Case 1:15-cv-00807-RGA-CJB Document 299 Filed 08/23/19 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 15316
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`ALARM.COM, INC. and ICN
`ACQUISITION, LLC,
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`Plaintiffs;
`
`V.
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`SECURENET TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 15-807-RGA
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`Kenneth Dorsney, MORRIS JAMES LLP, Wilmington, DE; Ian R. Liston, WILSON SONSINI
`GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C., Wilmington, DE; James C. Yoon, Ryan R. Smith, Christopher
`D. Mays, and Mary A. Procaccio-Flowers, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.,
`Palo Alto, CA, attorneys for Plaintiffs.
`
`Jack B. Blumenfeld and Stephen J. Kraftschik, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNEL LLP,
`Wilmington, DE; Erik B. Milch, Frank Pietrantonio, and Dustin Knight, COOLEY LLP, Reston,
`VA; Rose Whelan, Lisa Fuller Schweir, and Naina Soni, COOLEY LLP, Washington, D.C.,
`attorneys for Defendant.
`
`August 25, 2019
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00807-RGA-CJB Document 299 Filed 08/23/19 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 15317
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`Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial and Renewed
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`Judgment as a Matter of Law. (D.I. 283). The Parties' have fully briefed the issues. (D.I. 284,
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`287, 291). For the following reasons, I deny Plaintiffs' motion.
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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiffs Alarm.com, Inc. and ICN Acquisition LLC brought suit against Defendant
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`SecureNet Technologies LLC alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,855,635 ("the ' 635
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`patent"), 8,473 ,619 ("the '619 patent"), 8,478,844 ("the ' 844 patent"), and 8,073 ,931 ("the ' 931
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`patent"). Before trial, Plaintiffs narrowed their infringement contentions to allege infringement
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`(both direct and indirect) of claims 1 and 9 of the ' 931 patent, claims 1 and 5 5 of the '619 patent,
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`and claim 48 of the ' 844 patent ("the asserted patents"). Defendant asserted invalidity based on
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`obviousness for claims 1 and 9 of the ' 931 patent.
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`During trial, I granted JMOL of no infringement for any asserted claim under the Doctrine
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`of Equivalents. (D.I. 277). At trial, the jury found the following: 1) Plaintiffs did not prove direct,
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`induced or contributory infringement for any of the asserted claims, and 2) Defendant did not prove
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`invalidity of the ' 931 patent claims. 1 (D .I. 270).
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`Plaintiffs now move for a new trial or JMOL of infringement on the asserted claims of the
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`'619 and '931 patent. Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury' s finding on the ' 844 patent. Plaintiffs'
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`motion asserts that the jury was exposed to numerous erroneous claim constructions. I have
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`included the relevant claim language below, with the disputed claim language italicized.
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`1 Because the jury did not find infringement, the jury did not make any finding on willful infringement or damages.
`1
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`The asserted claims of the '619 patent read as follows:
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`1. A system comprising:
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`a gateway located at a first location;
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`a connection management component coupled to the gateway and automatically
`establishing a wireless coupling with a security system installed at the first
`location, the security system including security system components, wherein
`the connection management component forms a security network by
`automatically discovering the security system components and integrating
`communications and functions of the security system components into the
`security network; and
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`a security server at a second location different from the first location, wherein
`the security server is coupled to the gateway, wherein the gateway receives
`security data from the security system components, device data of a plurality of
`network devices coupled to a local network of the first location that is
`independent of the security. network, and remote data from the security server,
`wherein the gateway generates processed data by processing at the gateway the
`security data, the device data, and the remote data, wherein the gateway
`determines a state change of the security system using the processed data and
`maintains objects at the security server using the processed data, wherein the
`objects correspond to the security system components and the plurality of
`network devices.
`55. The system of claim 1, wherein the security server generates and transfers
`notifications to remote client devices, the notifications comprising event data.
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`('619 patent, els. 1, 55) (disputed claim terms italicized). The asserted claims of the '931 patent
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`read as follows:
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`1. A device comprising:
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`a touchscreen at a first location, wherein the touchscreen includes a processor
`coupled to a local area network (LAN) and a security system at the first
`location; and
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`a plurality of interfaces presented by at least one application executing on the
`processor of the touchscreen and presented to a user via the touchscreen,
`wherein the plurality of interfaces include a security interface and a network
`interface, wherein the security interface provides the user with control of
`functions of the security system and access to data collected by the security
`system, wherein the network interface allows the user to transfer content to and
`from a wide area network (WAN) coupled to the LAN; and
`a remote server at a second location, wherein the remote server is coupled to
`the touchscreen, the remote server managing at least one of the touchscreen and
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`2
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`the security system, wherein objects are maintained on the remote server that
`correspond to at least one of at least one security system component of the
`security system and at least one network device of the LAN.
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`9. The device of claim 7, wherein the camera is managed by the remote server.
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`('931 patent, els. 1, 9) ( disputed claim term italicized).
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`II.
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`LEGAL ST AND ARD
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`A. New Trial
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l)(A) provides, in pertinent part: "The court may,
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`on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues-and to any party- .. . after a jury trial,
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`for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court
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`... . " Among the most common reasons for granting a new trial are: (1) the jury's verdict is
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`against the clear weight of the evidence, and a new trial must be granted to prevent a miscarriage
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`of justice; (2) newly discovered evidence exists that would likely alter the outcome of the trial; (3)
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`improper conduct by an attorney or the court unfairly influenced the verdict; or (4) the jury' s
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`verdict was facially inconsistent. See Zarow-Smith v. N J Transit Rail Operations, Inc. , 953 F.
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`Supp. 581 , 584-85 (D.N.J. 1997).
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`The decision to grant or deny a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district
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`court. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Olefins Trading, Inc. v.
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`Han Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993) (reviewing district court's grant or denial
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`of new trial motion under the "abuse of discretion" standard). Although the standard for granting
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`a new trial is less rigorous than the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law-in that the
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`Court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner-a new trial
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`should only be granted where "a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand,"
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`the verdict "cries out to be overturned," or where the verdict "shocks [the] conscience."
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`Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1352-53.
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`B. Judgment as a Matter of Law
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`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would
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`not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [a] party" on an issue. Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`50(a)(l). "Entry of judgment as a matter oflaw is a 'sparingly' invoked remedy, ' granted only if,
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`viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of
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`every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably
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`could find liability."' Marra v. Phi/a. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation
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`omitted).
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`"To prevail on a renewed motion for JMOL following a jury trial, a party must show that
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`the jury' s findings, presumed or express, are not supported by substantial evidence or, if they were,
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`that the legal conclusion(s) implied [by] the jury's verdict cannot in law be supported by those
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`findings." Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original).
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`"' Substantial' evidence is such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be
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`accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review." Perkin-Elmer
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`Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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`In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must give the non-moving party, "as
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`[the] verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the evidence
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`presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor and, in general, view the record in the
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`light most favorable to him." Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir.
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`1991 ). The Court may "not determine the credibility of the witnesses [nor] substitute its choice
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`for that of the jury between conflicting elements in the evidence." Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 893.
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`Rather, the Court must determine whether the evidence supports the jury's verdict. See Dawn
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`Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc. , 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gomez v. Allegheny Health
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`Servs. Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing standard as "whether there is evidence
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`upon which a reasonable jury could properly have found its verdict"); 9B Charles Alan Wright &
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`Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2524 (3d ed. 2008) ("The question is not
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`whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but
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`whether there is evidence upon which the jury might reasonably find a verdict for that party.").
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`Where the moving party bears the burden of proof, the Third Circuit applies a different
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`standard. This standard '"requires the judge to test the body of evidence not for its insufficiency
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`to support a finding, but rather for its overwhelming effect. '" Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co. v.
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`Videfreeze Corp. , 540 F.2d 1171 , 1177 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Mihalchak v. Arn. Dredging Co.,
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`266 F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir. 1959)). The Court "'must be able to say not only that there is sufficient
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`evidence to support the finding, even though other evidence could support as well a contrary
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`finding, but additionally that there is insufficient evidence for permitting any different finding. "'
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`Id. at 1177 (quoting Mihalchak, 266 F.2d at 877).
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`C. Claim Construction
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`"It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to
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`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (internal quotation marks omitted). '" [T]here is no magic formula or
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`catechism for conducting claim construction. ' Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate
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`weight to appropriate sources 'in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law. "'
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`SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4758195, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1324) (alteration in original). When construing patent claims, a court considers the
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`literal language of the claim, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v.
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`Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 977-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370
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`(1996). Of these sources, "the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction
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`analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`"[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning . ...
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`[Which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
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`at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at
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`1312-13 ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim
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`term is its meaning to [an] ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321 (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). "In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood
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`by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction
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`in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
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`commonly understood words." Id. at 1314.
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`When a court relies solely upon the intrinsic evidence-the patent claims, the specification,
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`and the prosecution history-the court's construction is a determination oflaw. See Teva Pharm.
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`USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 , 841 (2015). The court may also make factual findings
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`based upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, which "consists of all evidence external to the
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`patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned
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`treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Extrinsic evidence
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`may assist the court in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one
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`skilled in the art, and how the invention works. Id. Extrinsic evidence, however, is less reliable
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`and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Id.
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`"A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it
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`defines terms in the context of the whole patent." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa ' per Azioni,
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`158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that "a claim interpretation that would exclude
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`the inventor' s device is rarely the correct interpretation." Osram GMBH v. Int 'l Trade Comm 'n,
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`505 F.3d 1351 , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Plaintiffs' motion focuses on purported errors in claim construction and testimony
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`regarding claim constructions. "Where an infringement verdict relies on incorrect construction of
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`the disputed claim terms, this court may grant JMOL, or order a new trial to correct the error,
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`depending on the degree of difference between the incorrect construction and the correct
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`construction." Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc. , 523 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus,
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`for each patent, I will first determine whether there was any error in claim constructions presented
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`to the jury and then, if an error was made, determine whether JMOL or a new trial is warranted.
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`A. The '619 Patent
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`Plaintiffs allege errors regarding three terms in the '619 patent: "connection management
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`component," "establishing," and "automatic discovery." (D.I. 284 at 4).
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`1. Construction of "Connection Management Component" in the '619
`Patent
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`Plaintiffs assert that the Court erroneously construed the claim term "connection
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`management component" in two ways: 1) by construing the term as a "means-plus-function" term
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ,r 6, and 2) by identifying an overly narrow structure with requirements that
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`are not clearly associated with the identified functions. (D.I. 284 at 4). The Court construed the
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`term "connection management component" as a means-plus-function term with the claimed
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`functions of "automatically establishing a wireless coupling with a separate security system" and
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`"forming a security network by automatically discovering the security system components of a
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`security system and integrating communications and functions of the security system components
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`into the security network" and the corresponding structure of "software executing on a processor
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`using the algorithms shown in Figures 12 and 14." (D.I. 94 at 2-3).
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`a. Means-Plus-Function
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`Plaintiffs assert that the term is not a means-plus-function claim term and should be given
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`the following construction, "manages connections of the gateway." (D.I. 284 at 6). Plaintiffs
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`argue that the Court made several errors in construing the term as a means-plus-function claim by:
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`(1) improperly requiring traditional physical structure in a software limitation, (2) failing to require
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`SecureNet to rebut the inventor' s testimony, and (3) failing to address whether the claim term, as
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`a whole, connoted sufficient structure. (Id. at 4-5).
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`First, the Court did not improperly require traditional physical structure in a software
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`limitation. Plaintiffs point to Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir.
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`2014), as evidence that software claims do not require physical structure, but may be "understood
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`through, for example, an outline of an algorithm, a flowchart, or a specific set of instructions or
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`rules." However, Plaintiffs have not identified any such structure in the claims or the specification
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`that would allow "connection management component" to be "understood by persons of ordinary
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`skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure." Williamson, 792
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`F.3d at 1348. Additionally, the Federal Circuit' s opinion in Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital
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`One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015), similarly construed a software claim limitation
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`as a means-plus-function claim in the absence of the word "means." The Federal Circuit
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`determined that the disputed claim term was a means-plus-function term where it had no
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`commonly understood meaning, was not generally viewed by one skilled in the art to connote a
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`particular structure, and the specification "only describe[ d] the term' s function and interaction with
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`other parts in the system." Id. at 13 72-73 . Here, the term "connection management component"
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`has no commonly understood meaning, is not generally viewed by those skilled in the art to
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`connote a particular structure, and the specification similarly only describes the term' s function
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`and interaction with the other parts of the system. (See, e.g., '619 patent, col. 19:11-14; 32:52-63
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`33:1-4, 33:32-39, 34:10-26; 35:38-50; 39:35-46).
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`Second, Defendant was not required to rebut testimony of the co-inventor to overcome the
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`presumption. The testimony of a co-inventor is legally irrelevant to claim construction.
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`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech. , 540 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Even
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`if the Court was required to consider the co-inventor' s testimony, it is unpersuasive to support
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`sufficient structure. The co-inventor' s testimony that was submitted with the Markman briefing
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`did nothing more than recite the functions of the component. (D.I. 57, Ex. 5 at 244:21-25 ("there' s
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`a component in the gateway which, you know, as it states, knows how to connect automatically to
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`those devices")). Therefore, it was unnecessary for Defendant to directly rebut this testimony.
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`Third, the claim term "connection management component," as a whole, does not connote
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`sufficient structure. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ,r 6 provides,
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`An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
`performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
`support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
`structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
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`The first question to determine whether § 112 ,r 6 applies to the claim limitation is whether the
`claim uses the word "means." If it does, it creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ,r 6 applies.
`If it does not, it creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ,r 6 does not apply. Williamson v.
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`Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, as the Federal Circuit noted
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`in Williamson, courts should not elevate form over substance when evaluating whether a claim
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`term is a means-plus-function term. " [T]he essential inquiry is not merely the presence or absence
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`of the word ' means' but whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill
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`in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure." Id. (citing Greenberg,
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`91 F.3d at 1583). The presumption that a term is not a means-plus-function term may be overcome
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`where "the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure
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`or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. " Id.
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`( cleaned up).
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`Though the claim does not use the term "means," Defendant demonstrated that the claim
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`term failed to recite "sufficiently definite structure" such that the claim term is properly construed
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`as a means-plus-function claim under § 112 ,r 6. While the claim term does not use the words
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`"means," the word "component" is a "nonce" or non-structural word under§ 2181 of the Manual
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`of Patent Examining Procedure. Nor does the preceding "connection management" language
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`provide sufficient structure for this non-structural term, as it is purely functional. The patent does
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`not define the "connection management component," it has no dictionary definition, and Plaintiffs
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`have not suggested that it was generally understood in the art. MIT v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d
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`1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Additionally, Plaintiffs' own claim construction ("manages
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`connections of the gateway" (D.I. 57 at 12) or "component that manages connections of the
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`gateway" (D.I. 91 at 80:5-12)) indicates that the term should be construed as a means-plus-function
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`claim. Plaintiffs' construction describes the "component" purely in terms of the function it
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`performs with no other structure. Thus, Defendant demonstrated that the claim term did not recite
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`"sufficiently definite structure," thereby rebutting the presumption against the application of§ 112
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`Thus, the Court did not err in construing "connection management component" as a means(cid:173)
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`plus-function term.
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`b. Structure of "Connection Management Component"
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`Plaintiffs also argue that if§ 112 ,r 6 applies, "the jury was still incorrectly instructed as to
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`the structure of ' connection management component"' because the Court' s construction
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`1) "requires the structure to include the entirety of the algorithms identified in both Figures 12 and
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`14 of the '619 patent" and 2) "includes structures with no clear association with the claimed
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`functions." (D.I. 284 at 11-12).
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`To construe a disputed means-plus-function term, the Court must "attempt to construe the
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`disputed claim term by identifying the ' corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
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`specification' to which the claim term will be limited." Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc. , 769
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`F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc. , 550 F.3d 1090, 1097
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008)). Where the means-plus-function term has multiple claimed functions, there must
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`be adequate corresponding structure to perform all the claimed functions. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit
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`Inc. , 675 F.3d 1302, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[W]here a disclosed algorithm supports some, but
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`not all, of the functions associated with a means-plus-function limitation, we treat the specification
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`as if no algorithm has been disclosed at all. In such instances, we are not faced with a disclosure
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`which addresses itself to an identifiable function, but arguably does so inadequately."). A
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`"computer-implemented means-plus-function term is limited to the corresponding structure
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`disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof, and the corresponding structure is the
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`algorithm." Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241 , 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`The Court has identified two functions for "connection management component:"
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`"automatically establishing a wireless coupling with a security system installed at the first
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`location," and "forming a security network by automatically discovering the security system
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`components and integrating communications and functions of the security system components into
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`the security network." (D.I. 94 at 2-3).
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`First, Plaintiffs argue the Court's construction is incorrect because Figure 12 and Figure
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`14 are alternative embodiments. However, Figure 12 alone does not provide sufficient structure
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`for a person of ordinary skill to understand the structure required. (See id. at 3 n.4 ("At step 1240,
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`the ' [p]lurality ofWSS capabilities and devices [are] 'learned' into [the] system. ' ' 619 Patent, Fig.
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`12. The specification, however, does not describe how this high-level function works.")). As the
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`Court explained in the Claim Construction Order, "Figure 14 teaches the detailed steps after
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`integrating from Figure 12." (Id.). Thus, it was not legal error to construe the structure to include
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`the steps of both Figure 12 and 14.
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`Second, Plaintiffs argue that the construction is incorrect because it includes structures
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`with no clear association with the claimed functions. Plaintiffs assert that individual steps of the
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`algorithms shown in Figures 12 and 14 (and included in the structural construction) "have no clear
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`association with the construed functions." (D.1. 284 at 7 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact
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`Accessories, Inc. , 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). But JVW only requires that the
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`structure as a whole is clearly associated with the claimed functions, not that each individual step
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`of the algorithm is. JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1330 n.1 ("the specification in no way associates the
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`'interlacing of fitting parts into each other' with the claimed function of' lockably receiving a video
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`game controller in fixed position" '). Plaintiffs do not dispute that Figure 12 and Figure 14 are
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`12
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`Case 1:15-cv-00807-RGA-CJB Document 299 Filed 08/23/19 Page 14 of 20 PageID #: 15329
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`clearly associated with the claimed functions. Thus, the construction of "connection management
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`component" is correct.
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`2. Dr. Polish's Purportedly Erroneous Construction of "Establishing"
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`Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Polish presented an erroneous application of "establishing" to the
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`jury, and therefore a new trial on the '619 patent is warranted. The term "establishing" was not
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`construed by the Court. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Polish's testimony "that SecureNet's server does
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`not ' automatically establish a wireless coupling with a separate security system' because the IGM
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`reaches out to the server first" is "a flawed and overly narrow interpretation of ' establish a wireless
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`coupling."' (D.I. 284 at 8). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to preserve their objections
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`to Dr. Polish' s testimony because Plaintiffs did not object in a Daubert motion or during trial.
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`(D.I. 287 at 7-8).
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`I agree with Defendant that Plaintiffs waived their objection to Dr. Polish' s testimony by
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`failing to object. Indeed, the section of testimony Plaintiffs cite contains no objection by the
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`Plaintiffs to Dr. Polish' s testimony. It is well-settled that "litigants waive their right to present
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`new claim construction disputes if they are raised for the first time after trial." Broadcom Corp.
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`v. Qualcomm Inc. , 543 F.3d 683, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Power Integrations, Inc. v.
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`Fairchild Semiconductor Int 'l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965 , 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the Parties never
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`proposed a claim construction of "establishing." (D.I. 51 , 57, 58, 85). They did not object at trial,
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`nor request that I construe the term "establishing" when discussing jury instructions. Thus, the
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`issue has been waived.
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`Even had the issue not been waived, I would not find Dr. Polish's construction to be legally
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`erroneous. The claim language defines "automatically establishing" as a function of the
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`"connection management component." (' 619 patent, cl. 1 ). This indicates that the "connection
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`management component" must be the piece initiating the interaction. The remainder of the claim
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`language also indicates that the "connection management component" is the piece of the system
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`"acting" on the other components. (' 619 patent, cl. 1 ("connection management component forms
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`a security network by automatically discovering the security system components and integrating
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`communications and functions of the security system components into the security network")).
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`Thus, Dr. Polish' s testimony was not legally erroneous.
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`3. Dr. Polish's Purportedly Erroneous Construction of "Automatic
`Discovery"
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`Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Polish presented an erroneous application of "automatic
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`discovery"2 to the jury, and therefore a new trial on the ' 619 patent is warranted. The term
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`"automatic" was construed by the Court to mean "without user input". (D.I. 94 at 1). Thus,
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`"automatic discovery" is construed as "discovery without user input." Plaintiffs argue that Dr.
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`Polish misinterpreted the Court' s construction of "without user input" when he testified "that a
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`security sensor is not ' automatically discovered' if the sensor is discovered by the panel upon being
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`'tripped"' as part of its intended purpose. (D.I. 284 at 9). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have
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`failed to preserve their objections to Dr. Polish's testimony because Plaintiffs did not object in a
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`Daubert motion or during trial. (D.I. 287 at 7-8).
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`I agree with Defendant that Plaintiffs waived their objection to Dr. Polish' s testimony by
`
`failing to object. Indeed, the section of testimony Plaintiffs cite contains no objection by the
`
`Plaintiffs to Dr. Polish's testimony. It is well-settled that "litigants waive their right to present
`
`new claim construction disputes if they are raised for the first time after trial." Broadcom Corp.,
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`543 F.3d at 694; see also Power Integrations, 904 F.3d at 974. Here, the Parties never proposed
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`2 The claim term is actually "automatically discovering." (' 619 patent, cl. 1). However, the parties both discuss this
`term using the phrase "automatic discovery" and I will adopt their terminology for the purposes of th is opinion.
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`Case 1:15-cv-00807-RGA-CJB Document 299 Filed 08/23/19 Page 16 of 20 PageID #: 15331
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`aclaimconstructionof"discovering." (D.I. 51 , 57, 58, 85). Theydidnotobjectattrial, norrequest
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`that I construe the term "discovering" when discussing jury instructions. Thus, the issue has been
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`waived.
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`Even if Plaintiffs had not waived their objection, I would not find Dr. Polish' s testimony
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`regarding "automatic" to be legally erroneous. The Court' s claim construction clearly
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`contemplated that "no human input or intervention is allowed." (D.I. 94 at 1 n.2). Plaintiffs
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`miscast Dr. Polish's testimony as a statement "that triggering a sensor in its normal operation
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`constitutes 'user input."' However, Dr. Polish testified that "with the sensors, in all cases, when
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`you're setting them up, you have to, at some point, trip them to tell the panel what sensor you're
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`talking about. So if you - if you put a motion sensor up top, you eventually have to wave at it, or
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`trip it." (D.I. 295 at 713:18-22; see also id. at 714:5-9). This testimony is not inconsistent with
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`the Court's claim construction of "automatic."
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`Nor would I find Dr. Polish's testimony regarding "discovery" to be legally erroneous.
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`"Discovery" was not construed. As Defendant notes, "The specification of the ' 619 patent
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`references 'discovering' devices as a pr