc., No. C 12-865, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116382, 2014 WL 4100638, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014).
`Further, Fujifilm dealt with prior art used to show motivations to combine, but the applicable local rules had been
`amended such that motivation to combine disclosures were no longer required to be part of the initial disclosures.
`Fujifilm, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21413, at *98-100.
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`5
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 10 of 16
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`assert the Heinonen reference as prior art, especially since the Heinonen reference was not part of
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`the extensive list of thirty-five prior art references under the heading “Prior art to the ’377 patent”.
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`Dkt. 261-01 at 11-13; see also Pactiv Corp. v. Mutisorb Techs., Inc., No. 10 C 461, 2013 WL
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`2384249, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2013) (“It would be improper to allow an expert to rely on
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`undisclosed prior art merely because it was cited in an asserted patent.”).
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`Fitbit also does not explain how its disclosure of most of the remaining references4 as prior
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`art to other asserted patents could possibly have put Philips on notice that Fitbit intended to use
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`the references as prior art to the ’377 Patent. As mentioned above, Fitbit’s invalidity contentions
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`included a list of thirty-five different references it contended were “Prior art to the ’377 patent” as
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`well as three other lists of references that Fitbit contended were prior art to the other asserted
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`patents. (Dkt. 261-01 at 4-13). Philips committed significant effort at evaluating the extensive
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`contentions that Fitbit actually served against the ’377 Patent, and it is not credible to suggest that
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`Philips should have been on notice that Fitbit could reasonably rely on any combinations of any
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`prior art asserted against any of the patents at issue—that is not at all what the local rules
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`contemplate.
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`Rather, Fitbit made deliberate choices as to which prior art references it intended to assert
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`against the ’377 Patent and which it intended to assert against the other patents, and Philips should
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`be able to rely on those choices. Allowing Fitbit to effectively hide its intention to assert these
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`references as prior art to the ’377 Patent would fly directly in the face of the purpose of mandatory
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`initial disclosure that “require[s] parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in litigation
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`and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.” O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366 n.12
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`4 Fitbit acknowledges, as it must, that the DARPA reference was not identified for any purpose in its invalidity
`contentions. See Fitbit Opposition at 11, n.4.
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 11 of 16
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`(quoting Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (N.D.
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`Cal. 2006)).
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`Thus, because Fitbit did not properly disclose these references as being prior art to the ’377
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`Patent, the Court should grant Philips’s motion to strike as to these references.
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`Fitbit Has Long Been Aware that Philips Contended that Claim 1 Applied to More
`than One Server
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`Fitbit’s argument that “Fitbit could not have reasonably discerned Philips’s apparent
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`contention that claim 1 is broad enough to read on systems that utilize two, three, or even more
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`servers, and therefore, Fitbit could not have raised this defense during fact discovery” strains
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`credulity. Fitbit Opp. at 14. Fitbit does not even attempt to explain how Dr. Paradiso was able to
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`include his so-called “contingent” invalidity opinion in his opening report (which explicitly relies
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`on an understanding of Philips’s position) if Philips’s infringement contentions were so unclear
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`that Fitbit could not “have reasonably discerned” that Philips read claim 1 to encompass more than
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`one server. Fitbit Opp. at 14. Obviously if Dr. Paradiso was able to understand Philips’s
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`infringement contentions as potentially involving more than one server prior to serving his expert
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`report, Fitbit could have done the same prior to serving its invalidity contentions.
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`Additionally, as explained in Philips’s opening brief, there was nothing “unclear” about
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`Philips’s infringement contentions. Fitbit attempts to mask this fact by inserting the word
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`“[screenshots]” when quoting Philips’s contentions, but as shown in the example below, the
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`screenshots clearly demonstrated that Philips was accusing the downloading of the Fitbit App from
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`the Apple App Store or the Google Play Store as meeting limitation 1(a).
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`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 12 of 16
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`Dkt. 261-05 at 2.
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`Likewise, as shown in the examples below, the screenshots in Philips’s infringement
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`contentions with regard to limitations 1(g) and 1(h) clearly demonstrated that Philips was accusing
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`Fitbit’s servers (which are obviously different than the servers of the Apple App Store or Google
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`Play Store) of being the servers referred to in those limitation.
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`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 13 of 16
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`Dkt. 261-05 at 16, 19.
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`Fitbit Waived Any Indefiniteness Challenges to the ’377 Patent
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`Fitbit does not dispute that it never disclosed the indefiniteness argument in Dr. Paradiso’s
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`Opening Expert Report (or indeed any indefiniteness arguments with respect to the ’377 Patent).
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`Even if the Court determines that additional claim construction is required with respect to the term
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`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 14 of 16
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`“server”,5 Fitbit’s should not be permitted to raise new indefiniteness arguments with respect to
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`the ’377 Patent.
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`Fitbit cites no case law in which a party was permitted to raise a previously undisclosed
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`indefiniteness theory after the close of fact discovery, and the cases Fitbit does cite are not at all
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`relevant. ePlus, Inc. deals with whether failing to raise an invalidity theory at trial that was denied
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`at summary judgment constitutes waiving the right to appeal that summary judgment. ePlus, Inc.
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`v. Lawson Software, 700 F.3d 509, 517-518 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This case has no relevance to whether
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`failure to disclose an indefiniteness theory in one’s invalidity contentions constitutes waiver of
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`that theory. Similarly, Nautilus merely describes the definiteness standard under § 112, and does
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`not deal with any sort of waiver. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910
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`(2014). Finally, Apple only stands for the proposition that failing to seek the construction of a term
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`does not waive related indefiniteness theories and does not deal with undisclosed indefiniteness
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`theories. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 932 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013). In
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`fact, in Apple, the court noted that the accused infringer did include the indefiniteness theory in
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`question in its invalidity contentions. Id.
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`In contrast, Philips’s opening brief cited two cases in which accused infringers were
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`precluded from asserting indefiniteness theories that were not adequately disclosed in their
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`invalidity contentions. See Philips Brief at 14 (citing INAG, Inc. v. Richar, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00722,
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`2021 WL 1582766, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2021) and BioCell Tech. LLC v. Arthro-7, No. 12-00516,
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`2013 WL 12131282, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013)). Fitbit’s opposition brief did not attempt to
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`distinguish either of these cases.
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`5 Fitbit filed a “Motion for the Construction of Three Related Claim Terms’ (Dkt. 271) and briefing on this subject is
`ongoing.
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`10
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 15 of 16
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`Thus, because Fitbit does not provide any explanation for its late disclosure, the Court
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`should grant Philips’s motion to strike as to the indefiniteness theory in Dr. Paradiso’s opening
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`report.
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`Dated: January 18, 2022
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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`
` /s/ John W. Custer
`
`Lucas I. Silva (BBO 673,935)
`Ruben J. Rodrigues (BBO 676,573)
`John Custer (BBO 705,258)
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`111 Huntington Avenue
`Suite 2500
`Boston, MA 02199-7610
`Phone: (617) 342-4000
`Fax: (617) 342-4001
`lsilva@foley.com
`rrodrigues@foley.com
`jcuster@foley.com
`
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`Eley O. Thompson (pro hac vice)
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`321 N. Clark Street
`Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60654-5313
`Phone: (312) 832-4359
`Fax: (312) 832-4700
`ethompson@foley.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
`Philips North America LLC
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 284 Filed 01/18/22 Page 16 of 16
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was filed with
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`the Court through the ECF system and that a copy will be electronically served on registered
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`participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing.
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`By: /s/ John W. Custer
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