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`Case 1:14-cv-14373-ADB Document 61 Filed 08/24/17 Page 1 of 15Case 1:14-cv-14373-ADB Document 65 Filed 09/13/17 Page 1 of 15
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`JOSEPH JABIR POPE,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`JOHN D. LEWIS,
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`Defendant.
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`CIVIL ACTION
`NO. 14-14373-ADB
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`REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`August 24, 2017
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`DEIN, U.S.M.J.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Joseph Jabir Pope (“Pope”), an inmate at MCI-Norfolk, claims to be the sole
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`owner of the copyright to a documentary film entitled “Word From The Joint” (the “motion
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`picture/video” or the “film”). On November 24, 2014, he brought this action pro se against his
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`former friend and fellow inmate, John D. Lewis (“Lewis”), claiming that Lewis infringed upon his
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`copyright and otherwise violated his rights by posting the motion picture/video on the internet
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`and promoting the work as his own.1
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`Although Lewis responded to Pope’s complaint, he subsequently failed to appear in
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`court, notify the court of his whereabouts, or demonstrate an intent to engage in the defense
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`of this action. On December 1, 2016, Pope filed a motion for the entry of default. (Docket No.
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`1 As a result of a prior ruling of this court, the only remaining claim in this matter is for copyright
`infringement. See Docket No. 46.
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`47). Default was entered on January 27, 2017. (Docket No. 52). On February 14, 2017, Pope
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`filed a motion for default judgment (Docket No. 55) in the amount of $36,000 and for a
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`permanent injunction and costs. Lewis did not respond to the motion.
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`Upon considering Pope’s motion for a default judgment and the accompanying affidavit,
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`this court entered an order on May 4, 2017 (Docket No. 57) in which it concluded that because
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`Pope had not submitted any evidence in support of his claim for actual damages, the affidavit
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`he submitted with his motion for default judgment appeared too speculative to support a final
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`default judgment. Accordingly, this court ordered Pope to provide further evidence of damages.
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`Specifically, this court ordered that to the extent Pope wished to pursue actual damages, he
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`should include any available documents that substantiated his claim, and to the extent that he
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`wished to pursue statutory damages, he should indicate which factors he would like the court
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`to consider in calculating an appropriate award and explain why those factors support a claim in
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`the case. See id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); KPS & Assoc., Inc. v. Designs By FMC, Inc., 318
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`F.3d 1, 19-21 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing the need for evidence to establish damages even where
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`defendant has been defaulted). Pope filed a responsive affidavit on May 18, 2017, in which he
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`asserted that he would like to pursue statutory damages in the amount of $50,000. (See Docket
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`No. 58). For all the reasons detailed herein, this court recommends to the District Judge to
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`whom this case is assigned that Pope be awarded $5,000 in statutory damages, injunctive relief
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`as described below, and his court fees and costs.
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`2
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`II.
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`Plaintiff’s Copyright Registration
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`As described above, the plaintiff is presently incarcerated at MCI-Norfolk. (Compl.
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`(Docket No. 10) ¶¶ 1, 4). Previously, however, he was housed at the Old Colony Correctional
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`Center in Bridgewater, Massachusetts (“OCCC”), where he took part in the development of the
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`film at issue in this litigation. (Id. ¶ 5). According to Pope, he and a number of other prisoners
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`came up with the idea of making a motion picture/video called “Word From The Joint” in
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`response to the gang violence that was plaguing communities in and around Boston. (See id.
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`¶ 6). The purpose of the project was to educate gang members about the harsh realities of
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`prison life, with the hope of persuading them to follow a different path and avoid criminal
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`conviction. (See id. ¶ 7). After obtaining approval from the Commissioner of Correction, Pope
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`allegedly took responsibility for writing both the script and the music for the motion
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`picture/video. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9). He also played a leading role in the motion picture/video, along
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`with other inmates from OCCC. (Id. ¶ 9). Pope claims that filming was conducted, and the
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`motion picture/video was completed, with assistance from an outside production company.
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`(Id.).
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`Following the project’s completion, Pope allegedly sought and obtained a copyright
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`registration for the motion picture/video. (Id. ¶ 10). Pope claims that the copyright is
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`evidenced by Certificate of Registration Number PAU1-894-352. (Id.). He also claims that the
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`Certificate establishes his rights as the owner of the work “Word From The Joint.” (Id.).
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`3
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`Allegedly, “Word From The Joint” has been entered in numerous film festivals, and has
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`won a number of awards, including a CINE Golden Eagle award from the Council of Interna-
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`tional Non-Theatrical Events, a Gold Apple from the National Educational Film Festival, and a
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`Special Merit Award from the Prozed Pieces Film Video Festival. (Id. ¶ 11). It has also been
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`marketed to educational institutions, law enforcement and corrections personnel, and is
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`available for sale or as a rental. (Id. ¶ 12; Compl. Ex. a). The record indicates that Pope
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`previously sued the film’s co-producer, Anthony Tenczar, for falsely representing that the
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`production was his alone. (Compl. at p. 3). The plaintiff claims that his lawsuit against Tenczar
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`settled, and that he has since received royalties from sales and rentals of the motion
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`picture/video. (See id.; Compl. Ex. c).
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`Pope’s Relationship with the Defendant
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`The defendant, Lewis, is a private citizen who resides in Massachusetts. (Compl. ¶ 2).
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`Pope met him, and allegedly became good friends with him, while the parties were both
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`incarcerated at MCI-Norfolk. (Id. ¶ 13). Pope claims that he advised Lewis, who is slightly
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`younger than the plaintiff, and tried to prepare him to lead a productive life following his
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`release from prison. (Id.). He further claims that Lewis agreed to follow Pope’s instructions
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`with respect to the motion picture/video “Word From The Joint,” and to protect the plaintiff’s
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`interests in the film, after his return to the community. (Id.).
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`Allegedly, Lewis left MCI-Norfolk in 2007 and continued to reside in the Boston area.
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`(Id. ¶ 14). He also assisted Pope with his efforts to promote and distribute “Word From The
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`Joint.” (See id. ¶¶ 15-18). For example, Lewis allegedly assisted the plaintiff by transferring the
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`motion picture/video from an analog format to a digital format. (Id. ¶ 15). He also complied
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`4
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`with Pope’s requests to deliver the film to various groups and individuals. (Id. ¶ 16). At some
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`point, however, Lewis allegedly told the plaintiff not to call him anymore, and that any
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`necessary contact should only occur by mail. (Id. ¶ 18).
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`Lewis’ Alleged Unlawful Conduct
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`While these activities were occurring, Pope was allegedly attempting to finish a book
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`and create a website aimed at promoting and generating sales of his creative works, including
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`“Word From The Joint” and the accompanying music. (See id. ¶¶ 17-20). Pope claims that he
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`retained Leonard Swafford-Donald, the President of an entity known as “Master Builders
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`Publications,” to assist him in this endeavor. (Id. ¶ 19). During the course of his work on the
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`website, Mr. Swafford-Donald allegedly discovered that “Word From The Joint” had been
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`uploaded to YouTube under the name John D. Lewis. (Id. ¶ 21; Compl. Ex. b). Mr. Swafford-
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`Donald notified the plaintiff of his discovery in about late October 2014. (Id. ¶ 22).
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`Pope claims that he asked Mr. Swafford-Donald to contact Lewis, instruct him to take
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`the film down from YouTube within a week, and pay the plaintiff a fee of $250. (Id. ¶ 23).
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`Allegedly, Mr. Swafford-Donald spoke with Lewis as requested, and Lewis informed him that he
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`would contact Pope directly. (Id. ¶ 24). According to the plaintiff, however, Lewis never
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`contacted him. (Id. ¶ 25). Nor has he removed “Word From The Joint” from YouTube. (Id.).
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`Pope claims that Lewis’ actions are infringing upon his copyright, and are depriving him of his
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`rights to the film and the accompanying music. (See id. ¶¶ 27-28). In addition, Pope claims
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`that Lewis is depriving him of sales and rental fees by making his work freely available to the
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`public for download from YouTube, or by keeping the proceeds and fees for himself. (See id.
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`¶¶ 27-28).
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`5
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`Additional facts will be provided below where appropriate.
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`III.
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`ANALYSIS
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`Entering Default Judgment
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`A.
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`“As set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b), a plaintiff ‘must apply to the court for a default
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`judgment’ where the amount of damages claimed is not a sum certain.” Sec. and Exch. Comm'n
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`v. Tropikgadget FZE., 146 F. Supp. 3d 270, 274–75 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`55(b)(2)) (internal citation omitted). “As to the issue of liability, the entry of default constitutes
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`an admission of all facts well-pleaded in the complaint.” Id. (internal quotation and citation
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`omitted). Because Lewis has defaulted in this case, he is “taken to have conceded the truth of
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`the factual allegations in the complaint as establishing the grounds for liability.” Banco Bilbao
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`Vizcaya Argentaria v. Family Rests., Inc., (In re The Home Rests., Inc.), 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir.
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`2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). On a motion for a default judgment, however,
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`it is appropriate to independently “examine a plaintiff’s complaint, taking all well-pleaded
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`factual allegations as true, to determine whether it alleges a cause of action.” Ramos-Falcon v.
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`Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 301 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002). “Assuming that the facts alleged
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`state a viable cause of action, the defendant’s liability will be established.” Tropikgadget FZE.,
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`146 F. Supp. 3d at 275.
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`Generally, a court may enter default judgment without a hearing if it “has jurisdiction
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`over the subject matter and parties, the allegations in the complaint state a specific, cognizable
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`claim for relief, and the defaulted party had fair notice of its opportunity to object.” In re The
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`Home Rests., Inc., 285 F.3d at 114.
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`6
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`This court has subject matter jurisdiction over Pope's claim of copyright infringement
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and, as was determined in a prior order of the court, has
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`personal jurisdiction over Lewis. See Docket No. 46 at 7-9. Furthermore, in that order, this court
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`also determined that Pope adequately alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of copyright
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`infringement. See id. at 11-12.
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`Having determined that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
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`defendant, and that the complaint is sufficient to support the default judgment, the court turns
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`to Pope’s requested relief.
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`B.
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`Relief Requested By the Plaintiff
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`i.
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`Statutory Damages
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`Under the Copyright Act, “a court can award statutory damages of not less than $750 or
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`more than $30,000, ‘as the court considers just,’ for all infringements with respect to one
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`work[.]” Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
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`504(c)(1)). Moreover, “[i]f the copyright holder proves that infringement was willful, the court
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`may increase the award to no more than $150,000.” Id. Even under such circumstances,
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`however, “[t]here must be some basis, such as . . . sufficient affidavits, [to support] the court’s
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`judgment.” Curet-Velazquez v. Acemla de P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2011).
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`Furthermore, even where infringement is found to be willful, “it is still within the fact-finder's
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`discretion to award less than the maximum” of $150,000 “all the way down to the statutory
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`minimum of $750.” Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 190 (D. Mass. 2007)
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`(internal citation omitted).
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`7
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`When determining the amount of statutory damages to award for copyright infringe-
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`ment, the court may consider such factors as “[any] expenses saved and profits reaped by the
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`defendant[ ] in connection with the infringement[ ], [any] revenues lost by the plaintiff[ ] as a
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`result of the defendant’s conduct, and the state of mind of the infringer[ ],” such as whether his
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`infringement was willful or innocent. Curet-Velazquez, 656 F.3d at 58 (quotations and citation
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`omitted). “Infringement is willful when the infringer knew or should have known that [his]
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`action was copyright infringement.” Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 190. See also Homeowner
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`Options for Mass. Elders, Inc. v. Brookline Bancorp, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209 (D. Mass.
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`2010) (“An infringement is willful if the defendants knew or should have known that their
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`conduct constituted copyright infringement, or acted in reckless disregard of the copyright
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`holder's rights”). “[T]he willfulness of the defendants may be inferred from their failure to
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`appear and defend this action.” Merch. Media, LLC v. H.S.M. Int'l, No. 05-CV-2817, 2006 WL
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`3479022, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006).
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`In addition to the factors listed above, the court may consider the number of
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`infringements, and the extent to which statutory damages would deter future unlawful conduct
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`by the infringer or third parties. See Bryant, 603 F.3d at 144 (describing factors that court will
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`consider in awarding statutory damages); Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d
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`183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004) (same). It also may consider the defendant’s lack of cooperation and
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`failure to participate in the litigation. See Curet-Velazquez, 656 F.3d at 59 (district court
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`properly took defendants’ lack of cooperation into account in awarding statutory damages for
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`copyright infringement). Ultimately, however, “the court’s discretion and sense of justice are
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`controlling in its award of statutory damages[,]” as long as the court adheres to the limits set
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`forth by Congress. Curet-Velazquez, 656 F.3d at 58 (quoting Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 221
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`F.2d 586, 587 (1st Cir. 1955)) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
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`“In cases where an amount greater than the specified minimum is sought, the deter-
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`mination of whether to conduct a hearing, or instead to find that the record before the court is
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`sufficient to adequately inform its analysis, rests with the discretion of the court.” Disney
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`Enters., Inc. v. Merchant, No. 6:05-CV-1489, 2007 WL 1101110, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. April 10, 2007)
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`(citing Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2002)); see also Morley Music Co.
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`v. Dick Stacey's Plaza Motel, Inc., 725 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) (“Although there need not be the
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`kind of hearing required if factual damages were the issue, . . . there must, we think, be either
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`some hearing or sufficient affidavits to give the trial judge an adequate reference base for his
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`judgment.”). This court finds that the evidence put forth in the plaintiff’s affidavits and verified
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`complaint and exhibits thereto provide a sufficient basis for this court to issue a finding of
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`statutory damages.
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`Pope claims $50,000 in statutory damages on the basis of the defendant’s willful
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`infringement of his copyright and the losses Pope suffered as a result of the unauthorized views
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`of his motion picture/video on the internet. This court finds that plaintiff has put forth sufficient
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`evidence that the defendant’s copyright infringement was willful. Pope alleged that he and
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`Lewis had a verbal agreement “to protect” the film (Compl. ¶ 13); that as part of that
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`agreement, Lewis was only to do with the film what Pope instructed (Id.); that Pope did not
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`instruct Lewis to post the film on YouTube (Id. ¶ 26); that Pope, through Mr. Swafford-Donald,
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`informed Lewis to take the film down from YouTube (Compl. ¶¶ 23-24); and that Lewis did not
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`do so (Id. ¶ 25). Lewis initially appeared in this action, so he clearly was aware of Pope’s claims.
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`9
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`These facts, along with Lewis’ default in this matter, are sufficient for a finding of willfulness.
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`See Disney Enters., 2007 WL 1101110 at *4 (willfulness found where defendant defaulted and
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`defendant knew or reasonably should have known that he was participating in the distribution
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`of a pirated copy of the motion picture because the home video release date for the motion
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`picture at issue had not yet occurred and thus no authorized copies of that copyrighted work
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`were available to the public); see also Merch. Media, 2006 WL 3479022, at *5 (willfulness found
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`where defendant continued to sell infringing items in the face of two cease-and-desist letters
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`from plaintiffs and defendant failed to appear and defend action); Broad. Music, Inc. v. C.B.G.,
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`Inc., No. 11-CV-40142, 2013 WL 6074121, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Nov. 15, 2013) (finding willfulness
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`where defendant continually refused to obtain a license to play copyrighted songs despite
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`many calls and letters by the plaintiff warning about the risk of infringement and offering to
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`enter into a licensing agreement with defendants); Sixx Gunner Music v. The Quest, Inc., 777 F.
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`Supp. 2d 272, 274 (D. Mass. 2011) (finding inference of willfulness where defendant received
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`multiple notifications that it was illegally using copyrighted music).
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`Pope has also provided evidence that the motion picture/video was viewed 56 times on
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`YouTube (Compl. Ex. b), and that at some point in time, the purchase price of the film ranged
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`from $39.99 to $295.00 (see Docket No. 2 at ¶ 5) and the rental price was $75.00. (Compl. Ex.
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`a). Given these facts2 and statutory damage awards in other cases, this court concludes that
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`$5,000 is reasonable and necessary as a statutory damage award in this case, and will have the
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`2 For example, if each of the 56 viewers had rented the film at $75 per rental, the loss would have been
`$4,200.00. The court has accepted Pope’s representations concerning the prices of rentals and
`purchases, although no additional document supporting the conclusion that those amounts have
`actually been paid has been provided.
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`10
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`requisite deterrent effect on the defendant. See Disney Enters., 2007 WL 1101110 at *6
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`(statutory damages award of $6,000 appropriate where there was a finding of willful
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`infringement and defendant distributed to others, without authorization, copies of copyrighted
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`motion pictures by using a peer-to-peer network on the internet); Sony Pictures Home Entm’t
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`Inc. v. Chetney, No. 5:06-CV-227, 2007 WL 655772, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (same).
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`ii.
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`Permanent Injunction
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`A court adjudicating a claim of copyright infringement may “grant temporary and final
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`injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
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`copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). “Courts have traditionally considered four factors in determining
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`whether to grant a request for a permanent injunction: (1) whether the plaintiff ‘has suffered
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`an irreparable injury’; (2) whether ‘remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
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`inadequate to compensate for that injury’; (3) whether ‘considering the balance of hardships
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`between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted’; and (4) whether ‘the
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`public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.’”3 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v.
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`Tenenbaum, No. 07-CV-11446-NG, 2009 WL 4723397, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009) (permanent
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`injunction aff’d on appeal, 660 F.3d 487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011)) (quoting CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee,
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`536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008)). Furthermore, “[a] finding of liability for copyright
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`infringement, combined with the threat of future infringement, justifies the imposition of a
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`3 The First Circuit has suggested that this four-factor test may not apply in cases, such as this one,
`“where Congress has specifically authorized injunctive relief.” CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112
`n. 14 (1st Cir. 2008). However, since plaintiff’s request for an injunction prohibiting defendant from
`infringing on plaintiff’s copyright and requiring that defendant, to the extent possible, remove the film
`from YouTube, satisfies the four-factor test, this court need not decide the question of whether the test
`applies to injunctions issued under 17 U.S.C. § 502.
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`permanent injunction.” Cipes v. Mikasa, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing
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`Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. P'ship, 830 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Mass. 1993)).
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`Here these factors clearly weigh in favor of granting an injunction that prohibits Lewis
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`from infringing on Pope’s copyright in the future and that requires Lewis, to the extent possible,
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`to take the remedial step of removing the motion picture/video from YouTube.4 With respect to
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`the first two factors, this court finds that Lewis’ continuing violation of Pope’s copyright
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`constitutes an irreparable injury and that monetary damages are insufficient to compensate
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`Pope. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 2009 WL 4723397, at *1 (“[o]nce copyright infringement is
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`established, irreparable injury is generally presumed, as is the conclusion that monetary
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`damages alone are inadequate to compensate plaintiff[].”) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
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`Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 344 (S.D.N.Y 2000)). The third factor, balancing the hardships,
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`clearly tilts in favor of granting the injunction because the hardship of removing, to the extent
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`possible, the film that the defendant uploaded to YouTube is slight and complying with copy-
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`right law in the future presents no hardship. With respect to the fourth factor, “the public
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`interest would be served by enjoining defendant to abide by federal copyright laws.” Id. See
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`also CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008) (“the public has an interest in the
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`enforcement of federal statutes[.]”). Moreover, the film is still available to the public through
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`lawful dissemination by Pope and, perhaps, Anthony Tenczar.
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`4 This court interprets Pope’s request for an order “that the YouTube Website showing Word From The
`Joint be immediately removed, Mr. Lewis [o]rdered that he has no legal or any other right to Word From
`[T]he Joint or any other works belonging to Mr. Pope” to be a request for a permanent injunction to that
`effect. Docket No. 55 ¶ 19.
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`12
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`As such, this court recommends that Pope’s request for a permanent injunction be
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`granted and that the following order enter:
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`John D. Lewis (“defendant”) shall be and hereby is enjoined from
`infringing the copyright protected under federal law of Joseph Jabir
`Pope (“plaintiff”) in “Word From The Joint” and shall cease distributing
`“Word From The Joint” or copies thereof without plaintiff’s express
`permission. Defendant shall, to the extent possible, remove “Word From
`The Joint” from YouTube.
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`
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`(iii)
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`Costs of Suit
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`Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs”
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`to the prevailing party on a copyright infringement claim. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Recovery of costs is
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`governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Rule 54(d) requires that
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`costs, other than attorney’s fees, be allowed to the prevailing party “[u]nless a federal statute,
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`these rules, or a court order provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Thus, “[t]here is a
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`background presumption favoring cost recovery for prevailing parties.” B. Fernandez & HNOS,
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`Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 516 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (additional citations omitted). Courts in
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`this jurisdiction have limited the types of recoverable costs to those itemized in 28 U.S.C. §
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`1920 (“Taxation of costs”). See Shea v. Porter, No. 08-CV-12148-FDS, 2013 WL 4413341, at *1
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`(D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013). Costs not listed under that section may not be awarded. See id.
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`Section 1920 states that the “judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
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`costs the following:
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`(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
`(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
`obtained for use in the case;
`(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
`(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
`materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
`(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
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`Case 1:14-cv-14373-ADB Document 61 Filed 08/24/17 Page 14 of 15Case 1:14-cv-14373-ADB Document 65 Filed 09/13/17 Page 14 of 15
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`(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
`interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
`interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.”
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`28 U.S.C. § 1920.
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`Pope seeks costs in the amount of $1500 for reimbursement of “court fees, postage,
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`time, paper, pens, envelopes” and “legal research.” (Docket No. 55 ¶ 17). Of those items, only
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`court fees are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Therefore, this court recommends that Pope
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`be reimbursed for any court fees that he has incurred in this matter.
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION5
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`For the reasons detailed herein, this court recommends to the District Judge to whom
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`this case is assigned that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Default Judgment (Docket No. 55) be
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`ALLOWED, and that judgment enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.
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`Furthermore, this court recommends that Pope be reimbursed for any court fees that he has
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`incurred in this matter. Finally, this court recommends that a permanent injunction be entered
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`against the defendant as follows:
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`5 The parties are hereby advised that under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 any party who objects to
`these proposed findings and recommendations must file a written objection thereto with the Clerk of
`this Court within 14 days of the party’s receipt of this Report and Recommendation. The written
`objections must specifically identify the portion of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report
`to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The parties are further advised that the
`United States Court of Appeals for this Circuit has repeatedly indicated that failure to comply with this
`Rule shall preclude further appellate review. See Keating v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 848 F.2d
`271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Park Motor Mart,
`Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 604-05 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Vega, 678 F.2d 376, 378-79
`(1st Cir. 1982); Scott v. Schweiker, 702 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
`153-54, 106 S. Ct. 466, 474, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). Accord Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199
`F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1999); Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir. 1994); Santiago v.
`Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998).
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`John D. Lewis (“defendant”) shall be and hereby is enjoined from
`infringing the copyright protected under federal law of Joseph Jabir
`Pope (“plaintiff”) in “Word From The Joint” and shall cease distributing
`“Word From The Joint” or copies thereof without plaintiff’s express
`permission. Defendant shall, to the extent possible, remove “Word From
`The Joint” from YouTube.
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`/ s / Judith Gail Dein
`Judith Gail Dein
`United States Magistrate Judge
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