Case 1:21-cv-02551-APM Document 30 Filed 11/10/22 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`STEVEN LEONEL ARIAS,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`_________________________________________ )
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`Case No. 21-cv-02551 (APM)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`I.
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`Plaintiff Steven Leonel Arias, also known as “2dirtyy,” is a music producer and composer.
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`Since 2017, Plaintiff has created musical works both individually and in collaboration with other
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`musical artists, including Malik Lynch, also known as “Mak Sauce.” Lynch is signed to Def Jam
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`Recordings, which is owned by Defendant Universal Music Group, Inc. (“UMG”). Plaintiff does
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`not allege that he is signed to any recording group. This case arises from an effort at musical
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`collaboration between Plaintiff and Lynch. On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff created a “musical beat”
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`entitled Suger, which Lynch requested to use in his own composition. Plaintiff “acquiesced” to
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`Lynch’s request, and the resulting composition, Good Morning, was released on June 23, 2019.
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`Later that year, in December 2019, Plaintiff received a contract from Def Jam Recordings
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`for his signature. The contract designated Plaintiff as “the publisher, track engineer, and the mix
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`engineer for the ‘Good Morning’ song project.” The contract also provided that Plaintiff would
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`receive $250 from Def Jam Recordings in return for his contribution to Good Morning. Plaintiff
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`signed the documents the day he received them, at age 17.
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`A second work incorporating Suger entitled Good Morning Remix was released on May 8,
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`2020, and featured on Lynch’s album. That day, Plaintiff contacted the UMG Licensing and
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`Copyright Department to “inquire[] about the publishing rights and song splits associated with the
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`‘Good Morning’ and ‘Good Morning Remix’ records” and requested both “an accurate accounting
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`for royalties payments” and “a full audit.” UMG failed to provide “a cogent answer to [Plaintiff’s]
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`accounting inquiry for months” and, eventually, Plaintiff “wished to disaffirm his contract with
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`[UMG].” Plaintiff applied to register the copyright for Suger, and the United States Copyright and
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`Trademark Office “received” his application on June 18, 2021. Plaintiff subsequently filed this
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`suit.
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`Plaintiff asserts claims of direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement under
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`the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501. Am. Compl., ECF No. 16, ¶¶ 45–46. Plaintiff brings
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`all infringement claims against five music industry Defendants: (1) UMG; (2) Universal Music
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`Group Publishing (“UMG Publishing”), which is part of UMG; (3) Vydia, Inc. (“Vydia”); (4) Sony
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`Music Publishing; and (5) Roman Alexander Publishing, Inc. (“Roman Alexander”).1 Id. ¶¶ 3–7.
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`Before the court are two motions to dismiss, the first filed jointly by Defendants UMG, UMG
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`Publishing, and Sony Music Publishing, and the second filed by Defendant Vydia. Defs.’ Mot. to
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`Dismiss, ECF No. 26 [hereinafter UMG & Sony Mot.]; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28
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`[hereinafter Vydia Mot.].
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`As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction with respect to
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`Defendant Vydia, and Defendants UMG Publishing and Sony Music Publishing are not separate
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`legal entities subject to suit. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not stated plausible claims for direct,
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`1 Because Defendant Roman Alexander has not moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, this Memorandum Opinion
`does not address Plaintiff’s claims against Roman Alexander.
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`Case 1:21-cv-02551-APM Document 30 Filed 11/10/22 Page 3 of 14
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`contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement against the remaining Defendant, UMG. For the
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`reasons that follow, both motions to dismiss are granted in full.
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`II.
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`The court first addresses the issue of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Vydia in the
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`District of Columbia. Vydia argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish that this court has personal
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`jurisdiction over Vydia and seeks dismissal of all claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).2 Vydia Mot., Def.’s Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss,
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`ECF No. 28-1 [hereinafter Vydia Mem.], at 1, 5–7.
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`“A complaint must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
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`jurisdiction,’” Miley v. Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Punta Cana, 537 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
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`2021) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)), and “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual
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`basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y,
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`894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Duarte v. Nolan, 190 F. Supp. 3d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2016).
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`A plaintiff meets this burden by “alleging specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum.”
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`Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).
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`Any “factual discrepancies appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.”
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`Crane, 894 F.2d at 456; Capel v. Capel, 272 F. Supp. 3d 33, 38 (D.D.C. 2017). However, a
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`plaintiff cannot “rely on conclusory allegations” and cannot “aggregate factual allegations
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`concerning multiple defendants in order to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over any individual
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`defendant.” Duarte, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`2 Because Plaintiff has not opposed Vydia’s motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s complaint does not address the issue of
`personal jurisdiction over Vydia, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9, the court addresses this issue based on Vydia’s motion to
`dismiss.
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`3
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`A plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant by demonstrating either
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`general or specific jurisdiction. Miley, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 5–6. General jurisdiction requires that
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`the defendant have “continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state such that the
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`defendant is essentially at home in the forum.” Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specific
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`jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff’s “claim is related to or arises out of the non-resident
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`defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Vasquez v. Whole Foods Mkt., 302 F. Supp. 3d 36, 46
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`(D.D.C. 2018).
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`Based on the parties’ allegations, the parties’ factual representations, and its own review
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`of the record, the court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden. Plaintiff characterizes Vydia as
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`“an end-to-end music technology platform that provides record labels and managers with the
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`infrastructure and tools to power their business” and that “offers supply chain, global distribution,
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`analytics, rights management, payments, detailed revenue reporting, and marketing.” Am. Compl.
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`¶ 5. Plaintiff does not, however, state any connection between Vydia and the District of Columbia.
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`By contrast, Vydia asserts that it is “neither ‘at home’ in the District of Columbia nor has
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`contacts with the District of Columbia relating to the instant dispute.” Vydia Mem. at 1. Plaintiff
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`has made no competing factual allegations here and therefore has not met his burden to establish
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`personal jurisdiction over Vydia. See Crane, 894 F.2d at 456. Vydia’s motion to dismiss for lack
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`of personal jurisdiction is therefore granted.
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`III.
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`The court next addresses Defendants UMG Publishing and Sony Music Publishing’s
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`contention that “they are not legal entities and thus cannot be sued.” Defs.’ Mot., Defs.’ Statement
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`of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26-1 [hereinafter UMG & Sony Mem.], at 1.
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`Specifically, Defendants argue that “Universal Music Group Publishing is a registered trade name
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`of various corporate entities” and that “Sony Music Publishing is not an existing legal entity
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`subject to suit.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends that “Sony Music Publishing (US) LLC (‘Sony’) . . . is
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`an active domestic limited liability company in the State of Delaware” as well as “an active foreign
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`corporation” in New York State, and therefore “Sony is indeed a legal entity in accordance with
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`both Delaware and New York laws and regulations.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
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`No. 27 [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.], at 2–3.3 Plaintiff does not address the question of whether UMG
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`Publishing is a legal entity. Id.
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`Courts in this District have previously declined to permit suits to proceed against parties
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`that are not “separate legal entit[ies],” a category that includes parties that are merely “trade
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`name[s]” of existing legal entities. Baylor v. Michell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 55 F. Supp. 3d
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`43, 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2014); Evans v. Washington Ctr. for Internships & Acad. Seminars,
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`587 F. Supp. 2d 148, 152 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that defendant “cannot be sued because it is
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`merely a trade name and not a legal entity”). That principle applies here. With respect to
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`Defendant UMG Publishing, Plaintiff’s allegation
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`that UMG Publishing “is part
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`of . . . [Defendant] Universal Music Group” is consistent with UMG Publishing’s contention that
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`it is not a separate legal entity and thus not subject to suit. Am. Compl. ¶ 4; UMG & Sony Mem.
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`at 5. Plaintiff also does not dispute that UMG Publishing is merely a trade name. Pl.’s Resp. at
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`2–3; Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29 [hereinafter UMG & Sony
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`Reply], at 1.
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`Similarly, Plaintiff has described Defendant Sony Music Publishing as “part of the Sony
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`Music Group owned by Sony Entertainment,” Am. Compl. ¶ 6, and argues that “Sony Music
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`Publishing (US) LLC” is a separate legal entity, Pl.’s Resp. at 2–3. But that is irrelevant because
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`3 The court uses ECF pagination in all references to this document.
`5
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`“Sony Music Publishing (US) LLC” is a different entity than “Sony Music Publishing,” which is
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`the entity named in the complaint. Am. Compl. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Resp. at 2–3. Plaintiff does not dispute
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`that named defendant Sony Music Publishing is not a separate legal entity. Accordingly, both
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`UMG Publishing and Sony Music Publishing “cannot be sued because [they are] . . . not . . . legal
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`entit[ies],” and they must be dismissed from this suit. See Evans, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
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`IV.
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`That leaves only UMG as a defendant. UMG contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a
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`claim for direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement. UMG & Sony Mem. at 9–12.
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`The court agrees. In addition, although the court already has held that Defendants Vydia, UMG
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`Publishing, and Sony Music Publishing are not subject to suit in this court, the court also finds that
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`Plaintiff has failed to state claims against them.
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`A.
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`“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
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`accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of
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`Health & Hum. Servs., 968 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180–81 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). “In other words, a plaintiff must put forth factual content that allows the court to draw
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`the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Graves v.
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`Callahan, 253 F. Supp. 3d 330, 332 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sanchez v.
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`Off. of State Superintendent of Educ., 45 F.4th 388, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2022). “[W]here a document
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`is referred to in the complaint and is central to plaintiff’s claim, such a document attached to the
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`motion papers may be considered . . . .” Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C.
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`1999). In assessing a complaint’s sufficiency, the court “must grant plaintiff the benefit of all
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`inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Graves, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 332 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must still, however, meet the minimum standard of
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`“present[ing] a claim on which the Court can grant relief,” and the court “need not accept as true
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`a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, nor inferences that are unsupported by the facts
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`set out in the complaint.” Davis, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 180–81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`B.
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`Licensing.
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` The court begins by assessing the effect of the written contract
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`(“the Agreement”) that Plaintiff undisputedly signed governing his participation in the production
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`of Good Morning. UMG & Sony Mot., Ex. A, ECF No. 26-2 [hereinafter UMG & Sony Ex. A],
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`at 2–3;4 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 32, 42 (conceding that Plaintiff “signed” documents to form a “contract
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`with Universal Music Group”5); UMG & Sony Mem. at 8 (stating that the Agreement is “a valid
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`and existing contract to which Plaintiff is a party”). The Agreement provided, among other things,
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`that (1) Plaintiff entered into a “producer agreement” to provide “producing services on [Lynch’s]
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`one . . . master recording entitled ‘Good Morning’”; (2) no “compositions . . . contained in or used
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`in connection with the Master[]”—that is, Good Morning—would “violate or infringe upon the
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`rights of any person or entity”; (3) if copyrighted works were incorporated into the Master,
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`Plaintiff would obtain “written consent of the applicable copyright proprietors . . . on terms which
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`grant[ed] UMG and its designees the unrestricted right to exploit the Master[]”; (4) the Master
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`itself would “from the inception of creation, constitute [a] ‘work[] made for hire’ for UMG”; and
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`(5) Plaintiff would receive “good and valuable consideration including in the form of payment in
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`the amount of [$250.00].” UMG & Sony Ex. A at 2.
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`4 The court uses ECF pagination in all references to this exhibit.
`5 The court accepts as true Plaintiff’s representation that the contract was formed “with Universal Music Group” but
`notes that the contract itself names “Def Jam Recordings, a division of UMG Recordings, Inc.” Am. Compl. ¶ 42;
`UMG & Sony Ex. A at 2.
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`UMG argues that, because Good Morning is “a work for hire,” UMG owns the copyright
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`in Good Morning. UMG & Sony Mem. at 13. Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed a “contract
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`with Universal Music Group,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 32, 42; Pl.’s Resp. at 4–5, which included a
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`“work made for hire” provision, UMG & Sony Ex. A at 2. The term “work made for hire” includes
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`“a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . . if the
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`parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
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`work made for hire.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
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`person for whom the work was prepared . . . unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in
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`a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” Id.
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`§ 201(b); see MOB Music Publ’g v. Zanzibar on the Waterfront, 698 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 n.3
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`(D.D.C. 2010) (noting that “[t]he work for hire doctrine is an exception to the general rule in
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`copyright that the author is the original owner of a work”). By signing the Agreement, Plaintiff
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`“expressly agree[d]” that Good Morning would “be considered a work made for hire.”
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`See 17 U.S.C. § 101; UMG & Sony Ex. A at 2 (“The Master(s) (excluding the underlying
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`compositions) shall, from the inception of creation, constitute ‘work(s) made for hire’ for
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`UMG . . . .”). Because UMG is the party “for whom [Good Morning] was prepared,” UMG—and
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`not Plaintiff—owns “all of the rights comprised in the copyright” of Good Morning, see 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 201(b), and Plaintiff cannot successfully assert a claim of infringement.
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`UMG further argues that, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that Good Morning or Good
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`Morning Remix infringed Suger, the Agreement “granted UMG Recordings, Inc. a license to use
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`Suger,” including “the right to use Suger in those masters and to exploit them as it sees fit.” UMG
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`& Sony Mem. at 9. A plaintiff who grants a license for “distribut[ion]” of his musical work(s)
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`may not bring copyright claims arising from that distribution. Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound,
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`77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 1999). The Agreement constituted such a license. In the Agreement,
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`Plaintiff affirmed that the use of any works incorporated into Good Morning would not infringe
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`his (or anyone else’s) rights and, in the alternative, affirmed that no copyrighted works would be
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`used “without the prior written consent of the applicable copyright proprietors . . . on terms which
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`grant[ed] UMG and its designees the unrestricted right to exploit the Master[].” UMG & Sony Ex.
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`A at 2. So, when Plaintiff agreed to incorporate Suger into Good Morning, he did so subject to
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`these terms. “Plaintiff’s grant of the . . . license[]” thus “bars him from asserting that [Defendant
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`UMG] violated his copyright[].” Staggers, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
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`Infancy. Plaintiff does not read the Agreement differently than UMG. He argues instead
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`that he is no longer bound by the Agreement because he “wished to disaffirm his contract” on the
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`grounds that he entered into the contract during his infancy and that Defendant UMG acted in “bad
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`faith” in responding to his “accounting inquiries.” Am. Compl. ¶ 42. Defendants do not dispute
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`that Plaintiff was a minor when he signed the Agreement or that contracts with minors are voidable
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`under District of Columbia law; they do dispute that Plaintiff actually disaffirmed or may now
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`disaffirm the Agreement. UMG & Sony Mem. at 17–19.
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`In the District of Columbia, “[c]ontracts with infants are generally voidable not void; and
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`an infant, upon becoming of age, may either affirm or avoid his contract” within “reasonable time.”
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`Gannon v. Manning, 42 App. D.C. 206, 209, 211–12 (D.C. 1914); D.C. CODE § 46-101 (setting
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`18 as the age of majority in the District of Columbia). Plaintiff’s claim that he has disaffirmed this
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`contract—even viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to him—fails for two related
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`reasons. First, Plaintiff alleges only that he “wished to disaffirm his contract”—not that he actually
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`did so. Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (emphasis added). There is no basis to infer that Plaintiff communicated
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`his disaffirmance to Defendant UMG at any time before filing suit. See Gannon, 42 App. D.C. at
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`211–12 (acknowledging disaffirmance where plaintiffs “gave notice of their election to disaffirm”
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`(emphasis added)); MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 694 (1897) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time
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`after reaching full age [the plaintiff] made and placed upon record an absolute disclaimer of the
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`alleged contract . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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`Second, without an explicit allegation of disaffirmance, there is no basis for the court to
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`determine whether Plaintiff disaffirmed within a reasonable time. To the extent that Plaintiff’s
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`filing of this lawsuit on August 23, 2021, can be viewed as an attempt at disaffirmance, it comes
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`too late. The filing occurred almost 11 months after Plaintiff turned 18 on September 29, 2020,
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`which is not within a “reasonable time.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30; Gannon, 42 App. D.C. at 211–12
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`(finding that approximately 18 days constituted a “reasonable time”). Plaintiff’s conclusory
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`assertion in his Prayer for Relief that the contract was “disaffirmed at a reasonable time before
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`[Plaintiff] reached his age of majority”6 cannot overcome the absence of relevant factual
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`allegations in the complaint. Am. Compl. ¶ A; Davis, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 180. The court finds that
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`the Agreement granted a license to UMG and that Plaintiff did not disaffirm the Agreement within
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`a reasonable amount of time after becoming of age. Accordingly, UMG’s motion to dismiss for
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`failure to state a claim is granted.
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`C.
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`Direct Copyright Infringement. Even independent of the Agreement, Plaintiff has failed
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`to state a claim for direct copyright infringement. Plaintiff asserts that “[e]ach Defendant is strictly
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`6 Plaintiff includes a slightly different version of this factual allegation in his response to Defendants’ motion to
`dismiss: “To his dissatisfaction, [Plaintiff] disaffirmed his contract with Defendant at this time as Defendant acted in
`bad faith by not resolving [Plaintiff’s] accounting inquiries.” Pl.’s Resp. at 5. However, this alternative phrasing, to
`the extent that it provides any clarification, similarly cannot overcome the absence of relevant factual allegations in
`the complaint. See Boyer v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 21-cv-2684 (TSC), 2022 WL 5241848, at *1
`(D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022) (“[I]t is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot remedy pleading defects with new facts stated for the
`first time in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”); Demissie v. Starbucks Corp. Off. & Headquarters, 19 F. Supp. 3d
`321, 325 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014).
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`liable for infringement as they worked in concert with each other to reproduce, distribute, display,
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`or license the reproduction, distribution, and/or display of [Plaintiff’s] registered works.”
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`Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendants counter that “Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the elements
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`of direct copyright infringement” because he “offers no facts or details regarding the alleged direct
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`infringement,” rendering his “claim . . . entirely conclusory.” UMG & Sony Mem. at 9–10; Vydia
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`Mem. at 7.
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`The court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss by
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`“lumping all the defendants together . . . and providing no factual basis to distinguish their
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`conduct.” Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2014)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted); Estate of Mickens v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 18-cv-928
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`(KBJ), 2021 WL 3418955, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2021). With the exception of Defendant UMG,
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`Plaintiff mentions the Defendants individually only in the “Parties” section of the complaint, which
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`provides a brief description of the general business of each Defendant but no reference to any
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`individual Defendant’s alleged conduct with respect to Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–7. The few
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`factual allegations that follow in the complaint refer to Defendants as an undifferentiated group.
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`Id. ¶¶ 1, 18–19. Because these allegations “refer to ‘Defendants’ collectively without specifying
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`which of [the Defendants] allegedly took each action described in the complaint,” they are
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`insufficient to maintain a direct infringement claim against Defendants. Estate of Mickens, 2021
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`WL 3418955, at *4. Nor do conclusory statements applied to all Defendants substitute for
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`individualized factual allegations. Davis, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 180; see Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (listing the
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`elements of a copyright infringement claim and attributing them to “[e]ach Defendant”).
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`Furthermore, even Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations against Defendant UMG fail to
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`sufficiently allege a violation. “In the music performance context,” direct copyright infringement
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`requires: “(1) originality and authorship of the compositions involved; (2) compliance with the
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`formalities required to secure a copyright; (3) plaintiff’s ownership of the copyright; and
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`(4) defendant’s public performance of the compositions.” MOB Music Publ’g, 698 F. Supp. 2d at
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`202. Plaintiff has successfully pleaded the first requirement, his “originality and authorship” of
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`Suger. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11.
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`However, Plaintiff falters when he reaches the copyright-related requirements. Although
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`“[c]opyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the work,” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a),
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`an author must actually register the copyright before bringing a lawsuit for copyright infringement.
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`Buchanan v. Sony Music Ent., No. 18-cv-3028 (KBJ), 2020 WL 2735592, at *4–5 (D.D.C. May
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`26, 2020); Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2019) (explicitly
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`finding registration “only when the Copyright Office grants registration,” not merely upon
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`submission of application and fee). Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about June 18, 2021, the
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`United States Copyright and Trademark Office . . . received [his] application to register the
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`creative work for ‘Suger.’”7 Am. Compl. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Alleging receipt of an
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`application does not allege registration as would be required for Plaintiff’s claim to proceed.
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`Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 888; Buchanan, 2020 WL 2735592, at *5 (“The lack
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`of
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`any
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`allegation
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`regarding pre-suit
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`registration . . . compels
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`the
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`conclusion
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`that
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`the . . . infringement claims that relate to [Plaintiff’s] unregistered work[] must be dismissed for
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`7 In his Claims for Relief, Plaintiff rephrases this fact slightly: “On June 18, 2021, the United States Copyright Office
`accepted an application for copyright registration for the original work, ‘Suger’ by 2Dirtyy.” Am. Compl. ¶ 44. The
`court interprets this language as having the same meaning. Given that copyright registration processing time,
`depending on type of application, ranges from an average of 1.2 months to an average of 9.9 months, it appears
`unlikely that with this minor change in language Plaintiff intended to allege actual registration on the same date that
`Times, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
`his
`application was
`received.
`
`Registration
`Processing
`https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2022).
`12
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`Case 1:21-cv-02551-APM Document 30 Filed 11/10/22 Page 13 of 14
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`failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s direct
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`copyright infringement claim fails against all Defendants.
`
`D.
`
`
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`Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Infringement. Finally, the court addresses
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`Plaintiff’s claims for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against all Defendants.
`
`Plaintiff argues that “Defendants’ willful infringement has been undertaken knowingly, and with
`
`the intent to financially gain,” and that “Defendants have failed to exercise their right and ability
`
`to supervise persons within their control to prevent infringement, and they did so with the intent
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`to further their financial interest in the infringement of [Plaintiff’s] creative works.” Am. Compl.
`
`¶ 46. Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s claims are “utterly conclusory and so devoid of specific
`
`factual allegations . . . that [they] fail[] to meet even the liberal pleading standards required by
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`[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8.” UMG & Sony Mem. at 1, 11–12; Vydia Mem. at 7–8.
`
`Although the acts of contributory and vicarious infringement that Plaintiff alleges
`
`constitute two separate claims, the analysis for present purposes overlaps because “in neither case
`
`can liability attach absent an underlying act of infringement by a third-party.” Rundquist v.
`
`Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2011); Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp.
`
`2d 181, 186 (D.D.C. 2005) (requiring “knowledge” and “substantial participation by the
`
`defendant” in “direct infringement by a third party” to establish contributory infringement
`
`(emphasis added)); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
`
`(requiring that a defendant “profit[] from” and “declin[e] to exercise a right to stop or limit”
`
`infringement by a third party to establish vicarious infringement). Because infringement by a third
`
`party is a required element of both the contributory and vicarious infringement claims, Plaintiff
`
`must “plead[] [this] element[] with adequate factual support to state a claim to relief that is
`
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`Case 1:21-cv-02551-APM Document 30 Filed 11/10/22 Page 14 of 14
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`plausible on its face” in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See Sanchez, 45 F.4th at 395 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted).
`
`Plaintiff here has not identified which third party or parties provide a basis for his claims.
`
`Plaintiff comes closest when he states that “Defendants have failed to . . . supervise persons within
`
`their control to prevent infringement,” but Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations as to
`
`who these “persons” are and how they participated in infringement. Am. Compl. ¶ 46; Sanchez,
`
`45 F.4th at 395 (requiring “adequate factual support” for each element of a plaintiff’s claim).
`
`Plaintiff is, of course, entitled to “all reasonable inferences in [his] favor” in his effort to survive
`
`Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Sanchez, 45 F.4th at 395. But for the court to identify the relevant
`
`infringing third party here—and then attempt to determine whether that third party was plausibly
`
`responsible for the direct infringement required to support claims of contributory and vicarious
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`infringement—would be pure guesswork.
`
`V.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Defendants UMG, UMG Publishing, and Sony Music
`
`Publishing’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 26, and Defendant Vydia’s motion to dismiss,
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`ECF No. 28, are granted.
`
`
`
`Dated: November 10, 2022
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Amit P. Mehta
`United States District Court Judge
`
`
`
`14
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