`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`v.
`
`FITBIT, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-IT
`
`Leave to file excess pages granted
`on December 10, 2019
`
`DEFENDANT FITBIT INC.’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS RENEWED
`RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA
`LLC’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 2 of 37
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ..................................................................................................... 1
`A.
`Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss under section 101 ............................................. 1
`B.
`Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................ 2
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`The ’233 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ....................................................... 4
`1.
`The ’233 patent is directed to the abstract idea of secure data
`transfer between devices ............................................................................ 4
`a.
`The claims recite generic devices .................................................. 4
`b.
`“Security mechanism” is a result, not a particular way of
`achieving the result ........................................................................ 5
`Federal Circuit has determined similar claims to be directed
`to abstract ideas .............................................................................. 6
`Result-oriented mobile device functionality does not save
`claims from § 101 abstraction ........................................................ 7
`The ’233 patent recites no inventive concept ............................................ 8
`2.
`Claim 1 of the ’233 patent is representative .............................................. 9
`3.
`The ’377 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 10
`1.
`The ’377 patent is directed to the abstract idea of collecting and
`analyzing exercise data, and presenting that data to a user ...................... 10
`a.
`Claims are directed to the abstract idea of data collection,
`analysis, and presentation ............................................................ 11
`Claims recite no improvements to technology or methods
`for exercise monitoring ................................................................ 12
`Claims recite no improvements to mobile phone technology ...... 13
`The Federal Circuit has determined similar claims to
`collection, analysis, and display of physiological data to be
`patent-ineligible ........................................................................... 14
`The ’377 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 14
`2.
`Claim 1 of the ’377 patent is representative ............................................ 16
`3.
`The ’958 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 16
`1.
`The ’958 patent is directed to the abstract idea of collecting and
`storing health data so it is not lost during a wireless connection
`interruption ............................................................................................... 17
`a.
`Collecting and storing data is an abstract concept ....................... 17
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`d.
`
`
`
`-i-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 3 of 37
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`D.
`
`
`
`III.
`
`Claims recite the abstract idea in a generic mobile
`environment ................................................................................. 18
`Recited storing of health data is a result, not a specific
`improvement or solution .............................................................. 18
`The ’958 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 19
`2.
`Claim 16 of the ’958 patent is representative .......................................... 20
`3.
`The ’007 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 20
`1.
`The ’007 patent is directed to the abstract idea of collecting and
`analyzing exercise data to track an athlete’s performance ....................... 21
`a.
`Reciting generic physical components is immaterial to
`whether a claim is “abstract” under § 101 ................................... 21
`Claims do not recite improvements to GPS, networking, or
`exercise monitoring technology ................................................... 22
`Claims do not recite improvements to athletic feedback
`data analysis ................................................................................. 23
`Claims recite no improvements to presentation or
`comparing of athletic performance data ...................................... 23
`The ’007 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 23
`Claim 21 of the ’007 patent is representative and Fitbit’s motion
`should be granted even under Philips’ constructions ............................... 24
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`
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`-ii-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 4 of 37
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................2, 8, 25
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................7, 8
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .......................................................................................................1, 2, 3, 8
`
`Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
`939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................3, 4, 21, 23
`
`Am. Well Corp. v. Teladoc, Inc.,
`191 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2016) ......................................................................................15
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
`788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................3
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................25
`
`Athena Diagnostics Inc. v. Mayo Collab. Servs. LLC,
`915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................2
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................1
`
`Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................2, 8
`
`Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`778 F. App’x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................3
`
`British Telecom. PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp,
`381 F. Supp. 3d 293 (D. Del. 2019) .........................................................................8, 16, 20, 24
`
`BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................ passim
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.,
`348 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D. Mass. 2018) ......................................................................................1, 8
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.,
`No. 15-CV-11803, 2017 WL 1788650 (D. Mass. May 4, 2017) .............................................25
`
`
`
`-iii-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 5 of 37
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................9
`
`Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co.,
`935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................8
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019).......................................................................................... passim
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................8, 17, 18
`
`Elec. Power Grp, LLC v. Alstom, S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................ passim
`
`First-Class Monitoring, LLC v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc.,
`389 F. Supp. 3d 456 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .......................................................................................2
`
`Hyper Search LLC v. Facebook Inc.,
`No. 17-1387, 2018 WL 6617143 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) ......................................................25
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................11
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................9
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) .....................................................................................................................2
`
`Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................................................................6
`
`Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
`868 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................2, 6
`
`Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,
`873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................................................2
`
`
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`-iv-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 6 of 37
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................7, 22
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................2
`
`The Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diag. LLC,
`859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................2
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).......................................................................................... passim
`
`Two-Way Media v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................6, 15
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC,
`772 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................9
`
`Univ. of Fl. Res. Found. v. GE Co.,
`916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................14
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 ........................................................................................................................25
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ..........................................................................................................1, 2
`
`
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`-v-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 7 of 37
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`Fitbit, Inc. (“Fitbit”) files this renewed motion to dismiss Philips North America, LLC’s
`
`(“Philips”) first amended complaint (Dkt. 25) with prejudice. In response to Fitbit’s first motion
`
`to dismiss (Dkt. 19–20), Philips added 24 paragraphs in an attempt to save its complaint and U.S.
`
`Patent Nos. 6,013,007 (“the ’007 patent”), 6,976,958 (“the ’958 patent”), 7,088,233 (“the ’233
`
`patent”), and 8,277,377 (“the ’377 patent”) (“the Asserted Patents”) from dismissal. But Philips’
`
`new allegations cannot rewrite the claims or specifications. The Asserted Patents issued before
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014), and their claims reflect an
`
`attempt to capture abstract concepts relating to the collection of health data in a generic mobile
`
`phone environment, the type of result-oriented, “do-it-on-a-computer” claims the Supreme Court
`
`instructed are not patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Philips’ new allegations are inconsistent
`
`with the specifications, not captured by the claims, or immaterial to the § 101 inquiry.
`
`At their core, the Asserted Patents take known, generic components and use them in
`
`conventional ways to collect, analyze, transfer, and present data. The specifications admit the
`
`patents do not improve GPS, physiological monitoring, or wireless technology. The claims are
`
`result-oriented and do not recite particular solutions, but the desired results of data collection and
`
`analysis in a generic mobile environment. None of claims recite use of anything other than
`
`conventional technology to achieve these desired results, “a frequent feature of claims held
`
`ineligible under § 101.” Elec. Power Grp, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016). Indeed, these claims are similar to claims this Court has held ineligible in CardioNet and
`
`American Well. Dismissal of Philips’ amended complaint with prejudice is warranted.
`
`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss under section 101
`
`To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
`
`its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Patent eligibility under § 101 is a
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`- 1 -
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 8 of 37
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`question of law based on underlying facts and “may be, and frequently has been, resolved on a
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`Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2018). “District courts have frequently decided section 101 issues on motions to dismiss, and the
`
`Federal Circuit has approved of that procedure on numerous occasions, including in cases post-
`
`dating the decisions in Aatrix and Berkheimer.” First-Class Monitoring, LLC v. United Parcel
`
`Serv. of Am., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 3d 456, 471 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (Bryson, J., Circuit Judge)
`
`(collecting cases); The Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diag. LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (The Federal Circuit “ha[s] repeatedly affirmed § 101 rejections at the motion to
`
`dismiss stage, before claim construction or significant discovery.”). District courts are “not
`
`obliged to accept” allegations as true that are “inconsistent with the [] patent.” See Athena
`
`Diagnostics Inc. v. Mayo Collab. Servs. LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 756 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also
`
`Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[C]ourt[s]
`
`need not accept as true allegations that contradict . . . the claims and the patent specification.”)
`
`B.
`
`Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`Patent eligibility under § 101 is determined using a two-step analysis expressed in Mayo
`
`Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and further delineated in
`
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. At step one, the Court must first determine whether the claims are
`
`“directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The step one inquiry involves
`
`looking at the “focus” of the claims. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. Limitations that render the
`
`scope of the claims “narrower than th[e] abstract idea,” do not change what those claims are
`
`“directed to.” See BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`Mayo/Alice step one is a legal determination that “must focus on the language of the
`
`Asserted Claims themselves.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Any “reliance on the specification must always yield to the claim language.”
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`- 2 -
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 9 of 37
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`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 766 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The specification
`
`cannot be used to import details “if those details are not claimed.” Id. at 769.
`
`Claims are not saved from abstraction because they recite components more specific than
`
`a generic computer. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–13 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016). The “focus of the claims” must be on a “specific asserted improvement in computer
`
`capabilities,” not an abstract concept “for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” BSG
`
`Tech, 899 F.3d at 1286. Step one requires that “a claimed invention must embody a concrete
`
`solution to a problem having ‘the specificity required to transform a claim from one claiming
`
`only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it.’” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896
`
`F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d
`
`1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (claims must recite “mechanisms for achieving [a] desired result”);
`
`“[M]inimal narrowing” does not satisfy step one, as “a claim is not patent eligible merely
`
`because it applies an abstract idea in a narrow way.” BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1287.
`
`At Mayo/Alice step two, the Court must consider whether claim limitations, individually
`
`and in combination, “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Alice,
`
`573 U.S. at 217. The claims must supply an “inventive concept” that ensures the patent is
`
`“significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. at 217–18. Reciting
`
`“conventional, routine and well understood applications in the art” does not supply an “inventive
`
`concept.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`Adding “novel or non-routine components is not necessarily enough to survive a § 101
`
`challenge.” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 773; see also Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns,
`
`Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[Court] not required to accept [the patentee’s]
`
`legal conclusions as true, even if couched as factual allegations,” including the patentee’s
`
`“repeated characterization of its inventions as ‘technical innovations.’”).
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 10 of 37
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`
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`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`The ’233 patent is invalid as patent ineligible
`
`The ’233 patent claims recite three generic components: a “first personal device” with a
`
`“detector input” (1.(a)); a “second device” that communicates wirelessly with the “first personal
`
`device” (1.(b)); and a “security mechanism” that “govern[s] information transmitted between”
`
`the two devices (1.(c)). Philips alleges infringement of claim 9, which depends from claims 7, 8,
`
`and independent claim 1, all which are reproduced and color-coded in Appendix A-1. These
`
`claims are directed to connecting existing personal medical devices to the Internet, “employ[ing]
`
`standard network communication systems.” ’233 patent, 2:24–27.
`
`1.
`
`The ’233 patent is directed to the abstract idea of secure data transfer
`between devices
`
`The focus of the ’233 patent claims is a desired result—secure transfer of data between
`
`two devices—with no specificity on how to achieve it. The claims recite generic devices, known
`
`wireless technology, and a result-focused “security mechanism,” providing no improvement to
`
`those devices or network components, or to how the transmitted data is secured. Like the
`
`ineligible Interval Licensing claims, the ’233 patent’s claims do not “embody a concrete solution
`
`to a problem having ‘the specificity require to transform a claim from one claiming only a result
`
`to one claiming a way of achieving it.’” 896 F.3d at 1343; Am. Axle, 939 F.3d at 1364
`
`(“distinction between results and means is fundamental to the step 1 eligibility analysis”).1
`
`a. The claims recite generic devices
`
`Neither the spec nor claims purport to improve the recited devices or their components.
`
`
`1 Philips’ allegation the Asserted Patents “do not pre-empt any field” is immaterial to the § 101
`inquiry. “[C]laims that are otherwise directed to patent-ineligible subject matter cannot be saved
`by arguing the absence of complete preemption.” Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 868 F.3d
`1350, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 11 of 37
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`
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`The first personal device can “take many forms,” including “well known in the art” pacemakers.
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`’233 patent, 1:63, 11:50–53. The first or second device can be known PDAs or phones like “the
`
`Motorola PageWriterTM 2000” or “NokiaTM 9000,” or generic “cellular telephone[s]” that can use
`
`“any of the various technologies employed by the cell phone industry.” Id. at 7:66–8:11.
`
`The detector input includes conventional interfaces like “serial, parallel, USB, etc.” Id. at
`
`3:47–49. The detector “may be any sensor of bodily or physiological parameters.” Id. at 3:29–33.
`
`The “detected” physiological parameters—e.g., “temperature, motion, respiration” are well-
`
`understood measurements that are not used in a new way: the spec provides no detail on their
`
`collection other than the sensor is “not limited to” detecting those parameters. Id. at 3:29–33.
`
`The communication between devices uses “bi-directional wireless communications
`
`modules” that employ known short- and long-range communication protocols. The “short-range”
`
`communication can be “[a]ny suitable RF system,” such as the “BLUETOOTH standard.” Id. at
`
`4:47–56. But “other suitable wireless communication standards and methods now existing or
`
`developed in the future are contemplated,” and examples in the spec are “not to be construed as
`
`limitations.” Id. at 4:60–63 (emphasis added), 6:14–16. “Long-range” communication can
`
`include “any consumer or proprietary network designed to serve users,” such as conventional
`
`“cellular network[s] . . . or other wireless communication network[s],” but “[c]ombinations of
`
`such networks and other embodiments may be substituted” as well. Id. at 6:23–28, 6:49–51.
`
`b. “Security mechanism” is a result, not a particular way of achieving the result
`
`The security mechanism is a mere result to be achieved by some method—it requires no
`
`particular implementation and is no improvement to security technology. See id. at 13:41–42
`
`(disclosed “embodiments of security” are all “possible” and “not meant to be exclusive”). For
`
`example, it can include “standard encryption algorithms,” and human behavior, such as a request
`
`for access to “a responsible third party.” Id. at 13:43–44, 14:7–8. All ‘mechanisms’ are described
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 12 of 37
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`
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`by their function and result, not as specific improvements to existing security methods.
`
`c. Federal Circuit has determined similar claims to be directed to abstract ideas
`
`Given their lack of specificity, the ’233 patent’s claims share commonalities with claims
`
`related to the delivery and transfer of information over networks that have been deemed abstract.
`
`In Two-Way Media v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
`
`claims directed to “the abstract idea of monitoring the delivery of real-time information to a user
`
`or users” were patent-ineligible. Like the ’233 patent, the Two-Way Media claims recited only
`
`“conventional computer components” and “functional results” rather than “sufficiently
`
`describ[ing] how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.” Id. at 1337. In Prism Techs.
`
`LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017), claims directed to
`
`“providing restricted access to resources” over the Internet were determined to be abstract. While
`
`the Prism claims recited more detail than the ’233 patent’s “security mechanism,” the claims
`
`were still deemed abstract as they did not require a “concrete, specific solution.” Id.
`
`Nor does limiting the type of data being transferred to physiologic data change the
`
`analysis. See SAP Am. Inc., 898 F.3d at 1169 (“limitation of the claims to a particular field of
`
`information . . . does not move the claims out of the realm of abstract ideas”). In particular,
`
`dependent claims limit the data transfer to physiological data, but this is immaterial to the § 101
`
`inquiry. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“collecting information, including when limited to
`
`particular content (which does not change its character as information),” is “within the realm of
`
`abstract ideas”). Save for their informational content, the claims recite only desired functions and
`
`results—devices “communicating,” data “detected,” a security mechanism “governing”—in a
`
`generic mobile environment. The “essentially result-focused, functional character” of the claims
`
`is “a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.” Id. at 1356.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 13 of 37
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`
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`d. Result-oriented mobile device functionality does not save claims from § 101
`abstraction
`
`That the ’233 patent recites functional capabilities of mobile devices and wireless
`
`communication does not confer eligibility. In Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`
`838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016), claims directed to “delivering user-selected media content
`
`to portable devices” were determined ineligible. Reciting “physical components such as a
`
`telephone unit and a server” did not save claims where those components “merely provide[d] a
`
`generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea.” Id. The Federal Circuit rejected the
`
`argument that “wirelessly streaming content to a handheld device” was a “concrete technological
`
`innovation” because it was not conventional by the early 2000 priority date, explaining that the
`
`claims only “describe[d] the function of streaming content to a wireless device,” not “a specific
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`means for performing that function.” Id. (emphases added). “At that level of generality, the
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`claims d[id] no more than describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting
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`detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem.” Id.
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`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly instructed that claims involving new devices are still
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`patent ineligible under § 101 if the claims do not recite improvements to those devices. In
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`ChargePoint, claims to networked electric vehicle charging stations the patentee alleged were
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`“paradigm-shifting” and the “first” to be patented, 920 F.3d at 774, were determined to be
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`abstract because the claims did not recite improvements to the charging devices themselves, id.
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`at 772. While the claims on their face recited “a physical machine that is quite tangible,” for the
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`purpose of § 101 their focus was “the abstract idea of communication over a network for
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`interacting with a device, applied to the context of electric vehicle charging stations.” Id. at 768;
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`see Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`(claims involving physical mass transit systems nevertheless abstract for purposes of § 101). The
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 14 of 37
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`’233 patent claims offer no specific technological improvements to recited mobile devices and
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`thus have the same flaws as those determined to be ineligible in Affinity Labs and ChargePoint.
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`The ’233 patent recites no inventive concept
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`2.
`Nor do the ’233 patent’s claims recite an inventive concept. The recited devices are
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`generic, the “security mechanism” is result-oriented and encompasses known security methods,
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`and the wireless communication between devices is conventional. See section II.A.1. Indeed, the
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`’233 patent claims are ineligible for the same reason as those in CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic,
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`Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (D. Mass. 2018). The CardioNet claims recited a combination of a
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`detector for health data and computers for processing the data, but did not recite any inventive
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`concept using the components. The Court explained the claims only “add conventional computer
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`components to the abstract idea.” Id. at 97. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus.
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`Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“conventional components, all recited in a generic
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`way, are no better equipped to save the claim from abstractness than . . . the conventional
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`computer used in Alice or the scanner used in Content Extraction”). That is also the case here.
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`Philips alleges the claims “were not well known, routine, or conventional” and “represent
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`specific improvements over the prior art,” without explaining how the claims achieve such
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`specific improvements and unconventional technological advances. Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 85–93. Philips’
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`allegations are not “rooted in the specification” and cannot add unrecited limitations to the
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`claims or negate admissions in the specification. See British Telecom. PLC v. IAC /
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`InterActiveCorp, 381 F. Supp. 3d 293, 322–23 (D. Del. 2019) (Bryson, J., Circuit Judge)
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`(“Aatrix and Berkheimer do not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff can avoid dismissal
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`simply by reciting in the complaint that the invention at issue is novel and nonconventional.”);
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`Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (no step two “factual dispute”
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 34 Filed 12/10/19 Page 15 of 37
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`without “improvements” in the specification that are “captured in the claims”).2
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`Philips alleges the patent improves computer functionality by “establishing a distributed
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`personal health communication system” and “enabling remote monitoring of vital signs or other
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`physiological parameters.” Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 85, 87, 89. But the claims do not recite a “distributed”
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`system or require “remote monitoring,” only the result of secure data transfer from a “first
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`personal device” to a “second device” that “communicat[es]” with the first device. ’233 patent,
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`15:5–9. Unlike in Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., where the Federal Circuit determined “what
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`makes the claims inventive [wa]s recited by the claims” and “discussed throughout the shared
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`specification,” 927 F.3d 1306, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2019), here Philips alleges “significant
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`advancement[s]” and “concrete and technological improvements” to monitoring devices, Dkt. 25
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`¶¶ 87, 90, but the claims recite nothing showing how any monitoring device itself is improved.
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`See section II.A.1. Philips also alleges the recited systems were “unavailable” and not
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`conventional in view of the art “twenty years ago.” Dkt. 25 ¶¶ 91, 85. But applying an abstract
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`idea to a “nascent but well-known environment” does not save a claim. See TLI, 823 F.3d at 607.
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`The specification admits the components and system structure were known. See section II.A.1.
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`Philips also admits: “before the invention, communications between cellular phones . . . could
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`be established in various manners including Bluetooth.” Dkt. 25 ¶ 88. Thus, the