Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 523 Filed 05/01/23 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 52802
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`GOOGLE’S PROPOSED FINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 5.7
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`C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
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`))))))))))
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`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 523 Filed 05/01/23 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 52803
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`Google’s Proposal:
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`5.7 LICENSE OR RELEASE DEFENSE—THE SAMSUNG AGREEMENT1
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`As you have heard during trial, Samsung and Arendi entered into a Settlement and Patent
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`License Agreement, referred to as the “Samsung Agreement” or the “Agreement,” which is an
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`exhibit in evidence at PX0077. Google asserts that the Samsung Agreement covers downloads
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`of the accused Google apps onto Samsung devices. Arendi asserts that it does not. If Google is
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`correct, then Google cannot be liable for any Google apps downloaded onto Samsung devices,
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`and Arendi may not recover damages for those apps.
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`If you reach the issue of damages, it is up to you to decide whether or not the Samsung
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`Agreement reduces any of Arendi’s damages as to Google for the ’843 Patent.
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`In particular, you should determine:
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`● Whether Google apps on Samsung devices with Google’s Android operating system are
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`“Licensed Product(s)” under Section 1.6 of the Agreement; and
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`● Whether Google is a “supplier” covered under Section 3.1 of the Agreement.
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`If the answer to one or both of these questions is “Yes,” then the Samsung Agreement
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`covers Google apps downloaded onto Samsung devices.
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`To make this determination, you must interpret the Agreement to decide what Arendi and
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`Samsung intended. The best evidence of what Arendi and Samsung intended is the words they
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`1 Though Google does not believe that this issue should be submitted to the jury and should
`instead be resolved by the Court because the Samsung Agreement is unambiguous in Google’s
`favor, Google proposes this instruction in view of the Court’s finding that Sections 1.6 and 3.1 of
`the Agreement are ambiguous, even in view of the Agreement’s integration clause § 8.3, and
`should be submitted to the jury for interpretation. See 5/1/23 Trial Tr.
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`1
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 523 Filed 05/01/23 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 52804
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`used in the Agreement.2 The language of the Agreements should not be read in isolation but read
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`as a whole to give meaning and effect to every term.3
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`In interpreting the Agreement’s provisions, you may consider extrinsic evidence, which
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`is evidence outside the contract regarding Arendi’s and Samsung’s intent, such as testimony
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`presented at trial. But extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict the ordinary meaning of
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`the contract’s terms.4 In cases of doubt or ambiguity, a contract must be construed most strongly
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`against the party who prepared it and favorably to a party who had no voice in the selection of its
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`language.5
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`If you determine that the Samsung Agreement covers accused Google apps downloaded
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`on Samsung devices, then you should not award any damages for those apps.
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`2 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 4:1, available on Westlaw (commentary) (“[A] fundamental tenet
`of contract law is that agreements are construed in accordance with the intent of the parties and
`the best evidence of the parties’ intent is what they express in their written contract”); see
`Tomhannock, LLC v. Roustabout Resources, LLC, 128 N.E.3d 674, 675 (N.Y. 2019); Marin v.
`Constitution Realty, LLC, 71 N.E.3d 530 (2017).
`3 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 4:1, available on Westlaw (commentary) (“[W]ords should be
`considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and
`the intention of the parties manifested thereby.”); see Paramax Corp. v. VoIP Supply, LLC, 107
`NYS3d 231 (4th Dept 2019).
`4 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 4:1, available on Westlaw (commentary) (“Extrinsic evidence
`that is admissible to explain an ambiguous portion of a contract cannot be used to contradict the
`unambiguous contract provisions.”); see P&B Capital Grp., LLC v RAB Performance
`Recoveries, LLC, 9 NYS3d 515 (4th Dept 2015).
`5 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.--Civil 4:1, available on Westlaw (commentary) (“In cases of doubt or
`ambiguity, a contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it and
`favorably to a party who had no voice in the selection of its language” (collecting cases); see,
`e.g., 67 Wall St. Co. v Franklin Nat. Bank, N.E.2d 184 (1975); Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky
`Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570 (1989); Onekey, LLC v Byron Place Assocs., LLC, 160 NYS3d 301
`(2d Dept 2021); Pedersen v Royce, 831 NYS2d 607 (3d Dept 2007).
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`2
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