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Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 1 of 12
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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` :
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`METRO MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT, LLC
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`
` :
`v.
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` : Civil Action No. DKC 12-0347
` :
` :
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`Presently pending and ready for resolution in this
`
`copyright infringement case are a motion for summary judgment
`filed by Defendant Richard Steinruck (ECF No. 100) and a motion
`for voluntary dismissal filed by Plaintiff Metro Media
`Entertainment, LLC (ECF No. 102). Also pending is a motion for
`a hearing filed by Defendant Richard Steinruck (ECF No. 107).
`The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
`hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the
`following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss will be
`granted. Defendant’s motions for summary judgment and for a
`hearing will be denied as moot.
`I.
`Background
`Some familiarity with the underlying facts of this case is
`presumed. (See ECF Nos. 67, 92, 99). Plaintiff Metro Media
`Entertainment, LLC owns the copyright to a pornographic film
`titled My Baby Got Back! #44. Plaintiff commenced this action
`
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`
`
`RICHARD STEINRUCK
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 2 of 12
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`on February 6, 2012, by filing a complaint against forty-seven
`Doe defendants alleged to have infringed Plaintiff’s copyright
`in this pornographic film by downloading and/or uploading the
`video over the Internet via a file-sharing protocol known as
`BitTorrent. (ECF No. 1).1 An order severed the forty-seven
`defendants named in the complaint and dismissed all except Doe
`1. (ECF No. 17). The order further directed that “all
`documents filed in this action that contain Doe 1’s identifying
`information shall be filed under seal.” (Id. at 2). Days
`later, Plaintiff’s counsel transmitted a settlement offer to the
`sole remaining defendant, stating, inter alia, that it will name
`Doe 1 as a defendant (i.e., as an alleged infringer of
`Plaintiff’s copyright in the pornographic film) unless a
`proposed “settlement offer” of $3,5000.00 was promptly remitted.
`(ECF No. 23-3, at 2).
`Doe 1, by counsel, responded by filing an answer and
`counterclaim in which he publicly revealed his identity as
`Defendant Richard Steinruck. (ECF No. 23). The counterclaim
`raised a single count of abuse of process under Maryland law.
`Plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim (ECF No. 29), which
`
`
`1 Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint on June 5,
`2012. (ECF No. 21).
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`2
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 3 of 12
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`was granted (ECF No. 67).2 A scheduling order was entered on
`July 30, 2012. (ECF No. 28). Shortly after discovery
`commenced, the parties became embroiled in a number of discovery
`disputes and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles
`B. Day for resolution of all discovery and related scheduling
`matters. Among other things, the parties were unable to agree
`on the terms of a protective order and as to the circumstances
`in which Defendant’s computers would be inspected by Plaintiff’s
`expert witness. After many months of delay, the issues
`regarding the protective order were resolved (after an objection
`to Judge Day’s ruling was overruled), but the parties apparently
`never submitted a final protective order to Judge Day for
`signature. Similarly, Judge Day ruled that Plaintiff was
`entitled to have its expert perform an inspection at his or her
`chosen location, and that Defendant was entitled to be present
`during the inspection. Despite that ruling in favor of
`Plaintiff’s request, the inspection never occurred. (See ECF
`No. 99, at 2-3).
`On March 15, 2013, approximately six months after
`expiration of the deadline for amendment of pleadings or joinder
`of additional parties, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend its
`complaint in order to add Patrick Steinruck, Defendant’s son, as
`
`
`2 Plaintiff also sought sanctions related to the filing of a
`frivolous counterclaim, which was denied.
`3
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 4 of 12
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`an additional defendant in this action. (ECF No. 85). That
`motion was denied because Plaintiff failed to show good cause
`for late-filing of the motion.3 (ECF No. 93).
`On October 25, 2013, Defendant moved for summary judgment.
`(ECF No. 100). Plaintiff opposed the motion on November 12,
`2013, and on the same date, filed its own motion to dismiss all
`of its claims voluntarily pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
`(ECF Nos. 101 & 102). Defendant filed a reply brief in support
`of his motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 104) and opposed
`Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal (ECF No. 105).
`Defendant later moved for a hearing on his motion for summary
`judgment (ECF No. 107).
`II. Analysis
`A.
`Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal
`Plaintiff moves for voluntary dismissal with prejudice
`pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), which allows for dismissal by
`court order after the opposing party has served either an answer
`or motion for summary judgment and without the consent of all
`parties who have appeared. The decision to grant or deny a
`
`
`3 Plaintiff commenced a separate action against Patrick
`Steinruck. See Civil Action No. DKC 13-1703. Plaintiff later
`moved to dismiss voluntarily pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2);
`Patrick Steinruck did not oppose the motion. The undersigned
`issued an order on January 31, 2014, granting Plaintiff’s motion
`for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party to bear
`its own attorneys’ fees and costs. (Civil Action No. DKC 13-
`1703, ECF No. 17).
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`4
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 5 of 12
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`voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is a matter of discretion
`to be guided by certain factors, including the potential
`prejudice to the nonmoving party. Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d
`1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987).
`Where, as here, a plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion
`“specifically request[s] dismissal with prejudice, it has been
`held that the district court must grant that request.” 9 Charles
`A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller § 2367 (3d ed. 2008) (emphasis
`added). Indeed, that Plaintiff seeks “dismissal with prejudice
`is of paramount importance,” F.D.I.C. v. Becker, 166 F.R.D. 14,
`15 (D.Md. 1996), because a voluntary dismissal with prejudice
`under Rule 41(a)(2) operates as “a complete adjudication on the
`merits of the dismissed claim,” Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel
`Stores Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991). Absent a specific
`order by the court, dismissal with prejudice “is subject to the
`usual rules of res judicata.” 9 Wright & Miller § 2367; see also
`In re Tomlin, 105 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1997) (“generally,
`[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete
`adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a
`bar to a further action between the parties.” (internal quotation
`marks omitted)); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 407 (4th
`Cir. 2009) (same). Moreover, “[n]ormally, a plaintiff may not
`appeal the dismissal of his suit with prejudice, which is granted
`on his own motion.” Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting
`
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`5
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 6 of 12
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`Corp., 984 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
`Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958)).
`In its motion for voluntary dismissal, Plaintiff represents
`that although it “believes sufficient evidence exists of
`Defendant’s copying and/or allowing someone (for example,
`Defendant’s son Patrick) to use Defendant’s Internet account to
`make an unauthorized copy of Plaintiff’s movie, Plaintiff is
`willing to accept dismissal with prejudice, with each party
`bearing its own costs and attorney fees.” (ECF No. 102, at 1).
`According to Plaintiff, the evidence shows that a user located at
`Richard Steinruck’s IP address downloaded a copy of the film in
`question. Despite Plaintiff’s belief “that a jury [would] find
`that Defendant is liable for copyright infringement, [it] has
`determined that the cost of going forward may not justify the
`damages that might be awarded, or that any damage would be
`recoverable.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff also believes that evidence
`may become spoliated, jeopardizing further proceedings. (Id. at
`4-5).
`Defendant has opposed the motion for voluntary dismissal,
`taking a much different view of the facts. Defendant believes
`that Plaintiff initiated this action “without a scintilla of
`evidence against Defendant himself” and has now moved for
`voluntary dismissal in an effort to avoid the imposition of
`judgment against it. (ECF No. 105, at 1). Specifically,
`
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`6
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 7 of 12
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`Defendant asserts that “[e]ven if the Court assumes that there
`was a downloading of Plaintiff’s copyrighted pornographic film by
`someone using Defendant’s router, there has never been the
`slightest evidence that Defendant did such downloading, was aware
`that anyone was downloading using his router, or has any idea who
`did the downloading even now.” (Id.). Defendant asserts that
`“[a]nyone within 400 feet of the Steinruck residence could have
`been using the router without Mr. Steinruck’s knowledge.” (Id.
`at 4).
`Although the strength of Plaintiff’s evidence to support
`copyright infringement is debatable, there is no indication that
`Plaintiff acted improperly or in bad faith by initiating and
`pursuing this suit against Richard Steinruck. Plaintiff filed
`and served a complaint against Richard Steinruck because it
`determined that a copy of one of its films had been downloaded by
`a computer located at the IP address 108.18.217.126, and that
`this IP address belonged to Richard Steinruck. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 5).
`Appended to the amended complaint is a certification from
`Plaintiff’s counsel reciting the details of the investigation
`that was undertaken in connection with the alleged infringement.
`(ECF No. 21-1). Plaintiff did not have conclusive proof that
`Richard Steinruck did the downloading or was aware that anyone
`was downloading the pornographic film using his router, but as
`Judge Paul W. Grimm recently stated in a copyright infringement
`
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`7
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 8 of 12
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`case with facts virtually identical to the facts here, “the
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not hold pleadings to such an
`impossibly high standard; plausibility – not conclusiveness – is
`the standard.” Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Osburn, No. PWG-12-1294,
`2014 WL 1682010, at *3-4 (D.Md. Apr. 28, 2014) (“it takes no
`great imagination to see how evidence that a file was downloaded
`by a certain IP address could support a plausible claim that the
`file was downloaded by the subscriber at that IP address.”).4
`Considering that dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s
`amended complaint insulates Defendant from further litigation
`arising out of the dismissed claims, any injustice that Defendant
`might otherwise suffer “is significantly lessened.” Becker, 166
`F.R.D. at 15. Because district courts ordinarily “must” grant a
`plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal with prejudice,
`Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion will be granted. See, e.g., C-
`Tech Corp. v. Aversion Technologies, Civ. Action No. DKC 11-0983,
`2012 WL 3962508, at *2-3 (D.Md. Sept. 7, 2012) (granting motion
`for voluntary dismissal with prejudice).
`The question remains, however, as to whether any conditions
`should be attached to dismissal of the amended complaint. The
`crux of Defendant’s opposition is his view that allowing
`Plaintiff to walk away without compensating him for attorney’s
`
`
`4 The same attorneys represent the parties in both that case
`and this litigation.
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`8
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 9 of 12
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`fees and costs “would be the height of unfair disposition by the
`Court.” (ECF No. 105, at 2-3). When a dismissal is without
`prejudice, the court may impose conditions, such as the movant’s
`payment of the opposing party’s fees and costs. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
`41(a)(2). In contrast, where a motion for voluntary dismissal is
`granted with prejudice, such as here, an award of attorneys’ fees
`is not appropriate because there is no risk that the defendant
`can “be called upon again to defend” and thus no risk of “any
`duplication of expense.” Lawrence v. Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329, 331
`(D.Md. 1963). Courts have recognized two exceptions to this
`general principle: (1) where the case involves “exceptional
`circumstances” and (2) where “there is independent statutory
`authority for such an award.” 9 Wright & Miller § 2366 (internal
`quotation marks and citations omitted). For instance,
`circumstance would be exceptional if the “‘plaintiff’s suit was .
`. . unnecessary, groundless, vexatious and oppressive.’” Nat’l
`Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Comcast Satellite Communications, Inc.,
`No. CIV. H-00-261, 2000 WL 1717304, at *2 (D.Md. 2000) (quoting
`Lawrence, 32 F.R.D. at 332-33).
`Defendant maintains that he has expended large sums of
`money for attorney fees, travel expenses for depositions, and for
`preparing pleadings, motions, and other filings in connection
`with Plaintiff’s case. The record reflects that aside from
`engaging in several discovery disputes seeking a protective order
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`9
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 10 of 12
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`and to inspect Defendant’s computers (which inspection Plaintiff
`never actually undertook), Plaintiff was relatively inactive in
`this case. By contrast, Defendant counterclaimed against
`Plaintiff and hired his own expert, who prepared an expert
`report, to rebut allegations of copyright infringement. In
`Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010, at *5, plaintiff also asserted claims of
`copyright infringement and then offered to dismiss voluntarily
`the action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own
`expenses. Much like here, defendant in Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010,
`at *5, vociferously objected to voluntary dismissal, arguing that
`he should be awarded attorney’s fees and costs in having to
`defend a baseless lawsuit. Judge Grimm rejected defendant’s
`arguments:
`It is not apparent from the record that
`[defendant] was required to respond to
`[plaintiff’s]
`relative
`inactivity
`by
`conducting multiple depositions 2,500 miles
`apart, retaining an expert and commissioning
`a full expert report, and drafting “multiple
`interrogatories and requests for production
`of documents,” [] and more economical
`alternatives, such as telephone depositions,
`were available. Although it appears that
`Osburn
`was
`responding
`forcefully
`to
`allegations that he considered personally
`offensive, [defendant’s] choice to pursue a
`particularly aggressive defense strategy
`does
`not
`constitute
`exceptional
`circumstances sufficient to warrant an
`attorney’s fees award. . . . And while the
`Copyright Act grants me discretion to
`apportion costs or attorney’s fees under
`certain circumstances, 17 U.S.C. § 505, I
`decline to exercise that discretion here.
`
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`10
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 11 of 12
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`Dismissal will not be conditioned on
`[plaintiff’s] payment of attorney’s fees or
`costs.
`
`Osburn, 2014 WL 1682010, at *5 (emphasis added). The same logic
`applies here. Moreover, Plaintiff offered to settle the matter
`with a complete dismissal on August 29, 2013, months before
`Defendant moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 102-1). In his
`opposition to the motion for voluntary dismissal, Defendant
`contends that the terms of the settlement included “an
`unjustified
`release
`of
`Plaintiff
`and
`a
`restrictive
`confidentiality provision.” (ECF No. 105, at 6). But as Judge
`Grimm noted, a confidentiality provision, a mutual release, and
`a provision for each party to bears its own fees and costs “are
`not unusual [clauses] in settlement agreements.” Osburn, 2014
`WL 1682010, at *4.
`Defendant further argues that “[i]t would be appropriate
`for the record to show that the case was disposed of by
`[s]ummary [j]udgment, as that would inform other Courts of the
`unsufficiency of the suit here more than a Rule 41 dismissal
`would show.” (Id. at 2). But as explained in Weathers v.
`Consolidated Stores Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 2002-3274, 2004 WL
`35769, at *2 n.2 (D.Md. Jan. 7, 2004), “[d]espite filing a
`summary judgment motion, [d]efendant’s interests are well-served
`by a dismissal with prejudice because ‘[a]n adjudication in
`favor of the defendants, by court or jury, can rise no higher
`
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`Case 8:12-cv-00347-DKC Document 110 Filed 08/27/14 Page 12 of 12
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`than this.’” (citing Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores
`Inc., 924 F.2d at 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991)).
`Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion will be
`granted, and this case will be dismissed with prejudice.
`B.
`Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
`Plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion will be granted, thus
`Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as moot.
`III. Conclusion
`For the foregoing reasons, the motion for voluntary
`dismissal filed by Plaintiff will be granted. Defendant’s
`motions for summary judgment and for a hearing will be denied as
`moot. A separate order will follow.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/
`
`
`
`
`DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
`United States District Judge
`
`
`
`12

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