throbber
Case 1:18-cv-00272-JRS-DML Document 50 Filed 03/29/19 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 251
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
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`ROUND TO FIT, LLC,
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`v.
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`JONATHAN REIMER,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`Order
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`No. 1:18-cv-00272-JRS-DML
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`Under the Copyright Act, an employer is deemed to be the initial author of a
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`“work made for hire,” and thereby the initial owner of the copyright in the work. In
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`order for this Court to render a declaration of authorship or ownership, an independ-
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`ent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond the Declaratory Judgment Act must exist.
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`The Court now considers whether, when authorship and ownership in a copyright
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`under the work made for hire doctrine by virtue of an employee acting within the
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`scope of the employee’s employment is asserted, the determination of authorship
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`arises under the Copyright Act; for the reasons stated herein, it does. Thus, this
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`Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the Declaratory Judgment claim,
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`and supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims and Defendant’s
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`motion must be denied.
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`This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jonathan Reimer’s Motion for
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`Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (ECF
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`No. 33.) Plaintiff Round to Fit, LLC (“R2Fit”) brought this action under the Copyright
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`1
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`Case 1:18-cv-00272-JRS-DML Document 50 Filed 03/29/19 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 252
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`Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the “Copyright Act”), the Indiana Uniform Trade
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`Secrets Act, Ind. Code § 24-2-3-1 et seq., the Indiana Crime Victims Recovery Act,
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`Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1, and Indiana common law. R2Fit seeks a declaratory judgment
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`from the Court confirming R2Fit’s authorship and ownership of the copyright at is-
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`sue, as well as all other appropriate relief for R2Fit’s state law claims. This Court
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`has jurisdiction over R2Fit’s federal-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and sup-
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`plemental jurisdiction over its state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. After
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`carefully reviewing the pleadings, motion, response, and reply, the Court concludes
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`that Reimer’s motion should be DENIED for the following reasons.
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`I. Legal Standard
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment
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`after the parties have filed a complaint and an answer. A challenge to subject matter
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`jurisdiction falls within the ambit of Rule 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(c) mo-
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`tions are analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule
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`12(b)(6). Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173–74 (7th Cir. 2015). Pisciotta v. Old
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`Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46
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`(7th Cir. 1996). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege facts that are “enough
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`to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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`U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, mere
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`“labels,” “conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action”
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`are insufficient. Id. In other words, the complaint must include “enough facts to
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`state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d
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`2
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`575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To be fa-
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`cially plausible, the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference
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`that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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`662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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`Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court will grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if “it
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`appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support
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`his claim for relief.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d
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`449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686,
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`688 (7th Cir. 1993)). The factual allegations in the complaint are viewed in a light
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`most favorable to the non-moving party; however, the court is “not obliged to ignore
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`any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim or to assign
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`any weight to unsupported conclusions of law.” Id. (quoting R.J.R. Serv., Inc. v. Aetna
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`Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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`“Copyright . . . vests initially in the author or authors of [a] work.” 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 201(a). “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer . . . for whom the work
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`was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the par-
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`ties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
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`all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). “[A] work for hire
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`can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees and one
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`for independent contractors, and . . . the classification of a particular hired party
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`should be made with reference to agency law.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
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`Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989).
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`3
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`II. Background
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`The following allegations are taken from R2Fit’s Complaint (ECF No. 1.) and are
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`accepted as true for purposes of deciding the pending motion, consistent with the ap-
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`plicable standard of review. The Court also considers the documents (ECF No. 1-1 –
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`1-6) attached to R2Fit’s Complaint, which are part of the Complaint for all purposes
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`and may be considered by the Court in ruling on the Motion without converting it to
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`one for summary judgment. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (c)).
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`R2Fit manufactures and sells specialized exercise equipment that utilizes data
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`from proprietary software to provide the user with a customized workout. (ECF No.
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`1 ¶ 6.) In October 2016, R2Fit hired Reimer to work as a personal trainer to R2Fit
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`clients. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) A few months after Reimer joined R2Fit, R2Fit contracted
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`with a third-party software development company, SpaceTech Corporation
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`(“SpaceTech”), to upgrade its proprietary software. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Reimer grew
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`interested in helping R2Fit further develop and upgrade its software and expressed
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`his desire to assist R2Fit and SpaceTech with the software upgrade project (the “pro-
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`ject”). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15-19.) Accordingly, R2Fit expanded the scope of Reimer’s
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`employment to allow Reimer to work on the project and included Reimer’s involve-
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`ment in the project in the “Software Development Contract” R2Fit executed with
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`SpaceTech. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.)
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`R2Fit promoted Reimer to Chief Technology Officer in January 2017, despite
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`Reimer’s lack of formal training in software development or any other related subject
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`4
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`matter. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 16; ECF No. 1 ¶ 26.) In around March 2017, R2Fit became
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`concerned that SpaceTech may be unable to finish the project to R2Fit’s satisfaction.
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`(ECF No. 1 ¶ 29.) But, Reimer informed R2Fit’s Chief Executive Officer that he could
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`finish the project without SpaceTech, if R2Fit provided him “additional training and
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`resources.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 30.)
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`In March 2017, R2Fit accepted Reimer’s proposition and terminated its business
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`relationship with SpaceTech. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 31.) R2Fit terminated the services con-
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`tract between it and SpaceTech and made final payment to SpaceTech to “obtain the
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`source code for the software [SpaceTech] had . . . developed up to that point.” (ECF
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`No. 1 ¶ 31.) Following R2Fit’s final payment to SpaceTech, SpaceTech sent the source
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`code (“software code”) to R2Fit’s CEO, Ariel Huskins (“Huskins”), who shared it with
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`Reimer. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 32.) R2Fit then provided Reimer the requested “paid mentor,
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`[ ]educational resources, and [ ]company computer” to facilitate Reimer’s continued
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`work on the project. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 34.) Reimer worked on the project from April 2017
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`to October 2017, writing and rewriting the software code for R2Fit’s upgraded soft-
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`ware. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 35.) Other R2Fit employees assisted Reimer in the writing and
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`rewriting of the code, which proceeded under Huskins’ direction. (ECF N. 1 ¶¶ 36-
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`37.) R2Fit paid Reimer for his work on the project. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 38-39.)
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`In August 2017, Reimer “abruptly decided” that “because of his efforts” he owned
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`the software code and demanded additional compensation to “license” the software to
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`R2Fit. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 40.) R2Fit’s CEO demanded that Reimer return the software
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`code to R2Fit, but Reimer refused, stating that he would only return the software
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`5
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`

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`code if R2Fit provided him additional compensation. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 41.) R2Fit refused
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`to provide Reimer additional compensation, and on November 7, 2017, R2Fit termi-
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`nated Reimer’s employment. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 42.) In a letter confirming Reimer’s ter-
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`mination, R2Fit demanded that Reimer return to R2Fit “any and all confidential in-
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`formation and company property in his possession.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 43.) Reimer re-
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`fused to return the software code, stating in his reply letter that “R2Fit believes it
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`owns software that I have written; It does not.” (ECF No. 1-5.) Rather, Reimer “al-
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`leged he wrote [the software] ‘on [his] own time and using [his] personal computer.’”
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`(ECF No. 1 ¶ 44.) R2Fit then filed the present suit seeking a declaratory judgment
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`confirming R2Fit as the rightful “author and copyright owner of the software/source
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`code under the ’works made for hire‘ doctrine of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C § 101”
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`and alleging several state law violations related to Reimer’s possession of the soft-
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`ware code.
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`III. Discussion
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`R2Fit asserts five legal claims, the first under the Copyright Act and the others
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`under Indiana law: (1) a request for declaratory judgment confirming R2Fit’s author-
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`ship and ownership of the software code copyright under the Copyright Act; (2) mis-
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`appropriation of trade secrets; (3) conversion; (4) criminal conversion; and (5) breach
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`of contract. Reimer’s Motion asserts that this Court does not have subject matter
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`jurisdiction over R2Fit’s declaratory judgment claim, because this claim (1) raises
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`only a question of Indiana law: whether “Reimer was acting as an employee under
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`Indiana law when he wrote [the] software,” (ECF 33 at 5), and (2) does not present
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`6
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`a “case or controversy” as required by Article III of the United States Constitution.
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`U.S. Const. art. 3 § 2, cl. 1. (ECF No. 33 at 6-7.) Reimer also argues that if the Court
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`dismisses R2Fit’s only purported federal law claim, the Court should decline to exer-
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`cise its discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over R2Fit’s state law claims. (ECF
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`No. 33 at 8-9.)
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`A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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`The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over R2Fit’s declaratory judgment
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`claim. Reimer, though admitting that this action arises under the Copyright Act of
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`1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (EFC No. 25 ¶ 2), argues that the Court lacks subject
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`matter jurisdiction because this case is about copyright ownership turning on
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`whether Reimer was acting as an R2Fit employee under Indiana law when he wrote
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`the software. Reimer further contends jurisdiction is lacking here because R2Fit fails
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`to present a “case or controversy,” as R2Fit suffered no “injury in fact” or no immedi-
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`acy of injury as required by Article III of the Constitution. (ECF No. 33 at 6.) The
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`Court rejects Reimer’s arguments and finds that the Court has subject matter juris-
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`diction for two reasons: (1) R2Fit’s request for declaratory judgment or author-
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`ship/ownership “arises under” the Copyright Act, requiring the Court to interpret
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`certain of the Act’s provisions and conferring to the Court subject matter jurisdiction;
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`and (2) R2Fit has sufficiently alleged an Article III “case or controversy,” because
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`R2Fitand has shown that it suffered the requisite “injury in fact.”
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`7
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`i. Article III Standing
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`R2Fit has Article III standing to bring its claim for declaratory judgment. Ar-
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`ticle III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power to deciding “cases
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`and controversies.” U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. To establish Article III standing, “a
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`plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and par-
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`ticularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury
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`is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
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`opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable deci-
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`sion.” Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 172-73 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defs.
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`Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992)). Here, R2Fit has alleged a concrete injury—
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`that Reimer is holding R2Fit’s proprietary software code hostage to extort payment
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`from R2Fit based on his assertion that his efforts of authorship—namely, writing the
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`code—in the software make him the owner of the software. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 42.) The
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`pleadings reveal at least one injury—that Reimer has denied R2Fit’s authorship/own-
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`ership rights granted under the Copyright Act—that rises above the speculative level.
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`Many injuries may radiate outward from this offense. Without a copy of the code,
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`R2Fit cannot use it, cannot register it, cannot sue for infringement, cannot license it,
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`cannot modify it, cannot exercise any of its rights that authorship arising under fed-
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`eral law would vest in R2Fit as original owner if the software is deemed a work made
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`for hire. Next, R2Fit’s complained of injury is traceable to Reimer, as Reimer is re-
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`sponsible for claiming ownership rights adverse to those of R2Fit and for refusing to
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`return the code to R2Fit. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40-46.) Finally, a declaration that R2Fit is
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`8
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`the rightful author and thereby the initial owner of the software code copyright would
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`be a favorable result for R2Fit, as such a declaration would resolve the dispute over
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`ownership of the copyright. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 57.) Indeed, Reimer admits that if the code
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`is a work made for hire, which is defined under and requires application of the Copy-
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`right Act, then R2Fit is the rightful author and owner. (ECF No. 33 at 4.)
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`Yet, Reimer maintains there is no “immediacy of injury,” in this case. But,
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`while Reimer notes that this is not an infringement case, he relies on cases where
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`there is no infringement alleged or imminent. No immediacy is pleaded. Such cases
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`are inapposite here, where R2Fit contrarily alleges currently being denied access to
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`the code it authored under the work made for hire doctrine. There is no speculative
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`future controversy in this case. Also, it is not a requirement that the harm or threat
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`of harm stem from an infringement action. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd, 775
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`F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
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`118, 132 (2007)).
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`ii. Declaratory Judgment
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over R2Fit’s request for declaratory
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`judgment. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: “[i]n a case of actual controversy
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`within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appro-
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`priate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
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`party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”
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`28 U.S.C. § 2201. However, the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent
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`basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
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`9
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`U.S. 667, 671–72 (1950). Rather, it provides a remedy available only if the court has
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`jurisdiction from some other source. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871,
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`879 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)).
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`In this case, the “other source” which provides the Court jurisdiction is the
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`Copyright Act—specifically, the Act’s “work made for hire” provisions. See 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 101. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
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`under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). To deter-
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`mine whether an action arises under the Copyright Act, courts in the Seventh Circuit
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`apply the standard articulated in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
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`1964). See Int'l Armor & Limousine Co. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 F.3d 912,
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`915–916 (7th Cir. 2001).
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`Under the “Harms test,” an action arises under the Copyright Act “if the com-
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`plaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act . . . .” 339 F.2d at 828. Here, the
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`remedy R2Fit seeks is a declaration that R2Fit is the rightful author and owner of
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`the software code copyright, a declaration that requires the Court to analyze, pursu-
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`ant to the Copyright Act, whether Reimer wrote the software code at issue as a “work
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`made for hire.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “work made for hire” as “a work pre-
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`pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment”). Here there is no
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`dispute whether R2Fit employed Reimer (ECF 25 ¶ 10) during the relevant period.
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`Rather, Reimer urges that he did not write the software within the course and scope
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`of that employment. Resolving this issue, and therefor ownership under the work
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`10
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`made for hire doctrine, he concludes, is a matter of state law; namely, the definition
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`of “employee” under Ind. Code § 22-3-6-1(b). (ECF 33 at 4-5; ECF 41 at 1.)
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`While not necessary for deciding the issue, it seems odd to cite Ind. Code § 22-
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`3-6-1(b). Not only does Reimer admit to being an employee, the cited definition comes
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`from a worker’s compensation statute and provides no guidance for determining
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`whether a work was prepared within the scope of an employee’s employment. Rather,
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`courts look to general common law of agency. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
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`490 U.S. 730, 740–41 (1989). Not only may such law be deemed federal common law
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`rather than state law, id., but it is not the threshold issue, which is that “work made
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`for hire” must be construed, and that is an analysis under the Copyright Act.
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`Conversely, it is true that on occasion ownership of copyrights may be based
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`on state law. For example, if the ownership arose by virtue of a contract, then state
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`contract law would govern. But, the cases relating to such ownership are inapposite
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`as R2Fit claims initial ownership by virtue of authorship under the work made for
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`hire doctrine. Initial ownership follows authorship as provided for under the Copy-
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`right Act, not under state law. Thus, authorship and initial ownership may not only
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`vest in the actual author of a work, but also in a co-author, or a non-author such as
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`an employer in the case of a work made for hire. Each of these is defined by and must
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`be construed under the Copyright Act. Indeed, Reimer concedes that determinations
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`of initial ownership based on “joint authorship” or “co-authorship” can raise federal
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`issues, “such as whether a party’s ‘contribution’ was copyrightable under the Copy-
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`right Act. (ECF 41 at 2.) First, the Court notes that the very same issues could arise
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`11
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`in this case. For example, whether the contributions by Huskins or the other R2Fit
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`employees are copyrightable. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007)
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`(“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set
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`of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”) Second, Reimer’s at-
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`tempts to distinguish initial ownership under joint authorship from initial ownership
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`under work made for hire by stating without authority that determining whether an
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`employer-employee relationship exists—as determined by state law—is what triggers
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`the application of the work made for hire doctrine. The state tail does not wag the
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`Copyright Act dog. Authorship, whether it be sole authorship, joint authorship or
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`work-made-for-hire authorship, is determined under the Copyright Act and deter-
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`mines initial ownership in the copyright. Subsequent ownership, which is not at is-
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`sue here, may be a matter of state law, as may be a determination of other matters,
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`such as whether others contributed to the writing of the software, and whether those
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`contributions fall under the work made for hire doctrine. At base, though, it is enough
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`that this case involves the construction of “work made for hire,” which necessarily
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`requires analysis under the Copyright Act.
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`Having found that work made for hire is at issue, Indiana employment law is
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`not at issue. Also, there is also no allegation that the other mutually exclusive means
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`of creating a work made for hire—namely a person, such as an independent contrac-
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`tor hired to create the work—is at issue. Indeed, none of the pleadings implicate a
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`contractual obligation relating to a non-employee writing the software, for example a
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`software development agreement with Reimer. In any event, courts would look to the
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`12
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`general common law of agency. If the portion of the code written by Reimer is a work
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`made for hire, then R2Fit is under the Copyright Act the author and ownership vests
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`in R2Fit by operation of federal law, unless there is a written agreement between the
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`parties to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 201. No such written agreement is alleged to
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`exist. Accordingly, R2Fit’s action arises under the Copyright Act and not under
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`state law, to the extent disposition of R2Fit’s claim requires the Court to interpret
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`the Copyright Act’s definition of “work made for hire” in determining whether Reimer
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`wrote the software code within the scope of his employment at R2Fit.
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`In Barnhart v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 04-Civ-3668, 2005 WL 549712,
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`*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2005), the court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand and
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`found that federal jurisdiction existed. The court stated: “[t]he Complaint alleges
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`that ‘[t]he Songs are not works for hire,’ a conclusion that would require the interpre-
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`tation of the term “works-for-hire” and its corresponding provisions under the Copy-
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`right Act . . . . Because the plaintiff's claims require construction of the Copyright Act
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`and therefore arise under that Act, the motion to remand based on lack of subject
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`matter jurisdiction is denied.” See also gh, LLC v. Curtin, 422 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997
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`(N.D. Ind. 2006) (citing Barnhart, 2005 WL 549712, at *4). Likewise, the court in
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`Gaiman v. McFarlane found that questions of copyright ownership “cannot be an-
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`swered without reference to the Copyright Act,” and therefore “arise under the Act.”
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`360 F.3d 644, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2004).
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`As in the present case, the plaintiff in Gaiman sought a declaration that he
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`was a “co-owner” of a comic book copyright pursuant to the Copyright Act, just as
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`13
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`R2Fit seeks a declaration that it is the rightful owner of the software code copyright
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`at issue. Indeed, the court in Gaiman had subject matter jurisdiction where the plain-
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`tiff requested a declaration similar to R2Fit’s request. The Gaiman court explained
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`that the plaintiff’s request for a declaration of copyright co-ownership clearly impli-
`
`cated the “work made for hire” doctrine of the Copyright Act. See Gaiman, 360 F. 3d
`
`at 653 (7th Cir. 2004). The same scenario exists in the present case: R2Fit’s request
`
`for a declaration of ownership turns on the interpretation of the “work made for hire”
`
`provisions of the Copyright Act. As such, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
`
`over this claim.
`
`B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
`
`District courts have supplemental jurisdiction “in any civil action of which the
`
`district courts have original jurisdiction,” and where the claims “are so related to
`
`claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
`
`case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.
`
`§1367. When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court
`
`should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values
`
`of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll.
`
`of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
`
`U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)).
`
`R2Fit asserts four state law claims: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets, (2)
`
`conversion, (3) criminal conversion, and (4) breach of contract, all which stem from
`
`the dispute over copyright ownership of the software code at issue. R2Fit’s state law
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 1:18-cv-00272-JRS-DML Document 50 Filed 03/29/19 Page 15 of 16 PageID #: 265
`
`claims are so related to the Copyright Act claim that they “form part of the same case
`
`or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
`
`More specifically, because the question of whether R2Fit is the author and initial
`
`owner of the copyright over the software code is central to the disposition of R2Fit’s
`
`state law claims and because both R2Fit’s federal and state claims arise from the
`
`same factual circumstances, the Court finds that R2Fit’s state law claims arise from
`
`the same case or controversy—whether R2Fit is the rightful owner of the software
`
`code copyright pursuant to the “work made for hire” provisions of the Copyright Act.
`
`In addition, the Court’s declaration that R2Fit is or is not the rightful author
`
`of the software code and therefore the initial owner of the software code copyright by
`
`operation of 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) will affect the disposition of R2Fit’s state law claims,
`
`namely whether Reimer breached his services contract, misappropriated trade se-
`
`crets, or committed conversion with respect to R2Fit’s software code. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶
`
`56-72.) Accordingly, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
`
`weigh in favor of the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction to facilitate an ef-
`
`ficient resolution of R2Fit’s closely related federal and state claims. Therefore, the
`
`Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over R2Fit’s state law claims is proper.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Reimer’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
`
`Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) is DENIED. The stay in this matter is hereby lifted
`
`(ECF No. 49) and the case will proceed. The Court requests that the Magistrate
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case 1:18-cv-00272-JRS-DML Document 50 Filed 03/29/19 Page 16 of 16 PageID #: 266
`
`Judge facilitate a status conference to reinstate a case management plan and
`
`appli-cable deadlines in this matter.
`
`SO ORDERED.
`
`Date: 3/29/2019
`
`Distribution:
`
`April M. Jay
`OVERHAUSER LAW OFFICES LLC
`ajay@overhauser.com
`
`Paul B. Overhauser
`OVERHAUSER LAW OFFICES, LLC
`poverhauser@overhauser.com
`
`Christopher R. Taylor
`Boring & Taylor, P.C.
`chris@boringtaylor.com
`
`16
`
`

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