Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 493 Filed 04/27/23 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 51341
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 493 Filed 04/27/23 Page 1 of 3 PagelD #: 51341
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`GOOGLELLC,
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`Defendant.
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`eeSOaaa’
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`C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
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`Original Version Filed: April 20 2023
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`Public Version Filed: April 27, 2023
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`LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL FROM NEAL BELGAM
`REGARDING GOOGLE’S REQUEST FOR RE-ARGUMENT OF SAMSUNG LICENSE
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Daniel Taylor (No. 6934)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`dtaylor@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneysfor PlaintiffArendi S.A.R.L.
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`Of Counsel:
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`SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
`Seth Ard (pro hac vice)
`Max Straus (pro hac vice)
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32"? Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`John Lahad (pro hac vice)
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kalpana Srinivasan (pro hac vice)
`1900 Avenueof the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`KemperDiehl (pro hacvice)
`401 UnionStreet, Suite 3000
`Seattle, WA 98101-3000
`kdiehl@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: April 20, 2023
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 493 Filed 04/27/23 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 51342
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`Dear Judge Hall:
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`Google asks this Court, once again, to dismiss 42% of Arendi’s claims against Google, on
`the eve of trial, and years after the applicable summary judgment deadline. The Court rejected this
`exact argument two weeks ago because it was an untimely summary judgment motion:
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`
`[L]et’s start with Google’s Motion to Strike Portions of Mr. Weinstein's
`supplemental expert report regarding damages. I reviewed the parties’ submissions
`on that. The Court’s ruling is that Google’s motion is going to be denied. I disagree
`with Google that the dispute was properly brought as a motion to strike.
`
`I agree with Arendi that what Google essentially seeks is a pretrial ruling that
`infringement is licensed when the accused apps are on Samsung devices and that's
`an issue that, in my view, should have been appropriately raised as a motion for
`partial summary judgment. And, of course, the deadline for filing those motions
`has long passed.
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`D.I. 469, Ex. 1, at 4-5. This ruling was correct for all the reasons set forth in Arendi’s original
`letter on this issue. D.I. 426.
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`Google improperly seeks reconsideration of this Court’s ruling during the pre-trial
`conference, without citing or even attempting to meet the high standards for re-argument in this
`District. See In re Sensipar (Cinacalcet Hydrochloride Tablets) Antitrust Litig., No. 19-MD-2895-
`CFC, 2023 WL 2810061, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 2023) (denying motion for re-argument where
`party failed to show any of the three grounds for reconsideration). Far from supporting re-
`argument, the only two cases Google cites relating to patent licenses confirm this Court was correct
`in determining that Google’s motion “should have been appropriately raised as a motion for partial
`summary judgment.” See Oyster Optics, LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., 816 F. App’x 438, 439
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (license issue decided at summary judgment); Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
`Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628–30 (2008) (same). And of course, any such motion for summary judgment
`was due and waived long ago.
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`On the merits, Google’s position is meritless and completely divorced from Arendi’s and
`Samsung’s intent, which controls. A stranger to a contract does not get to dictate what the contract
`means or says. Rather than repeating those arguments, Arendi incorporates its previous responses
`on these exact issues. D.I. 426.
`
`Without citation to any authority, Google argues that this Court must resolve whether the
`contract is ambiguous pretrial, simply because whether a contract is ambiguous is for the Court to
`decide. That is a non-sequitur argument. Courts decide legal issues all the time at the charging
`conference, during trial, even though those legal issues are purely for the Court to decide. The
`same should be done here.
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`Google did not propose any jury instructions on this issue, nor did it preserve this defense
`in its Answer, which it never amended after the Samsung license. To the extent the issue is not
`waived, the proper course is for the parties to present this issue at the charging conference and the
`Court to rule then. On the merits of what the Agreement means, there are three possibilities: the
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`1
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 493 Filed 04/27/23 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 51343
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`contract is unambiguous in Arendi’s favor; it is ambiguous; or it is unambiguous in Google’s
`favor.1 An appropriate jury instruction can be crafted at the charging conference to reflect any of
`those rulings.
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`Respectfully,
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`/s/ Neal C. Belgam
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`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
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`cc:
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`
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`Clerk of Court (via CM/ECF)
`All Counsel of Record (via CM/ECF)
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`1 Contrary to Google’s suggestion, the fact that the parties take opposite views on what the contract
`unambiguously means does not mean the contract is unambiguous. Arendi’s position is that the
`contract is either unambiguous in its favor or that it is ambiguous. See D.I. 426.
`2
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