throbber
Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 1 of 25 PageID #: 56927
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
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`)))))))))
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`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT GOOGLE’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF ARENDI S.A.R.L.’S
`RENEWED MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION
`FOR A NEW TRIAL
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Robert W. Unikel
`John Cotiguala
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Tel: (312) 449-6000
`
`Robert R. Laurenzi
`Chad J. Peterman
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Tel: (212) 318-6000
`
`Ginger D. Anders
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`601 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 500E
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`Tel: (202) 220-1100
`
`Vincent Y. Ling
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`350 S. Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Tel: (213) 683-9100
`
`Dated: June 30, 2023
`10896916 / 12599.00040
`
`David E. Moore (#3983)
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew L. Brown (#6766)
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`dmoore@potteranderson.com
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`abrown@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 2 of 25 PageID #: 56928
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`B.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 1
`INVALIDITY DEFENSES ............................................................................................... 2
`A.
`There Was More Than Sufficient Basis for the Jury’s Anticipation
`Finding. .................................................................................................................. 2
`There Was More Than Sufficient Basis for the Jury’s Obviousness
`Verdict.................................................................................................................... 8
`1.
`The jury properly relied on Dr. Fox’s motivation-to-combine
`opinion. ...................................................................................................... 8
`Google’s combinations teach the claimed invention. .............................. 10
`2.
`IPR ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY ............................................................................. 14
`A.
`Arendi Does Not Acknowledge, Much Less Demonstrate Any Error in, the
`Court’s IPR Estoppel Rulings on Multiple Independent Grounds. ...................... 15
`Even If the Court Were to Reconsider Its Ruling, Estoppel Does Not
`Apply.................................................................................................................... 16
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 20
`
`B.
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 3 of 25 PageID #: 56929
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP,
`No. 02-1694 GMS, 2006 WL 890995 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2006) ..............................................16
`
`Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc.,
`967 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................1
`
`In re Brimonidine Pat. Litig.,
`643 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................1
`
`Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd.,
`2019 WL 8192255 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019), aff’d, 25 F.4th 976 (Fed. Cir.
`2022) ........................................................................................................................................17
`
`CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
`526 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................19
`
`Chemours Co. v. Daikin Indus., Ltd.,
`2022 WL 2643517 (D. Del. July 8, 2022) .........................................................................15, 16
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) ...........................................................................16
`
`Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`658 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................2
`
`Fleming v. Escort Inc.,
`774 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................19
`
`Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc.,
`941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................1
`
`Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corp.,
`64 F.4th 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ................................................................................................16
`
`Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.,
`587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................1
`
`Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................10
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 4 of 25 PageID #: 56930
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Infobridge Pte Ltd.,
`929 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................17
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. UUSI, LLC,
`775 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................9
`
`Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp.,
`264 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................19
`
`Schumer v. Lab’y Comp. Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................1
`
`Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. Cox Commc’ns Inc.,
`302 F. Supp. 3d 597 (D. Del. 2017) .........................................................................................20
`
`Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
`926 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1991).....................................................................................................1
`
`Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................19
`
`Zup, LLC v. Nash Mfg., Inc.
`896 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................14
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) .........................................................................................................................18
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) .........................................................................................................................15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) .....................................................................................................................15
`
`Other Authorities
`
`L.R. 7.1.3(a)(4) ..............................................................................................................................20
`
`L.R. 7.1.5 .......................................................................................................................................16
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 5 of 25 PageID #: 56931
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendant Google LLC proved that claims 23 and 30 of U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843 (the
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`“’843 Patent”) are anticipated and obvious. During the six-day trial, Google provided clear and
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`convincing evidence to support the jury’s invalidity findings, including testimony and
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`documentary evidence from prior artists, expert analysis, and excerpts from the ’843 Patent’s
`
`prosecution history. No new trial is necessary, and the prior art systems are not estopped.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`“A grant of JMOL is appropriate ‘where a party has been fully heard on an issue during a
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`jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient
`
`evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.’” Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941
`
`F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (applying 3d Cir. law). A court should “grant[] a new trial
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`only where ‘a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand’ or where the verdict
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`‘shocks [the] conscience.’” Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2020) (applying 3d Cir. law) (second alteration in original).
`
`“There is no invariable requirement that a prior art reference be accompanied by expert
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`testimony.” In re Brimonidine Pat. Litig., 643 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A jury’s
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`deliberation “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person
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`of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.”
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`Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).1 Because the
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`parties agreed upon a general verdict form, Arendi must demonstrate there is no substantial
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`evidence to support a finding of obviousness regarding any of the combinations presented at trial.
`
`
`1 Arendi incorrectly asserts that expert testimony must meet more “exacting requirements,” citing
`Schumer v. Lab’y Comp. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Br. at 3. Schumer concerned
`summary judgment of invalidity, which requires presuming disputed facts in favor of the patentee
`and thus places a particularly high burden on the defendant. Id. at 1315-16.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 6 of 25 PageID #: 56932
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`See Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`III.
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`INVALIDITY DEFENSES
`A.
`There Was More Than Sufficient Basis for the Jury’s Anticipation Finding.
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`Google presented extensive testimony from Dr. Dey, the creator of the prior art CyberDesk
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`system (“CyberDesk”); numerous documents related to CyberDesk; statements Arendi itself made
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`to the PTO regarding aspects of CyberDesk; testimony from the inventor, Mr. Hedloy, regarding
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`those statements; and expert testimony from Dr. Fox on anticipation.
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`At a high level and as discussed further below, CyberDesk ran within a web browser (e.g.,
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`Netscape), which displayed applets in individual browser sub-windows. The applets included local
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`services (e.g., an e-mail editor) and could use another local application (e.g., Contact Manager) or
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`network services on the web (e.g., Switchboard or AltaVista) to search for additional information,
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`such as contact information, related to a “first information,” such as a name or e-mail address.
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`CyberDesk presented the user with “ActOn” Buttons suggesting actions for the first information;
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`for example, a user could click on a button to look up and display a phone number based on a
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`name, or look up and retrieve a map based on a street address.
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`As the jury heard, during prosecution of the ’843 patent, Arendi pointed to an Accelerated
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`Examination Support Document (“AESD”) from its prosecution of another patent application from
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`the same family, telling the PTO that “the prior art references analyzed in the [AESD] are of
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`particular interest in relation to the present application [for the ’843 patent].” DTX-2.0180-81; see
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`also DTX-925 (AESD); 4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 205:25-207:19. As Dr. Fox explained and Mr.
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`Hedloy conceded, Arendi admitted in the AESD that most of the elements of the asserted claims
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`were disclosed by a printed publication about CyberDesk. DTX-925.0114-15; 4/24 Trial Tr.
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`(Hedloy) 211:8-212:9; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1146:12-1147:4, 1148:9-24, 1158:21-1159:13, 1160:8-
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`1161:5, 1165:20-1167:13. But Arendi argued in the AESD that CyberDesk was “separate” from
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 7 of 25 PageID #: 56933
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`any document editing programs. DTX-925.0115. Dr. Fox explained that this meant Arendi was
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`arguing that the limitations “providing an input device . . . ,” and “in consequence of receipt” of a
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`user command from an input device, causing a search “using a second computer program, in order
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`to find second information”—both of which depend on actions by a “first computer program”—
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`were not present in CyberDesk. 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1150:19-1153:19, 1160:8-1161:5, 1172:8-
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`1176:1. Arendi seeks to walk back its AESD statements on the basis that they related to a different
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`patent application, but Arendi ignores that the statements are standalone admissions regarding
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`CyberDesk’s features, DTX-925.0114-15, and that it expressly relied on them during prosecution
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`of the ’843 patent, see DTX-2.0180-81; 4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 205:25-207:19. Thus, the AESD,
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`together with Dr. Fox’s and Mr. Hedloy’s testimony about it, is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
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`jury to find that CyberDesk satisfied almost every element of the asserted claims.
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`In any event, Google also presented further evidence on all of the disputed limitations to
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`support the jury’s finding of anticipation. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
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`CyberDesk “display[ed] the document electronically using the first computer program,” under the
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`Court’s construction of “document” as “a word processing, spreadsheet, or similar file into which
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`text can be entered.” D.I. 143 at 5. For example, the testimony of Drs. Dey and Fox establishes
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`that CyberDesk displayed text-editable files in applets (e.g., e-mail editor applet or letter in a text
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`editor). See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 842:23–844:19, 891:21-892:8, 892:25-894:10; 5/1 Trial Tr.
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`(Fox) 1154:25-1156:12, 1173:9-14, 1265:9-1267:3. Arendi now argues that the testimony should
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`be ignored because a document about CyberDesk (DTX-10) shows an image example of an e-mail
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`in a non-editable mode. But there was no inconsistency between that image and Dr. Dey’s
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`testimony. In fact, Dr. Fox explained that Dr. Dey expounded on the document and clarified that
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`the “first computer program” in CyberDesk—either the browser or an applet—could include
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 8 of 25 PageID #: 56934
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`“editing tools” displaying editable e-mails or letters. 5/1 Trial Tr. 1154:25-1156:12. Indeed, Dr.
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`Sacerdoti’s testimony that CyberDesk did not display an editable file was based solely on the
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`CyberDesk document, and he admitted that his opinion was contradicted by Dr. Dey’s testimony.
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`5/1 Trial Tr. (Sacerdoti) 1386:8-1387:22.2 The jury was entitled to credit Dr. Dey’s testimony and
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`Dr. Fox’s analysis instead of Dr. Sacerdoti’s.
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`Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met the limitation
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`“while the document is being displayed, analyzing . . . first information . . . to determine if [it] is
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`at least one of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for in order to find second
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`information related to the first information.” For example, the testimony of Drs. Dey and Fox
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`establishes that CyberDesk analyzed text selected by a user or found in a document to determine
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`if it was of a predefined type (e.g., name or e-mail address) that could be used to search for related
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`information in an external source (e.g., Contact Manager or Switchboard). See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr.
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`(Dey) 843:25-850:24, 860:18-863:15, 869:9-870:4, 880:18-881:13, 886:22-887:24, 892:9-15;
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`DTX-10; DTX-11; DTX-15; DTX-18; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1151:24-1153:19, 1173:15-1174:4. Dr.
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`Dey identified numerous examples of types that can be searched for, including names, e-mail
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`addresses, and phone numbers. See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. 846:16-847:24, 852:16-853:11, 860:18-
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`863:15, 892:4-19; DTX-11.0002; see also DTX-28; 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 886:22-889:2; 5/1 Trial
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`Tr. (Fox) 1156:13-1158:20 (list of Network Services for CyberDesk on the Future Computing
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`Environments (“FCE”) website). Arendi admitted that CyberDesk identifies at least URLs and
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`names to search for related information. 4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 210:18-212:9; DTX-925.0114.
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`2 The Court should reject Arendi’s attorney argument that Dr. Fox wrongly equated Dr. Dey’s use
`of “working in an e-mail” with editing. It was for the jury to weigh the testimony and determine
`whether Dr. Fox’s interpretation was credible. Even Dr. Sacerdoti admitted that Dr. Dey testified
`the e-mail documents were editable. 5/1 Trial Tr. (Sacerdoti) 1386:9-1387:4. And Dr. Dey clearly
`used the terms “working in” throughout his testimony to mean editing, and “working document”
`to mean an editable document such as a “text editor.” See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 892:3-894:10.
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`4
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 9 of 25 PageID #: 56935
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`Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk “retriev[ed]
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`the first information.” Dr. Dey testified, and exhibits showed, that CyberDesk retrieved the text
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`constituting “first information” and sent or used it for searching and provision of an input device.
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`See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 844:20-845:20, 847:1-848:13, 851:3-11 (pushing information to
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`services); id. at 852:12-853:20 (describing Fig. 3 of DTX-10, -11 obtaining selected text for
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`conversion); see also, e.g., 4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 211:8–212:9 (CyberDesk retrieves highlighted
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`text to provide options for names and URLs); DTX-925.0114; 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 862:21-863:9;
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`5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1152:6-25 1153:20-1154:6, 1160:10-1161:5, 1174:5-6.
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`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met the “providing an
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`input device . . .” element. The testimony of Drs. Dey and Fox establishes that CyberDesk provided
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`input devices (i.e., the ActOn Buttons) that allowed a user to initiate an operation or action (e.g.,
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`“Lookup Name using ContactManager”; “Lookup Phone Number For Name using Switchboard”).
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`See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 847:1-849:9, 851:3-23, 853:4-20, 859:2-863:23, 870:5-871:10,
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`880:11-24, 892:16-894:10; DTX-10; DTX-11; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1151:24-1152:5; see also, e.g.,
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`4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 211:8–212:9 (admitting CyberDesk presents options to search for
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`information related to names and URLs); DTX-925.0114. Their testimony further establishes that
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`clicking an ActOn Button performed a search using at least part of the first information (e.g., name
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`or e-mail address) in an external information source (e.g., Contact Manager or Switchboard) for
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`second information of a specific type related to the first information; the second information was
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`then displayed in a browser or applet window, suggested or retrieved for the user, saved in a
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`database, or inserted into the document. See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 846:16-847:24, 849:10–
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`851:23, 852:16-853:11, 860:18-863:15, 888:1-889:2, 892:4-894:10; DTX-10; DTX-11; DTX-28;
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`5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1152:22-1153:11, 1156:15-1157:8, 1157:16-1158:6, 1174:7-1175:4.
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`
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 10 of 25 PageID #: 56936
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`Arendi argues that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that the ActOn
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`Buttons are “configured by” the first computer program, but the testimony of both Drs. Dey and
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`Fox covered this limitation. They explained how services are integrated so that an applet or
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`browser dynamically provided ActOn Buttons depending on the type of first information. See, e.g.,
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`4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 842:6-846:8, 847:1-848:18, 853:4-17; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1151:24-1152:21,
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`1153:20-1154:24, 1174:7-1175:4.3 Substantial evidence similarly supports the jury’s finding that
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`CyberDesk searched “in an information source external to the document” limitation. Drs. Dey and
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`Fox testified that searches occur in databases external to the document such as through Contact
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`Manager or the Switchboard service. See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 848:14–851:23, 886:22-889:2;
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`5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1152:22-1153:11, 1156:15-1157:8, 1157:16-1158:6, 1174:7-1175:4.
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`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk “perform[ed] an action
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`using at least part of the second information.” For example, the evidence establishes multiple
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`actions using at least part of the search results, including display, suggestion, or retrieval of the
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`information, insertion of the information into a document, and saving of the information into a
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`database. See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 849:6-851:23, 892:4-19 (displaying contact information
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`found from search), id. at 859:2-860:17, 862:15-864:19 (saving contact information), 892:20-
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`894:10 (inserting text or suggesting related information in working document); DTX-11; 5/1 Trial
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`Tr. (Fox) 1152:22-1153:11 (displaying contact information), 1155:19-1158:20 (inserting text,
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`retrieving map), 1174:13-1175:4.
`
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`3 Drs. Dey and Fox also testified that the type of second information found (e.g., contact
`information, suggested reading, map, date history) depends on the type of first information (e.g.,
`name/e-mail, technical text, street address, date (respectively)). See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey)
`847:21-24, 852:16-853:20, 860:18-863:15, 869:20-871:10, 880:18-881:17, 886:22-889:2, 892:4-
`894:10; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1156:13-1158:20; DTX-11.0001 (showing ActOn Buttons with display
`result dependencies by type, e.g., “Lookup Phone Number For Name using Switchboard”); DTX-
`11.0002 (ActOn Buttons work for both names and URLs); DTX-28 (listing system services).
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`
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`6
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 11 of 25 PageID #: 56937
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`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met the “in consequence
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`. . .” element. As discussed with respect to the prior element, Drs. Dey and Fox testified that
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`clicking an ActOn Button (e.g., “Lookup Name using ContactManager”) was a command to the
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`applet (e.g., e-mail window) or browser to cause a search using at least part of the first information
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`(e.g., name or e-mail) in an information source external to the document (e.g., Contact Manager
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`or Switchboard) for second information related to the first information (e.g., address or phone
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`number). See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 849:10-851:23; DTX-10; DTX-11; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox)
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`1151:24-1152:5, 1152:22-1153:11, 1156:15-1157:8, 1157:16-1158:6, 1175:5-15. The list of
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`network services on the FCE website further identified other types of second information related
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`to the search term searched in a second computer program, such as retrieving a map for a given
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`address from MapQuest or retrieving information about historical events for a date from Day in
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`History. DTX-28; 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 888:1-889:2; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1156:15-1158:20.
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`Substantial evidence similarly supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met the “first
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`computer program” and “second computer program” limitations of this element. For example,
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`testimony from Drs. Dey and Fox establishes that the web browser (e.g., Netscape, including
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`windows for service applets) or individual applets can be considered the “first computer program.”
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`See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 843:25-851:1, 860:18-863:15, 869:9-870:4, 880:18-881:13, 886:22-
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`887:24, 892:9-15; DTX-10; DTX-11; DTX-15; DTX-18; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1172:21-1173:8,
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`1176:4-6; DTX-11. Their testimony further establishes that Switchboard or Contact Manager can
`
`be considered the “second computer program.” 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 843:25-851:1, 860:18-863:15,
`
`869:9-870:4, 880:18-881:13, 886:22-887:24, 892:9-15; DTX-10; DTX-11; DTX-15; DTX-18;
`
`DTX-20.0003; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1152:22-1153:11, 1160:5-1161:5, 1175:5-15.4
`
`
`4 In its motion, Arendi both ignores the evidence regarding Contact Manager and quotes testimony
`out of context to argue that Dr. Fox “only ‘think[s] [Switchboard is] a separate program.’” Br. at
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 12 of 25 PageID #: 56938
`
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met the “if searching finds
`
`any . . .” element. As discussed, the testimony of Drs. Dey and Fox establishes that the second
`
`information found in the search was displayed, retrieved, suggested, saved, or inserted (“the
`
`action”) in a browser or applet window. See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 849:10-851:23, 892:4-19,
`
`892:20-894:10; DTX-10; DTX-11; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1152:22-1153:11, 1175:16-21. This
`
`testimony further establishes that the type of action depended on the type of first information. See,
`
`e.g., id.; see also, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 888:1-889:2; 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1156:15-1158:12;
`
`DTX-11 (showing ActOn Buttons with display result dependencies by type, e.g., “Lookup Phone
`
`Number For Name using Switchboard”); DTX-28 (services with display result dependencies by
`
`type, e.g., “retrieve a map for a given address using City Net”); 4/24 Trial Tr. (Hedloy) 211:8-
`
`212:9 (webpage associated with the selected URL displayed); DTX-925.0114 (same).
`
`Finally, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk met claim 30. Drs.
`
`Dey and Fox established that CyberDesk prompted a user to update the information source (e.g.,
`
`Contact Manager) with the first information (e.g., name or e-mail address), along with other
`
`associated information (e.g., mailing address or phone number). See, e.g., 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey)
`
`850:22-851:2, 870:18-871:10; DTX-10; DTX-11 (showing various updateable contact information
`
`fields for Contact Manager); 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1176:2-1177:1 (“[T]here’s a little button that says
`
`‘New Contact,’” that “is a prompt,” and “a user could add a new contact”).
`
`B.
`
`There Was More Than Sufficient Basis for the Jury’s Obviousness Verdict.
`
`1.
`
`The jury properly relied on Dr. Fox’s motivation-to-combine opinion.
`
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of a motivation to combine the prior art
`
`
`
`
`
`systems Google presented at trial. Dr. Fox testified to “explicit instructions in the documentation
`
`
`5. But the evidence clearly identified Switchboard and Contact Manager as “second computer
`programs” running separately from the “first computer program.”
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 13 of 25 PageID #: 56939
`
`that were available that would guide us” to be motivated to combine CyberDesk, Apple Data
`
`Detectors (“ADD”), and Microsoft Word 97 (“Word”). 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1177:8-13. A list of
`
`system services on the FCE website showed that CyberDesk could be used with “simple notepad,”
`
`a word processor. Id. at 1177:14-19; DTX-8.002. Dr. Fox said that would have caused one of
`
`ordinary skill to think of Word. 5/1 Trial Tr. 1177:14-22. He similarly testified about a screen from
`
`ADD that “clearly” reflects a word processing document, noting “[i]n the top in parentheses it also
`
`says WP for word processing.” Id. at 1178:5-12; DTX-189.0004. Further, Dr. Fox identified
`
`multiple articles about CyberDesk that explicitly referenced ADD. 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1177:23-
`
`1178:4; DTX-18.00005; DTX-20.0005. And Dr. Dey testified that he met the creator of ADD, Mr.
`
`Miller, at a Georgia Tech “Demo Day” at which Dr. Dey demonstrated the CyberDesk system.
`
`4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey) 875:13-866:2. Mr. Miller, in turn, testified that ClarisWorks was a “word
`
`processing program” that ADD could work with (4/27 Trial Tr. (Miller) 1023:19-22), and one of
`
`the MacWorld videos established that ADD could work with “any type of document you have.”
`
`Id. at 1037:21-1038:3. Dr. Fox also testified that incorporating the functionality from a system
`
`such as CyberDesk or ADD into Word would have been “easy . . . back in the day” because it was
`
`taking available “shortcut functionality … [and] mov[ing] it into other programming packages.”
`
`5/1 Trial Tr. 1184:16–1185:11. As Mr. Hedloy admitted, Microsoft provided a programming
`
`language for developers to save time creating features or applications for Word. 4/24 Trial Tr.
`
`187:16-188:23. Thus, Google’s evidence was not limited to vague assertions that the prior art
`
`systems were in the same field of art. See Br. at 10-11.
`
`
`
`Contrary to Arendi’s arguments, Dr. Sacerdoti’s testimony that the references “taught
`
`away” from combination does not negate the evidence discussed above. His testimony that
`
`CyberDesk and ADD were going in “opposite directions” was conclusory and cannot defeat
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 14 of 25 PageID #: 56940
`
`obviousness because an artisan may still be motivated to combine references directed to different
`
`problems. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. UUSI, LLC, 775 F. App’x 692, 695 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). Arendi also points to Dr. Sacerdoti’s
`
`testimony that the CyberDesk disclosures “teach away” from a combination with Word. Br. at 11.
`
`But the article he relied on aligns with Dr. Fox’s testimony that there were two approaches for
`
`shortcut tools: (1) putting the tool inside one application, and (2) allowing the tool to be shared by
`
`many applications. DTX-10. Even if the article expressed a preference for the CyberDesk
`
`approach, “[a] reference does not teach away ‘if it merely expresses a general preference for an
`
`alternative invention but “does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into
`
`the invention.’” Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In
`
`any event, the jury was free to credit competing testimony on motivation to combine.
`
`2.
`
`Google’s combinations teach the claimed invention.
`
`a)
`
`Claims 23 and 30 are obvious over CyberDesk in view of ADD.
`
`
`
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that CyberDesk in view of ADD rendered
`
`the Asserted Claims obvious. Dr. Fox provided detailed expert opinions alongside documentary
`
`evidence and fact testimony explaining how CyberDesk and ADD together satisfied the limitations
`
`of the Asserted Claims, rendering them obvious. See, e.g., 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1148:9-1171:1
`
`(discussing CyberDesk and ADD), 1171:2-1176:1 (anticipation by CyberDesk), 1178:13-1179:22
`
`(combination as to claim 23), 1180:15-1182:21 (combination as to claim 30); 4/27 Trial Tr. (Dey)
`
`828:829:2, 829:25-864:19, 866:4-896:4, 898:7-900:13; 4/27 Trial Tr. (Miller) 1002:9-1055:6; see
`
`also DTX-4, 6-11, 13-20, 28, 34, 179, 180, 182, 186-191, 777, 880-883, 925.
`
`With respect to claim 23, Arendi’s only argument regarding the combination of CyberDesk
`
`and ADD is that Dr. Fox could not establish that ADD teaches “if searching finds . . .” because he
`
`did not show that “Write a Letter” teaches an action “of a type depending at least in part on the
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 576 Filed 06/30/23 Page 15 of 25 PageID #: 56941
`
`type or types of the first information.” Br. at 13. Dr. Fox, however, referenced the MacWorld
`
`demonstrations, and testified about how ADD analyzed a Wall Street Journal article and picked
`
`out “named entities,” gave the user choices based on those entities, found a person’s email address
`
`and phone number, and wrote a letter using the mailing address found in a contact book by
`
`searching for the email address. 5/1 Trial Tr. (Fox) 1162:13-1164:22. The described “Write a
`
`Letter” functionality showed using first information (email address) to search for second
`
`information (mailing address) and performing an action to insert the contact information into the
`
`letter. Id. The “Write a Letter” action is dependent on the first information, i.e., contact information
`
`that could be used to find a mailing address. See also DTX-189, 777, 880-883.
`
`With respect to claim 30, Dr. Fox pointed to evidence of this limitation in both CyberDesk
`
`and ADD. In CyberDesk, he noted Dr. Dey’s testimony that a user could add a new contact, and
`
`pointed to the “new contact” button as the prompt. 5/1 Trial Tr

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