Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 1 of 18
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`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`Case No. 1:22-cv-22706-RNS
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`
`BELL NORTHERN RESEARCH, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`HMD AMERICA, INC.; HMD GLOBAL OY;
`SHENZHEN CHINO-E COMMUNICATION
`CO., LTD.; HON HAI PRECISION
`INDUSTRY CO., LTD.; TINNO MOBILE
`TECHNOLOGY CORP.; SHENZHEN
`TINNO MOBILE CO., LTD.; TINNO USA,
`INC.; UNISOC TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.;
`SPREADTRUM COMMUNICATIONS USA,
`INC.; WINGTECH TECHNOLOGY CO.;
`LTD.; WINGTECH INTERNATIONAL,
`INC.; BEST BUY CO., INC.; BEST BUY
`STORES L.P.; TARGET CORP.; WALMART
`INC.
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`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT UNISOC TECHNOLOGIES CO.
`LTD.’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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`Defendants.
`_______________________________________
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`1
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 2 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
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`II. LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`Personal Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................ 1
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`Rule 8 Pleading Standard ................................................................................................. 2
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`III. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 3
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`This Court Has Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Unisoc............................................ 3
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`This Court Has Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(2) .............................................................. 7
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`Defendant’s Arguments Alleging Inadequate Pleading Also Fail ................................... 7
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`Defendant’s Cases Are Distinguishable ........................................................................... 8
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`IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 13
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`i
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 3 of 18
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp.,
`689 F.3d 1358, (Fed. Cir. 2012).......................................................................................... 10, 11
`Alpha Tech. U.S.A. Corp. v. MLSNA Dairy Supply, Inc.,
`No. 6:13-cv-1062-Orl-37TBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167884 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2013)... 10,
`11, 12
`Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987). ................................................................................................................. 12
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................................ 2, 12, 15
`Atmos Nation, LLC v. BnB Enter., LLC,
`No. 0:16-cv-62083-CIV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135129 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2017). ............. 16
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................... 2, 4, 14, 15
`Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc.,
`497 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2007). ...................................................................................... 9
`Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt.,
`789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015). ............................................................................................... 13
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
` 575 U.S. 632 (2015). ................................................................................................................ 15
`Conformis, Inc. v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.,
`No. 1:19-cv-21499, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99343 (D. Del. June 3, 2022). ............................ 15
`Conley v. Gibson,
`355 U.S. 41 (1957) ...................................................................................................................... 2
`CTP Innovations, LLC v. Solo Printing, Inc.,
`No. 1:14-cv-21499, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190232 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2014). ...................... 16
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`571 U.S. 117 (2014). ................................................................................................................. 12
`Elecs. For Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle,
`340 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............................................................................................... 1, 2
`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
` 563 U.S. 754 (2011). ................................................................................................................ 16
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`579 U.S. 93 (2016). ................................................................................................................... 16
`In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig.,
` 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 2019). ................................................................................... 14
`In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
`Nos. 2924; 20-MD-2924, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220610 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2020). ............ 14
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
`326 U.S. 310 (1945). ................................................................................................................. 13
`K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
`714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 3
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007)............................................................................................. 3, 10
`MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
` 420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).................................................................................................. 4
`ii
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 4 of 18
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`N. Am. Philips Corp. Am. Vending Sales, Inc.,
`3 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994)....................................................................................................... 8
`Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc.,
`203 F.3d 790 (Fed. Cir. 2000)............................................................................................... 3, 10
`Starr v. Baca,
`652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................... 3
`Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,
`574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................... 9
`United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer,
`556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009), ............................................................................................... 13
`Viavi Sols. Inc. v. Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co. Ltd.,
`No. 2:21-CV-00378-JRG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022). ........ 7, 8
`World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
`444 U.S. 286 (1980). ............................................................................................................. 5, 13
`Zanakis v. Scanreco, Inc.,
`No. 18-cv-21813-UU, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89210 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2019). ...................... 14
`
`
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`iii
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 5 of 18
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`
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`Plaintiff Bell Northern Research, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “BNR”) submits this brief in
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`opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Spreadtrum Communications USA, Inc.
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`(“Defendant” or “Spreadtrum”) and Unisoc Technologies Co., Ltd. (“Defendant” or “Unisoc”).
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`(Dkt. 91.) Contemporaneously with the filing of this opposition paper, Plaintiff is filing an
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`unopposed motion to dismiss Spreadtrum from this action, without prejudice. Thus, this brief is
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`only directed to Unisoc’s arguments for dismissal of the action against it.1
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Unisoc’s motion to dismiss is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected. The motion
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`rests on an inconclusive declaration and a faulty analysis of personal jurisdiction under Rule
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`12(b)(2). Unisoc also neglects Rule 4(k)(2) in its entirety, which provides a further basis for this
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`Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Moreover, Unisoc’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments for
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`dismissal of Plaintiff’s infringement claims do not properly address the pleading requirements in
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`patent cases like this one under Rule 8, which BNR has fully satisfied.
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`Unisoc should not be dismissed from this action as a party. Nor should Plaintiff’s claims
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`for patent infringement against Unisoc be dismissed. There is no basis for any of the relief
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`sought in Unisoc’s motion.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`Personal Jurisdiction
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`Federal Circuit law governs the issue of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a
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`defendant in a patent infringement case. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1348
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`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiff established a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction
`
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`1 Defendant Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd (“Hon Hai”) separately filed its own motion to
`dismiss (Dkt. 78) on the same date as the motion of Unisoc and Spreadtrum. As with
`Spreadtrum, Plaintiff is filing contemporaneously with this paper an unopposed motion to
`dismiss Hon Hai from this action, also without prejudice.
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`1
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 6 of 18
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`over defendants). Indeed, “in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only to
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`make a prima facie showing that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1349.
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`Plaintiff has manifestly established such a prima facie case here. Moreover, a district court’s
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`exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, must comport with the state’s
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`long-arm statute and due process, see id. at 1349, both of which are satisfied here as to Unisoc.
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`B.
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`Rule 8 Pleading Standard
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`Rule 8 only requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
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`entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court cases, Ashcroft v.
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`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) are clear that
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair
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`notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
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`(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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`Thus, a plaintiff asserting patent infringement need only plead facts sufficient to place a
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`potential infringer on “notice of what activity or device is being accused of infringement.” K-
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`Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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`(holding that plaintiff’s amended complaint satisfied pleading standard for patent infringement
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`without the identification of specific products); Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys.,
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`Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding 12(b)(6) motion should not have been granted
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`where complaint alleged ownership of the asserted patent, named each individual defendant,
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`cited to the patent allegedly infringed, and pointed to specific sections of patent law). The
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`complaint is not required to contain specifics regarding how the allegedly infringing method
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`works because this is something that is determined through discovery and is an inappropriate
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`ground for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357–58
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`2
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 7 of 18
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`Indeed, “Plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed only when defendant’s plausible
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`alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiff’s explanation is implausible . . . . As the
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`Court wrote in Twombly, Rule 8(a) ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
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`stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
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`evidence’ to support the allegations.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2011)
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`(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Here, Plaintiff BNR’s claims
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`are clear and precise in the complaint, and Unisoc’s motion does nothing to dent them, much
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`less demonstrate any implausibility in those claims.
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`This Court Has Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Unisoc
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`Specific personal jurisdiction over Unisoc requires compliance with Florida’s long-arm
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`statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), and due process. Both are satisfied here, as patent
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`infringement is a “tort” under Florida’s long-arm statute, Unisoc’s platforms are distributed in
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`this District, and nothing in Unisoc’s motion demonstrates otherwise, particularly its vague
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`declaration.
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`Notwithstanding that declaration, there is no doubt that Unisoc introduces infringing
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`products into the stream of commerce within the United States, Florida and this District in
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`particular. As shown in Exhibit A to this brief, at least three (3) different models of Nokia
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`phones are offered for sale in the United States, Florida and this District, including via suppliers
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`such as Best Buy and Walmart, and all of these phones contain Unisoc platforms that are offered
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`for sale in this District, namely the Nokia T20, Nokia 225 4G, and Nokia T10. (See Ex. A at
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`006, 009, 024.) All of these products are identified in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 113.)
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`Plaintiff’s complaint also identifies the following products with Unisoc platforms: Nokia C10,
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`Nokia C20, Nokia C21, and the Nokia G11 Plus. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 113; Ex. A at 012, 016, 017, 021.)
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`3
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 8 of 18
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`Patent infringement occurs wherever an allegedly infringing product is sold, offered for
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`sale, and/or used. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Further, under Federal Circuit law, patent infringement
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`causes injuries wherever infringement occurs. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
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`Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, Unisoc has committed
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`patent infringement by introducing products infringing BNR’s patents into the stream of
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`commerce within the United States and Florida and this District in particular. (See Ex. A at 006,
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`009, 024.) A district court does not exceed its powers if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
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`corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
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`will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
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`444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). That is absolutely the case here with Unisoc, as Exhibit A
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`demonstrates. Defendant’s declaration does not, and cannot rebut this evidence.
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`The declaration of Zhang Zhen (the “Zhen declaration”) (Dkt. 91-1) is sparse on facts,
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`and makes the following statements:
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`5. Unisoc does not develop, design, manufacture, advertise, market, sell, import,
`or distribute products in the United States.
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`6. Unisoc does not provide any post-sales service or support in the United States.
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`7. Unisoc has no distributor in the United States for its products and has
`established no distribution channel in the United States.
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`11. Customers may incorporate Unisoc’s chipsets in downstream products (e.g.
`mobile phones and tablets) and sell such downstream products in China or
`elsewhere in the world. Unisoc has no control over the incorporation of its
`chipsets into any downstream products and has no control over the distribution or
`sale of the downstream products. The manufacturers of downstream products
`have no obligations to inform Unisoc of the sales of downstream products.
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`12. Unisoc does not specifically design its chipsets to meet the requirements of
`the market of United States.
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`(Dkt. 91-1, ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 11, 12.) These statements are not sufficient under Rule 12(b)(2) and do
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`not rebut Plaintiff’s above, prima facie establishment of personal jurisdiction.
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`4
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 9 of 18
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`The Zhen declaration fails to provide any support for the above statements, including that
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`Unisoc does not “develop, design, manufacture, advertise, market, sell, import, or distribute
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`products in the United States.” Importantly, the public evidence rebuts that declaration and
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`shows the contrary is true. (See Ex. A.) Unisoc’s own website also provides that it is a “leading
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`platform chip design company” with a “business scope” that covers 128 countries and has passed
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`shipment certification of 200+ operators worldwide,” as shown below.
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`(https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/home/about/61 (last accessed Jan. 30, 2023.) As shown in the
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`Unisoc platforms on its website (unisoc.com), Unisoc has “field tested” these platforms in more
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`than “130 countries,” has “collaborat[ed] with more than 200” operators, has “mass shipment”
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`with more than 200 operators, and indicates that their platforms are “[t]o be sold on a global
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`scale.” (Ex. A at 002, 014, 019.)
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`5
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 10 of 18
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`The Viavi case from the Eastern District of Texas is instructive. In Viavi, the plaintiff
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`patent holder filed a multi-patent case against a Chinese corporate defendant. Viavi Sols. Inc. v.
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`Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co. Ltd., No. 2:21-CV-00378-JRG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106, at
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`*2, *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022). The allegedly infringing products were “low angle shift
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`optical filters that employ hydrogenated silicon layers as a high refractive index layer (the
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`‘[f]ilters’).” Viavi, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106, at *2. Defendant manufactured and sold the
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`filters “in China to other Chinese companies.” The court found that ultimately, these filters were
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`“sold to Samsung for use in Samsung’s Galaxy cellphones. The Galaxy cellphones [were] then
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`exported to the United States for sale throughout the country, including in the Eastern District of
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`Texas.” Viavi, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205106, at *7. The court held that the defendant was
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`subject to its personal jurisdiction under both Asahi stream of commerce tests. Viavi, 2022 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 205106, at *15.
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`The connection between the accused Nokia products, Unisoc, and this forum is even
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`tighter than those in Viavi. In Viavi, the plaintiff had to break open a Samsung Galaxy phone to
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`form the “belief” that the filter was manufactured by the defendant, and even then, the defendant
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`submitted a declaration stating that they did not have an agreement with Samsung and that its
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`filters could not be “directly incorporated into a smartphone or tablet.” Viavi, 2022 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 205106, at *10, *11. Here, the public websites of the accused infringers in this case
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`plainly show that Unisoc platforms are directly incorporated into Nokia branded phones and sold
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`in this District in Best Buy and Walmart stores. There is even a direct link on the Unisoc website
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`to the Nokia T20, in which the Unisoc describes the Nokia T20 as a “Product Example” for its
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`T610 platform. (Ex. A at 003.) Furthermore, unlike the declaration in Viavi, the Zhen
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`declaration does not deny that Unisoc has a commercial relationship with “Customers” that are
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`located in this District. (Dkt. 91-1 at ¶ 11.)
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`6
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 11 of 18
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`Under patent law, “patent infringement occurs where the allegedly infringing sales are
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`made.” N. Am. Philips Corp. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 3 F.3d 1576, 1578–79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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`The undisputable fact that Unisoc’s products are distributed and sold in this District mandates
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`denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint hold, and are
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`not refuted by the Zhen declaration, which itself is contrary to the public record. Accordingly,
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`Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be denied.
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`B.
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`This Court Has Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(2)
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`If the Court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction under the stream of
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`commerce theory in Florida, then Unisoc would still be subject to nation-wide personal
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`jurisdiction, including in this District, based on Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure. To exercise personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), “[1] the plaintiff’s claim must
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`arise under federal law, [2] the defendant must not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts
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`of general jurisdiction, and [3] exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process.”
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`Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2009). All of these elements
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`are met because this action arises under patent law, Unisoc is a Chinese company and does not
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`contend that it is subject to any state court general jurisdiction, and as shown above, Unisoc’s
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`platforms are distributed in this District.
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`C.
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`Defendant’s Arguments Alleging Inadequate Pleading Arguments Also Fail
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`Unisoc also incorrectly argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for direct,
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`indirect and willful infringement. (Dkt. 91 at 12.) Taking the well-plead facts of the complaint
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`as true, a court may grant a motion to dismiss only when, “on the basis of a dispositive issue of
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`law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Berry v. Budget
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`Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2007). These standards of dismissal
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`under Rule 12(b)(6) are clearly not met by the facts here.
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`7
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 12 of 18
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` A complaint for patent infringement must contain allegations identifying (a) the patents
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`that have been infringed, (b) ownership, (c) the party that has infringed the patent, (d) how the
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`infringement occurred, and (e) what theory of patent law the claim arises under. Phonometrics,
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`Inc., 203 F.3d at 794. Further specifics regarding how the allegedly infringing method works is
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`something that is determined through discovery and is an inappropriate grounds for Rule
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`12(b)(6) dismissal. See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1357-1358.
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`Plaintiff has amply demonstrated these five grounds for its thirteen counts of direct,
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`indirect and willful patent infringement in its complaint against each of the Defendants,
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`including Unisoc. (See Dkt. 5-1 at 28-80.) Indeed, Plaintiff goes into great detail setting forth
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`those allegations, more than satisfying the pleading requirements in patent law. This is shown in
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`Count I, for example, as to asserted U.S. Patent No. 8,204,554 and the allegations of direct (see
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`Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 114–129), indirect (see Dkt. 1 at ¶ 130) and willful (see Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 129, 132)
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`infringement against all Defendants, including Unisoc, and continues throughout the complaint
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`as to the remaining twelve asserted patents (see e.g., Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 114–136).
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`Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is unsupported by fact or law,
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`and should be denied.
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`D.
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`Defendant’s Cases Are Distinguishable
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`Each of the patent cases that Unisoc relies on in support of its Rule 12(b)(2) arguments is
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`distinguishable from the instant case. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d
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`1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of patent infringement case for lack of personal
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`jurisdiction because the foreign defendants had insufficient contact with the forum state); Alpha
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`Tech. U.S.A. Corp. v. MLSNA Dairy Supply, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1062-Orl-37TBS, 2013 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 167884, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2013) (court found that it did not have personal
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`jurisdiction over plaintiff’s patent claims because there was no evidence any infringing system
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`8
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 13 of 18
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`had made its way to Florida). AFTG-TG is distinguishable because there, the district court of
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`Wyoming found, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that “there was ‘no evidence or allegation that
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`the infringing technologies or products actually reached Wyoming.’” AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at
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`1361. That is not the case here, because Plaintiff has alleged and presented evidence that
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`Unisoc’s infringing technologies and products have actually reached Florida, and this District in
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`particular.
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`
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`In Alpha Tech., the plaintiff, a Florida corporation, filed a complaint against a Wisconsin
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`corporation that included allegations of patent infringement related to cleaning teats of milk-
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`producing animals. Alpha Tech., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167884, at *2. The court observed that
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`the parties were engaged in business contacts for a few months that resulted in defendant
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`purchasing four teat scrubbing systems from plaintiff. Alpha Tech., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`167884, at *10. However, the court reasoned that these limited business contacts were not
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`enough to comport with the requirements of due process, and moreover, the “business dealings
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`occurred before the [patent in suit] even issued.” Alpha Tech., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167884,
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`at *17. The court also found that “there [was] no evidence that any infringing system has made
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`its way into Florida.” Alpha Tech., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167884, at *19. As a result, the court
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`granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Alpha Tech., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167884, at *24.
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`Here, while BNR and Unisoc have not had business contacts like the plaintiff and
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`defendant in Alpha Tech., the record shows that Unisoc products have made their way into
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`Florida after the issuance of the patents in suit. Accordingly, the Alpha Tech. case is
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`distinguishable from the case at bar and does not support dismissing BNR’s patent infringement
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`claims against Unisoc for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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`Unisoc also relies upon a number of distinguishable non-patent cases to argue that this
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`Court cannot exercise general or specific jurisdiction over it and that dismissal supposedly is
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 14 of 18
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`appropriate under Rule 12(b)(2). See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120, 142 (2014)
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`(holding that alleged human-rights violations occurring entirely abroad did not support general
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`jurisdiction in California on foreign defendant); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009)
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`(addressing pleading standard in cause of action brought against federal officials); Asahi Metal
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`Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (holding that a California court could not
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`exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese defendant in a product liability action); World-
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`Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (holding that an Oklahoma court
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`could not exercise personal jurisdiction over New York companies in a product-liability action);
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`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 311, 321 (1945) (holding state court of Washington had
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`personal jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation in action involving the recovery of unpaid
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`contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund). None of these Supreme Court
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`cases directly addresses personal jurisdiction in the context of a patent case. Notably, their facts
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`are far afield of anything found here and distinguishable on that basis alone.
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`
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`Unisoc’s attempted reliance on Eleventh Circuit precedent is similarly distinguishable.
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`See Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., 789 F.3d 1201, 1202, 1206 (11th Cir. 2015) (court lacked
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`general jurisdiction over foreign defendant accused of negligence where alleged act of
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`negligence occurred in Belize); United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir.
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`2009) (court could not exercise general jurisdiction over foreign defendant accused of stealing
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`blueprints where alleged conduct of defendant’s Belgium managing director did not create
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`systematic business contacts with Florida). As with Defendant’s Supreme Court cases, none of
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`these Eleventh Circuit cases involves patent infringement or the challenge of personal
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`jurisdiction in a patent case. Moreover, here, Unisoc’s accused infringing activity demonstrably
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`occurs in Florida and in this District, in sharp contrast to the above cases.
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 15 of 18
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`
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`Unisoc further relies on non-patent district court cases to support its jurisdictional
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`arguments, but these too are unavailing. See In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos.
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`2924; 20-MD-2924, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220610, at *41 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2020) (denying
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`jurisdictional discovery); Zanakis v. Scanreco, Inc., No. 18-cv-21813-UU, 2019 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 89210, at *51 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2019) (holding Swiss company that manufactured
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`joysticks for industrial products in a products liability case was not subject to specific
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`jurisdiction in Florida); In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1117
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`(S.D. Fla. 2019) (class-action product liability case concerning defective airbags where court
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`found it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over certain foreign defendants). Zantac does
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`not even make a holding on the issue of personal jurisdiction and neither Zanakis nor Takata
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`address any patent claims, much less personal jurisdiction issues related to patent claims.
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`Defendant’s reliance on Twombly and Confirmis for its argument that Plaintiff fails to
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`properly plead direct infringement is misplaced. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`553 (2007) (addressing the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy claim under the
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`Sherman Act); Conformis, Inc. v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-21499, 2022 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 99343, at *9 (D. Del. June 3, 2022) (dismissing without prejudice claims of direct
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`patent infringement because plaintiff failed to specifically allege infringement occurring in the
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`United States). First, Twombly addresses antitrust conspiracy claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1, see
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548, but in any case Plaintiff’s complaint and pleadings fully satisfy the
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`standards set forth by the Supreme Court in that case. Second, and most importantly, Plaintiff’s
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`complaint specifically alleges infringement occurring in the United States and in this District
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`(e.g., Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 28, 124) thus making this case distinguishable from Conformis. In
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`Conformis, the court found that “nowhere” in the complaint did the plaintiff specifically allege
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`direct infringement. Conformis, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99343, at *9. That is not case here
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`Case 1:22-cv-22706-RNS Document 127 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/31/2023 Page 16 of 18
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`where Plaintiff properly alleges direct infringement occurring in the United States in every count
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`of the complaint, including against Unisoc (see above).
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`
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`Defendant’s reliance on Iqbal and Commil for its argument that Plaintiff fails to properly
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`plead indirect infringement is also misplaced. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (2009) (holding plaintiff’s
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`pleadings as insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss in action against federal officials for
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`unconstitutional discrimination); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 647 (2015)
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`(reaffirming Global-Tech and holding that an infringer’s belief in invalidity is no defense to a
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`claim of induced infringement). Iqbal did not involve a patent claim and Commil did not hold on
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`the issue of properly pleading an indirect patent infringement claim. Thus, neither one of these
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`cases supports dismissal of Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims.
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`
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`Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s willful infringement allegations should be
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`dismissed also is not supported under Halo, Global-Tech, Atmos, or CTP. See Halo Elecs., Inc.
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`v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 110 (2016) (holding that a district court may in its discretion
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`award enhanced damages for patent infringement in “egregious cases”); Global-Tech
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`Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) (holding that induced infringement