Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 1 of 28
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`____________________________________
`
`)
`
`))
`
`Civil Action No. 06-700 (RCL)
`
`))
`
`)
`)
`)
`
`))
`
`ABDULWAHAB NATTAH,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GEORGE W. BUSH,
`President of the United States, et. al.,
`
`)
`Defendants.
`____________________________________)
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`Now before the Court comes three motions by plaintiff Abdulwahab Nattah: motion [47]
`
`for leave to file first amended complaint, motion [48] for leave to join additional defendants, and
`
`motion [48] to vacate this Court’s Order [32] granting dismissal to federal defendants.1 Also
`
`before the Court is Defendant L-3 Communications Titan Group’s (“Titan”)2 motion [38] to
`
`dismiss. Upon full consideration of the motions, opposition briefs, replies, the entire record
`
`herein, and applicable law, the Court finds that the motion for leave to file amended complaint
`
`will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, the motion to join additional defendants will be
`
`1 Plaintiff filed these three motions with the Court on November 28, 2007 as one
`continuous document without page numbers docketed at entry number [47]. When referring to
`these motions and their accompanying memoranda, the Court will reference “Docket Entry [47]”
`and refer to page numbers given by the ECF system.
`
`2 Subsequent to the events alleged in this case, L-3 Communications acquired the Titan
`Corporation. The successor entity is known as L-3 Titan Group.
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 2 of 28
`
`DENIED, the motion to vacate will be DENIED, and Titan’s motion to dismiss will be
`
`GRANTED.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`In January 2003, plaintiff Nattah, a dual citizen of Libya and the United States, began
`
`working as an employee of Titan as an Arabic linguist. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 97.) Although
`
`plaintiff makes reference to an employment contract signed January 17, 2003 (See id. ¶ 97), his
`
`employment offer letter, which Nattah signed on January 17, 2003, indicates that he would work
`
`in the capacity of an “at-will employee.” (See Ltr. from Williams to Nattah (Jan. 17, 2003), Ex.
`
`1 to Mot. to Dismiss.) According to Nattah, Titan contracted not to send Nattah to work in a war
`
`zone, promised that he would receive luxury accommodations in Kuwait, and agreed that he
`
`would only be terminated for one of three reasons. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 93–94.) Nattah states
`
`that he, relying upon these representations by Titan and those by President Bush regarding
`
`Iraq— including the representation that the war in Iraq would be swift and would not entail
`
`battling an insurgency—decided to accept Titan’s employment offer. (See id. ¶¶ 75–90, 96,
`
`139.)
`
`At some time in early 2003, Nattah began working for Titan in Kuwait. According to
`
`Nattah, as the United States was preparing to invade Iraq, Titan “sold plaintiff as a slave to the
`
`military.” (Id. ¶ 101.) At that time, “the U.S. military made plaintiff one of the first prisoner[s]
`
`of war.” (Id. ¶ 102.) The military then allegedly forced Nattah to work in Iraq against his will
`
`and he was deployed there as a military interpreter on March 20, 2003. (Id. ¶ 103.) Plaintiff
`
`contends that these events occurred because of the military’s secret agreement as to the “slave
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 3 of 28
`
`sale” with Titan “to trick plaintiff into staying in Kuwait” until war commenced in Iraq “at which
`
`time it would be impossible for plaintiff to leave the war zone.” (See Docket Entry [47] at 6.)
`
`Nattah states that he “objected to his confinement, but that neither the military nor Titan would
`
`agree to release him from bondage.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 103.)
`
`At some point during Nattah’s service in Iraq, he suffered a loss of all hearing in his left
`
`ear and partial hearing in his right ear, and required medical attention. (Id. ¶¶ 112–13, 118.)
`
`According to Nattah, he was sent to the American Army Hospital in Landstuhl, Germany and
`
`examined on May 16, 2003. (Id. ¶ 113.) Plaintiff next asserts that in June 2003, Rob Hansen,
`
`Deputy Director for Operations, indicated in a memo that Nattah needed to return to the United
`
`States, as he was on leave without pay as of May 12, 2003. (See id. ¶ 114.) Nattah felt that he
`
`needed to stay in Germany because “turbulence associated with a flight back to the United States
`
`would result in his death.” (Id. ¶ 115.) At this point, Mr. Hansen apparently communicated to
`
`Nattah that his employment was terminated. (Id.) Then, Nattah states that on June 21, 2003, two
`
`“thugs” entered his hospital room, assaulted him, and told him to gather his belongings so that he
`
`could be taken to a doctor. (See id. ¶¶ 116, 271.) Nattah asserts that the “hoodlums” attempted
`
`to abduct him to send him back to the United States. (Id.) Plaintiff then underwent surgeries on
`
`June 23 and July 8, 2003 that failed to improve his hearing problems. (See id. ¶¶ 117–18.)
`
`Ultimately Nattah contends that in August 2003, he received a letter confirming his termination
`
`from employment and stating no reason for the termination. (Id. ¶ 122.) In addition to plaintiff’s
`
`slavery and wrongful termination claims, he further alleges violations of several other United
`
`States laws, the Geneva Convention, the United Nations Charter, and provisions of Iraqi and
`
`Kuwaiti law. Further, Nattah seeks to hold Titan accountable for the manner in which it
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 4 of 28
`
`administered security clearance applications on behalf of its employees. (Id. ¶¶ 335–53.)
`
`On October 30, 2006, federal defendants filed a motion [22] to dismiss. Plaintiff, having
`
`received an extension of time [26] to file an opposition to the motion, failed to file such a brief.
`
`On January 30, 2007, the Court granted federal defendants’ motion and dismissed this case as it
`
`pertained to the federal defendants.3 Plaintiff asks this Court to clarify whether its Order [32]
`
`dismissing the case as to the federal defendants applied to his Bivens claim against six unknown
`
`military personnel or only to the three named federal defendants. (See Docket Entry [47] at 4.)
`
`In March 2007, Titan filed a motion [38] to dismiss. While that motion was pending, plaintiff,
`
`on November 28, 2007, filed his motion for leave to file amended complaint, motion to join
`
`additional parties, and motion to vacate the Court’s Order [32] granting dismissal as to the
`
`federal defendants. (See Docket Entry [47].) On March 24, 2008, plaintiff filed a notice [63]
`
`voluntarily dismissing his claims against President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick
`
`Cheney.
`
`II.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Clarification of this Court’s January 30, 2007 Order
`
`This Court’s January 30, 2007 Order dismissed claims only against the following federal
`
`defendants: President George W. Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, and former Secretary of
`
`Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The remaining defendants are Titan and “six unknown United States
`
`Government employees.”
`
`3 Plaintiff appealed the Order dismissing the case as to the federal defendants. The Court
`of Appeals ordered the appeal dismissed for lack of prosecution. (See Court of Appeals
`Mandate, Docket Entry [46].)
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 5 of 28
`
`B.
`
`Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
`
`1.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`Plaintiffs are permitted to amend a complaint once as a matter of right anytime “before
`
`being served with a responsive pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). This right to amend is
`
`generally absolute as long as no responsive pleading has been served. See James V. Hurson
`
`Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A motion to dismiss is not
`
`ordinarily considered a “responsive pleading.” See Bowden v. United States, 176 F.3d 552, 555
`
`(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir.
`
`1993)). Once such a pleading has been served, “leave of court or [ ] written consent of the
`
`adverse party” is required to amend a complaint. See Confederate Mem’l, 995 F.2d at 299
`
`(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
`
`2.
`
`Leave to Amend Shall be Granted in Part and Denied in Part
`
`The Court will evaluate the motion for leave to amend by dividing the named defendants
`
`in the proposed amended complaint into three groups: (1) defendants with claims pending
`
`against them at the time Nattah moved for leave to file; (2) defendants who were granted
`
`dismissal with prejudice; and, (3) new proposed defendants who were not included in the
`
`original complaint.
`
`i.
`
`Titan and Six Unknown Government Employees
`
`First, the Court finds that plaintiff’s amendment as to Titan and six unknown government
`
`employees will be granted as of right under Rule 15(a) because no responsive pleading has been
`
`filed. The proposed amended complaint will be deemed filed as the amended complaint as of
`
`November 28, 2007.
`
`5
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 6 of 28
`
`ii.
`
`Previously Dismissed Defendants
`
`a.
`
`Court Has Discretion
`
`The Court next examines Nattah’s motion for leave to amend as to federal defendants
`
`George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Robert Gates. Upon plaintiff’s notice [63] voluntarily
`
`dismissing his cause of action against President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, Secretary
`
`Gates is now the only previously dismissed defendant that plaintiff wishes to include as a named
`
`defendant. When the motion was filed, Nattah’s claims against Secretary Gates had been
`
`dismissed with prejudice.4 This Court agrees with the approach that “[w]hen a plaintiff’s first
`
`amended complaint asserts claims against defendants who have been dismissed from the suit,”
`
`courts have “discretion in denying amendment as to those defendants.” Johnson v. Dist. of
`
`Columbia, 244 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007) (Lamberth, J.); see Bancoult v. McNamara, 214 F.R.D.
`
`5, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting motion to amend complaint “as a matter of course” as to
`
`defendants against whom claims remained pending, but denying the motion as futile as to
`
`dismissed defendant); see also Cassell v. Michaux, 240 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1956)) (holding
`
`that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been
`
`dismissed with prejudice). Thus, plaintiff lost the ability to amend as a matter of course as to
`
`Secretary Gates when the Court entered its Order dismissing Nattah’s claims against him, and
`
`the Court has discretion in determining whether to permit amendment as to this federal
`
`defendant.
`
`4 The Court dismissed this action against Donald Rumsfeld, in his official capacity.
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Rumsfeld’s “successor is automatically
`substituted as a party.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates simply steps into Mr. Rumsfeld’s role
`as defendant. Thus, the Court’s dismissal of the action as to Mr. Rumsfeld applies equally to
`Secretary Gates.
`
`6
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 7 of 28
`
`b.
`
`Amendment Denied as Futile
`
`When a court has discretion, it “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED.
`
`R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). However, it is within a court’s discretion to deny leave to amend for
`
`“sufficient reason, such as ‘undue delay, bad faith, [ ] dilatory motive . . . repeated failure to cure
`
`deficiencies by [previous] amendments . . . [or] futility of amendment.’” Firestone v. Firestone,
`
`76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see
`
`Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding no abuse
`
`of discretion when district court denied leave to amend because additional claim would have
`
`been futile). A court may deny a motion to amend as futile “if the proposed claim would not
`
`survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099
`
`(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 181–82).
`
`For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Nattah’s proposed claims against
`
`Secretary Gates are futile; the Court, in its discretion, will deny Nattah’s motion for leave as to
`
`Secretary Gates. Despite Nattah’s assertions to the contrary, the proposed amended complaint
`
`does not assert a new factual basis for liability against Secretary Gates but rather relies on
`
`plaintiff’s same vague assertions that he was tricked into working for Titan in the Middle East by
`
`defendant’s false representations as to the nature of his work and as to whether the United States
`
`would ultimately invade Iraq in 2003. Nattah relies on these facts to support the many claims
`
`alleged in his proposed amended complaint. To the extent that plaintiff seeks damages against
`
`Secretary Gates in his official capacity,5 all of Nattah’s claims would fail to survive a motion to
`
`5 The proposed amended complaint lists Secretary Gates as a defendant in his official
`capacity. (See Am. Compl. at 1.) However, the document is at times unclear as to whether
`Secretary Gates is sued in his individual or official capacity. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (stating that
`several claims are asserted against Secretary Gates in his individual capacity).)
`7
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 8 of 28
`
`dismiss because the Government has not waived sovereign immunity. All suits against the
`
`United States are barred by sovereign immunity except in terms of explicit waiver of such
`
`immunity. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). And, Nattah’s claims against Secretary
`
`Gates in his official capacity are properly considered claims against the United States.6 Thus,
`
`sovereign immunity would bar Nattah’s claims against Secretary Gates in his official capacity.
`
`To the extent that plaintiff asserts a claim against Secretary Gates in his individual
`
`capacity, such a claim would also fail to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court recognizes that
`
`under Bivens, a cause of action may exist for a violations of a person’s constitutional rights. See
`
`Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
`
`However, such a suit is subject to the defense qualified immunity for claims against government
`
`officials. Government officials retain qualified immunity to the extent that, in the performance
`
`of discretionary functions, “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
`
`constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
`
`457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (citations omitted). Here, Secretary Gates would be shielded from
`
`liability because the nexus between his actions and plaintiff’s alleged harm has not been
`
`sufficiently plead. Plaintiff essentially alleges a foreign-policy conspiracy that indirectly led to
`
`his injuries. Such an assertion does not encroach upon an official’s qualified immunity. For
`
`these reasons, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend as to Secretary Gates.
`
`iii.
`
`Newly Named Defendants
`
`Finally, the Court turns to the motion to amend as to newly named defendants. Plaintiff’s
`
`6 Mere naming of individual defendants does not avoid the doctrine of sovereign
`immunity. See Saunders v. Reno, No. 93-cv-1829, 1993 WL 771009, at *1 & n.5 (D.D.C. Dec.
`20, 1993) (Lamberth, J.).
`
`8
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 9 of 28
`
`motion seeks to add the following individuals and entities to the original lawsuit: Francis
`
`Harvey, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the Army; “Curveball”; Dr. Ahmed
`
`Chalabi; the Iraqi National Congress Assembly Fund; the Iraqi National Congress Support
`
`Foundation; the Iraqi National Congress Defense Foundation, LLC; and, the Iraqi National
`
`Congress Action Foundation. (See Docket Entry [47] at 21–22.) Because plaintiff’s amended
`
`complaint does not adequately differentiate among the four Iraqi National Congress entities and
`
`appears to accuse each of the same causes of action, this Opinion will refer to the four entities
`
`collectively as “the INC.”
`
`a.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`“It is well accepted that a plaintiff may add new defendants in amending her complaint
`
`‘as a matter of course.’” Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 244 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2007)
`
`(Lamberth, J.) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), (c); 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
`
`MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1474 (1990)). However,
`
`“‘[t]he purpose of the amendment of right provision is to avoid judicial involvement in the
`
`pleading process [at a stage] when . . . it is unlikely that applications for leave to amend would
`
`be denied by a judge’ for such reasons as undue delay, undue prejudice, or futility.” See
`
`Johnson, 244 F.R.D. at 6 (quoting 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
`
`KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1474 (1990)) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
`
`178, 182 (1962)). In Johnson, this Court expressed the sentiment that it was somewhat illogical
`
`that leave of court should be required to reinstate previously dismissed defendants and not
`
`required to add new defendants when “naming wholly new defendants seems far more likely to
`
`cause delay or prejudice.” See Johnson, 244 F.R.D. at 6. Despite this Court’s recognition of the
`
`well-established principal that plaintiffs may add new defendants as a matter of course when
`9
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 10 of 28
`
`amending a complaint, in extraordinary cases the Court will deny such a motion. See Burdine v.
`
`Wells, No. 94-3103, 1994 WL 174174, at *2 n.1 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 1994) (recognizing the rule
`
`that a plaintiff may generally amend a complaint once as a matter of course before the filing of a
`
`responsive pleading but nonetheless denying a plaintiff’s attempt to add a new defendant
`
`because plaintiff’s claim was without legal or factual foundation), aff’d, 45 F.3d 439 (10th Cir.
`
`1994) (unpublished table decision).
`
`b.
`
`Motion as to Iraqi Defendants
`
`Plaintiff states that the “amended complaint joins individuals and organizations
`
`responsible for starting the Iraq war and charges them with violating the False Claims Act.”
`
`(Docket Entry [47] at 23.) Nattah apparently seeks joinder because since the time he filed the
`
`original complaint, investigations of pre-war intelligence concluded that the supposed existence
`
`of mobile labs capable of making chemical and biological weapons was a key factor in
`
`convincing the United Nations to authorize military action in Iraq. (See id.) Nattah, with the
`
`hindsight of knowing that this intelligence was inaccurate, seeks to hold parties legally
`
`responsible for the intelligence. (See id. at 24.) Thus, plaintiff seeks joinder of “Curveball,” an
`
`Iraqi taxidriver because he, working as an agent of proposed defendants the INC and Ahmed
`
`Chalabi, fabricated the story about mobile labs. (See id.) Nattah wishes to join the INC and Mr.
`
`Chalabi because they concocted a story about Iraq attempting to purchase Yellow Cake from
`
`Niger. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that the INC defrauded the Defense Intelligence Agency out of
`
`$20,000,000. (See id. at 24–25.) In sum, Nattah appears to seek joinder of these defendants
`
`because one of them must be responsible for the United States’ decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
`
`(See id. at 23.) Plaintiff succeeds in clearly communicating a dissatisfaction with the intelligence
`
`or mis-intelligence that may have led to the United States invasion of Iraq. However,
`10
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 11 of 28
`
`successfully expressing such commentary does not translate into successfully stating a
`
`cognizable claim. Nattah’s legal claims against INC, Curveball, and Mr. Chalabi do not even
`
`approach stating a claim upon which relief can be granted and from a legal standpoint are vague,
`
`unclear, and conclusory. The claims are the very essence of futile and the ends of justice and
`
`efficiency would not be served by forcing the proposed new defendants to expend resources in a
`
`lawsuit that has no chance of stating a plausible claim. For this reason, the Court will deny the
`
`motion for leave to file an amended complaint as to these defendants.
`
`c.
`
`Motion as to Army Secretary Francis Harvey
`
`Plaintiff’s amended complaint names Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey as a
`
`defendant in his official capacity. The amended complaint makes no specific allegations against
`
`Secretary Harvey that are distinguishable from those asserted against the other federal
`
`defendants. Thus, claims against Secretary Harvey would not survive a motion to dismiss for the
`
`same reasons that the claims Secretary Gates, in his official capacity, fail—the Government is
`
`immune from suit and has not explicitly waived immunity. As with Nattah’s claims against the
`
`Iraqi defendants, his claims against Secretary Harvey represent the extraordinary instance where
`
`it is proper to deny a motion to add parties when they would typically be added as a matter of
`
`right. The alternative to denying the motion to add Secretary Harvey as a defendant—essentially
`
`granting joinder of Secretary Harvey, waiting for Secretary Harvey to file a motion to dismiss,
`
`and then granting dismissal on the same grounds that dismissal was granted for the other federal
`
`11
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 12 of 28
`
`defendants—would be an unnecessary waste of resources for all parties involved. The motion to
`
`for leave to amend as to Secretary Harvey will be denied.7
`
`C.
`
`Motion to Vacate Order Dismissing Federal Defendants
`
`The Court will deny plaintiff’s motion to vacate this Court’s order [32] dismissing the
`
`suit against Secretary Gates. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs reconsideration of
`
`orders that do not constitute final judgments in a case. Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531,
`
`539 (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.). Rule 54(b) provides that:
`
`any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates
`fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
`all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a
`judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
`liabilities.
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). This Court may grant revision “as justice requires.” Cobell v. Norton, 224
`
`F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) (Lamberth, J.). While the phrase, “as justice requires,” is
`
`somewhat abstract, it refers to a court, in its broad discretion, determining whether
`
`reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances. Id.
`
`Here, the Court, in its discretion, finds that justice does not require vacating or revising
`
`its dismissal order. Nattah submits that new factual evidence exists in that plaintiff’s counsel has
`
`7 The Court notes that there is some authority for taking a different route to
`accomplishing the same result that the Court today reaches as to both the Iraqi defendants and
`Secretary Harvey. The D.C. Circuit has held that “it is practical and fully consistent with
`plaintiffs’ rights and efficient use of judicial resources” for a district court to sua sponte dismiss
`a plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “‘where the claimant
`cannot possibly win relief.’” Baker v. Director, United States Parole Com’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726
`(D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Svc., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.
`1987)). This approach is proper “in cases where the plaintiff has not advanced a shred of a valid
`claim.” Id.
`If this Court had granted Nattah’s motion for leave to amend as to these defendants, the
`Court would have been inclined to sua sponte dismiss the amended complaint.
`12
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 13 of 28
`
`filed a similar suit on behalf of another former Titan employee, Mark Shallal, who was allegedly
`
`hired to work in Kuwait as a linguist but was subject to Titan’s attempted coercion to serve with
`
`“Army Intelligence” in Iraq. (See Docket Entry [47] at 14); see also Complaint, Shallal v. Gates,
`
`No. 07-cv-2154 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2007). The existence of a lawsuit making some of the same
`
`allegations that Nattah makes is insufficient to cause the Court to alter its order of dismissal,
`
`particularly in light of the Court’s analysis in Part II.B.2.ii of this Opinion discussing the futility
`
`of claims against the previously dismissed defendant, Secretary Gates.
`
`D.
`
`Titan’s Motion to Dismiss
`
`1.
`
`Standard of Review
`
`When a party files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule
`
`12(b)(1), “the plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
`
`the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 2004). A court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of
`
`jurisdiction must construe plaintiffs’ complaint in plaintiffs’ favor, accepting all inferences that
`
`can be derived from the facts alleged. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249,
`
`1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
`
`On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
`
`pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court will dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to plead “enough
`
`facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
`
`S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating the prior standard which required appearance, beyond a
`
`doubt, that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
`
`relief). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, giving the
`
`defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic
`13
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 14 of 28
`
`Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
`
`47 (1957)). Thus, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the
`
`complaint's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
`
`plaintiff's favor. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
`
`U.S. 1149 (2004); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir.
`
`2003). However, the Court need not accept asserted inferences or conclusory allegation that are
`
`unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d
`
`1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
`
`2.
`
`The Court Will Dismiss All Claims Against Titan
`
`For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Titan’s motion [38] to dismiss all
`
`claims against Titan.8
`
`i.
`
`Alleged Violations of International Law
`
`Counts 3 and 19 of the amended complaint—alleging violations of the United Nations
`
`Charter, the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and other international law—must be
`
`dismissed. Plaintiff cannot assert a claim against Titan under the United Nations Charter
`
`because that treaty provides no right of action against private entities such as Titan. See Comm.
`
`of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that
`
`a provision of the United Nations Charter did not confer rights on private individuals).
`
`Likewise, Titan fails to establish that the Geneva Convention provides for a cause of action
`
`8 Although the Court grants leave to file plaintiff’s amended complaint as to Titan,
`Titan’s motion to dismiss the original complaint applies equally well to the amended complaint,
`and the Court sees no need to permit Titan an additional opportunity to file a pleading based on
`this revised complaint. Such an opportunity would merely serve to delay disposition of this
`matter.
`
`14
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 15 of 28
`
`against a private entity.9 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that the
`
`corrective machinery in the Geneva Convention is non-judicial); see also Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi,
`
`586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (refusing to find a private right or duty in the Geneva
`
`Convention). “The Hague Conventions similarly cannot be construed to afford individuals the
`
`right to judicial enforcement” and “they have never been regarded as law private parties could
`
`enforce.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Simply put,
`
`plaintiff’s international law allegations have failed to state a claim upon which this Court may
`
`grant relief.
`
`ii.
`
`Slavery Claim
`
`Count 5—slavery—will be dismissed. Plaintiff claims that Titan agreed to sell him to the
`
`Army. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 239.) According to Nattah, six unknown United States soldiers
`
`pointed loaded weapons at him, told him that he was being drafted into the military, and that he
`
`would be shot for desertion if he failed to report for duty. (See id. ¶ 240.) Nattah states that he
`
`complied with this order and worked for the military in exchange for no compensation. (See id.
`
`¶ 241–42.) However, in another portion of the amended complaint, plaintiff, rather than
`
`asserting that he was not compensated for his labor, instead complains of not receiving “any sort
`
`of overtime, combat, or hazardous duty pay to compensate for the risks or conditions.” (Id.
`
`¶ 104.) Additionally, in Count 12 of the amended complaint, plaintiff seeks relief for his alleged
`
`wrongful termination from employment with Titan. (See id. ¶¶ 306–09.) Nattah even states that
`
`9 The Supreme Court has found that Article Three of the Geneva Convention can provide
`prisoners of war with a claim against the government in a habeas action. See Hamdan v.
`Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006). This case is not a habeas action, Titan is not the
`Government, and the Court does not interpret Hamdan as extending a right of action to cases
`such as this.
`
`15
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 16 of 28
`
`he is entitled to and seeks reinstatement of his employee relationship with Titan. (See id. ¶ 308,
`
`Requested Relief at 87.)
`
`Plaintiff claims that “Department of Defense regulations on human trafficking, [the
`
`Trafficking Victims Protection Act], and the United Nations Convention on Elimination of all
`
`Forms of Slavery each create a private right of action to enforce the 13th Amendment.” (See
`
`Am. Compl. ¶ 246.) This Court disagrees. To the extent that plaintiff’s slavery claim relies
`
`upon the Thirteenth Amendment, that amendment does not in itself create a private right of
`
`action. Holland v. Bd. of Trustees of the Dist. of Columbia, 794 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D.D.C.
`
`1992). Similarly, plaintiff fails to provide a basis for his slavery claim under the Trafficking
`
`Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). See 22 U.S.C. § 7108(a) (indicating that the President may
`
`assert an action under the TVPA but providing no private cause of action). As for the United
`
`Nations Convention claim, the Court is aware of no such convention and assumes that plaintiff is
`
`speaking of the United Nations Slavery Convention. See Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60
`
`U.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927). Plaintiff fails to establish any private cause of
`
`action based on the Slavery Convention and the Court knows of no such authority supporting
`
`such a claim. Additionally, plaintiff fails to set forth any specific Department of Defense
`
`regulations that would support a private cause of action to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
`
`Further, plaintiff cites several statutes in Title 18 of the United States Code, that he
`
`asserts create a private right of action to enforce the 13th Amendment. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 251,
`
`260–61 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590).) Generally speaking, these statutes
`
`create criminal liability for enticement into forced labor, sale into slavery, and use or provision
`
`of forced labor; they do not create an independent means of asserting a private action. However,
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1595 expressly provides for a civil remedy for victims of violations of sections
`16
`
`

`
`Case 1:03-cv-00948-RCL Document 145 Filed 03/31/08 Page 17 of 28
`
`1589, 1590, and 1591.10 See 18 U.S.C. 1595(a). Yet, there is no indication that section 1595
`
`provides any remedy for alleged violations of the three statutes that occur outside the United
`
`States.11 The Court thus finds that Nattah’s proposed extraterritorial application of these statutes
`
`is improper. Consequently, plaintiff’s claims under Title 18 of the United States Code must be
`
`