Case: 1:13-cv-03841 Document #: 7 Filed: 06/19/13 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`TCYK, LLC,
`
`v.
`
`)
`)
`Plaintiff, ) Case No.: 13-cv-3841
`)
`) Judge Edmond E. Chang
`)
`DOES 1 – 36, ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim
` )
` )
`
`Defendants.
`
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE
`DISCOVERY PRIOR TO RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
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`
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`I. Introduction
`
`This copyright suit relates to the ongoing infringement of an award-winning, mainstream
`movie. In particular, this action seeks to address the infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrighted
`motion picture, a political action drama entitled “The Company You Keep” (the “Motion Picture”),
`which has a 3-star rating and was directed by Robert Redford. The Motion Picture stars Robert
`Redford, Susan Sarandon, Shia LaBeouf, Anna Kendrick, Stanley Tucci, Julie Christie and Nick
`Nolte, among others.
`The Motion Picture debuted at the Venice Film Festival where it won several awards and
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`the U.S. premiere was on April 1, 2013 in New York City. (Exhibit A). The Motion Picture is
`currently playing in theaters throughout the country including this District, and will be available
`for rental and purchase on DVD in a few months.
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`The illegal downloading of mainstream movies to avoid purchasing a theater ticket,
`buying a DVD or paying a rental fee is so pervasive that certain segments of the public appear to
`consider it acceptable. There are even websites devoted to illegal copying. One such website is
`The Pirate Bay which includes instructions on how to download the required pirating software,
`usually a torrent.1 The Pirate Bay even provides a convenient “Pirate Search” tab that enables
`infringers to “shop” for illegal copies of games, music, movies, books and software. This brazen
`and widely accepted scheme for illegal copying, which clearly is an intentional act since it
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`1 http://thepiratebay.sx.
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`requires an infringer to install special software and search out movies to pirate, is the problem
`addressed by this lawsuit.
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`Cloaked in the anonymity of the Internet, digital pirates banded together into swarms using
`file-sharing technology such as BitTorrent to illegally obtain and distribute high quality copies of
`the Motion Picture within days after the film opened. While each single act of infringement may
`appear to be slight, collectively, illegal downloading often starts even before a movie is released
`(Exhibit B) and costs legitimate industries millions of dollars. (Exhibit C). Not only are movies
`pilfered, the pirates’ other prizes include TV shows, computer games, e-books, software and
`music. (Id.)
`
`Thus, this suit not only represents a single copyright owner faced with the daunting task of
`protecting its property from the irreparable harm caused by thousands of swarming infringers, it is
`emblematic of the fight of the motion picture industry and other legitimate creative businesses that
`rely on copyright protection. Denying Plaintiff the discovery needed to pursue the infringing
`swarm in a single action endorses and encourages the ongoing infringement. It frees the pirates to
`roam the Internet searching for prizes by providing shelter through the anonymity of the Internet
`and the high cost of individual enforcement.
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`Plaintiff sued each Defendant as a “Doe” because Defendants committed infringement
`using on-line pseudonyms (“user names” or “network names”), not their true names. Plaintiff has
`only been able to identify the Doe Defendants by (1) their Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses, (2)
`the dates and times of the infringement, (3) the hash value which identifies each Defendant as
`participating in the same swarm and (4) the location of each IP address within Illinois.
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`Defendants’ actual names can only be obtained from the non-party Internet Service
`Providers (“ISPs”) to which Defendants subscribe and from which Defendants obtain Internet
`access, as this information is readily available to the ISPs from records kept in the regular course
`of business. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to serve limited discovery prior to a Rule
`26(f) conference on the non-party ISPs solely to determine the true identities of the Doe
`Defendants. Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order allowing Plaintiff to serve Rule 45
`subpoenas on the ISPs immediately and that the ISPs comply with the subpoenas.
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`If the Court grants this Motion, Plaintiff will serve subpoenas on the ISPs requesting the
`identifying information. If the ISPs cannot themselves identify one or more of the Doe
`Defendants but can identify an intermediary ISP as the entity providing online services and/or
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`network access to such Defendants, Plaintiff will then serve a subpoena on that ISP requesting the
`identifying information for the relevant Doe Defendants. In either case, these ISPs will be able to
`notify their subscribers that this information is being sought, and, if so notified, each Defendant
`will have the opportunity to raise any objections before this Court. Thus, to the extent that any
`Defendant wishes to object, he or she will be able to do so.
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`II. ARGUMENT
`
`Pursuant to Rule 26(d)(1), except for circumstances not applicable here, absent a court
`order, a party may not propound discovery in advance of a Rule 26(f) conference. Rule 26(b)
`provides courts with the authority to issue such an order: “[f]or good cause, the court may order
`discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” In Internet
`infringement cases, courts routinely find good cause exists to issue a Rule 45 subpoena to discover
`a Doe defendant’s identity, prior to a Rule 26(f) conference, where: (1) plaintiff makes a prima
`facie showing of a claim of copyright infringement, (2) plaintiff submits a specific discovery
`request, (3) there is an absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information,
`(4) there is a central need for the subpoenaed information, and (5) defendants have a minimal
`expectation of privacy. See Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
`Sony Music Entm’t v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Elecktra Entm’t
`Group, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-115-FL, 2008 WL 5111886, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008);
`Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-116-FL, 2008 WL 5111883, at *4 (E.D.N.C.
`Dec 4, 2008); BMG Music v. Doe #4, No. 1:08-CV-135, 2009 WL 2244108, at *3 (M.D.N.C.
`July 24, 2009). See also, Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F.Supp.2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2008),
`and the cases cited therein, noting the “overwhelming” number of cases where copyright
`infringement plaintiffs sought to identify “Doe” defendants and courts “routinely applied” the
`good cause standard to permit discovery. Here, all of the good cause elements are present. Thus,
`Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should grant the Motion.
`A.
`Precedent Allowing Discovery to identify Doe Defendants
`
`
`In copyright cases brought by motion picture studios and record companies against Doe
`defendants, this Court and other courts have granted motions for leave to take expedited discovery
`to serve subpoenas on ISPs to obtain the identities of Doe Defendants prior to a Rule 26
`conference. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Does 1-6, 527 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing
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`plaintiffs to serve a Rule 45 subpoena upon Georgetown University to obtain the true identity of
`each Doe defendant, including each defendant’s true name, current and permanent addresses and
`telephone numbers, email address, and Media Access Control (“MAC”) address) (citing
`Memorandum Opinion and Order, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-199, No. 04-093(CKK)
`(D.D.C. March 10, 2004); Order, UMG Recordings v. Does 1-4, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan)
`305 (N.D. Ca. March 6, 2006)).
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`In fact, for the past few years, federal district courts throughout the country, including
`this Court, have granted expedited discovery in Doe Defendant lawsuits that are factually
`similar to the present lawsuit.2 In these cited cases and others like them, copyright holder plaintiffs
`have obtained the identities of P2P network users from ISPs through expedited discovery using
`information similar to that gathered by Plaintiff in the present case, and they have used that
`information as the basis for their proposed subpoenas to these ISPs.
`
`The following factors are considered when granting motions for expedited discovery to
`identify anonymous Internet users: (1) whether the plaintiff can identify the missing party with
`sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity
`who could be sued in federal court; (2) all previous steps taken by the plaintiff to identify the Doe
`Defendant; and (3) whether the plaintiff’s suit could withstand a motion to dismiss. Columbia Ins.
`Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Rocker Mgmt. LLC v.
`John Does, No. 03-MC-33 2003 WL 22149380, *1-2, (N.D. Cal. 2003).
`B.
`Good Cause Exists to Grant the Motion
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`
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`1.
`Plaintiff’s has a Prima Facie Claim for Copyright Infringement
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`a.
`Overview of Allegations and Factual Showings
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`The Complaint alleges that the Doe Defendants, without authorization, used an online
`media distribution system to download the copyrighted Motion Picture and distribute it to other
`users on the P2P network, including by making available for distribution to others the copyrighted
`Motion Picture for which Plaintiff holds the exclusive reproduction and distribution rights.
`
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`2 Representative cases include First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-76, Case No. 11 C 3831 (N.D. Ill.) (Bucklo, J.);
`Pacific Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1-31, Case No. 11 C 9064 (N.D. Ill.) (Leinenweber, J.); Hard Drive Productions
`v. Does 1-48, Case No. 11 C 9062 (N.D. Ill.) (Kim, J.); Pacific Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1-25, Case No. 12 C
`1535 (N.D. Ill.) (Bucklo, J.); Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2008)
`(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Worldwide Film Entertainment LLC v. Does 1-749, Case No. 10-38 (D.D.C.) (Kennedy, Jr.,
`J.); G2 Productions LLC v. Does 1-83, Case No. 10-41 (D.D.C.) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v.
`Does 1-358, Case No. 10-455 (D.D.C.) (Urbina, J.); Maverick Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1-1,000, Case No.
`10-569 (D.D.C.) (Leon, J.); Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1-171, Case No. 10-1520 (D.D.C.) (Sullivan, J.).
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`(Complaint, paras. 11-15). Crystal Bay Corporation (“CBC”), a provider of online anti-piracy
`services for the motion picture industry, was engaged to monitor this infringing activity. Exhibit
`D; Declaration of Darren M. Griffin (“Griffin Decl.”).
`
`An IP address is a unique numerical identifier that is automatically assigned to an Internet
`user by the user’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). In logs kept in the ordinary course of
`business, ISPs keep track of the IP addresses assigned to their subscribers. Once provided with an
`IP address, plus the date and time of the detected and documented infringing activity, ISPs can use
`their subscriber logs to identify the name, address, email address, phone number and Media
`Access Control number of the user/subscriber. (Griffin Decl., para. 4).
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`Only the ISP to whom a particular IP address has been assigned for use by its subscribers
`can correlate that IP address to a particular subscriber. From time to time, a subscriber of Internet
`services may be assigned different IP addresses from their ISP. Thus, to correlate a subscriber
`with an IP address, the ISP also needs to know when the IP address was being used.
`Unfortunately, many ISPs only retain for a very limited amount of time the information necessary
`to correlate an IP address to a particular subscriber. (Id. at para. 5).
`
`To identify the IP addresses of those BitTorrent users who were copying and distributing
`Plaintiff’s copyrighted Motion Picture, Darren Griffin, a software consultant with CBC, was
`responsible for analyzing, reviewing and attesting to the results of the investigation. (Id. at para.
`6).
`Forensic software provided by CBC to scan peer-to-peer networks for the presence of
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`infringing transactions (Id. at para. 7) and the transactions and the IP addresses of the users
`responsible for copying and distributing the Motion Picture (identified as the “Work”) were
`isolated. (Id. at para. 8). Through each of the transactions, the computers using the IP addresses
`identified in Exhibit A to the Griffin Decl. (“Griffin Ex. A”) transmitted a copy or a part of a copy
`of a digital media file identified by the relevant hash value. The IP addresses, hash values, dates
`and times contained in Griffin Ex. A correctly reflect what is contained in the evidence logs. The
`subscribers using the IP addresses set forth in Griffin Ex. A were all part of a “swarm” of users
`that were reproducing, distributing, displaying or performing the copyrighted work. (Griffin
`Decl., para. 9).
`
`Moreover, the users were sharing the exact same copy of the Motion Picture. Any digital
`copy of an audiovisual work may be uniquely identified by a unique, coded, string of characters
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`called a “hash checksum.” The hash checksum is a string of alphanumeric characters generated
`by a mathematical algorithm known as US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 or “SHA-1”, which was
`developed by the National Security Agency and published as a US government standard. Using a
`hash tag to identify different copies of the Motion Picture, it was confirmed that these users
`reproduced the very same copy of the Motion Picture. (Id. at para. 10).
`
`The CBC software analyzed each BitTorrent “piece” distributed by each IP address listed
`in Griffin Ex. A and verified that reassembling the pieces using a specialized BitTorrent client
`results in a fully playable digital motion picture. (Id. at para. 11).
`
`The software uses a geolocation functionality to confirm that all IP addresses of the users
`set forth in Griffin Ex. A were located in Illinois. Although an IP address alone does not reveal
`the name or contact information of the account holder, it does reveal the locations of the Internet
`connection used for the transaction. IP addresses are distributed to ISPs by public, nonprofit
`organizations called Regional Internet Registries. These registries assign blocks of IP addresses to
`ISPs by geographic region. In the United States, these blocks are assigned and tracked by the
`American Registry of Internet Numbers. Master tables correlating the IP addresses with local
`regions are maintained by these organizations in a publicly-available and searchable format. An
`IP address’ geographic location can be further narrowed by cross-referencing this information
`with secondary sources such as data contributed to commercial database by ISPs. (Id. at para. 12).
`
`As set forth in Exhibit D, it was confirmed not only that the users distributed the files in
`Illinois, but also the specific location where the distribution took place. (Id. at para. 13).
`
`The targeted date of the swarm in this matter is a single day, April 21, 2013 -- in
`particular, a time span of 22 hours on April 21, 2013 from 12:21 AM UTC to 10:26 PM UTC.
`(Griffin Decl., para. 14). Torrent swarms can survive over extended periods of time (months or
`years) and provide users with exactly the same file comprising exactly the same pieces. (Id. at
`para. 15). A primary factor determining the size of a swarm is the popularity of the product that
`the file contains (movie, audio, TV series, etc.). For example, a recently released movie can
`lose popularity within weeks or months, whereas a famous album of a rock band might continue
`to be popular for several years. (Id. at para. 16).
`
`As further stated in the accompanying Griffin Declaration (Id. at para. 17), it is not
`necessary for each of the Defendants to have directly interacted with each other Defendant, or to
`have shared a piece of the file with each and every Defendant when downloading the movie.
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`The Defendants are properly joined because their actions directly relate back to the same initial
`seed of the swarm, and their alleged infringement further advanced the series of infringements
`that began with the initial seed and continued through other infringers. In doing so, the
`Defendants all acted under the same system. It is sufficient that the Defendants shared pieces
`that originated from the same (identical) file, and opened their computer to allow others to
`connect and receive those pieces. See, for example, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1-21,
`CIV. A. 11-15232, 2012 WL 1190840 (E.D. Mich., Magistrate Judge Randon, Apr. 5, 2012).
`(Copy attached as Exhibit E, see pp. 7-8).
`b.
`Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Showing of Copyright Infringement
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`Plaintiff has sufficiently identified the Doe Defendants through the unique IP address that
`each Doe Defendant was assigned at the time of the unauthorized distribution and copying of the
`copyrighted Motion Picture. These Defendants gained access to the Internet through their
`respective ISPs (under cover of an IP address) only by setting up an account with the various ISPs.
`The ISPs can identify each Defendant by name through the IP address by reviewing its subscriber
`activity logs. Thus, Plaintiff can show that all Defendants are “real persons” whose names are
`known to the ISP and who can be sued in federal court.
`
`A prima facie claim of copyright infringement consists of two elements: (1) ownership of
`a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist
`Publ’ns. Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Plaintiff satisfied the first
`good cause factor by properly pleading a cause of action for copyright infringement. (Complaint
`at paras. 11-17). In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
`124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004) (“Teenagers and young adults who have access to the Internet like to swap
`computer files containing popular music. If the music is copyrighted, such swapping, which
`involves making and transmitting a digital copy of the music, infringes copyright,“); Elektra
`Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-115-FL, 2008 WL 5111886, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4,
`2008) (“[P]laintiffs have established a prima facie claim for copyright infringement, as they have
`sufficiently alleged both ownership of a valid copyright and encroachment upon at least one of the
`exclusive rights afforded by copyright.”); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-116-
`FL, 2008 WL 5111883, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (same). Accordingly, Plaintiff has met and
`exceeded its obligation to plead a prima facie case.
`2.
`Plaintiff Seeks Limited and Specific Discovery
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`Plaintiff only seeks to discover the name, address, telephone number and e-mail address of
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`the Defendants. This is all specific information that is in the possession of each Defendant’s ISP
`that will enable Plaintiff to serve process. Since the requested discovery is limited and specific,
`Plaintiff has satisfied the second good cause factor.
`3.
`No Alternative Means Exist to Obtain Defendant’s True Identities
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`Other than receiving the information from the Defendants’ ISP, there is no way to obtain
`Defendants’ true identity because the ISP is the only party who possesses records which track IP
`address assignment to their subscribers. Consequently, the ISP is the source for information
`relating to associating an IP address to a real person. Since there is no other way for Plaintiff to
`obtain Defendant’s identity, except by serving a subpoena on Defendant’s ISPs demanding it,
`Plaintiff has established the third good cause factor. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy et al.,
`185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-115-
`FL, 2008 WL 5111886, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (finding that the feasibility of a suggested
`alternative method of determining defendants’ identities by hiring a private investigator to observe
`downloading “is questionable at best”); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-116-FL,
`2008 WL 5111883, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (same).
`4.
`Discovery is Needed to Advance the Asserted Claims
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`Plaintiff will not be able to serve the Defendants with process and proceed with this case
`without the requested discovery. Plaintiff’s statutorily protected property rights, in which millions
`have been invested, are at issue in this suit and, therefore, the equities should weigh heavily in
`favor of preserving Plaintiff’s rights. Since identifying the Defendant by name is necessary for
`Plaintiff to advance the asserted claims, Plaintiff has established the fourth good cause factor.
`Sony, 326 F.Supp at 566; BMG Music v. Doe #4, No. 1:08-CV-135, 2009 WL 2244108, at *3
`(M.D.N.C. July 24, 2009) (finding under nearly identical circumstances that “[p]laintiffs have
`shown that the subpoenaed information - Doe #4’s identity – is centrally needed to advance
`Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim”).
`5.
`Plaintiff’s Interest in Knowing Defendants’ True Identities
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`Outweighs Defendants’ Interests in Remaining Anonymous
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`Plaintiff has a strong legitimate interest in protecting its copyright. Defendants are
`copyright infringers with no legitimate expectation of privacy in the subscriber information
`provided to the ISP, much less in distributing the copyrighted work in question without
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`permission. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (“computer users do not have a
`legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have conveyed it to
`another person – the system operator”); BMG Music v. Doe #4, No. 1:08-CV-135, 2009 WL
`2244108, at *3 (M.D.N.C. July 24, 2009) (finding under nearly identical circumstances that
`“[p]laintiffs have shown that Defendant Doe #4 has a minimal expectation of privacy
`downloading and distributing copyrighted songs without permission”); Interscope Records v.
`Does 1-14, 558 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1178 (D. Kan. 2008) (a person using the Internet to distribute or
`download copyrighted music without authorization is not entitled to have their identity protected
`from disclosure under the First Amendment); Sony, 326 F.Supp.2d at 566 (“defendants have little
`expectation of privacy in downloading and distributing copyrighted songs without permission”);
`Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2008) (finding that the
`“speech” at issue was the doe defendant’s alleged infringement of copyrights and that “courts
`have routinely held that a defendant’s First Amendment privacy interests are exceedingly small
`where the ‘speech’ is the alleged infringement of copyrights”); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does
`1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“defendants have little expectation of privacy in
`downloading and distributing copyrighted songs without permission”); Arista Records, LLC v.
`Doe No. 1, 254 F.R.D. 480, 481 (E.D.N.C. 2008); U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F.Supp.2d 504, 508
`(W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000).
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`Downloading a mainstream motion picture is no different than downloading a song.
`Being named as a defendant in this action does not expose an individual to embarrassment. It is
`not blackmail. In fact, copying music and mainstream movies is so pervasive that certain
`segments of the public apparently accept it without question. This is the specific problem this
`lawsuit addresses – copying a mainstream movie is no different than downloading a song, it raises
`no privacy concerns.
`C.
`Irreparable Harm Establishes Good Cause to Grant the Motion
`
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`Good cause exists here for the additional reason that a claim for copyright infringement
`presumes irreparable harm to the copyright owner. This is especially true in this matter since the
`copying results in lost ticket sales, and will also erode rentals and purchases. See UMG
`Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, 2008 WL 4104214 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (fining good cause for expedited
`discovery exists in Internet infringement causes, where a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
`infringement, there is no other way to identify the Doe defendant, and there is a risk an ISP will
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`destroy its logs prior to the conference); Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
`Copyright, § 14.06[A], at 14-03 (2003); Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d
`622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003).
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`The first and necessary step that Plaintiff must take to stop the infringement of its valuable
`copyright is to identify the Doe Defendants who are copying and distributing the Motion Picture.
`This lawsuit cannot proceed without the limited discovery Plaintiff seeks because the ISPs are the
`only entities that can identify the otherwise anonymous Defendants. Courts regularly permit early
`discovery where such discovery will “substantially contribute to moving the cause forward.”
`Semitool, 2008 F.R.D. at 277.
`
`III. Conclusion
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant the pending
`Motion for Leave to Take Discovery Prior to the Rule 26 Conference. Plaintiff requests
`permission to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on the ISPs it has identified as of this date, and those it
`identifies in the future, so that the ISPs can disclose the true name, address, telephone number, e-
`mail address, and MAC address of each Doe Defendant that Plaintiff has identified to date, and an
`order that the ISPs shall comply with the subpoenas. To the extent that any ISP, in turn, identifies
`a different entity as the ISP providing network access and online services to the Doe Defendants,
`Plaintiff also seeks leave to serve, on any such later identified ISP, limited discovery sufficient to
`identify the Doe Defendant prior to the Rule 26 conference.
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`Plaintiff will only use this information to prosecute its claims. Without this information,
`Plaintiff cannot pursue its lawsuit to protect its Motion Picture from past and ongoing, repeated
`infringement.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`TCYK, LLC
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`By:
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`s/ Michael A. Hierl
`Michael A. Hierl (Bar No. 3128021)
`Todd S. Parkhurst (Bar No. 2145456)
`Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.
`Three First National Plaza
`70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000
`Chicago, Illinois 60602
`(312) 580-0100 Telephone
`mhierl@hsplegal.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`TCYK, LLC
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`Date: June 19, 2013
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`Case: 1:13-cv-03841 Document #: 7 Filed: 06/19/13 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:32
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
`Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f)
`conference was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court and served on all counsel of
`record and interested parties via the CM/ECF system on June 19, 2013.
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`s/Michael A. Hierl
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`12