Case 1:22-cv-01564 Document 1 Filed 06/02/22 Page 1 of 19
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON D.C.
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`Stephen Thaler, an individual
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`Case No. : 1:22-cv-01564
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`COMPLAINT
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`Shira Perlmutter, in her official capacity as
`Register of Copyrights and Director of the United
`States Copyright Office; and The United States
`Copyright Office;
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`Defendants.
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`Plaintiff Stephen Thaler (“Dr. Thaler”) complains and alleges against Defendant Shira
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`Perlmutter (the “Register”), in her official capacity as the Register of Copyrights and Director of
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`the United States Copyright Office, and Defendant the United States Copyright Office (“USCO,”
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`and together with Register, the “Defendants”) as follows:
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`NATURE OF ACTION
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`1.
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`Dr. Thaler is in the business of developing and applying advanced artificial
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`intelligence (AI) systems capable of generating creative output that would historically qualify for
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`copyright protection and that are made under conditions in which no natural person contributed
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`to the work as a traditional author (“AI-Generated Works”).
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`2.
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`Dr. Thaler filed to register copyright for an AI-Generated Work with USCO. The
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`application named the AI as the author and Dr. Thaler as the owner of the copyright in the work.
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`3.
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`Defendants, in a final agency action, denied the copyright registration application
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`on the basis that an AI-Generated Work “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a
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`copyright claim.”
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`4.
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`Defendants also denied the copyright registration on the basis that Dr. Thaler was
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`not entitled to apply for copyright registration for his submitted work.
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`5.
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`The denial creates a novel requirement for copyright registration that is contrary
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`to the plain language of the Copyright Act (“Act”), contrary to the statutory purpose of the Act,
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`and contrary to the Constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science.
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`6.
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`The denials are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
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`(APA) 5 U.S.C. § 704. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and other relief as set forth below.
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`7.
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`AI is continually getting better at creating AI-Generated Works. These works are
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`going to be profoundly economically and socially disruptive, as they evolve from essentially
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`academic pursuits to those having significant commercial value, including in the context of
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`personalized music, journalism, and digital art.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`8.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction and is authorized to issue the relief
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`sought under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), 1361, and 2201-2022.
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`9.
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`Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
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`10.
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`Plaintiff Dr. Stephen Thaler is an individual who resided in the State of Missouri
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`PARTIES
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`at all times relevant to this complaint.
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`11.
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`As described more fully below, Plaintiff is the applicant for the copyright
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`registration.
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`12.
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`Defendant Shira Perlmutter is named in her official capacity as the Register of
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`Copyrights and Director of the United States Copyright Office. Under 17 U.S.C. § 701, the
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`powers and duties of the Copyright Office are vested in the Register.
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`13.
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`Defendant the United States Copyright Office (USCO) is a department of the
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`Library of Congress, responsible for registering copyright claims and maintaining records of
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`copyright ownership.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`I.
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`HISTORY OF THE APPLICATION
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`14.
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`Plaintiff is in the business of developing and using AI systems including those
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`capable of creating “AI-Generated Works,” here referring to output that would traditionally
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`qualify for copyright protection and made under conditions in which no natural person
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`contributed to the work as a traditional author.
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`15.
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`The present case involves Plaintiff’s application to register a copyright for an AI-
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`Generated Work produced by one of Plaintiff’s AI systems referred to as a “Creativity Machine.”
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`The work is the two-dimensional artwork (“The Work”) titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,”
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`reproduced below:
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`16.
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`On November 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application (#1-7100387071) to register
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`the Work with the USCO.
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`17.
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`In the application, Plaintiff identified the author of the Work as the “Creativity
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`Machine,” and noted it was “Created autonomously by machine.” Plaintiff listed himself as the
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`“Copyright Claimant” alongside a transfer statement labelled “Ownership of the Machine.”
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`18.
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`Plaintiff separately noted in the application that the Work was autonomously
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`created by a computer and that he was entitled to own the copyright in the Work including by
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`virtue of the work made for hire doctrine.
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`19.
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`On August 12, 2019, the USCO refused to register the claim based on the lack of
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`human authorship. That refusal stated, “We cannot register this work because it lacks the human
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`authorship necessary to support a copyright claim. According to your application this work was
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`‘created autonomously by machine.’” The refusal did not address Dr. Thaler’s entitlement to any
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`copyright in the Work.
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`II.
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`PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR RECONSIDERATION
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`20.
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`Plaintiff filed two requests for reconsideration to the USCO on September 23,
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`2019, and May 27, 2020, respectively. Plaintiff confirmed that the submission lacked traditional
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`human authorship. However, Plaintiff argued that the USCO’s human authorship requirement
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`was unsupported by law.
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`21.
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`In denying the first request for reconsideration, the USCO reiterated its response
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`that the copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that “are founded in the
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`creative powers of the mind.” Citing to In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). The
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`USCO stated that since copyright law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the
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`author,” it refused to register the claim because it determined a human being did not create the
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`Work. The USCO again cited to Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
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`(1884), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 306 (3d
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`ed. 2017).
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`22.
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`On February 14, 2022, the USCO reconsidered Plaintiff’s request the second time,
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`and again refused to register the Work. The USCO accepted that the Work was autonomously
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`created by artificial intelligence without any creative contribution from a human actor. Citing
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`again to In re Trade-Mark Cases, the USCO stated that Plaintiff had failed to either provide
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`evidence that the Work is the product of human authorship or convince the USCO to “depart
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`from a century of copyright jurisprudence.” Since there was no issue of human author
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`involvement, the USCO limited its review to whether the human authorship requirement was
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`unconstitutional and unsupported by case law.
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`23.
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`The USCO acknowledge that the phrase “original work of authorship” was
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`“purposefully left undefined” by Congress in order to “incorporate without change the standard
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`of originality established by the courts under the [1909] copyright statute[,]” citing to H.R. Rep.
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`No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). The USCO also acknowledged that the Act leaves “unquestionably
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`other areas of existing subject matter that [Bill 94-1476 did] not propose to protect but that future
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`Congresses may want to.”
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`24.
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`The USCO cited again to Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., stating that copyright
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`was afforded to photographers because photographs are “representatives of original intellectual
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`conceptions of [an] author.” Id., at 57-59. Pointing out that the court referred to “authors” as
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`human there. Id., at 58. Citing to Mazer v. Stein, the USCO stated that the Supreme Court
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`defined an author as someone who “may be viewed as an individual who writes an original
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`composition,” stating “the term in its constitutional sense, has been construed to mean an
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`‘originator,’ ‘he to whom anything owes its origin.’” USCO argues this requires human
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`authorship as an essential element of protection.
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`25.
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`Providing additional examples for its decision, the USCO also referred to Urantia
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`Found v. Kristen Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 957-959 (9th Cir. 1997), arguing the court refused to
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`extend copyright protection to non-human creations. The USCO additionally referred to Naruto
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`v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 2018) arguing a monkey cannot register a copyright
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`because the Act specifically referred to an author’s “children,” “widow,” “grandchildren,” and
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`“widower,” which necessarily implied humans and excluded animals. The USCO acknowledged
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`that it was unaware whether a court had considered the authorship of a copyright by artificial
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`intelligence, but held that the decisions rejecting registration for non-human spiritual beings and
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`animals supported its position.
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`26.
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`The USCO also cited to the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
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`Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) as support of its position. CONTU was mandated, in part, to
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`study the “creation of new works by the application or intervention of [] automatic systems of
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`machine reproduction.” In the final report in 1979, CONTU determined that the existing judicial
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`construction requiring human authorship sufficiently enabled protection for works created with
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`the use of computers, and that no amendment to copyright law was needed. CONTU specifically
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`stated that eligibility of registration did not depend on the use of devices in its creation, but rather
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`if there was the presence of at least minimal human creative effort at the time it was produced.
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`The USCO failed to recognize that the language cited from CONTU did not specifically address
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`works created solely by computers as it was assumed it was not possible for a machine to create
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`autonomously at the time.
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`27.
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`However, it stated that CONTU’s position mirrored that of the USCO. The USCO
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`stated that the practice manual for the office — the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office
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`Practices — “has long mandated human authorship for registration.” The original Compendium
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`implied that a work must owe its origin to a human being, and that materials provided solely by
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`nature, by plants, or by animals were not copyrightable. Following that reasoning, the current
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`Compendium provided examples of works that were not copyrightable, including automated
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`computer translations, derivative sound recordings made purely by mechanical processes, human
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`performance required for choreography and pantomimes, machine produced expression in visual
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`arts works such as linoleum flooring, x-rays and other medical imaging, or hypertext markup
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`language if created by a human being rather than a website design program.
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`28.
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`Finally, the USCO stated that its position was supported by a recent report from
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`the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, where it sought public comment on whether a “work
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`produced by an AI algorithm or process, without the involvement of a natural person…
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`qualif[ies] as a work of authorship under the Copyright Act.” It indicated in its report that the
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`“vast majority of commenters acknowledged that existing law does not permit a non-human to be
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`an author [and that] this should remain the law.” U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
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`PUBLIC VIEWS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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`POLICY at 19-21 (2020).
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`III. USCO’S DENIAL OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION IS AN ARBITRARY AND
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`CAPRICIOUS AGENCY ACTION AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
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`A. The Plain Language of the Act Allows Protection of AI-Generated Works
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`29.
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`The Act affords protection to “original works of authorship,” a phrase which
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`Congress left purposely undefined and for interpretation by the courts. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). At no
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`point does the Act limit authorship to natural persons. Indeed, corporations and other non-human
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`entities have been considered “authors” for purposes of the Act for over a century. 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 101.
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`30.
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`The bar for originality is low. “To qualify for copyright protection, a work must
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`be original to the author.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.,
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`499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citation omitted). “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means
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`only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
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`works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id., at 345 (citation
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`omitted).
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`31.
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`The Work meets all the requirements for copyright protection. Indeed, if Dr.
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`Thaler had submitted the same AI-Generated Work with his company listed as the author, USCO
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`would have granted his company a registration, and no one would have known the work was AI-
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`Generated. The USCO argues that this is not cause for concern because “[a]pplicants who
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`mislead the Office do so at their peril.” But contrary to the USCO’s argument, the USCO does
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`not test, or have a means to test, to see if a registration is being submitted for an AI-Generated
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`Work, and USCO does not require, at least for works made for hire, that a human author be
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`disclosed in a registration filing. It is very likely that other applicants have successfully
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`registered copyright in AI-Generated Works without exhibiting Dr. Thaler’s level of
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`transparency.
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`32.
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`Copyright protection for AI-Generated Works is entirely consistent with the text
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`and purpose of the Act. It would promote the use and development of creative AIs which would
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`generate socially and commercially valuable works, and it would protect the moral rights of
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`human authors by preventing someone from falsely claiming credit for work done by a machine.
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`B. No Case Law Stands for the Proposition that an AI-Generated Work is
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`Ineligible for Copyright Protection
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`33.
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`The USCO cites to In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) and to
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`Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) in support of its Human
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`Authorship Requirement. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition,
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`Section 306. This Human Authorship Requirement, of course, is a Copyright Office policy—not
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`something created by statute. In fact, it is contrary to statute.
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`34.
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`Certainly, any number of judicial opinions have discussed originality in the
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`context of human-centric mental activity, but none of those opinions have considered an AI-
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`Generated Work. It is hardly surprising that judgments from the Gilded Age would fail to
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`consider the possibility of AI stepping into the shoes of a person and generating something
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`creative. Dicta from such cases should therefore not be taken out of context to create a blanket
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`prohibition on an entire field of publicly beneficial activity.
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`35.
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`The appropriate takeaway from Burrow-Giles—which involved the Supreme
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`Court holding for the first time that a photograph was eligible for copyright protection—is not
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`that an AI cannot be an author, but rather that our courts have a long history of purposive
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`interpretation of the Act in light of technological evolution.
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`36.
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`Technology has advanced considerably since CONTU determined that AI-
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`Generated Works were too speculative to consider in 1979. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW
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`TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
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`USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 44 (1979). Today, AI can autonomously create works
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`indistinguishable from a human being in terms of original and creative output. Applications
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`allowing users and companies to utilize such AI to create AI-Generated Works are commercially
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`available and rapidly increasing in use. See, e.g., https://aiartists.org/ai-generated-art-tools.; see,
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`generally, https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/. AI, including Dr. Thaler’s AI, are capable of
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`producing creative output that, at least functionally, is equivalent to “the fruits of intellectual
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`labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
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`82, 94 (1879).
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`37.
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`Courts associating mental activity with originality have not been using terms
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`precisely or meaningfully in the context of AI-Generated Works. The problem of speaking
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`precisely about such concepts with regards to computers was identified by Alan Turing, one of
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`the founders of computer science, who in 1950 considered the question, “Can machines think?”
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`See A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433–51 (1950). He
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`found the question to be ambiguous, and the term “think” to be unscientific in its colloquial
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`usage. Id.
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`38.
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`Turing decided the better question to address was whether an individual could tell
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`the difference between responses from a computer and an individual; rather than asking whether
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`machines “think,” he asked whether machines could perform in the same manner as thinking
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`entities. Id. Turing’s analysis from more than sixty years ago demonstrates that a test based on
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`whether a machine is exhibiting “mental activity” would be ambiguous, challenging to
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`administer, and of uncertain utility. The real question is whether a machine can make something
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`indistinguishable from a person for purposes of copyright protection. The answer, as an
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`undisputed factual matter here, is yes.
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`39.
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`In addition to cases where courts have used human-centric language, USCO cites
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`to two 9th Circuit cases it argues involves facts analogous to AI activity: animal art and works
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`allegedly authored by spirits. First, neither is an appropriate analogy to AI-Generated Works.
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`Second, neither case stands for the proposition claimed by USCO.
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`40.
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`Naruto v. Slater involved a series of images that a black crested black macaque,
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`named Naruto, took of himself in Indonesia. Naruto, by and through his Next Friends, People for
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`the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (PETA), sued David Slater, who owned the camera used
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`by Naruto and who subsequently used Naruto’s photographs without permission. While USCO is
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`correct that the case was dismissed, this was not based on the USCO’s Human Authorship
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`Requirement. The case was dismissed based on standing. As the 9th Circuit Court articulated,
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`“We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for
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`damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s
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`precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the
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`United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since
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`they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the
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`judgment of the district court.” Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018).
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`41.
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`The present case, unlike Naruto, involves a human being suing for his ownership
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`rights to property made by his machine. There is clearly no standing issue of the sort at issue in
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`Naruto. If anything, Naruto emphasizes the importance of a purposive approach to statutory
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`interpretation rather than a hyper-literal, textualist approach combined with over-reliance on
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`dicta. Because, of course, if the 9th Circuit had literally intended for animals to be unable to sue
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`under the Act, such a holding would prohibit many lawsuits. Human beings are, obviously,
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`animals.
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`42.
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`USCO also cites to, Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
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`1997), which involved a book allegedly authored in part by a spiritual being. While a very
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`interesting case in its own right and for a variety of reasons unrelated to AI-Generated Works,
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`the 9th Circuit found that the book was protected by copyright regardless of any spiritual
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`influences. “For copyright purposes, however, a work is copyrightable if copyrightability is
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`claimed by the first human beings who compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged the Urantia
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`teachings, ‘in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
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`authorship.’” Id. at 958. “We hold that the human selection and arrangement of the revelations in
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`this case could not have been so ‘mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.’
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`We conclude, therefore, that the ‘extremely low’ threshold level of creativity required for
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`copyright protection has been met in this case. Id. at 959 (citing Feist, supra, 499 at 345 (“The
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`vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no
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`matter how crude, humble, or obvious it might be.’”)
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`43.
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`The 9th Circuit even noted that, “The copyright laws, of course, do not expressly
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`require ‘human’ authorship, and considerable controversy has arisen in recent years over the
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`copyrightability of [AI-Generated Works].” Id. at 958. Without addressing the protectability of
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`AI-Generated Works, the 9th Circuit held that, “[a]t the very least, for a worldly entity to be
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`guilty of infringing a copyright, that entity must have copied something created by another
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`worldly entity.” Id. at 958. The present case lacks, on information and belief, any divine
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`intervention.
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`44.
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`There is nothing mystical about AI-Generated Works—Dr. Thaler’s AI is the
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`result of decades of his research and investment. Investment which the Act is intended to
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`promote, along with the distribution of creative works. “Nothing in the text of the Copyright
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`Clause confines the “Progress of Science” exclusively to “incentives for creation.” Golan v.
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`Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). In Golan, the Supreme Court notes that inducing the dissemination
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`of works by itself is an appropriate means to promote science.
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`C. Dr. Thaler is Entitled to The Work Under Common Law Principles of
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`Property Ownership Including Accession and First Possession
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`45.
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`Copyright in a work can initially vest in an author. “Copyright in a work protected
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`under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). However,
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`it is often the case that copyright in a work will instead initially vest in an author’s employer, or
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`in a party for whom a work was prepared. “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
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`other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
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`and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
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`owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). In addition, the ownership
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`of copyright may be transferred by operation of law. “The ownership of a copyright may be
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`transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be
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`bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”
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`17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
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`46.
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`An AI is not a legal person and does not have rights. It is therefore not possible
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`for an AI to “own” intellectual property. An AI that creates an AI-Generated Work does not do
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`so as a legal “employee” per se. It does so, at least in the present case, in its capacity as personal
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`property.
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`47.
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`Dr. Thaler owns and operates the AI which created The Work. He is therefore
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`entitled to property created by his AI under principles and rules of property ownership including
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`accession and first possession.
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`48.
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`It is generally the case that where property creates additional property, the owner
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`of the original property is entitled to the subsequent property. This rule, sometimes referred to as
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`accession, applies in a variety of contexts. If a person owns a cow that births a calf, the cow’s
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`owner becomes calf’s owner. If a person owns a fruit tree that bears fruit, the tree’s owner owns
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`the fruit. The tree owner derives title to the fruit through the tree, but this does not require the
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`tree to execute a written document that transfers title to the fruit—the title to the fruit initially
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`vests in the tree’s owner by virtue of her relationship to the fruit tree.1 See generally Thomas W.
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`Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS, 459-505
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`(2009).
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`1 In some cases, third parties may have conflicting entitlement claims, such as a party picking
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`fruit, but there are no conflicting claims to entitlement in the present case. Dr. Thaler is the only
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`possible owner of The Work.
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`49.
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`Here, Dr. Thaler’s AI generated a piece of intellectual property that Dr. Thaler
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`owns because he owns the AI. If the AI had been a 3D printer that created a physical painting of
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`The Work, Dr. Thaler would own that painting as personal property. There is no reason why Dr.
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`Thaler should be any less entitled to the property in a digital painting made by his AI.
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`50.
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`Alternately, or in addition, if the Court holds that an AI-Generated Work is indeed
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`proper subject matter for copyright protection, then Dr. Thaler owns copyright in The Work by
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`virtue of being the first party to possess it. “[T]he common and civil law (both of which accept
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`the desirability of private ownership) have responded with the proposition that the taking
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`possession of unowned things is the only possible way to acquire ownership of them.” Richard
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`A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Georgia Law Review 1221, 1222 (1979). The rule
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`of first possession is simple, but like accession, foundational to functioning systems of private
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`property. If the AI made a piece of property, and if no other party was entitled to ownership by
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`virtue of their relationship to the AI, then The Work was unowned property which Dr. Thaler
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`took title to by virtue of first possession.
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`51.
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`Although the work for hire doctrine provides one statutory mechanism for a party
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`other than an author to claim initial ownership, nowhere does the Act prohibit other ownership
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`mechanisms including pursuant to common law rules of entitlement.
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`D. Dr. Thaler is Also Entitled to The Work Under the Work for Hire Doctrine
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`52. While an AI is not an employee, the Work for Hire Doctrine is sufficiently
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`flexible to apply in this case. Dr. Thaler built and controlled the AI which generated The Work,
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`The Work was only created by the AI at Dr. Thaler’s insistence, and The Work only exists due to
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`Dr. Thaler’s investment.
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`53.
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`The Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
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`730 (1989) identified factors that characterize an employment relationship under agency law.
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`Those factors, including the employer’s control over the work, control over the employee, and
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`the status and conduct of an employee, all weigh heavily in favor of The Work being treated as a
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`work for hire. Id., at 751-752. The AI is controlled by Dr. Thaler, the AI only operates at Dr.
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`Thaler’s direction, and the AI is owned as property by Dr. Thaler.
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`54.
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`The central concern with overapplication of the work for hire doctrine is that it
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`has the potential to exploit human authors. Employers might acquire copyrights not
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`contemplated at the time of contracting and which would not be reflected in the agreed-upon
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`price for employment or a work. See, e.g., Anne Marie Hill, Work for Hire Definition in the
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`Copyright Act of 1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Works, 74 Cornell L.
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`Rev. 559, 569 (1989). Here, where the author is a machine that has no legal rights, there can be
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`no concern about exploitation.
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`55.
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`In addition to works created within the scope of employment, certain works
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`created by independent contractors are also considered works-for-hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101. This
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`requires that the parties “expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
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`shall be considered a work for hire.” Id. However, that requirement was again motivated by the
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`desire to protect human authors. See, e.g., Anne Marie Hill, Work for Hire Definition in the
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`Copyright Act of 1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Works, 74 Cornell L.
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`Rev. 559, 569 (1989). In this case, again, The Work was created by the AI while the AI was
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`under his control and at Dr. Thaler’s request and expense. In the case of an AI-Generated Work,
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`because an AI has no rights to protect, there is no need for a written instrument for its benefit.
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`56. While an AI is neither a legal employee nor an independent contractor capable of
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`executing a contract, it functionally behaves as an employee or independent contractor in
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`creating AI-Generated Works.
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`E. AI Authorship is Consistent with the Purpose of the Act and the
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`Constitution
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`57.
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`It is important to interpret the Act consistent with its purpose and with the
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`Constitution. Copyright protection is intended to promote the creation of socially valuable works.
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`It is “intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without
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`burden-some requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or
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`artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.’” Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36.
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`It is also intended to promote dissemination of those works. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
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`873, 888 (2012). The Copyright Clause of the Constitution likewise is intended to promote the
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`creation and dissemination of new works. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution provides for
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`Copyright protection, “[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit
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`of the public, such rights are given.” H.R. Rep. No 60-2222, at 7 (2d Sess. 1909).
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`58.
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`Allowing protection of AI-Generated Works is required by the plain language of
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`the Act. In 1973, the Supreme Court noted that the terms “Writings” and “Authors,” have “not
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`been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the
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`broad scope of constitutional principles.” Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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`59.
`
`The Supreme Court has also articulated, “[w]hen technological change has
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`rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of its basic
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`purpose.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). For instance, in
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`Aiken, the issue was whether playing a radio in a restaurant constituted a performance and thus
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`an infringement. The meaning of performance was therefore ambiguous given the technology
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`invented after the 1909 Copyright Act. The Supreme Court held that playing a radio in a
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`restaurant was not a “performance.” Id., at 162. This was because of a simple logic that a passive
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`listener cannot be a performer, and “those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not
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`infringe.” Id., at 159 (citation omitted).
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`60.
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`The Supreme Court has directly stated that “our inquiry cannot be limited to
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`ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the
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`development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here.” Fort. Corp. v. United
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`Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968). Thus, “[w]e must read the statutory language
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`of 60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change.” Id. In doing so, the Supreme Court
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`defined an airing over its airwaves as a “performance” of copyright work. Id. Like Aiken, the
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`court looked at the actual relationship between performers and listeners, to essentially determine
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`what was going on within the ambit of the Act.
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`CAUSES OF ACTION
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`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
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`(Admin