Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 1 of 26
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`FITBIT, INC.,
`
`
`
`
` Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-IT
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`FITBIT’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 2 of 26
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`Page
`
`B.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`U.S. PATENT NO. 6,013,007 ........................................................................................... 1
`A.
`“means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series
`of time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver” (Claims 1, 21) ......... 2
`“means for suspending and resuming operation of said means for
`computing when a speed of the athlete falls below a predetermined
`threshold” (Claim 7) .............................................................................................. 7
`U.S. PATENT NO. 6,976,958 ........................................................................................... 8
`A.
`“in the event of an interruption of the wireless connection . . . configured
`to store the health parameter or visual data in a memory or on the
`removable memory device” (Claims 15, 16) ......................................................... 8
`“memory” (Claims 15, 16) ................................................................................... 10
`“internet-enabled wireless web device” (Claims 15, 16) ..................................... 11
`“health parameter indicative of a disease state or condition of a patient”
`(Claim 15) and “health parameter or visual data corresponding to a
`patient’s disease state or condition” (Claim 16) .................................................. 12
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,088,233 ......................................................................................... 15
`A.
`“governing information transmitted between the first personal device and
`the second device” (Claim 1) ............................................................................... 15
`“first personal device” (Claim 1) ......................................................................... 16
`B.
`“wireless communication” (Claim 1) ................................................................... 18
`C.
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8,277,377 ......................................................................................... 19
`A.
`“indicating a physiologic status of a subject” (Claim 1) ...................................... 19
`
`B.
`C.
`D.
`
`
`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`
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`-i-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 3 of 26
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
`651 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................9
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc.,
`672 F.3d 1335 ............................................................................................................................9
`
`B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..............................................................................................2, 8
`
`BlackBoard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................4, 5, 7
`
`Certain Digital Media Devices, Including Television, Blu-Ray Disc Players,
`Home Theatre Systems, Tablets, and Mobile Phones, Components Thereof and
`Associated Software,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-882, USITC Pub. 539707...............................................................................9
`
`Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`412 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................5
`
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................3
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................11, 16, 18
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................12
`
`MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`780 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................7
`
`MTD Prods. Inc. v. Iancu,
`933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................6
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................1
`
`
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`-ii-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 4 of 26
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................1
`
`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................11, 18
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................12
`
`Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed,
`595 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................17
`
`Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc.,
`744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................1
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holding Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................14
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..........................................................................................2, 3, 7
`
`Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Apple Inc.,
`905 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................16
`
`WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................................1, 3, 8
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`-iii-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 5 of 26
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The purpose of claim construction is to “resol[ve] disputed meanings and the technical
`
`scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims.” O2
`
`Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A
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`patent’s claims, specification, and prosecution history (including references cited therein)
`
`comprise “intrinsic evidence” that must be consulted before any other evidence when construing
`
`patent claims. Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[T]he
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`prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent”
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`and may show that “the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution . . .” Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Fitbit’s proposed
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`constructions follow these and other canons of claim construction. Philips’ constructions ignore
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`the canons, seek to recast the scope of its patents in an attempt to cover Fitbit’s innovative
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`technology, and repeatedly contradict its prior arguments in this case and at the Patent Office.
`
`II.
`
`U.S. PATENT NO. 6,013,007
`
`The ’007 patent claims a system for computing outdoor athletic performance, presenting
`
`the performance data audibly over a wired headset, and transmitting the performance data to a
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`remote computer for comparison with other athletes. See ’007 patent, cover, 2:1-3:13, 6:63-9:20.
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`Importantly, the specification explains prior art GPS systems “do not include real-time athletic
`
`performance algorithms.” Id., 1:47-48. Yet, no such algorithms are disclosed in the patent. The
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`lack of such algorithms invalidates the asserted claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`The two disputed terms for the ’007 patent are written in the means-plus-function (“MPF”)
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`format, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, which states:
`
`An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
`performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 6 of 26
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`support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
`structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
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`In other words, MPF allows a patentee to claim a function (e.g., tracking performance) without
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`identifying in the claim itself a specific structure for performing that function. By employing the
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`convenience of claiming in this manner, the claims “shall be construed to cover the corresponding
`
`structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Williamson v.
`
`Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(emphasis added). The duty to link or
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`associate structure with the function is the quid pro quo for using MPF. B. Braun Med., Inc. v.
`
`Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The asserted claims of the ’007 patent fail to
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`disclose adequate structure linked to the claimed function, which renders the claims indefinite.
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351-52. Fitbit’s pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgement (MSJ)
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`contains a discussion of controlling MPF law.1 D.I. 44 at 4-9.
`
`A.
`
`“means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of
`time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver” (Claims 1, 21)
`
`Fitbit’s Proposal
`
`Philips’ Proposal
`
`Function: computing athletic performance
`feedback data from the series of time-stamped
`waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver
`
`feedback data”
`“athletic performance
`means elapsed distance, current and average
`speeds and paces, calories burned, miles
`remaining and time remaining
`
`Structure: Limitation is indefinite under 35 §
`112, ¶ 2 because specification does not provide
`an actual algorithm to program a processor to
`perform the function
`
`
`Function: computing athletic performance
`feedback data from the series of time stamped
`waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver
`
`feedback data”
`“athletic performance
`means elapsed distance of an athlete, current or
`average speed of an athlete, and current or
`average pace of an athlete
`
`Structure: a processor and equivalents thereof
`(see, e.g., Fig.6, col. 5 ll. 36-40 and col. 9 ll.
`31-35). Limitation is not indefinite.
`
`
`Proposed Construction: a processor (and
`equivalents thereof) that determines any of the
`
`
`1 Granting Fitbit’s currently pending 15-page MSJ, D.I. 44 will render moot all of the claim
`construction disputes relating to the ‘007 patent.
`
`
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 7 of 26
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`section, Philips’
`this
`in
`As detailed
`“Proposed Construction” is a legally improper
`construct that runs afoul of settled MPF law.
`Moreover, Philips’ construction only requires
`structure for determining “any of” (as opposed
`to all of) the data elements. As discussed
`below, this is contrary to law.
`Two disputes remain: (1) whether the means-plus-function term is indefinite and (2) the
`
`following from a series of time stamped
`waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver
`during an exercise session: elapsed distance of
`an athlete; current or average speed of an
`athlete; current or average pace of an athlete
`
`meaning of the term “athletic performance feedback data” within the claimed function. Both
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`disputes relate to validity. As detailed in the MSJ, the asserted claims are indefinite because the
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`specification does not provide an algorithm, as required for a computer-implemented MPF, for
`
`performing the agreed upon function of “computing athletic performance feedback data from the
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`series of time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver.” The specification lacks the
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`required algorithm regardless of whether Fitbit’s or Philips’ construction of “athletic performance
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`feedback data” is adopted. The second dispute might also relate to infringement as Philips is
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`attempting to broaden the scope of the claims by including less required claim elements in them.
`
`“Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. The court must first
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`identify the claimed function. Then, the court must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in
`
`the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Williamson, 793 F.3d at 1351-52; see also
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`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004).2 The claim language
`
`
`2 Philips introduces a new construct for the MPF claims that it calls “Proposed Construction.”
`This runs counter to the required “two-step process” where function is identified first and then
`structure. Philips improperly combines the term’s function and processor structure together. This
`amounts to purely functional claiming of all possible ways to program a processor to perform the
`claimed “computing . . .” function. The Federal Circuit expressly forbids this strategy. See
`Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, at 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`(“Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very
`different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular
`function does not limit the scope of the claim to ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts’
`that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6”). Further, it is counter to §
`Aristocrat 112, ¶ 6 which delineates function and structure (“such claim shall be construed to
`cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
`
`
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 8 of 26
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`defines the function as: “computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of time-
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`stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver.” The parties do not dispute this, just the
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`meaning of “athletic performance feedback data,” which is addressed at the end of this section.
`
`The agreed-upon function “computing athletic performance feedback data. . .” requires
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`“computing,” a computer-performed step. Performing the function therefore requires an
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`algorithm to instruct the computer processor to perform the claimed computing function. “[T]he
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`corresponding structure for a § 112, ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the
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`algorithm disclosed in the specification.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333; see also BlackBoard, Inc.
`
`v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“when a computer is referenced as
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`support for a function in a means-plus-function claim, there must be some explanation of how
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`the computer performs the claimed function”). Thus, in addition to the processor, there must be a
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`specific algorithm disclosed in the specification for performing the function of “computing
`
`athletic performance feedback data . . .” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339,
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`at 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) at 1348 (“[t]he structure of a microprocessor programmed to carry out
`
`an algorithm is limited by the disclosed algorithm”); see also D.I. 44 at 7-8. 
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`The necessity for an algorithm is highlighted by the patent’s admission that prior art GPS
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`systems “do not include real-time athletic performance algorithms.” ’007 patent, 1:47-48. Yet here
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`the ‘007 specification provides no specific algorithm—it simply states a result: “from these [GPS]
`
`positions and times, performance data…are calculated.” ’007 patent, 7:45-48; see also D.I. 44 at
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`12-13. Thus, the claims are indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2. Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1382.  
`
`
`thereof.”) Philips combination construction is simply trying to circumvent the strict rules
`attendant to having used a means-plus-function claiming format and would also lead to jury
`confusion at trial. For example, a jury may erroneously conclude that simply achieving the
`functional result using a processor, without regard to how the processor does it, satisfies the
`claim limitation.
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 9 of 26
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`When Fitbit asked Philips about the missing algorithm during the meet and confer process,
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`Philips stated that one skilled in the art would know how to use the processor to perform the
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`claimed function. This is legally deficient: “[a] patentee cannot avoid providing specificity as to
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`structure simply because someone of ordinary skill in the art would be able to devise a means to
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`perform the claimed function.” Id. at 1385; D.I. 44 at 8-9. Indeed, “the testimony of one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of structure from the specification.” Default Proof
`
`Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., 412 F.3d 1291, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Philips’
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`identification of a processor alone, without an algorithm, might be relying on In re Katz Interactive
`
`Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) which provides a very narrow
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`exception where standard microprocessors can be structure for ‘functions [that] can be achieved
`
`by any general purpose computer without special programming.” The Federal Circuit has
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`explained this Katz exception is limited to functions “coextensive” with a microprocessor itself,
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`such as “basic ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing’ functions.” EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 621–22
`
`(emphasis added). The Federal Circuit further explained: “A microprocessor or general purpose
`
`computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other
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`computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm.” Id. at 623. The agreed upon
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`computer-implemented function is “computing athletic performance feedback data from the series
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`of time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver.” On its face, this function goes beyond
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`the basic function of a microprocessor. Again, this is confirmed by the specification, which admits
`
`that prior art GPS systems “do not include real-time athletic performance algorithms,”
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`demonstrating that such functionality is not coextensive with microprocessor function, but must
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`be programmed to do so. ’007 patent, 1:47-48. Therefore, the specification fails to meet the quid
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`pro quo of MPF claiming.
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`5
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 10 of 26
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`This second dispute is the meaning of “athletic performance feedback data” within the
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`function. According to Philips, it means elapsed distance, current and average speeds and paces.
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`Computing these types of data go beyond the basic functions of a microprocessor. Moreover,
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`Philips’ construction omits required data. Based on the express disclosure in the specification,
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`“athletic performance feedback data” must also include “calories burned, miles remaining and time
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`remaining,” pushing the function further beyond the basic functions of the microprocessor. ’007
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`patent, 7:45-48; see also id., 6:49-50. Fitbit’s construction tracks the specification language exactly
`
`and includes all embodiments of performance data. Philips’ construction, in contrast, cherry picks
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`the first four types of data, while excluding “calories burned, miles remaining and time remaining”
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`from the scope of the function. Id., 7:47-48. There is no basis for this cherry picking, particularly
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`as the data Philips omits is identified in the specification as being “calculated” from GPS “positions
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`and times” data. Id. 40-47. Perhaps Philips is attempting to invoke the Katz exception by making
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`the function less complicated. However, as explained above, Philips’ incorrect construction still
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`goes beyond, basic processor functions.
`
`Philips’ construction may also be an infringement-driven attempt to broaden the scope of
`
`the claims by including less requirements in them. This is further evidenced by Philips’ “Proposed
`
`Construction” (discussed in fn.2, above), which attempts to broaden the required structure by
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`arguing that the structure only needs to be capable of determining “any of” (i.e., just one of) the
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`athletic performance feedback data as opposed to all of such data. However, the law is clear—
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`“[w]here there are multiple claimed functions, as we have here, the patentee must
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`disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the claim functions.” MTD Prods.
`
`Inc. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336, 1343 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351-52).
`
`Philips’ proposals are directly counter to settled MPF law and should be rejected.
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 11 of 26
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`B.
`
`“means for suspending and resuming operation of said means for computing
`when a speed of the athlete falls below a predetermined threshold” (Claim 7)
`
`Fitbit’s Proposal
`
`Philips’ Proposal
`
`Function: suspending and resuming operation
`of said means for computing when a speed of
`the athlete falls below a predetermined
`threshold
`
`Structure: This means-plus-function term is
`indefinite under 35 § 112, ¶ 2 because the
`specification does not disclose structure that
`performs the claimed function.
`
`
`
`
`Function: No dispute.
`
`
`
`
`Structure: The means-plus function limitation
`is not indefinite. The structure is a processor
`and equivalents thereof (see, e.g., Fig.6, col. 5
`ll. 36-40 and col. 9 ll. 31-35.)
`
`Proposed Construction: a processor (and
`equivalents
`thereof)
`that
`suspends
`said
`computing when a speed of the athlete is below
`a predetermined threshold and resumes said
`computing when a speed of the athlete is not
`below said predetermined threshold.3
`
`The sole dispute here is whether the term is indefinite, which would invalidate claim 7.
`
`The parties agree the claimed function is “suspending and resuming operation of said means for
`
`computing when a speed of the athlete falls below a predetermined threshold.” This function
`
`references the same “means for computing” discussed above in Section II.A. Like the “means for
`
`computing,” the “means for suspending . . .” fails to satisfy the second step of the MPF construction
`
`analysis. Here, there is no structure “clearly linked” in the specification to the performance of the
`
`claimed function. Williamson, 792 F.3d 1351-52; MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d
`
`1159, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that a disclosed structure is a “corresponding structure” only
`
`if the specification clearly links or associates that structure to the claimed function). Thus it is
`
`indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2. Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1382. Notably, the term “predetermined
`
`threshold” only appears in the claim. The specification does not even use the word “threshold” or
`
`
`3 As discussed in fn.2, Philips’ combination structure / function proposed constructions are
`improper and not recognized under Federal Circuit precedent.
`
`
`
`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 12 of 26
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`otherwise describe a structure that suspends and resumes the operation the means for computing
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`based on a threshold. The specification fails to meet the quid pro quo for the convenience of
`
`employing § 112, ¶ 6. B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1424.
`
`III. U.S. PATENT NO. 6,976,958
`The ’958 patent describes monitoring disease data using “off the shelf” wireless devices
`(e.g., mobile phones and tablets), sending the data from the mobile phone to a server over a
`wireless connection, and programming the mobile phone to save the data to the mobile phone in
`the event that the wireless connection is interrupted. See ’958 patent, 2:38-5:5, 9:30-10:67, 12:47-
`13:55.
`
`A.
`
`“in the event of an interruption of the wireless connection . . . configured to
`store the health parameter or visual data in a memory or on the removable
`memory device” (Claims 15, 16)
`
`Fitbit’s Proposal
`
`Claim 16: programmed to store the health parameter or
`visual data in a memory or on the removable memory
`device in response to the event of an interruption.
`
`Claim 15: programmed to store the health parameter
`from the health monitoring device in a memory or on a
`removable memory device in response to the event of an
`interruption.
`
`Philips’ Proposal
`
`No construction necessary.
`
`
`
`Fitbit’s construction is the plain meaning and is supported by the patent specification.
`
`Philips disagrees, but has provided no alternative construction. This construction is relevant to
`
`non-infringement as Fitbit does not configure third-party wireless devices (e.g., mobile phones and
`
`tablets) running the Fitbit app to store data in the event of an interruption of a wireless connection.
`
`The surrounding claim language states that “in the event of” an interruption of a wireless
`
`connection, the wireless web device is “configured to” store information. ’958 patent, 17:29-18:2,
`
`18:19-25. This “configured to…” claim language is limiting and requires actual programming (i.e.,
`
`computer code or program instructions) to perform the function of storage in the event of
`
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`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 13 of 26
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`interruption, not just mere capability or coincidence. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear,
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`Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (“configured to” has the “narrower definition” of “designed to” or
`
`“adapted to,” not the “broader” meaning “capable of” or “suitable for”); Certain Digital Media
`
`Devices, Including Television, Blu-Ray Disc Players, Home Theatre Systems, Tablets, and Mobile
`
`Phones, Components Thereof and Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-882, USITC Pub.
`
`539707, Init. Det. at 223 (U.S.I.T.C. Jul. 7, 2014) (“configured to” means “computer code or
`
`program instructions sufficient to perform the operations recited [in the claims] without additional
`
`modification or the addition of further program instructions”). There must be an actual
`
`programmed “cause and effect” relationship between the “interruption of the wireless connection”
`
`and the “stor[ing] the health parameter [or visual data] in a memory.” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am.
`
`Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1329, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“identifying . . . in response to
`
`a vehicle condition” requires the identification to occur “in response to a vehicle condition, not in
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`response to any [other] action” because “a skilled artisan would understand the claims as requiring
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`a ‘cause-and-effect’ relationship between the occurrence of the vehicle condition and the []
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`identification”). Mere coincidence that storage may occur when there is no wireless connection is
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`insufficient. Fitbit’s construction gives meaning to the claim language “is configured” and the
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`narrow requirements that flows from the claim language.
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`The ’958 specification also supports Fitbit’s construction: “[i]n the event of drop-outs,
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`interruptions, or unavailability, of the wireless network, no loss of data occurs, as the data has been
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`stored on the memory device and may be wirelessly transmitted at a later time when cellular or
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`mobile service is again available.” ’958 patent, 12:53-13:18. This ties the storage of data to the
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`precondition of an interruption of the wireless connection. Inputting Fitbit’s construction into the
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`surrounding claim language of claim 16 yields: “wherein in the event of an interruption of the
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`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 14 of 26
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`wireless connection between the internet-enabled wireless web device and the server, the internet-
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`enabled wireless web device is programmed to store the health parameter or visual data in a
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`memory or on the removable memory device in response to the event.” (Fitbit’s construction is
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`underlined).
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`B.
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`“memory” (Claims 15, 16)
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`Fitbit’s Proposal
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`Philips’ Proposal
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`persistent data storage
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`No construction necessary. Alternatively: any device
`capable of storing information, including temporary storage
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`Fitbit’s construction, “persistent data storage” or data storage that is not temporary, meets
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`
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`the purpose of the claim and is supported by the evidence. The accused mobile phone running the
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`Fitbit App does not preserve this data and does not infringe as properly construed.
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`The “memory” referred to here is “memory” recited within the claim term construed
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`immediately above “in the event of an interruption of the wireless connection . . . configured to
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`store the health parameter or visual data in a memory or on the removable memory device.” The
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`purpose of the memory, as evidenced by the plain claim language is to “store” health data in the
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`event the wireless connection gets interrupted. The ’958 specification explains memory was
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`essential to the system for medical monitoring as it prevented loss of important data “as the data
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`has been stored on the memory device and may be wirelessly transmitted at a later time when
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`cellular or mobile service is again available . . .” Id., 13:6-25 (emphasis added). To meet the
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`goals of the claim, as confirmed by the specification, the data must remain and be available in the
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`memory in the event of interruption of the wireless connection. Fitbit’s construction accomplishes
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`this goal. Philips’ construction, which includes an amorphous concept of “temporary” memory
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`(which could last a fleeting amount of time), does not.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 72 Filed 06/05/20 Page 15 of 26
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`The specification identifies only persistent data storage components, including cards,
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`sticks, and drives. Id., 12:53-62. “[W]hen a patent repeatedly and consistently characterizes a claim
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`term in a particular way, it is proper to construe the claim term in accordance with that
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`characterization.” GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, in
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`the face of Fitbit’s § 101 motion to dismiss (D.I. 20), Philips amended its complaint to assert: “the
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`[’958] claimed inventions improve functionality of health monitoring devices by enabling for the
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`preservation and storage of health information in the event of an interruption of [] wireless
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`connection” (D.I. 25, ¶ 129) and “the three [claimed] devices (health monitoring device, internet-
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`enabled wireless web device, and the server) work together to preserve disease state or condition
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`information in unstable situations” (id., ¶ 132). Philips’ assertions illustrate the claimed memory
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`must preserve the data (i.e., not be temporary) to be available in the event of wireless interruption.
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`Philips may not pursue one interpretation for purposes of validity and another for infringement.
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`See PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`C.
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`“internet-enabled wireless web device” (Claims 15, 16)
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`Fitbit’s Proposal
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`No construction necessary
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`
`Philips’ Proposal
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`a device designed to display interactive information through
`a connection to the Internet
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`“Internet-enabled wireless web device” does not require construction because it has an
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`ordinary meaning. Philips’ construction seeks to avoid invalidating prior art that displays data
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`which Philips alleges is not “interactive.” Other applications in the ’958 patent family specifically
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`claim wireless web devices and displa