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`IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`Case No. 1:22-cv-22706-RNS
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`BELL NORTHERN RESEARCH, LLC,
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`HMD AMERICA, INC., HMD GLOBAL OY,
`SHENZHEN CHINO-E COMMUNICATION
`CO. LTD., HON HAI PRECISION
`INDUSTRY CO., LTD, TINNO MOBILE
`TECHNOLOGY CORP., SHENZHEN TINNO
`MOBILE CO., LTD., TINNO USA, INC., UNISOC
`TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD., SPREADTRUM
`COMMUNICATIONS USA, INC., WINGTECH
`TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., WINGTECH
`INTERNATIONAL, INC., HUAQIN CO. LTD.,
`BEST BUY CO., INC., BEST BUY STORES L.P.,
`TARGET CORP., WALMART INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANT UNISOC TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD.’S
`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 2 of 10
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER UNISOC .......................... 1
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`PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PLEAD ANY ACTIVITY BY UNISOC THAT
`COULD POSSIBLY DIRECTLY INFRINGE THE ASSERTED PATENTS .................. 3
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`PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD INDIRECT AND WILLFUL
`INFRINGEMENT BY UNISOC ........................................................................................ 4
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 4
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`i
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 3 of 10
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cnty.,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987) .................................................................................................................. 1
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 3, 4
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`Atlantis Hydroponics, Inc. v. Int’l Growers Supply, Inc.,
`915 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2013) ..................................................................................... 3
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`Atmos Nation, LLC v. BnB Enter., LLC,
`No. 0:16-cv-62083-CIV, 2017 WL 5004844 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2017) .................................. 4
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`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 3, 4
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`Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
`471 U.S. 462 (1985) .................................................................................................................. 1
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`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`575 U.S. 632 (2015) .................................................................................................................. 4
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`CTP Innovations, LLC v. Solo Printing, Inc.,
`No. 1:14-cv-21499, 2014 WL 11997838 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2014) ......................................... 4
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`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`579 U.S. 93 (2016) .................................................................................................................... 4
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`In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ............................................................................. 1, 2, 3
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`SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
`580 U.S. 328 (2017) .................................................................................................................. 2
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`Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC,
`997 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2021)................................................................................................. 2
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`Viavi Sols. Inc. v. Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00378, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) ..................... 2
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`Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,
`683 F. App’x 786 (11th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................... 3
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`ii
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 4 of 10
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`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
`444 U.S. 286 (1980) .................................................................................................................. 1
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`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................................................................ 4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 .......................................................................................................................... 2, 3
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`iii
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 5 of 10
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`I.
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`THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER UNISOC
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`All that Plaintiff was able to amass for specific jurisdiction over Unisoc1 comes down to
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`1) webpages listing several Unisoc chipsets; and 2) that some other company’s products found in
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`the United States apparently contain Unisoc chipsets. ECF No. 127 at 3-7 (“Opp.”). Then, without
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`any further support, Plaintiff states that “there is no doubt that Unisoc introduces infringing
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`products into the stream of commerce within the United States.” Opp. at 3 (emphasis added). But
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`personal jurisdiction requires more than pure conjecture. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
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`v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (holding that exercise of specific jurisdiction requires
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`showing that the defendant placed the accused products into the “stream of commerce with the
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`expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State” where expectation
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`requires more than mere “foreseeab[ility]”); In re Takata Airbag Prod. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp.
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`3d 1101, 1155 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“[S]pecific jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory will
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`not be sustained upon unspecific and generalized allegations.”). Neither the Complaint nor
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`Plaintiff’s opposition brief identifies the requisite contacts with the forum.
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`The “substantial connection” with the forum “necessary for a finding of minimum contacts
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`must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”
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`Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
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`(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). Plaintiff, however, fails to
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`identify any Unisoc activity purposefully directed toward Florida or the United States. Instead,
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`Plaintiff cites a Unisoc website that simply acknowledges its products are “sold on a global scale.”
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`Opp. at 5. Nor is it significant that the Unisoc website links to the Nokia T20 as a product
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`example—the Nokia T20 is sold globally.2 None of this shows Unisoc directing anything toward
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`1 Plaintiff does not assert general personal jurisdiction over Unisoc.
`2 See, e.g., https://www.nokia.com/phones/en_int/nokia-t-20?sku=F20RID1A001 at n.3.
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`1
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 6 of 10
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`Florida or the United States. Plaintiff’s only evidence of activity directed to Florida or the United
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`States is that of other companies. Plaintiff thus fails to “allege the necessary ‘something more’ to
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`invoke this Court’s jurisdiction” under stream of commerce. Takata, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
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`Plaintiff also errs by dismissing this Court and Supreme Court cases because they are “non-
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`patent cases”3 (Opp. 9-12), and instead relies on the Viavi case from the Eastern District of Texas
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`while omitting key details (Opp. 6). In reaching its decision in Viavi, the Texas court noted that
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`“the record reflects that [Defendant] Crystal . . . knew (or should have reasonably known) the likely
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`destination of the products.” Viavi Sols. Inc. v. Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd., No. 2:21-cv-
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`00378, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106, *14-15 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) (emphasis added). Here,
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`there is no record showing such knowledge or any purposeful availment of Florida or the United
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`States. Instead, this case is more like Takata because Plaintiff does not allege Unisoc designed its
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`products “in or specifically for the” U.S.; “directed any advertising campaign”; “established any
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`channels for advising customers in the” U.S.; “created the distribution network in the” U.S.;
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`“provided any financial support to” a U.S. distributor; or “otherwise controlled” companies
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`performing such activities. 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1154. In fact, this case is even stronger because,
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`unlike in Takata, Unisoc does not have any parent-subsidiary relationship with companies that sell
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`the accused products in the United States. See id.; cf. Zhen Decl. (ECF No. 91-1), ¶¶ 5-12.
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`Plaintiff raises Rule 4(k)(2) in its Opposition despite not alleging it in the Complaint.
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`Regardless, Plaintiff fails to identify any different evidence or argument under Rule 4(k)(2). Opp.
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`3 “[P]atent law is governed by the same . . . procedural rules as other areas of civil litigation.”
`SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 580 U.S. 328, 340 (2017).
`There are no “special” patent rules for personal jurisdiction. Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC,
`997 F.3d 1147, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“personal jurisdiction cannot rest on special patent
`policies”).
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`2
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 7 of 10
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`7 (relying on its non-Rule 4(k)(2) argument). As explained above, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient
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`contacts with Florida or the United States (under Rule 4(k)(2)) to exercise jurisdiction.
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`Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery should be denied. Jurisdictional discovery is
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`“to ascertain the truth of the allegations or facts underlying the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”
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`Atlantis Hydroponics, Inc. v. Int’l Growers Supply, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380 (N.D. Ga.
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`2013). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any facts supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
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`Its request for jurisdictional discovery is nothing more than an improper “fishing expedition” that
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`courts routinely reject. See id. (collecting cases); see also Takata, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1157 (denying
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`jurisdictional discovery where Plaintiff fails to “specify what information [Plaintiffs have] sought
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`or how that information would bolster [their] allegations”) (quoting Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,
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`683 F. App’x 786, 792 (11th Cir. 2017)). The Court should do the same here.
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`II.
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`PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PLEAD ANY ACTIVITY BY UNISOC THAT COULD
`POSSIBLY DIRECTLY INFRINGE THE ASSERTED PATENTS
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`Plaintiff does not meaningfully contest that it fails to adequately plead direct infringement
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`by Unisoc. Instead, Plaintiff misstates the law, makes conclusory allegations, and ignores issues
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`with its Complaint raised in Unisoc’s opening brief. Compare ECF No. 91 at 9-10 (“Mot.”), with
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`Opp. at 7-8. As an initial matter, Plaintiff wrongly states the standard for when a motion to dismiss
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`may be granted. Opp. 7. The Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to patent cases. Cf. supra Note 3.
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`Plaintiff alleges only that Nokia branded mobile phones and tablets infringe the asserted
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`patents, and alleges only that “these phones contain Unisoc platforms.” See Opp. at 3. But Unisoc
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`does not make, sell, or import these mobile devices and Plaintiff does not allege otherwise.
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`Compare Mot. at 9-10 (noting this), with Opp. at 7-8 (not rebutting it). Instead, Plaintiff appears
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`to focus on whether it adequately pled that these mobile devices meet the claim elements. Opp. at
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`8. But that is the wrong issue because the problem is that Plaintiff fails to give Unisoc “fair notice”
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`3
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 8 of 10
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`of what its claim is against Unisoc and how Unisoc allegedly directly infringes. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). None of the paragraphs Plaintiff cites (¶¶ 114-129) allege any
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`Unisoc activity that could possibly directly infringe any of the asserted patents. Opp. at 8. Plaintiff
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`cannot hide behind its allegations against different defendants. The Court should dismiss its claims.
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`III.
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`PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD INDIRECT AND WILLFUL
`INFRINGEMENT BY UNISOC
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`Plaintiff merely concludes in its opposition that it “amply demonstrated . . . indirect and
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`willful patent infringement.” Opp. at 8. But this fails to address the issues raised in Unisoc’s
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`opening brief. Compare Mot. at 10-11, with Opp. at 8. Nor does Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish
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`Iqbal and Commil. Opp. at 12. Commil sets forth the elements for an indirect infringement claim
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`and those same elements apply at the pleading stage. And Plaintiff cannot ignore Supreme Court
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`precedent simply because Iqbal “did not involve a patent claim.” See supra Note 3.
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`Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish cases for willful infringement similarly fails. Halo sets
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`forth the elements of a willful infringement claim and, like indirect infringement, those same
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`elements apply at the pleading stage. Plaintiff states that Atmos and CTP Innovations “are not
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`persuasive because” its willful infringement allegations here “pre-date the filing of the complaint.”
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`Opp. at 13. Plaintiff, however, fails to cite any such allegation in its Complaint. See id. Rather, the
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`Complaint does not allege any knowledge that “pre-date[s] the filing of the complaint.” See ECF
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`No. 1.
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`The Court should dismiss the indirect and willful infringement claims against Unisoc.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the above reasons, the Court should dismiss this case as to Unisoc under Federal Rule
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`of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(2) or 12 (b)(6).
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`4
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 9 of 10
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`__/s/ Terri Ellen Tuchman Meyers
`Terri Ellen Tuchman Meyers
`Fla. Bar No. 881279
`tmeyers@klugerkaplan.com
`Marissa Reichel
`mreichel@klugerkaplan.com
`Fla. Bar No. 1016190
`KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN &
`LEVINE, P.L.
`201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, 27th Floor
`Miami, FL 33131
`Tel: (305) 379-9000
`
`Qingyu Yin (admitted pro hac vice)
`qingyu.yin@finnegan.com
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER, LLP
`901 New York Avenue N.W.
`Washington, DC 20001
`Tel: (202) 408-4000
`
`Benjamin R. Schlesinger (admitted pro hac vice)
`Benjamin.schlesinger@finnegan.com
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER, LLP
`271 17th Street, NW, Suite 1400
`Atlanta, GA 30363-6209
`Tel: (404) 653-6416
`
`Jacob A. Schroeder (admitted pro hac vice)
`jacob.schroeder@finnegan.com
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER, LLP
`3300 Hillview Avenue
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Tel: (650) 849-6600
`
`Yi Yu (admitted pro hac vice)
`yi.yu@finnegan.com
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER, LLP
`1875 Explorer St., Suite 800
`Reston, VA 20190
`Tel: (571) 203-2700
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 133 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/07/2023 Page 10 of 10
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`Attorneys for Defendant Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies
`Co., Ltd.
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`6
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