`
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 1 of 35
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
`
`PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`
`v.
`
`FITBIT, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11586-IT
`
`Leave to file excess pages granted
`on November 13, 2019
`
`DEFENDANT FITBIT INC.’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
`DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`
`
`

`

`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 2 of 35
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ..................................................................................................... 2 
`A.
`Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................ 2 
`B.
`Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................ 2 
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4 
`A.
`The ’233 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ....................................................... 4 
`1.
`The ’233 patent is directed to abstract idea of secure data transfer
`between devices ......................................................................................... 4 
`The ’233 patent recites no inventive concept ............................................ 7 
`2.
`Claim 1 is representative and no terms require construction ................... 10 
`3.
`The ’377 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 11 
`1.
`The ’377 patent is directed to abstract idea of collecting and
`analyzing exercise data, and presenting that data to a user ...................... 11 
`The ’377 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 14 
`Claim 1 of the ’377 patent is representative and no terms require
`construction .............................................................................................. 16 
`The ’958 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 17 
`1.
`The ’958 patent is directed to abstract idea of collecting and
`storing health data so it is not lost during a wireless connection
`interruption ............................................................................................... 17 
`The ’958 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 19 
`Claim 16 of the ’958 patent is representative and no terms require
`construction .............................................................................................. 20 
`The ’007 patent is invalid as patent ineligible ..................................................... 21 
`1.
`The ’007 patent is directed to abstract idea of collecting and
`analyzing exercise data to track an athlete’s performance ....................... 21 
`The ’007 patent recites no inventive concept .......................................... 23 
`Claim 21 of the ’007 patent is representative and Fitbit’s motion
`should be granted even under Philips’ constructions ............................... 24 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25 
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`
`
`-i-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 3 of 35
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................2
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ...........................................................................................................1, 2, 4
`
`Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
`939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019)........................................................................................3, 5, 22
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
`788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................4
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................25
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................2
`
`Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................8
`
`British Telecom. PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp,
`381 F. Supp. 3d 293 (D. Del. 2019) .........................................................................8, 14, 19, 23
`
`BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................ passim
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.,
`No. 15-CV-11803, 2017 WL 1788650 (D. Mass. May 4, 2017) ...............................................2
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................4
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)......................................................................................3, 4, 6, 22
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................2, 17
`
`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................2, 7, 12, 21
`
`
`
`-ii-
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 4 of 35
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Hyper Search LLC v. Facebook Inc.,
`No. 17-1387, 2018 WL 6617143 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) ......................................................25
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................3, 5
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) .....................................................................................................................2
`
`Nisselson v. Lernout,
`469 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2006) ......................................................................................................2
`
`Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset,
`640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................................2
`
`Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................................................................7
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................3
`
`TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc., v. AKM Enter., Inc.,
`657 F. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................3
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).......................................................................................... passim
`
`Two-Way Media v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................7
`
`Univ. of Fl. Res. Found. v. GE Co.,
`916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................13
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 ........................................................................................................................25
`
`35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) .......................................................................................................................1
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.53(c)(3) ......................................................................................................................1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ..............................................................................................................2
`
`
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`-iii-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 5 of 35
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`Fitbit, Inc. (“Fitbit”) files this motion to dismiss Philips N. Am., LLC’s (“Philips”)
`
`complaint with prejudice. Opening a new front in its thus-far unsuccessful worldwide patent
`
`assertion campaign, Philips has asserted infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,013,007 (“the ’007
`
`patent”), 6,976,958 (“the ’958 patent”), 7,088,233 (“the ’233 patent”), and 8,277,377 (“the ’377
`
`patent”) (“the Asserted Patents”). Two patents (the ’007 and ’233 patents) have already expired,
`
`and the other two will expire before any trial in this action. All four Asserted Patents issued years
`
`before Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), and their claims reflect an
`
`attempt to capture abstract concepts relating to the collection of health data using generic mobile
`
`phone technology, the type of result-oriented, “do-it-on-a-computer” claims the Supreme Court
`
`in Alice instructed are outside the boundaries of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`At their core, the claims of Philips’ Asserted Patents share common characteristics: they
`
`take known concepts relating to the collection, analysis, transfer, and presentation of health and
`
`exercise information, and apply them in a generic mobile phone technological environment.
`
`None of the Asserted Patents purport to provide improvements to mobile phone or wireless
`
`technology. Rather, all claims recite conventional, routine, and well-understood applications in
`
`the art and thus cannot supply an “inventive concept.” Nor do the claims recite any particular
`
`solutions. Instead, the claims attempt to capture all ways of achieving the desired results of data
`
`collection and analysis in a known and generic technological environment. These expired or
`
`soon-to-expire claims1 fall well within the boundaries of the abstract idea exception and are
`
`invalid under § 101 based on admissions in the respective specifications alone. Dismissal of
`
`Philips’ complaint with prejudice is warranted.
`
`1 The ’007 and ’233 patents expired on March 26, 2018, and August 27, 2019, respectively. 35
`U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). The ’377 patent claims priority to a conversion of a provisional application,
`and will expire on January 18, 2020. 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(c)(3). The ’958 patent will expire no later
`than February 28, 2021, and as early as February 28, 2020. Id.
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`
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`I.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 6 of 35
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
`A. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
`
`its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court must “begin by
`
`identifying and disregarding statements . . . that merely offer ‘legal conclusion[s] couched as . . .
`
`fact[ ].’” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (alteration
`
`original). Patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage when there are no
`
`plausible factual allegations that preclude dismissal. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
`
`Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d
`
`143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006) (motions to dismiss may be premised on “inevitable success of an
`
`affirmative defense”). Even where there are claim construction disputes, courts may resolve
`
`motions by “adopting the non-moving party’s constructions” and construing the claims in a
`
`manner most favorable to that party. See Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1125; Content Extraction &
`
`Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CardioNet,
`
`LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., No. 15-CV-11803, 2017 WL 1788650 at *1 n.5 (D. Mass. May 4, 2017).
`
`B.
`
`Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`Patent eligibility under § 101 is determined using a two-step analysis expressed in Mayo
`
`Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and further delineated in
`
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. At step one, the Court must first determine whether the claims are
`
`“directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The step one inquiry involves
`
`looking at the “focus” of the claims. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Limitations that render the scope of the claims “narrower than th[e] abstract
`
`idea,” do not change what those claims are “directed to.” See BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`
`899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 7 of 35
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`Mayo/Alice step one is a legal determination that “must focus on the language of the
`
`Asserted Claims themselves.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). At step one, any “reliance on the specification must always yield to the claim
`
`language in identifying th[e] focus” of the claims. ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920
`
`F.3d 759, 766 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In determining that focus of the claims, “the specification cannot
`
`be used to import details . . . if those details are not claimed.” Id. at 769. Features not claimed
`
`“are irrelevant as to step 1 or step 2 of the Mayo/Alice analysis.” Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v.
`
`Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`Claims are not saved from abstraction merely because they recite components more
`
`specific than a generic computer. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–
`
`13 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The “focus of the claims” must be on a “specific asserted improvement in
`
`computer capabilities” not an abstract concept “for which computers are invoked merely as a
`
`tool.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1286. To pass the Mayo/Alice step one filter, “a claimed invention
`
`must embody a concrete solution to a problem having ‘the specificity required to transform a
`
`claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it.’” Interval Licensing
`
`LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see American Axle, 939 F.3d at 1363
`
`(claims must recite “mechanisms for achieving [a] desired result” to be “outside the realm of
`
`ineligible subject matter”); TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc., v. AKM Enter., Inc., 657 F. App’x
`
`991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims ineligible when “recit[ing] the what of the invention, but none
`
`of the how that is necessary to turn the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application”).
`
`“[M]inimal narrowing” does not satisfy step one, as “a claim is not patent eligible merely
`
`because it applies an abstract idea in a narrow way.” BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1287.
`
`At Mayo/Alice step two, the Court must consider whether the limitations of the claims,
`
`both individually and as an ordered combination, “transform the nature of the claim” into a
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 8 of 35
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`patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The transformative elements must supply an
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`“inventive concept” that ensures the patent amounts to “significantly more than a patent upon the
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`[ineligible concept] itself.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo). Claims reciting “conventional, routine
`
`and well understood applications in the art” do not supply an “inventive concept.” Ariosa
`
`Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Adding “novel or
`
`non-routine components is not necessarily enough to survive a § 101 challenge.” ChargePoint,
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`920 F.3d at 773. Whether claims recite an inventive concept is a legal question, although
`
`underlying factual determinations may inform the ultimate legal conclusion. BSG Tech, 899 F.3d
`
`at 1290. Performance of the “directed to” ineligible concept “cannot supply the inventive concept
`
`that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” Id. Allegations in a
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`complaint that are “wholly divorced from the claims or the specification” cannot “defeat[] a
`
`motion to dismiss.” See Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`The ’233 patent is invalid as patent ineligible
`
`The ’233 patent describes connecting existing personal medical devices to the Internet,
`
`“employ[ing] standard network communication systems to deliver a comprehensive medical
`
`communications service.” ’233 patent, 2:24–27. Philips alleges infringement of claim 9, which
`
`depends from claims 7, 8, and independent claim 1, all which are reproduced in Appendix A-1.
`
`These claims recite three generic components: a “first personal device” with a “detector
`
`input;” a “second device” that communicates wirelessly with the “first personal device;” and a
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`“security mechanism” that “govern[s] information transmitted between” the two devices.
`
`1.
`
`The ’233 patent is directed to abstract idea of secure data transfer
`between devices
`
`The focus of the ’233 patent’s claims is no more than a desired result—securely
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 9 of 35
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`transferring data between devices—with no specificity on how to achieve that result. The claims
`
`recite generic devices, known wireless components and protocols, and a result-focused “security
`
`mechanism,” providing no improvement to the devices or networking components, or to how the
`
`transmitted data is secured. Nor do the claims provide any specific solution for how the generic
`
`components achieve the results of “detecting” or “communicating,” or for how the “security
`
`mechanism” operates to protect transmitted data, only that it achieves the desired result. Like the
`
`ineligible Interval Licensing claims, the ’233 patent’s claims do not “embody a concrete solution
`
`to a problem having ‘the specificity require to transform a claim from one claiming only a result
`
`to one claiming a way of achieving it.’” 896 F.3d at 1343; see American Axle, 939 F.3d at 1364
`
`(“distinction between results and means is fundamental to the step 1 eligibility analysis”).
`
`To illustrate, the recited devices can “take many forms,” including generic PDAs or cell
`
`phones. See ’233 patent, 1:63, 7:66–8:11. The “detector” of dependent claims 7–9 “may be any
`
`sensor of bodily or physiological parameters.” Id. at 3:29–33. The recited “bi-directional wireless
`
`communications modules” employ known and conventional “short-range” and “long-range”
`
`communication protocols including the Bluetooth standard and conventional cellular network
`
`protocols, and “other suitable wireless communication standards and methods now existing or
`
`developed in the future.” Id. at 4:47–63 (emphasis added), 6:23–28. The “security mechanism”
`
`involves existing strategies and no improvements to security methods. See id. at 13:41–14:14.
`
`Nor does it require any particular way of providing security—the patent makes clear that
`
`“embodiments of security” in the specification “are not meant to be exclusive.” Id. at 13:41–42.
`
`In short, the claims are so result-oriented and functional that they cover communication between
`
`almost any Bluetooth-enabled device and a cell phone.
`
`To begin, that the ’233 patent recites the use of devices that can communicate wirelessly
`
`does not confer eligibility. In Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266,
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 10 of 35
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`1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016), claims directed to “the concept of delivering user-selected media content
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`to portable devices” were determined to be ineligible. Reciting “physical components such as a
`
`telephone unit and a server” did not save the claims where those components “merely provide[d]
`
`a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea.” Id. The Federal Circuit rejected
`
`the argument the claims recited a “concrete technological innovation” because “wirelessly
`
`streaming content to a handheld device” was not routine or conventional by their early 2000
`
`priority date, explaining that while the claims “describe[d] the function of streaming content to a
`
`wireless device,” they did not recite “a specific means for performing that function.” Id.
`
`(emphases added). Therefore, “[a]t that level of generality, the claims d[id] no more than
`
`describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the
`
`claim to a particular solution to an identified problem.” Id.
`
`Similarly, in ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 763, although the patents related to network
`
`communication between physical, tangible components, the claims were determined to be
`
`abstract. Indeed, although the patentee contended it was the “first to patent networked [electric
`
`vehicle] charging technology” and the specification “describe[d] a paradigm-shifting concept of
`
`how to charge electric vehicles in a dynamic, networked environment,” the Federal Circuit was
`
`unmoved, instructing that “the specification must always yield to the claim language in
`
`identifying” the “focus” of the claims for the § 101 inquiry, and the claims were directed to the
`
`“the abstract idea of communication over a network for interacting with a device, applied to the
`
`context of electric vehicle charging stations.” Id. at 763, 766, 768. Because the claims did not
`
`recite improvements to the charging devices themselves, the Federal Circuit determined “[t]he
`
`only improvement alleged [wa]s use of the concept of network communication to interact with
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`the particular devices,” and thus the claims were directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 772. Like
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`those ineligible in ChargePoint, the ’233 patent claims offer no technological improvements,
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 11 of 35
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`reciting the mere use of conventional network communications to interact with known devices.
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`Given their lack of specificity, the ’233 patent’s claims share commonalities with sets of
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`claims related to the delivery and transfer of information over networks that have been deemed
`
`abstract. In Two-Way Media v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2017), claims directed to “the abstract idea of monitoring the delivery of real-time information to
`
`a user or users” were patent-ineligible. Like the ’233 patent, the Two-Way Media claims recited
`
`only “conventional computer components” and “functional results” rather than “sufficiently
`
`describ[ing] how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.” Id. at 1337. In Prism Techs.
`
`LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017), claims directed to
`
`“providing restricted access to resources” over the Internet were determined to be abstract. While
`
`the Prism claims recited more detail than the ’233 patent’s “security mechanism”—i.e., “1)
`
`receiving identity data from a device . . . (2) confirming the authenticity of the identity data . . .
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`(3) determining whether the device identified is authorized to access the resources requested”—
`
`the claims were still deemed abstract as they did not require a “concrete, specific solution.”
`
`While the dependent claims limit the securely transferred data to health and physiological
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`data, limiting the data to particular content is immaterial to the § 101 inquiry. See Electric
`
`Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“collecting information, including when limited to particular content
`
`(which does not change its character as information),” is “within the realm of abstract ideas”).
`
`Save for the particular information content, the ’233 patent claims recite desired functions and
`
`results—devices “communicating,” data “detected,” a security mechanism “governing”—all in a
`
`generic mobile device environment. The “essentially result-focused, functional character” of the
`
`claims is “a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101.” See id. at 1356.
`
`2.
`
`The ’233 patent recites no inventive concept
`
`Nor do the ’233 patent’s claims recite an inventive concept. Philips’ complaint alleges the
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 12 of 35
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`claims “were not well known, routine, or conventional” and “represent specific improvements
`
`over the prior art,” but in a conclusory fashion, without providing specific factual allegations
`
`explaining how the claims achieve such specific improvements and unconventional technological
`
`advances. Complaint, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 77–81. Philips’ allegations are not “rooted in the specification”
`
`and cannot add unrecited limitations to the claims or negate admissions in the specification. See
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`British Telecom. PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 381 F. Supp. 3d 293, 322–23 (D. Del. 2019)
`
`(Bryson, J., Circuit Judge) (“Aatrix and Berkheimer do not stand for the proposition that a
`
`plaintiff can avoid dismissal simply by reciting in the complaint that the invention at issue is
`
`novel and nonconventional.”); Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (no
`
`step two “factual dispute” without “improvements” in the spec that are “captured in the claims”).
`
`Philips alleges the ’233 patent improves computer functionality by “enabling remote
`
`monitoring of vital signs or other physiological parameters.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 77. But the claims do not
`
`require any “remote monitoring,” only the secure transfer of data from a “first personal device”
`
`to a “second device” that “communicat[es]” with the first device. ’233 patent, 15:5–9. Philips
`
`alleges the patent provides a “significant advancement of monitoring devices,” but the claims
`
`recite nothing showing how any monitoring device itself is improved. See section II.A.1. Philips
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`also alleges the claims were not conventional based on the state of the art “twenty years ago.”
`
`Dkt. 1 ¶ 79. But applying an abstract idea to a “nascent but well-known environment” does not
`
`save a claim. See TLI, 823 F.3d at 607. And Philips allegations cannot negate the specification,
`
`which emphasizes the recited components and combinations thereof were conventional.
`
`For example, the personal device can “take many forms,” including a pacemaker, “as is
`
`well known in the art.” ’233 patent, 1:63, 11:50–53. The first or second device can be known
`
`PDAs like “the Motorola PageWriterTM 2000” or generic “cellular telephone[s]” that can use
`
`“any of the various technologies employed by the cell phone industry” like known phones such
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 13 of 35
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`as the “NokiaTM 9000 series of devices.” Id. at 7:66–8:11.
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`The “detector” of claims 7–9 “may be any sensor of bodily or physiological parameters.”
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`Id. at 3:29–33. The “input” includes conventional interfaces such as “serial, parallel, USB, etc.”
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`Id. at 3:47–49. Claim 9’s detected physiological parameters—“temperature, motion, respiration,
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`blood oxygen content, and electroencephalogram” are conventional measurements that are not
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`used in a new way: the specification provides no detail on their collection other than the sensor is
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`“not limited to” detecting those parameters or “other measurements.” Id. at 3:29–33.
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`The communication between devices uses “bi-directional wireless communications
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`modules” that employ known and conventional “short-range” and “long-range” communication
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`protocols. For example, the “short-range” communication can be “[a]ny suitable RF system that
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`conforms to FCC requirements and power requirements,” such as the “BLUETOOTH standard.”
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`Id. at 4:47–56. But “other suitable wireless communication standards and methods now existing
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`or developed in the future are contemplated” and examples in the spec are “not to be construed
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`as limitations.” Id. at 4:60–63 (emphasis added), 6:14–16. “Long-range” communication can
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`include “any consumer or proprietary network designed to serve users,” such as conventional
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`“cellular network[s] . . . or other wireless communication network[s],” but “[c]ombinations of
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`such networks and other embodiments may be substituted” as well. Id. at 6:23–28, 6:49–51.
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`The recited “security mechanism” does not improve any technological component or
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`introduce a particular new way to secure the transfer of data. The “security mechanism” can
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`include “standard encryption algorithms,” and human behavior, such as a request for access to “a
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`responsible third party.” Id. at 13:43–44, 14:7–8. But no particular way of providing security is
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`required, as the “embodiments of security” in the specification “are not meant to be exclusive.”
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`Id. at 13:41–42. Furthermore, the “security mechanism” involves existing strategies and no
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`improvements to security technology itself. See id. at 13:41–14:14. For example, the
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 14 of 35
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`specification identifies “security keys,” but only that they “may be held by a central agency,” and
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`“biometrics,” but only that it “refers to the measurement of some bodily parameter.” Id. at
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`13:50–59. The “security mechanism” is a mere result to be achieved by some method—no
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`particular implementation and no technological improvement in any security mechanism itself.
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`Taken together, the recited components can vary in “organization,” “hardware, software,
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`mechanical design, and configuration without departing from the claimed invention.” Id. at 2:58–
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`62. In describing the “data flow” that purportedly employs the claimed system, see id. at Fig. 5,
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`11:47–12:52, the specification reminds “many other scenarios are possible. Id. at 12:47–49.
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`There is nothing in the claims other than ineligible abstract idea itself, which cannot supply the
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`required inventive concept. BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1290. The ’233 patent claims fail step two.
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`3.
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`Claim 1 is representative and no terms require construction
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`Claim 1 is representative. The ’233 patent includes four similar independent claims (1,
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`33, 48, 55), each reciting the same generic components of two devices, a detector input, wireless
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`communication modules (short-range and/or long-range), and a “security mechanism,” and
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`having the same general focus. Dependent claims 7–9 limit the “detector” to collecting
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`physiological data. The other dependent claims show the breadth of the generic components. For
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`example, claims 2–6, 41–46 recite different conventional “security mechanisms.” Claims 10–12,
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`14, 24–25, 32, 37–38, 47 recite different generic components of mobile phones like a “user
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`interface module,” “display,” “camera,” and “GPS.” Claims 15–23, 26–31, 34–36, 39–40, 49–54,
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`56–57 recite conventional aspects of wireless communication. None of these dependent claims
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`change the focus away from the abstract idea of secure data transfer between devices.
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`Nor do any terms require construction. For example, the “security mechanism” is
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`described in the specification as a broadly covering everything from “standard encryption
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`algorithms” to human behavior in the form of requests for access. ’233 patent, 13:43–46, 14:7–8.
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`Case 1:19-cv-11586-IT Document 20 Filed 11/13/19 Page 15 of 35
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`B.
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`The ’377 patent is invalid as patent ineligible
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`The ’377 patent “relates to . . . health-monitoring of persons where measured or input
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`health data is communicated by a wireless device to and from a software application running on
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`an internet-connected server.” ’377 patent, 1:35–39. Previous systems provided “interactive
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`physiological monitoring in the home environment” through personal computers and “cellular
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`telephone technology,” id. at 2:4–37, but were “not designed to be used with ‘off-the-shelf’
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`wireless devices or health measuring equipment,” id. at 2:29–30, 2:38–40. Philips alleges
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`infringement of claim 6 of the ’377 patent, which depends from claims 4, 5, and independent
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`claim 1, all of which are