Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 1 of 29 PageID #: 51293
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 1 of 29 PagelD #: 51293
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`EXHIBIT 1
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 1 of 29 PagelD #: 51293
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`EXHIBIT 1
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 2 of 29 PageID #: 51294
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`Draft Transcript
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`)
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
` )
` )
` Plaintiff, )
` ) C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
`v. )
` )
`GOOGLE LLC,
`)
` )
` Defendant. )
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Friday, April 24, 2023
`9:00 a.m.
`Jury Trial
`
`Volume I
`
`
`
`844 King Street
`Wilmington, Delaware
`
`BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL
`United States Magistrate Judge
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`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`
` SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
` BY: NEAL C. BELGAM, ESQ.
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` -and-
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 3 of 29 PageID #: 51295
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`Draft Transcript
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`APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
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`
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` SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
` BY: JOHN LAHAD, ESQ.
` BY: KEMPER DIEHL, ESQ,
` BY: MAX STRAUS, ESQ.
` BY: SETH ARD, ESQ.
` BY: KALPANA SRINIVASAN, ESQ.
` Counsel for the Plaintiff
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` POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON
` BY: DAVID ELLIS MOORE, ESQ.
`
`
`-and-
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` PAUL HASTINGS
` BY: ROBERT W. UNIKEL, ESQ.
` BY: CHAD J. PETERMAN, ESQ.
` BY: MATTHIAS A. KAMBER, ESQ.
` BY: ANDREA ROBERTS, ESQ.
` Counsel for the Defendant
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`it intended to raise at trial.
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`And I said that Arendi could raise whatever
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`remaining dispute it had about prior art references in a
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`letter after it received those combinations. But, again,
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`I had no idea at that time, and I certainly wasn't made
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`aware that Arendi's concern actually had to do with prior
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`art references that Judge Stark had already addressed in
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`his prior opinion.
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`Then on April 11, five days after the pretrial
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`conference, and over a year after Judge Stark addressed
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`the same issue, I got a letter from Arendi that said --
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`DI 256, again asking the Court to preclude Google from
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`presenting at trial any combinations of prior art that
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`used CyberDesk.
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`Arendi's request is denied for several
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`independent reasons.
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`First, the timing. This request is just too
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`late. If Arendi thought there were open issues that
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`needed resolution prior to trial, Arendi had multiple
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`chances to bring them to the Court. A motion for
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`reargument before Judge Stark, a request in the pretrial
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`order for a bench trial prior to the jury trial, or an
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`express request in the pretrial order that the Court
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`decide the issue before trial on the written record, or
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`even a motion in limine.
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`The motion in limine that Arendi did file for
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`the pretrial order asked for a ruling that defendant
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`couldn't violate Court prior orders. However, there was
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`never any ruling out of this Court saying that Google was
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`estopped from asserting the CyberDesk system; thus, the
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`arguments it now brings are wholly unrelated to the motion
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`in limine that Arendi did file.
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`Second, Arendi's request to exclude all
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`combinations of prior art that include CyberDesk is denied
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`to the extent that it is inconsistent with Judge Stark's
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`prior ruling that IPR estoppel does not prevent Google
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`from presenting obviousness combinations that consist of
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`estopped references in combination with non-estopped
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`references.
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`Third, Arendi says that an evidentiary hearing
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`is not required for the Court to rule on the issue of
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`estoppel. That's that document 463. And on the record
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`presently before the Court, I find that Arendi has failed
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`to meet its burden to prove estoppel.
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`The law says that: "A petitioner in an
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`inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable
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`one or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could
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`be raised under Section 102 or 103 only on the basis of
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`prior art consisting of patents and printed publications."
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`Google says that the CyberDesk system is prior
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 6 of 29 PageID #: 51298
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`art because it was in public use prior to the relevant
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`date. Public use is a separate category of art from
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`patents in publications. The record before the Court
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`suggests that Google intends to show that the CyberDesk
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`system anticipates and was in public use prior to the
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`relevant date.
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`The evidence Google seeks to present to prove
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`anticipation comes from testimony of a developer who
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`demonstrated the system in public and various printed
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`publications that describe aspects of the system,
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`including nine printed publications, one conference
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`poster, the developer's thesis notes, and some other
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`materials like source code and slides.
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`I'm not persuaded that Google could have raised
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`that anticipation argument in the IPR, at least for the
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`reasons that involves combining evidence from multiple
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`sources to show that a single prior art system had all the
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`limitations, and it relies on the public use of the
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`invention which could not have been raised in the IPR.
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`Likewise, I'm not persuaded that Google could
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`have raised public use of the CyberDesk system as part of
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`obviousness combination in the IPR.
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`Arendi points out that Google could have raised
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`in the IPR patents and printed publications that describe
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`CyberDesk. And it contends that those patents and printed
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`publications are cumulative to the evidence that Google
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`intends to present at trial.
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`Judge Stark seemed receptive to that argument,
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`but he didn't decide it. I'm less perceptive.
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`Instead, I agree with the approach and analysis
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`laid out by Judge Noreika in her opinion in Chemours vs.
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`Daikin. That's at 2022 Westlaw 2643517.
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`And I conclude that as a matter of statutory
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`interpretation, estoppel does not apply to Google's
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`invalidity arguments that rely on a prior public use of
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`the CyberDesk system whether or not it's testimonial and
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`written evidence of that system is cumulative to the art
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`that Google could have raised in the IPR.
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`Arendi says that the CyberDesk system is
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`nonexistent; however, Google intends to present testimony
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`that it did exist and that it was publicly demonstrated
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`even though there was no working system fully presented at
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`trial.
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`Arendi also says that pursuant to the
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`corroboration rule, Dr. Dey, a developer of the CyberDesk
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`system, can only testify about aspects of the system that
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`are also described in the printed publications.
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`Arendi argues that because Dey can't testify
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`about additional aspects, the publications are, by
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`definition, cumulative to what he can testify about.
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`I reject that argument, at least for the reason
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`that I disagree that the corroboration rule prevents
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`Dr. Dey from testifying about aspects of a prior art
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`system that are not described in patents and printed
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`publications.
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`To be clear, this is not a case where the only
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`evidence of a prior art public use is a reference that a
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`patentee could have raised in an IPR. I could imagine a
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`hypothetical case where there is an advertisement of a
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`prior art device that an IPR challenger could have
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`presented in an IPR as a printed publication.
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`If the advertisement were the only evidence of
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`a prior public use of an invention, I might be receptive
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`to the argument that defendant cannot escape IPR estoppel
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`by saying that the same reference is also evidence of a
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`prior public use. But the record reflects that is not the
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`case here.
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`Google says that it intends to prove prior use
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`of the CyberDesk system through a combination of testimony
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`and multiple public and nonpublic documents. Thus, even
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`if there were a narrow exception that precluded evidence
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`of prior public use when the only such evidence is
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`materially identical to a single printed publication it
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`could have been raised in the IPR, that exception would
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`not apply here.
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`But, of course, we don't know what will happen
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`at the trial. Accordingly, my ruling is that Google is
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`not estopped from raising the public use of the CyberDesk
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`system as prior art.
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`My ruling is without prejudice for Arendi to
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`reraise it should it appear that Google's only evidence of
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`a prior public use is a publication that could have been
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`raised in the IPR.
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`And that concludes my ruling on that issue.
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`Hopefully that takes care of letters 456, 457, 463, and
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`464.
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`I realized, after I started, that it's possible
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`that Google has furthered limited its combinations to
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`render this issue moot.
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`Is Google still intending to rely on the
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`CyberDesk system?
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`MR. UNIKEL: We are, Your Honor.
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`THE COURT: All right. Okay. Good.
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`All right. Let's move on to the next issue I
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`have on my list. That is issue is the Samsung license
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`defense. I have letters that 469 and 472.
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`By the way, the first -- it took me about
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`12 minutes to read that first ruling. That time will be
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`charged to Arendi.
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`Okay. Next, we have Google's letter filed at
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`The third issue has to do with the scope of
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`evidence that could be presented on -- that has to do with
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`the IPR proceedings. So this, I think it's fair to say
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`that the parties' positions on this issue have been
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`evolving over time, including since last Thursday.
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`So I've got letters that were filed late last
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`night, including, at least, one after midnight. So let's
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`hear from Google on where things stand now.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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`After the hearing on Friday when this issue
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`came up, we had had discussions over the weekend in an
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`attempt to try and at least narrow the dispute, if not get
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`rid of the dispute. Google has withdrawn all of its
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`references to Pandit, which is the one ground that was
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`actually included in the IPR.
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`We have no be obviousness combinations. We are
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`not going to raise Pandit. As a result, our proposal
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`was -- and I think it's the appropriate proposal -- that
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`IPR proceedings should just not come in at all, because at
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`this point, since Pandit is not in the case, those
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`reference to any of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit
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`or the PTAB are going to be confusing to the jury.
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`And, frankly, I think that what we've seen from
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`Arendi is that they would like to use those proceedings to
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`suggest to the jury that all validity issues have been
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`resolved, that the Federal Circuit has spoken definitively
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`on the issue, even though none of the grounds that we are
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`presenting here were presented in the IPR.
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`So we would like just there to be no reference
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`by either side to the IPR proceedings. But if reference
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`is made, then it's going to become a much bigger deal to
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`try and explain to the jury what happened, what does it
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`mean for this case, why are the grounds here different
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`than what could be considered in front on the PTAB, and
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`the different burdens of proof, different claim
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`constructions. And it becomes a very big moras.
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`So we tried to avoid that by eliminating Pandit
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`from the case altogether.
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`THE COURT: So can you tell me what
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`combinations? I have the list of eight. I don't think I
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`know what's getting raised. Just out of curiosity --
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`MR. UNIKEL: Correct. So we're proceeding with
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`anticipation based on CyberDesk, CyberDesk plus Microsoft
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`Word 97, CyberDesk plus Apple data detectors, and Apple
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`data detectors plus Microsoft Word 97.
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`That's all, Your Honor.
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`THE COURT: Okay. The fact that -- I guess I'm
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`struggling. I think what I'm going to hear from the other
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`side is -- and I'll let them talk in a minute -- is that
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`up until this weekend, you wanted to introduce evidence of
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`the IPR proceedings, and it wasn't because -- were you
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`going to say that you thought it was invalidity based on
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`Pandit?
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`MR. UNIKEL: No, Your Honor. The only reason
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`that this was coming up at all is because there's a
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`willfulness charge post complaint. The case was stayed
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`for five years based on IPR proceedings. And we felt that
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`it was important, if there was going to be an aggressive
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`willfulness case, to explain there were proceedings going
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`on in the Patent Office, and that's why we reasonably
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`acted as we did.
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`We do not believe that even that discussion
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`that we were proposing had any relevance to the jury's
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`determination about validity. And we were not planning to
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`use it to suggest validity or invalidity of the patent.
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`We simply -- frankly, we still need to explain
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`why we didn't -- why there was no action for five years as
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`this case was going on, which is why we've asked, in light
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`of the new developments in the case and withdrawal of
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`certain claims, that there not be a willfulness charge as
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`part of the case.
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`But even if there is, we'll just have to
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`explain without reference to the IPR proceedings, because
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`it's become clear that introducing a discussion of the IPR
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`proceedings will become vastly more confusing than it
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`helps on any point.
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`And so we'll basically just have to explain
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`that we were defending the case for 2013 through 2018 when
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`it resumed, and we would not reference what was happening
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`in the Patent Office during that time.
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`That was the only reason we were going to
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`reference the proceedings at all.
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`THE COURT: All right. Thanks very much.
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`All right. Let's hear from Arendi.
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`MR. ARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Seth Ard from
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`Susman Godfrey.
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`First, we think this issue has been raised.
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`They could have raised this long ago in motions in limine.
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`They've been telling us ever since -- you know, up to
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`three days ago, they're going to raise these invalid- --
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`this IPR, and that was their intent to do so. And we
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`think it's too late now. We have our opening prepared.
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`We have our witnesses prepared. It's too late to do it
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`now.
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`Second, it does go to willfulness. He just --
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`Mr. Unikel just said that they reasonably acted the way
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`they did with respect to their belief in invalidity.
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`Their own cases that we've cited back to the Court say
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`that for our willfulness affirmative case, we can show
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`that they took their best shot in trying to invalidate the
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`patent, and they failed to do so. And that shows they
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`didn't have a reasonable belief in the invalidity of the
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`patent. In cases, you know, that we cite say that.
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`And the third point, Your Honor, is, I think,
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`as Your Honor just explained, they can't show invalidity
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`based solely on the features that were exposed in the
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`written publications of CyberDesk, for example, their
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`anticipation defense. And the jury needs to understand
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`that. Otherwise, the jury could make a finding of
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`invalidity that is contrary to the law of estoppel.
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`THE COURT: There's no way that they could have
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`raised CyberDesk public use as an anticipating reference
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`in the IPR; isn't that right?
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`MR. ARD: Well, Your Honor, we agree with what
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`you -- I mean, we accept what you just said about the fact
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`that Dr. Dey is testifying to CyberDesk features that were
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`not disclosed in the publications, but that doesn't mean
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`that those -- what he disclosed -- what we testified that
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`was not disclosed is material to this case in any way. He
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`may have testified to something that wasn't disclosed.
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`But I think, as Your Honor said at the end of
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`your ruling, you know, if what they're really doing and
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`what really ends up happening, is that the publications
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`themselves expose features that invalidate the patent,
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`then that's something that can't be used to invalidate the
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 15 of 29 PageID #: 51307
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`fairly simple propositions.
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`There was an effort to seek review in the
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`Patent Office in 2013. It did not ultimately result in
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`the patent being invalidated in 2016 before the infringing
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`conduct took place. And I think that the stipulations are
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`not really that far apart. Our view it this should be
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`factual, and maybe it could be narrower. Google has
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`offered one that we felt was a little more about argument.
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`But at the end of day, I think that those are
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`two points that, in the absence of understanding what
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`happened, one, it's to our detriment because it doesn't
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`explain what happened with the case. And, two, it does
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`bear on willfulness. That goes both ways. So for Google
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`to say, well, we were going to rely on an adverse final
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`written decision to show that we had a good faith belief,
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`we weren't actually willfully -- and they don't want to do
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`that anymore. I understand that's their election. But we
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`are also entitled to use it to show that they didn't have
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`a basis to believe the patent was invalid at that time
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`that they released their infringing product.
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`And I think that is really the crux of what the
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`IPR proceedings should be used for. It can be whittled
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`down, frankly, to those two propositions. We've really
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`tried to make it factual, but even the stipulation could
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`be shortened to just say that.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 16 of 29 PageID #: 51308
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`I think in the absence of doing that, we are
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`put in this position that is prejudicial to us. And
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`Google has intended to use this. They have the IPR
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`petition and the final written decision on their exhibit
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`list, and they intended to rely on it. And now they've
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`effectively brought a motion in limine to say we were
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`going to rely on it; you can't. We may or may not rely on
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`it. And yesterday they said they didn't. It's a
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`concession that is relevant.
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`But I just want to be clear, we're not talking
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`about spiraling into some rehash of what happened in the
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`petition for institution. I think that we should be able
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`to advise the jury of the basic premise that Google sought
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`review of the patent, that that resulted in a stay of this
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`case, and that, ultimately, the patent was not invalidated
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`in 2016 before the launch of the functionality that's
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`accused in this case. Those bear directly on the issue of
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`willfulness.
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`THE COURT: Couldn't we tell the jury -- can
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`everybody agree that we can tell the jury that the case
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`was stayed and that it's not your fault that the case was
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`stayed.
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`MS. SRINIVASAN: We can. But I think that it's
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`critical, frankly, to understand how we got here. I mean,
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`Google's going to make an argument about how our patent is
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 17 of 29 PageID #: 51309
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`expired and how much time has elapsed. And these are
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`things that are being placed as prejudicial to us. And it
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`is relevant to the question of willfulness and what Google
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`knew at the time that it began its infringing conduct.
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`Surely, they are going context that.
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`THE COURT: But if we didn't say anything about
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`the IPR, the jury's going to sit here and think that there
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`was a valid patent during this time period. I mean, how
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`is that different? You want to be able to tell them that
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`their challenge was rejected.
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`MS. SRINIVASAN: That's it. That their
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`challenge was rejected, and I -- and that, you know, that
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`was part of the reason this matter was not told. To go
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`back to the Patent Office and to seek a review, and that
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`was rejected, and that is relevant to their state of mind
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`at the time that the infringing conduct began.
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`And then I don't think that we need to turn
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`into some, you know, side proceeding about what was in,
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`what was out. We can keep it that simple. But it is
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`relevant, and there are many themes in Google's
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`presentation of its defense that are aimed at, you know,
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`making it look like these patents are expired, so much
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`time has elapsed, we couldn't know, we didn't know.
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`The fact that they -- that the case was brought
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`and then they were able to understand the patents
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 18 of 29 PageID #: 51310
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`Only if you find that we have infringed and
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`only if you find that the patent is valid will you have to
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`consider the question: If Google used Arendi's approach,
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`how much was it really worth to Google?
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`Once again, you're going to hear that their
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`invention was to put all of the instructions inside a
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`single computer program. Google went a different way and
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`put the instructions outside of any specific computer
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`program.
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`So it raises the question of how much would
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`Google pay for a technology that was the opposite of what
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`it wanted, that did the exact opposite thing of how it
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`wanted to construct its systems. And Arendi, as you've
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`seen, wants more than $40 million from Google for the
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`period from December 2017 to November 10, 2018, 11 months,
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`for Google's use of a technology that it didn't want, that
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`it didn't need, and, frankly, that it wanted the opposite
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`of.
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`But if you ultimately get to consider damages,
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`despite the fact that we went one way and they went the
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`other, you're going to hear from an expert by the name of
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`Douglas Kidder. He is a gentleman who has 30-plus years
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`in the area of patent damages and financial damages
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`analysis. And you're going to hear from him about what
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`the appropriate way to consider the possible value to
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`
`
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 19 of 29 PageID #: 51311
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`Google of this would have been.
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`There's a little context, though, that I would
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`like you to consider. Before Arendi filed this suit, it
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`did not contact Google in any way about the patent. It
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`didn't send us a letter. It didn't call us on the phone.
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`Not a single contact to say: I have this patent. I think
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`you might be interested in it, or I think you might be
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`using the technology.
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`Now, remember, when they filed suit in 2013,
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`there's not a single product that's being accused of
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`infringement from that period of time. There's not a
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`single product right now, from 2013 to 2017, that's being
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`accused of infringement in this case, and yet they didn't
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`reach out to us before they filed suit to say: We think
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`you're infringing or we think you're using our patent; you
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`might want a license.
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`As you will hear, since the year 2000, Arendi's
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`company's only business is getting patents and enforcing
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`patents. Since the year 2000, they do not make any
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`products, they do not sell any products, they have not
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`tried to develop any products.
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`And as you will see, from the moment that they
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`filed suit against Google, Google has defended itself at
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`all times on the basis that it doesn't use the technology,
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`it does not want the technology, and it wants to go in a
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`
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 20 of 29 PageID #: 51312
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`different direction. It has defended itself by pointing
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`out the prior art CyberDesk systems and Apple Data
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`Detectors systems, and it has defended itself throughout
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`the case.
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`Now, Arendi pointed multiple times to
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`settlement agreements with Apple, Samsung, and Microsoft.
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`And the strong suggestion was made that these companies
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`took a license because they somehow valued and wanted the
`
`'843 patent. First thing I'll note is that two of those
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`agreements, the Apple agreement and the Samsung agreement,
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`were signed after the patent had expired. After
`
`litigation. They did not come to Arendi before the patent
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`expired and say, hey, we really want your technology;
`
`please let us introduce it. They signed the agreement
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`after they were sued to settle litigation and did this
`
`after the patent was expired.
`
`And there are some more critical things about
`
`these agreements that Arendi doesn't really want you to
`
`focus on.
`
`First, these companies expressly stated that
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`the '843 patent was, in their view, invalid and not
`
`infringed. You will see that on the face of the
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`agreements themselves. So when they say that these were
`
`agreements that were because the patent -- these companies
`
`really valued this technology or thought Arendi was a
`
`
`
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 21 of 29 PageID #: 51313
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`pioneer, you will see that's not true from the face of the
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`agreements.
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`Second, the agreements were not just for the
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`'843 patent. You will sees that these agreements dealt
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`with and licensed many U.S. and European patents. So when
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`they suggest that it was because there was such great
`
`value to the '843 patent that these companies licensed it,
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`what you will see is actually they were getting an entire
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`portfolio of patents. But Arendi is going to ask you to
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`attribute all of the payments that you just saw to just
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`the '843 patent, which doesn't make any sense.
`
`Next, what you will hear is that the total
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`amounts paid under those agreements, the numbers that you
`
`saw for the fees, were tiny compared to the revenues for
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`the covered products that those companies were getting.
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`So they paid a fee and, in return, they got the right to
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`sell a certain amount of product worth a certain amount of
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`revenue. And it was a tiny -- you will hear it was a tiny
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`amount that they paid relative to the revenue that they
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`actually were buying the right to get from the litigation.
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`If Google were to pay the same percentage of
`
`revenues roughly, Google would owe between 40,000 and
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`350,000 total. And Mr. Kidder is going to take you
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`through all the specific numbers so that you can see for
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`yourselves how the license agreements would result in
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`
`
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 22 of 29 PageID #: 51314
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`involved in the process of getting a patent. And then he
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`said that the applicant has to say what it believes its
`
`invention is and clearly express it to the Patent Office.
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`The Patent Office wants to rely on those statements, and
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`then on the basis of that exchange, a patent can issue or
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`not issue.
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`That's true for the patent prosecution process,
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`but it ignores the fact that there was a contested
`
`proceeding on the validity of the patents in which Google
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`participated. So if they're going to say to the jury,
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`well, part of the reason things didn't get before the
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`examiner is because the examiner had to rely solely on
`
`what Arendi said, that is, frankly, opening the door, and
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`is a sword and shield to the fact that there was a
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`contested inter partes review proceeding.
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`Second -- and they said it again. When the
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`Patent Office considered the CyberDesk and Apple Data
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`Detector references, they relied on Arendi's arguments, as
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`they were entitled to do because of the duty of candor,
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`and the patent issue because there was a difference in
`
`their mind.
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`And counsel said they disclosed only some of
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`the capability of those systems, not all. Again, when
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`there's a subsequent proceeding in which a party, the
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`party that is the defendant here, has the ability to raise
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`
`
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 23 of 29 PageID #: 51315
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`art but is then saying that the plaintiff, the patent
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`holder failed -- and implying that we failed to disclose
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`some capability in the references we put before the
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`examiner, and they are then part of inter partes review
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`proceeding where they have every opportunity to put every
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`capability before the IPR, before the Patent Office, that
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`leaves an improper implication in the mind of the jury.
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`And finally, there was quite a bit of reference
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`to, from the moment that they filed suit against Google,
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`Google has defended it at all times on the basis that it
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`doesn't use the technology, it doesn't want the
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`technology, and it wants to go in a different direction.
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`Arendi should be entitled to say that that
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`position is inconsistent with running to the Patent Office
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`within months of the suit being filed to ask to invalidate
`
`the patent. Their position now is, we done practice
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`what's in the patent; we are going in a different
`
`direction. But the fact that they went and sought -- they
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`put the case on hold, they didn't defend themselves
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`against noninfringement, and they sought to invalidate the
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`patent for that period of time is responsive to this
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`assertion they've made.
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`And there was a discussion about how they
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`weren't given notice and nobody came to them to ask for a
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`license, and they're exploiting the timeline in exactly
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 489-1 Filed 04/25/23 Page 24 of 29 PageID #: 51316
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`the way I feared.
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`But these statements that imply that, you know,
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`the examiners, the Patent Office only had whatever Arendi
`
`put before it, is wrong, and you can't take advantage of a
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`contested proceeding and then leave the jury with the
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`impression that all the Patent Office ever saw was what
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`Arendi put before it. And so, you know, the implication
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`is if they didn't put everything properly before the
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`office or they didn't meet their duty of candor, that the
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`patent might have issued even though it was not valid.
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`THE COURT: Thank you.
`
`Counsel?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Your Honor, first, everything that
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`was just said about proceedings to prosecute a patent was
`
`100 percent accurate and came right from the Federal
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`Judicial Center video.
`
`Second, they put up slides in their opening
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`that showed CyberDesk and Apple Data Detectors highlighted
`
`in the references cited in the patent. The Court has
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`already ruled that those systems could not have been
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`presented as part of the IPR. All we argued to the jury
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`was that the Patent Office did not have all the features
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`of those systems in front of it, and,
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