throbber
Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 47503
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 12-1601-JLH
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`))))))))))
`
`
`)
`
`)))))))))
`
`
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`
`
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC F/K/A
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
`CLARIFICATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Robert W. Unikel
`Michelle Marek Figueiredo
`John Cotiguala
`Matt Lind
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Tel: (312) 449-6000
`
`Robert R. Laurenzi
`Chad J. Peterman
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Tel: (212) 318-6000
`
`
`
`
`David E. Moore (#3983)
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew L. Brown (#6766)
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`dmoore@potteranderson.com
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`abrown@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Motorola Mobility
`LLC f/k/a Motorola Mobility, Inc. and
`Google Inc.
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 47504
`
`Ariell Bratton
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4747 Executive Drive, 12th Floor
`San Diego, CA 92121
`Tel: (858) 458-3000
`
`Dated: January 19, 2023
`10555206 / 12599.00040
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 3 of 19 PageID #: 47505
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`V.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Statement of the Nature and Stage of the Proceedings, and Summary of Argument ........ 1
`Statement of Facts .............................................................................................................. 3
`The ’843 patent ...................................................................................................... 3
`Prosecution history of the ’843 patent ................................................................... 5
`Procedural history .................................................................................................. 6
`The Court’s claim construction .................................................................. 6
`The Court’s Daubert and summary judgment rulings ............................... 7
`Legal Standard ................................................................................................................... 9
`IV. Argument ........................................................................................................................... 9
`Clarification is needed before trial ......................................................................... 9
`categories of information “can be searched for” .................................................. 10
`Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 14
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Asserted Claims require a distinct “determination” that the predefined
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 4 of 19 PageID #: 47506
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Acera Surgical, Inc. v. Nanofiber Solutions, LLC,
`C.A. No. 20-980-CFC-JLH, 2022 WL 6948855 (D. Del. Oct. 12, 2022) ...............................10
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................11
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................9, 14
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ...................................9, 10
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................9, 14
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................9
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc.,
`853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................9, 11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 5 of 19 PageID #: 47507
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Statement of the Nature and Stage of the Proceedings, and Summary of Argument
`
`Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L. (“Arendi”) and Defendants Google LLC (“Google”) and
`
`Motorola Mobility LLC f/k/a Motorola Mobility, Inc. (“Motorola”) have completed discovery,
`
`dispositive motions, and an unsuccessful mediation, and now prepare for a trial in these patent-
`
`infringement cases beginning April 24, 2023. (See D.I. 412,1 Supp. Scheduling Order.)
`
`It has become apparent that the Court’s prior construction of one asserted claim limitation
`
`suffers from an ambiguity that, in the absence of clarification, will confuse jurors and improperly
`
`force the jury to decide the scope of the Asserted Claims. Specifically, Defendants move for
`
`clarification regarding the meaning and scope of the claim element, “while the document is being
`
`displayed, analyzing, in a computer process, first information from the document to determine if
`
`the first information is at least one of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for
`
`in order to find second information related to the first information.” (D.I. 97-1, ’843 patent at
`
`10:43–48.) The Court previously construed the constituent phrase “to determine if the first
`
`information is at least one of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for” to mean
`
`“to determine if the first information belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of
`
`identifying information (e.g., a name) or contact information (e.g., a phone number, a fax number,
`
`or an email address) that can be searched for in an information source external to the document.”
`
`(D.I. 143 at 13.)
`
`In subsequent rulings on Daubert and summary judgment motions, Judge Stark ruled that
`
`the Asserted Claims do not require that a separate searchability determination be made at the time
`
`that the computer process actually analyzes a specific text string to ascertain whether it belongs to
`
`a predefined category of information (e.g., a phone number). (D.I. 400 at 6–7, 15, 23.) As a result,
`
`
`1 All docket citations are to the Arendi v. Google case, C.A. No. 13-919, unless otherwise indicated.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 6 of 19 PageID #: 47508
`
`
`
`Judge Stark ruled that Defendants’ non-infringement expert “is precluded from testifying that the
`
`Accused Devices or Accused Apps do not satisfy the claim limitation because they do not
`
`determine the searchability of the first information.” (Id. at 7.) However, the Court’s collective
`
`rulings left, and leave, unclear whether the full claim element mandates a determination at some
`
`point in time as to whether information is of a type “that can be searched for” (e.g., that a
`
`searchability determination be made at least when predefining categories of information to be
`
`identified). Defendants have maintained, and continue to maintain, that the claim language (as well
`
`as the Court’s existing construction) requires a searchability determination.2 At trial, Defendants
`
`intend to argue non-infringement on this basis, as the evidence establishes that none of the accused
`
`products assess searchability in any way in determining what types of information should be
`
`identified in text strings. In the absence of a clarifying ruling or construction, a reasonable jury
`
`will be confused as to what exactly the claim element, as presently construed, means and requires,
`
`and thus will be forced to determine the proper scope of the claims. In particular, the jury will be
`
`forced to decide what the asserted claims require in order for an accused computer process “to
`
`determine if the first information belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of
`
`identifying information (e.g., a name) or contact information (e.g., a phone number, a fax number,
`
`
`2 To be clear, Defendants maintain that the plain language of the full claim element, “while the
`document is being displayed, analyzing, in a computer process, first information from the
`document to determine if the first information is at least one of a plurality of types of information
`that can be searched for,” clearly requires a determination as to whether the first information is a
`“type[] of information that can be searched for” during the time that the “document is being
`displayed.” Judge Stark’s construction seemed to confirm this requirement. Yet, Judge Stark’s
`ruling on the Daubert and summary judgment motions concluded that a searchability
`determination is not required as part of displaying the document or analyzing first information.
`Google believes that Judge Stark’s ruling on this point is incorrect and should be corrected before
`trial. However, at a minimum, Judge Stark’s rulings and construction leave open the issue of
`whether the claims’ required searchability determination must be made at some point in time (even
`if not while the document is displayed), e.g., at the time that information categories are predefined
`for identification. Defendants will argue non-infringement on this basis at trial.
`
`-2-
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 7 of 19 PageID #: 47509
`
`
`
`or an email address) that can be searched for in an information source external to the document.”
`
`(D.I. 143 at 13.)
`
`Defendants request that the Court confirm that the asserted claims, as construed, require a
`
`determination at some point in time that first information belongs to a category or type of
`
`information “that can be searched for in an information source external to the document.” At
`
`minimum, Defendants request that the Court make clear that Defendants and their expert are
`
`permitted to argue and opine at trial that the Accused Products do not infringe the asserted claims
`
`because they do not include any determination, including during the predefinition of information
`
`categories to be identified in text, that “the first information is at least one of a plurality of types
`
`of information that can be searched for,” as is expressly required by the claim language (and by
`
`the existing construction).
`
`II.
`
`Statement of Facts
`A. The ’843 patent
`
`Arendi alleges infringement by Defendants of independent claims 1 and 23 and dependent
`
`claims 8 and 30 (the “Asserted Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843 (the “’843 patent”). Claim
`
`1 is representative for purposes of this motion and discloses, with the relevant language
`
`emphasized:
`
`1. A computer-implemented method for finding data related to the contents of a
`document using a first computer program running on a computer, the method comprising:
`displaying the document electronically using the first computer program;
`while the document is being displayed, analyzing, in a computer process, first
`information from the document to determine if the first information is at least
`one of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for in order to find
`second information related to the first information;
`retrieving the first information;
`providing an input device, configured by the first computer program, that allows a user
`to enter a user command to initiate an operation, the operation comprising (i)
`
`
`
`
`
`-3-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 8 of 19 PageID #: 47510
`
`
`
`performing a search using at least part of the first information as a search term in
`order to find the second information, of a specific type or types, associated with the
`search term in an information source external to the document, wherein the specific
`type or types of second information is dependent at least in part on the type or types
`of the first information, and (ii) performing an action using at least part of the
`second information;
`
`in consequence of receipt by the first computer program of the user command from
`the input device, causing a search for the search term in the information source,
`using a second computer program, in order to find second information related to
`the search term; and
`
`if searching finds any second information related to the search term, performing the
`action using at least part of the second information, wherein the action is of a type
`depending at least in part on the type or types of the first information.
`
`(’843 patent at 10:38–11:3.)
`
`Figure 1 of the ’843 patent illustrates the purported invention in flowchart form:
`
`
`
`(Id. at Fig. 1.) As will be discussed in greater detail below, Steps 4 and 6 show that first information
`
`in a document is analyzed to determine whether it is a type of information that can be searched for.
`
`As seen in Steps 12 and 14, if the information is determined to be a “NAME ONLY (OR
`
`SIMILAR)” or “NAME AND ADDRESS,” which are determined to be searchable in a database,
`
`
`
`
`
`-4-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 9 of 19 PageID #: 47511
`
`
`
`then the invention proceeds to “LOOKUP NAME IN DATABASE.” (Id.) As seen in Step 10, if
`
`the information is determined to be an “EMAIL ADDRESS MAILING LIST/CATEGORY
`
`NAME, TEL. NO. OR OTHER,” which are determined not to be searchable in a database, then
`
`the invention does not even attempt to perform a search in the database, and instead proceeds to
`
`different “APPROPRIATE ACTION (NOT DISPLAYED HERE).”
`
`B. Prosecution history of the ’843 patent
`
`On July 29, 2008, Atle Hedløy (“Applicant”) filed the application for what later would
`
`become the ’843 patent. (See ’843 patent.) On October 28, 2010, the patent office rejected the
`
`patent claims, as then drafted, as obvious based on prior art, including the “Person” prior art
`
`reference, which disclosed certain “mail merge” software. (Unikel Decl., Ex. 1, Non-Final
`
`Rejection at 8, 12.)
`
`On December 28, 2010, Applicant submitted a response to the rejection, amending its
`
`claims to add the “to determine if” element and arguing that the claims as amended were not
`
`obvious based on Person, and another reference, “Tso.” (Unikel Decl., Ex. 2, Suppl. Resp. A.)
`
`Specifically, Applicant amended the claim language as follows:
`
`while the document is being displayed, analyzing, in a computer process,
`the document to identify any first information from the document to
`determine if the first information is at least one of a plurality of types of
`information that can be searched for in order to find second information
`related to the first information;
`
`(Id. at 7.)
`
`When amending the claims to add the “to determine if” element, Applicant made clear, and
`
`emphasized, that the requirement of analyzing information to determine if it is of a type “that can
`
`be searched for” is separate and distinct from the later claim element requiring “performing a
`
`search.” (Id. at 22–24 (labeling the searchability determination requirement as “item (1)” and the
`
`performing a search requirement as “item (2)” and then distinguishing Person and Tso in light of
`
`
`
`
`
`-5-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 10 of 19 PageID #: 47512
`
`
`
`those separate claim requirements).) Of particular note, Applicant argued that, “The Person
`
`reference also does not disclose or suggest item (1) above, analyzing first information from the
`
`document to determine if the first information is at least one of a plurality of types of information
`
`that can be searched for in order to find second information related to the first information, as
`
`required by the claims.” (Id. at 23–24 (italics in original).) According to Applicant, “Person fails
`
`to disclose or suggest a search for first information, as required by item (2) above, because the
`
`information to be inserted by mail merger is never searched for in the information source,” and
`
`“[s]ince there is no search, as required by the claims, Person also cannot determine if the first
`
`information is of a type that can be searched, as further required by item (1) above.” (Id. at 23–24
`
`(italics in original, underlining added).)
`
`The ’843 patent subsequently was granted and issued, with the amended “to determine if”
`
`element in the Asserted Claims, on March 29, 2011. (’843 patent.)
`
`C. Procedural history
`1. The Court’s claim construction
`
`On August 19, 2019, the Court provided the following construction:
`
`Claim Term
`
`Court’s Construction
`
`“to determine if the first
`information is at least one of
`a plurality of types of
`information that can be
`searched for”
`(D.I. 143 at 13.)
`
`“to determine if the first information belongs to one or more of
`several predefined categories of identifying information (e.g.,
`a name) or contact information (e.g., a phone number, a fax
`number, or an email address) that can be searched for in an
`information source external to the document”
`
`The Court’s construction did not make clear when or how the determination must be made
`
`that the predefined categories of identifying or contact information “can be searched for in an
`
`information source external to the document.” In particular, the Court’s construction did not make
`
`apparent whether the determination must be made (a) by the computer process at the moment of
`
`
`
`
`
`-6-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 11 of 19 PageID #: 47513
`
`
`
`“analyzing . . . first information”, and/or (b) during the predefinition of information categories to
`
`be identified. (See id.)
`
`2. The Court’s Daubert and summary judgment rulings
`
`On March 5, 2021, Defendants moved for summary judgment of non-infringement,
`
`explaining, among other things, that the Accused Products do not “analyze to determine whether
`
`identified information is of a type that ‘can be searched for’ on a user’s device.” (E.g., D.I. 327 at
`
`23; C.A. No. 12-1601, D.I. 326 at 23.) Arendi conceded that the Accused Products do not make
`
`any determination that the identified types of information can be searched for, but instead argued
`
`that the Asserted Claims do not require such a distinct determination. (See D.I. 358 at 25.)
`
`Arendi simultaneously moved to exclude certain opinions of Dr. Rinard, Defendants’ non-
`
`infringement expert, including those opining that the Accused Products do not infringe because
`
`“none of the Accused Products determine if the first information is of a type that ‘can be searched
`
`for,’” and there was no allegation by Arendi “that any of the[] predefined types can be searched
`
`for or that any determination is made that they can be searched for.” (Unikel Decl., Ex. 3 (“Rinard
`
`Report”) ¶ 441; 541; see also id. ¶¶ 561, 562, 566, 568–571 (explaining same for each accused
`
`functionality).) (E.g., D.I. 314 at 4; C.A. No. 12-1601, D.I. 310 at 4.)
`
`On March 31, 2022, Judge Stark ruled on these motions. The Court granted Arendi’s
`
`Daubert motion in relevant part, and held that “Dr. Rinard is precluded from testifying that the
`
`Accused Devices or Accused Apps do not satisfy the claim limitation because they do not
`
`determine the searchability of the first information.” (D.I. 400 at 7.) The Court adopted its
`
`reasoning from Arendi’s similar motion against a different defendant’s non-infringement expert,
`
`reasoning that “the Court’s construction does not require that the searchability determination of
`
`
`
`
`
`-7-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 12 of 19 PageID #: 47514
`
`
`
`the first information must be made by the accused infringing products while performing this step
`
`of the claimed process.” (Id. at 6.)3
`
`The Court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motions as to this claim limitation for
`
`the same reasons, finding “that the asserted claim does not require that the searchability
`
`determination of the first information be made by the Accused Products while performing this step
`
`of the claimed process.” (Id. at 15 (emphasis added), 23.)
`
`Accordingly, the Court ruled that the claim language at issue does not require that a distinct
`
`searchability determination be made at the time of “analyzing . . . first information.” But, regardless
`
`of the correctness or incorrectness of the Court’s decisions, those rulings did not expressly address
`
`whether or not searchability must be determined at some point in time, e.g., assessed and used to
`
`predefine the information categories to be identified. The language of the Asserted Claims, and
`
`the Court’s existing construction, explicitly refer to a required determination as to whether “the
`
`first information belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of identifying information
`
`(e.g., a name) or contact information (e.g., a phone number, a fax number, or an email address)
`
`that can be searched for in an information source external to the document.” But, Judge Stark’s
`
`Daubert and summary judgment rulings create significant ambiguity and dispute about how the
`
`Court’s construction can and should be argued by the parties and applied by the jury.
`
`
`3 Once again, to be clear, Defendants maintain that this ruling is error and ignores the requirements
`of the full claim element containing the phrase that the Court construed. The full claim element
`expressly states, “while the document is being displayed, analyzing, in a computer process, first
`information from the document to determine if the first information is at least one of a plurality of
`types of information that can be searched for.” (’843 patent at 10:43–48.) This requires that the
`analyzing “to determine if” must occur at the time the document is being displayed on a user
`device. Defendants urge the Court to correct this error before the scheduled trial.
`
`-8-
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 13 of 19 PageID #: 47515
`
`
`
`III. Legal Standard
`
`“[T]he court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of
`
`language used in the patent claim.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). “When the parties raise an actual dispute
`
`regarding the proper scope of the[] claims, the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.” O2
`
`Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Failing to
`
`do so constitutes “legal error.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314,
`
`1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding error when “the court left [a] question of claim scope unanswered,
`
`leaving it for the jury to decide”).
`
`As the Court explained in its claim construction opinion, in construing claims, courts
`
`consider the claims, specification, prosecution history and, where appropriate, extrinsic evidence.
`
`(D.I. 143 at 2–4.) See also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “It is
`
`highly disfavored to construe terms in a way that renders them void, meaningless, or superfluous.”
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`IV. Argument
`A. Clarification is needed before trial
`
`The Court has found that the Asserted Claims do not require a distinct determination, at
`
`the moment of “analyzing . . . first information,” that the “predefined categories of identifying
`
`information . . . or contact information . . . can be searched for.” (D.I. 400 at 6–7.) But the Court
`
`has not resolved or made clear whether the searchability determination nevertheless must be made
`
`at some point in time, such as when predefining eligible categories of identifying or contact
`
`information. That open issue decides whether Defendants, supported by their non-infringement
`
`expert, may present at trial that the Accused Products do not infringe the Asserted Claims because
`
`at no point do they determine that a category of information can be searched for, including when
`
`
`
`
`
`-9-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 14 of 19 PageID #: 47516
`
`
`
`determining the predefined categories of information to be identified in a document. Defendants
`
`fully intend to make this presentation at trial based on the existing construction, and expects that
`
`Arendi will present its infringement case based on a broader claim scope that omits a searchability
`
`determination altogether. It therefore is important for the Court now to clarify the existing
`
`construction so the jury is not presented with two competing understandings of the claims’ scope
`
`and requirements, which it must then improperly choose between and apply. See Markman, 52
`
`F.3d at 979; see also Acera Surgical, Inc. v. Nanofiber Solutions, LLC, C.A. No. 20-980-CFC-
`
`JLH, 2022 WL 6948855, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 12, 2022) (Report and Recommendation) (“When the
`
`parties have an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of claim terms, their dispute must be
`
`resolved by the judge, not the jury.”) (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979).
`
`B. The Asserted Claims require a distinct “determination” that the predefined
`categories of information “can be searched for”
`
`The Asserted Claims, as construed by the Court, include an analysis “to determine if the
`
`first information belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of identifying information
`
`(e.g., a name) or contact information (e.g., a phone number, a fax number, or an email address)
`
`that can be searched for in an information source external to the document.” (D.I. 143 at 13.) This
`
`necessitates a “determination” that the “predefined categories . . . can be searched for.” Though
`
`the Court’s summary judgment and Daubert rulings held (incorrectly, in Defendants’ view) that
`
`this determination need not be made “while the document is displayed,” at the moment of
`
`“analyzing . . . first information,” (D.I. 400 at 6–7, 15), the actual claim language and the Court’s
`
`existing construction make clear that such determination must be made at some point in time, such
`
`as when predefining the categories of information.
`
`Finding otherwise would effectively read “that can be searched for” out of the “to
`
`determine if” claim element and would improperly merge into one the “to determine if”
`
`
`
`
`
`-10-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 47517
`
`
`
`requirement and the later and distinct claim element requiring “performing a search using at least
`
`part of the first information as a search term . . . .” (’843 patent at 10:50–60.) This would make the
`
`words “that can be searched for” in the separate “to determine if” requirement a “merely
`
`superfluous, nonlimiting elaboration,” and thus would not “giv[e] effect to all terms in the claim.”
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Wasica Fin. GmbH,
`
`853 F.3d at 1288 (“It is highly disfavored to construe terms in a way that renders them void,
`
`meaningless, or superfluous.”). A “determination” that the categories of information “can be
`
`searched for” (either as part of the predefinition of categories to be identified or at the time of the
`
`analyzing) is a distinct, express requirement that must be met under the Asserted Claims. Indeed,
`
`given that the categories of information indisputably must be categories that “can be searched for,”
`
`a determination that the categories can be searched for must be made at some point, in order to
`
`predefine those categories.
`
`The ’843 patent specification confirms that a distinct searchability determination must be
`
`made. In particular, Figure 1 shows that, after Step 6, where information is identified as being of
`
`a particular type, a further Step 10, 12, or 14 is taken depending on the type of information that
`
`was found and whether that type of information is one that has been determined to be searchable
`
`in a database. (See ’843 patent at Fig. 1; see also id. at Fig. 2 (same).) The specification explains
`
`that “[t]he program analyzes what the user has typed,” and then takes the appropriate resulting
`
`action. (Id. at 4:32–39.) If the information includes a name, which is determined to be searchable,
`
`then the name is looked up in a database (Id. at Fig. 1, Steps 12 and 14); but if the information
`
`includes only an “email address mailing list/category name, tel. no. or other,” then the information
`
`is not looked up in a database and a different “APPROPRIATE ACTION” is taken instead. (See
`
`id. at Fig. 1, Step 10, 4:40–46.) The specification’s examples thus make clear that even though
`
`
`
`
`
`-11-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 16 of 19 PageID #: 47518
`
`
`
`names, addresses and telephone numbers are all analyzed and identified in the document, only
`
`names, having separately been determined to be searchable in the database, are used to later
`
`perform a search in the database. Telephone numbers and other categories of information, having
`
`apparently been determined not to be searchable in the database, are routed to “APPROPRIATE
`
`ACTION” other than “LOOKUP IN DATABASE.” (E.g., id. at Fig. 1, Steps 4, 8, 10, 12, 14; 6:10–
`
`18, 7:30–37.) Therefore, the purported invention ultimately determines not only what category or
`
`categories of information the analyzed information belongs to, but also whether any of those
`
`categories “can be searched for,” so it then can decide whether to even attempt to look up the
`
`information in a database or take a different appropriate action. Indeed, the claimed invention
`
`could not proceed to carry out a search (as separately required by the claims) if it had not first
`
`determined that the analyzed information corresponded to a usable database search field.
`
`The ’843 patent’s prosecution history reinforces the conclusion that the “to determine if”
`
`claim element is separate and distinct from the later “performing a search” claim element, and
`
`requires a determination at some point in time that the information “can be searched for.” As noted
`
`earlier, to overcome a rejection, Applicant amended the claims to add the independent “to
`
`determine if” requirement and explained that “Person fails to disclose or suggest a search for first
`
`information, as required by item (2) [the “performing a search” requirement] above, because the
`
`information to be inserted by mail merger is never searched for in the information source,” and
`
`“[s]ince there is no search, as required by the claims, Person also cannot determine if the first
`
`information is of a type that can be searched, as further required by item (1) [the searchability
`
`determination requirement] above.” (Unikel Decl., Ex. 2, Supp. Resp. A at 7, 22–24 (italics in
`
`original, underlining added).) Applicant thus specifically emphasized Person’s alleged lack of a
`
`searchability determination as an independent basis to distinguish the prior art. This further
`
`
`
`
`
`-12-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 422 Filed 01/19/23 Page 17 of 19 PageID #: 47519
`
`
`
`substantiates that searchability is a distinct determination required by the Asserted Claims, and
`
`supports Defendants’ proposed clarification.
`
`Finally, in this litigation, Arendi’s own experts have recognized that the “to determine if”
`
`element requires a searchability determination that goes beyond merely identifying information as
`
`being of a particular category (e.g., a telephone number). For instance, Arendi’s validity expert
`
`expressly distinguished the Newton prior art on the basis that it did not make a distinct searchability
`
`determination, even though the Newton undisputedly identified information as being of particular
`
`categories:
`
`Q. And why is it the case that if Newton identifies 555-1000 as a possible phone number that
`it does not necessarily mean that the phone number can be searched for?
`
`A. Because those are independent functionalities of a computing device.
`
`*****
`
`Q. And is it your view that identifying text as a phone number is not enough to meet the
`claim element that you’ve identified here?
`
`A. On the face of it, it’s not because there’s a – there’s also a requirement that the type of
`information can be searched for -- excuse me, that the information can -- the information is
`of a type that can be searched for.

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket