Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 1 of 22
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`_______________________________________
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`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
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`)
`)
`) Civil Action No.
`) 19-11586-FDS
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`FITBIT, INC.,
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`
`)
`Defendant.
`_______________________________________)
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`
`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
`DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`SAYLOR, C.J.
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`This is an action for patent infringement. Plaintiff Philips North America LLC has sued
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`defendant Fitbit, Inc., asserting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 271 for infringement of three patents of
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`which Philips is the owner and assignee. The patents at issue concern technology related to
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`connected-health products, such as wearable fitness trackers.
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`Fitbit has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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`can be granted. It contends that each asserted patent is directed to patent-ineligible subject
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`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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`For the following reasons, that motion will be denied.
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`I.
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`Background
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`A.
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`Factual Background
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`The facts are stated as set forth in the complaint unless otherwise noted.
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`1.
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`The Parties
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`Philips North America LLC is a Delaware limited liability company based in
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 2 of 22
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`Massachusetts. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 12). It develops, among other things, connected-health
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`technologies and related products, such as wearable fitness trackers that monitor and analyze
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`personal health and fitness information. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4-7, 12, 24-25). Its patent portfolio includes
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`more than 60,000 patents. (Id. ¶ 8). It licenses its patented technologies to companies in the
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`connected-health field. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8).
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`Fitbit, Inc. is a Delaware corporation based in Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 13). It develops,
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`manufactures, and sells connected-health products. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 29-30).
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`2.
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`Patents in Suit
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`The second amended complaint alleges that Fitbit infringes three patents owned by
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`Philips: U.S. Patent No. 6,013,007 (“the ’007 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 7,088,233 (“the ’233
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`patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 8,277,377 (“the ’377 patent”).1 The patents concern technology
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`related to connected-health products, including GPS/audio athletic training, security mechanisms
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`for transmitting personal data, wearable-technology products, and handling interrupted
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`connections. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12, 37).
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`a.
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`The ’007 Patent
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`The ’007 patent is titled “Athlete’s GPS-Based Performance Monitor.” (’007 patent at
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`Title). The patent concerns applying “Global Positioning System (GPS) technology for the
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`personal performance monitoring of outdoor athletes, . . . and providing the athlete with real-time
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`performance feedback and optional long-term trend analysis.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 8-13). It identifies
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`“a need for a portable GPS unit that is small and light enough to be carried or worn by an
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`1 The original complaint alleged that Fitbit infringes a fourth patent: U.S. Patent No. 6,976,958 (“the ’958
`patent”). Philips has since withdrawn its allegations of infringement of that patent. The Court will therefore not
`address Fitbit’s motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of the claim of infringement of that patent.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 3 of 22
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`outdoor athlete which incorporates real-time athletic performance algorithms for continuously
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`monitoring the athlete’s progress and reporting his/her progress periodically during the exercise
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`session.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 59-64). According to the patent, “[r]eal-time audio reports would assist
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`and motivate the athlete to improve his/her performance without any visual distractions” and
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`“[a]n integrated radio can provide the athlete with entertainment.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 64-67).
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`The patent states that “the GPS-based performance monitor and feedback device of the
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`present invention can be used to provide an outdoor athlete with continuous, consistent, and
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`accurate real-time performance feedback, independent of his/her outdoor location in the world.”
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`(Id. col. 9 ll. 63-67). It further states that “[t]he data presentation method of using an audio
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`module eliminates the exclusive use of large, power-consuming, cumbersome, and visually
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`distracting displays and leaves the athlete free to concentrate on his/her exercise, safety, and
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`surroundings.” (Id. col. 9 l. 67; id. col. 10 ll. 1-4).
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`The patent provides for, among other things, a “portable feedback system providing
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`regular updates on an athlete’s performance” comprising:
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`• a global positioning system GPS receiver for obtaining a series of time-
`stamped waypoints;
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`• means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of
`time-stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver; and
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`
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`• means for presenting the athletic performance feedback data to an athlete.
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`(Id. col. 2 ll. 56-67). It further provides for a “system for comparing an athlete’s performance
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`with the performance of other athletes” comprising the same components plus “a modem for
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`transmitting the athletic performance feedback data to a remote computer for comparison with
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`athletic performance feedback data of other athletes.” (Id. col. 2 ll. 65-67; id. col. 3 ll. 1-10).
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`b.
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`The ’233 Patent
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`The ’233 patent is titled “Personal Medical Device Communication System and Method.”
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`(’233 patent at Title). It generally concerns a “bi-directional personal and health-wellness
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`provider communication system.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 21-23). More particularly, it concerns “a
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`personal communication system suitable for use with children, vulnerable adults (such as those
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`in assisted living situations), and more specifically, medically distressed persons and those in
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`whom a[] personal medical device has been deployed, for medical testing, and for other life
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`enhancements.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 23-28).
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`According to the patent, personal medical devices are devices that may either “monitor”
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`or “provide” body functions. (Id. col. 2 ll. 2-3, 5). They may be used “to deliver drugs, heart
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`defibrillation, or other treatment” or “to enhance wellness, test drug therapies, monitor patient
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`health, deliver long-term care, or treat acute conditions.” (Id. col. 2 ll. 7-10). They take “many
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`forms” and may be “surgically implanted, strapped externally to the body, carried in a pocket,
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`transported in a carrying case, or installed as a home appliance.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 63-67).
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`The patent describes “a device and method to couple with [personal medical devices] to
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`provide wireless communication and locating functions.” (Id. col. 2 ll. 11-12). Such
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`communication may be used, among other things, “to provide health care professionals with
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`access to information for remote diagnostic capabilities; to provide notification of acute
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`conditions possibly requiring immediate assistance, transportation to a medical center, or remote
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`treatment action; to provide a location information of mobile persons for caregivers; to notify
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`responsible parties of the occurrence of a medical condition; and to provide remote intervention
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`assistance by caregivers through verbal or visual interaction.” (Id. col. 2 ll. 14-22).
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`c.
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`The ’377 Patent
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`The ’377 patent is titled “Method and Apparatus for Monitoring Exercise with Wireless
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`Internet Connectivity.” (’377 patent at Title). It concerns “monitoring of living subjects.” (Id.
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`col. 1 ll. 35-36). More particularly, it concerns “health-monitoring of persons where measured or
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`input health data is communicated by a wireless device to and from a software application
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`running on an internet-connected server and where the same may be studied and processed by
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`the software application, a health professional, or the subject.” (Id. col. 1 ll. 36-41).
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`The patent provides for a “method and apparatus . . . for wireless monitoring of exercise,
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`fitness, or nutrition by connecting a web-enabled wireless phone to a device which provides
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`exercise-related information, including physiological data and data indicating an amount of
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`exercise performed.” (Id. at Abstract). It further provides that “[a]n application for receiving the
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`exercise-related information and providing a user interface may be downloaded to the web-
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`enabled wireless phone from an internet server” and that “[t]he exercise-related information may
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`be transmitted to an internet server, and the server may calculate and return a response.” (Id.).
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`The patent identifies two “complementary” systems that embody the invention. (Id. col.
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`2 l. 64). The first embodiment may be employed “to manage the disease state or condition of a
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`patient” by “employ[ing] a health monitoring device.” (Id. col. 2 l. 67; id. col. 3 ll. 1-2). That
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`device would provide data by a wireless connection “for processing via the internet[,] including a
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`review by a physician or other health care professional if required.” (Id. col. 3 ll. 1-2). For
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`example, a diabetic could connect a blood-glucose monitor to a wireless web device, download
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`data to a diabetes-management company’s server, and receive guidance concerning his next
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`meal. (Id. col. 3 ll. 14-20).
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`The second embodiment enables implementation of a “health or lifestyle management
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`plan” by allowing “[v]arious health parameters, such as those relating to nutrition or exercise,
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`[to] be entered into a health monitoring device” and to be wirelessly communicated to a server.
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 6-11). In this embodiment, the system “may be employed to monitor the
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`physiologic status of a healthy subject while eating, exercising, or performing other activities.”
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 34-36). For example, an individual following an exercise program could attach a
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`wireless web device to an exercise machine, send data from that machine over the Internet to the
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`server of a health and fitness company, and receive personalized responses from that company.
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`(Id. col. 3 ll. 21-27).
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`B.
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`Procedural Background
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`On July 22, 2019, Philips filed this action against Fitbit. The second amended complaint
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`asserts three counts of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271: infringement of the ’007
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`patent (Count 1); infringement of the ’233 patent (Count 2); and infringement of the ’377 patent
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`(Count 3).
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`On July 22, 2021, the Court issued its Memorandum and Order on Claim Construction.
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`In that decision, it concluded, among other things, that a means-plus-function claim term in the
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`’007 patent—“means for computing athletic performance feedback data from the series of time-
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`stamped waypoints obtained by said GPS receiver”—is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack
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`of corresponding structure for the claimed function.
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`Fitbit has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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`can be granted. It contends that each asserted patent is directed to patent-ineligible subject
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`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.2
`
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`2 Fitbit moved to dismiss the complaint before the second amended complaint was filed. As noted, the
`second amended complaint withdrew Philips’s claim of infringement of the ’958 patent without amending the
`allegations concerning the other asserted patents. The Court deemed Fitbit’s motion and all related briefing as
`directed to the second amended complaint.
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`Fitbit has also moved for partial summary judgment as to the claim of infringement of the ’007 patent. It
`contends that the asserted claims of that patent are invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. That motion has
`been stayed pending further court order.
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`II.
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`Legal Framework
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`A.
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`Legal Standard
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`To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its
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`face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a claim to be plausible, the
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`“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
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`Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
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`requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When
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`determining whether a complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth of all well-
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`pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ruiz v. Bally
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`Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75,
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`77 (1st Cir. 1999)). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual
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`allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain
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`recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.
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`2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
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`2005)).
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`Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an
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`issue of law. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Courts
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`have therefore occasionally decided the issue of § 101 patent-eligibility at the pleadings stage.
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`See, e.g., Rothschild Digital Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc., 2020 WL 1307016, at
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`*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020). But “like many legal questions,” determining eligibility under §
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`101 can involve “subsidiary fact questions”—in particular, the second step of the Alice/Mayo
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`test, which asks whether a patent’s claims contain a sufficiently inventive concept. See Aatrix
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`Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Thus,
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 8 of 22
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`while the Federal Circuit has held that “patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6)
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`stage,” it has also cautioned that “[t]his is true only when there are no factual allegations that,
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`taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.” Id. at 1125.
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`B.
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`Statutory Framework
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`An invention is generally patentable if it qualifies as a “new and useful process, machine,
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`manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, “this provision contains an
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`important implicit exception. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
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`patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (internal
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`quotation marks and citations omitted). When applying that exception, a court “must distinguish
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`between patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the
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`building blocks into something more.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208, 217
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`(2014) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
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`The framework for making that distinction comprises two steps. At step one, the court
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`determines “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts”
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`that is so abstract as to “risk disproportionately tying up the use of [] underlying ideas.” Id. at
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`217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). If the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
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`concept, the court continues to step two. At step two, the court looks for an “inventive concept,”
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`namely “an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in
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`practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Id. at
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`217-18 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). If the claims lack an
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`inventive concept, then the patent claims subject matter that is not patent-eligible, and the claims
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`are therefore invalid.
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`III. Analysis
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`A.
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`The ’377 Patent
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`Claim 1 of the ’377 patent recites a method for “interactive exercise monitoring.” (’377
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`patent col. 13 l. 23). That method comprises (1) downloading an application to a wireless phone;
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`(2) “coupling” that phone to a device that provides exercise-related data; (3) receiving data
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`“indicating a physiologic status of a subject” and the amount of exercise performed by the
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`subject; (4) wirelessly transmitting the exercise-related data to a server; (5) receiving a response
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`from the server that is calculated based on that data; and (6) displaying the response on the
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`application. (Id. col. 13 ll. 25-47).3 In its Memorandum and Order on Claim Construction, the
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`Court concluded that the term “indicating a physiologic status of a subject” will be given its plain
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`and ordinary meaning.
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`1.
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`Step One: Patent-Ineligible Concept
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`Defendant contends that the ’377 patent is directed to the abstract idea of collecting and
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`analyzing exercise-related data and presenting that data to a user.
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`The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly held” that “collecting, analyzing, and displaying
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`data” are “abstract concepts.” CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 816 F. App’x 471, 475 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2020) (citing Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, 776 F.3d
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`1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016), the court explained that claims reciting those concepts—either individually or
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`collectively—“fall into a familiar class of claims” directed to patent-ineligible concepts:
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`3 Defendant contends that claim 1 of the ’377 patent is representative. It is unclear whether plaintiff agrees.
`It does not respond to that specific contention; instead, at the outset of its opposition brief, it states that each claim of
`the asserted patents “must be analyzed individually, and in the context of Philips’ well-pled allegations.” (Pl. Opp.
`at 3). For present purposes, the Court will assume that claim 1 is representative.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 10 of 22
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`Information as such is intangible. Accordingly, we have treated collecting
`information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change
`its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas. In a similar
`vein, we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their
`minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
`processes within the abstract-idea category. And we have recognized that merely
`presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
`information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation),
`is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.
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`Id. at 1353-54 (internal citations omitted; emphases added).
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`The claims at issue in Electric Power Group recited receiving, analyzing, and displaying
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`power-grid data. See id. at 1351-52. The court found that they were directed to an abstract idea
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`because “[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information
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`of a specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive
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`technology for performing those functions.” Id. at 1354. They “focused on the combination of
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`those abstract-idea processes,” which rendered the claims directed to patent-ineligible concepts.
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`Id.
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`The same can be said about claim 1 of the ’377 patent. It recites a series of steps
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`comprising gathering data (by “downloading” an application to a wireless phone, “coupling” that
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`phone to a device that provides exercise-related data, and “receiving” data concerning the
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`physiologic status of the subject and the amount of exercise performed by the subject); analyzing
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`that data (by wirelessly “sending” the exercise-related data to a server and “receiving” a response
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`from the server that is calculated based on that data); and showing the results (by “displaying”
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`the response from the server). (’377 patent col. 13 ll. 25-47). In other words, it recites nothing
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`more than the collection, analysis, and presentation of information, which have been found—
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`individually and collectively—to be abstract concepts. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353-54
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`(collecting cases). It does not recite “inventive technology for performing those functions.” Id.
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`at 1354; see also Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
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`(“[T]he claimed steps for calculating the P&L values . . . is nothing more than mere automation
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`of manual processes using generic computers, which does not constitute a patentable
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`improvement in computer technology. . . . [T]he claims here fail because arranging information
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`along an axis does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently,
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`or solve any technological problem.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));
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`CardioNet, 816 Fed. App’x at 475 (“[T]he claims and specifications treat those steps as
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`conventional processes, and therefore the claims cannot be said to require anything more than
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`generic data analysis. . . . [M]erely displaying data by conventional methods as part of a series
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`of abstract steps is itself an abstract concept.”).
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`The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
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`LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) underscores that conclusion. There, the court considered
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`claims that were directed to Internet-content filtering. See id. at 1344-45. The invention
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`improved upon prior art by locating the filtering software at the server of the Internet service
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`provider rather than on the local computer or on a local server. See id. Plaintiff here contends
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`that the Bascom court “deferred at step one” and that “the claims at issue in Bascom could have
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`been found to be non-abstract at Alice step one . . . .” (Pl. Opp. at 16).
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`That is not so. In fact, the Bascom court did not defer at step one; it expressly found that
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`“the claims of the ’606 patent are directed to filtering content on the Internet,” that “filtering
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`content is an abstract idea,” and that “[a]n abstract idea on an Internet computer network or on a
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`generic computer is still an abstract idea.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1348 (internal quotation marks
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`omitted).4 Plaintiff’s reliance on that decision, at least at step one, is therefore misplaced. To
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`4 The Bascom court did “defer . . . consideration of the specific claim limitations’ narrowing effect for step
`two,” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1349, a step that would have been unnecessary if it did not conclude that the claims were
`directed to an abstract concept.
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`the extent that the claims of the ’377 patent are—as plaintiff contends—“similar” to those at
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`issue in Bascom, they are likewise directed to an abstract concept.
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`Plaintiff also relies on Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016). But there, the court assumed that the relevant claim was directed to a patent-
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`ineligible idea at step one, before concluding that it contained a saving inventive concept at step
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`two. See id. at 1300.
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`Accordingly, the Court finds that claim 1 of the ’377 patent is directed to the abstract
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`concept of collecting, analyzing, and displaying exercise-related information.
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`2.
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`Step Two: Inventive Concept
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`The Court must next examine the elements of claim 1 to determine whether it contains an
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`“inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible
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`application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`That examination requires the court to “consider the elements of each claim both
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`individually and as an ordered combination.” Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
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`inquiry searches for “an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the
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`patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.”
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`Id. at 217-18 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “An inventive concept reflects
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`something more than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-understood, routine, and
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`conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927
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`F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Aatrix Software, 882 F.3d at 1128). “The question of
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`whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
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`conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
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`Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`At this stage, it appears that the complaint plausibly alleges that the elements of claim 1
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 13 of 22
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`of the ’377 patent, when considered collectively, contain an inventive concept sufficient to
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`transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Bascom is again instructive. As
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`noted, the court found that the relevant claims were directed to filtering content on the Internet,
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`an abstract idea, at step one. See Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1348. Yet it further found that the
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`claimed invention contained a saving inventive concept—“the installation of a filtering tool at a
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`specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each
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`end user”—at step two. Id. at 1350. It reasoned that “the patent describes how its particular
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`arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such
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`content.” Id. The “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
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`pieces” transformed “the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application
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`of that abstract idea.” Id. at 1350, 1352.
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` Here, the patent describes a method that employs conventional, “off-the-shelf”
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`components in such a way that appears—at least on its face—to result in a technological
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`advancement over prior art, allowing for expanded range and “full back-end server functionality
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`with which to provide a wide range of interactive communication with the patient.” (’377 patent
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`col. 2 ll. 1-51). That method also appears to allow for “efficient processing of exercise related
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`information . . . in real time” by receiving that information “at least partially while the subject is
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`exercising” and by processing that information remotely on a server over the Internet. (Second
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`Am. Compl. ¶ 110; ’377 patent col. 13 ll. 35-47). In other words, like the inventions at issue in
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`Bascom, the claimed inventions here appear to arrange the components to yield technological
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`benefits, such as real-time processing of exercise-related data without location-based restraints.
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`By doing so, it transforms the abstract idea of collecting, analyzing, and displaying information
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`into a “particular, practical application of that abstract idea.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352; see also
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 14 of 22
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`Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1301 (concluding that the claim contained a sufficient inventive concept
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`where it “purposefully arranges the components in a distributed architecture to achieve a
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`technological solution to a technological problem specific to computer networks”).
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`That conclusion is bolstered by the allegations in the complaint. Quoting from the
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`prosecution history of the patent, it alleges how the disclosed inventions improve upon the
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`functionality of prior art:
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`[T]he relatively small amount of memory and processing capability provided on a
`wireless phone in the 1990s, as compared to the present time, severely limited the
`functionality of applications running on the wireless phone, especially in terms of
`computing capacity, processing power, and user interface. In the current claimed
`systems, e.g., the application program downloaded from a server is thus designed
`to suit the constraints of the small display screens of a mobile phone. . . . By
`providing significant application functionality on the server, less memory and
`processing capabilities become necessary on the wireless phone; thus freeing
`memory and processing power for an interactive user interface and for receiving
`the exercise related data. The external application running on the internet server
`and external data storage were other examples of way employed to overcome the
`computing limitations of a mobile phone.
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`(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 109). It further alleges that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
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`understand that the inventions offer several specific improvements over prior art:
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`• “allow[ing] for the efficient processing of exercise related information and data
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`indicating physiologic status by the server in real time, thereby overcoming the
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`limitations resulting from reliance on local processing capabilities” (id. ¶ 110);
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`• “eliminat[ing] the location-based restraints of prior art systems by arranging the data
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`processing components such that the data analysis is offloaded to a server that is in
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`wireless communication with a wireless web device” (id.); and
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`• “allow[ing] the downloading of applications in connection with health monitoring
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`devices to perform improved data capture, sharing, and analysis functions without the
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`need for complex connections or expensive additional components.” (Id. ¶ 113).
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 15 of 22
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`Defendant urges the Court to disregard these allegations. It repeatedly directs the Court
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`to decisions from the Federal Circuit that reject patentees’ claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`notwithstanding allegations in the relevant complaints that purportedly show patent eligibility.
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`(See, e.g., Def. Supp. Mem. at 2-4 (discussing Boom! Payments, Inc. v. Stripe, Inc., 839 F. App’x
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`528 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Data Scape Ltd. v. W. Digital Corp., 816 F. App’x 461 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
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`Ubisoft Ent., S.A. v. Yousician Oy, 814 F. App’x 588 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Dropbox, Inc. v.
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`Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020))). Those decisions, however,
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`support little more than the uncontroversial proposition that a court is “not bound to accept as
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`true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Dropbox, 815 F. App’x at 538 (quoting
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`Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
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`For example, in Dropbox, the Federal Circuit concluded that the relevant allegations
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`offered “no more than a series of legal conclusion[s] about the § 101 analysis.” Id.
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`Dropbox’s allegations restate the claim elements and append a conclusory
`statement that “nothing in the specification describes these concepts as well-
`understood, routine, or conventional.” The allegations claim that each of the
`patents solves given technological problems, but never provide more support than
`a conclusory statement that “the inventions described and claimed . . . solved
`these problems,” improved the art, “represented a significant advance over
`existing approaches[,] and were not well-known, routine, or conventional in the
`field” at the time of patenting.
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`Id. (internal citations omitted). By contrast, the allegations in the complaint here are tied to the
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`claims and specification and identify “how the specific techniques recited in the claims [are]
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`inventive.” Id. (citing Cellspin Soft, 927 F.3d at 1317-18).
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`Of course, those allegations may well prove to be unsupported. It is possible that
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`discovery will reveal that the claims of the ’377 patent do not in fact reveal an inventive concept.
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`But that is a question for another day. At this stage, it is enough to find that patent, coupled with
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`the plausible allegations of the complaint, sufficiently indicates that they do.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-FDS Document 219 Filed 08/10/21 Page 16 of 22
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`Accordingly, the