Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 1 of 47 PageID #: 31232
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`f/k/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A. No. 12-1601-LPS
`
`Original Version Filed: March 5, 2021
`Public Version Filed: March 11, 2021
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
`Original Version Filed: March 5, 2021
`Public Version Filed: March 11, 2021
`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`Of Counsel:
`Seth Ard
`Beatrice Franklin
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`bfranklin@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`John Lahad
`Ibituroko-Emi Lawson
`Burton DeWitt
`Robert Travis Korman
`Brenda Adimora
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 2 of 47 PageID #: 31233
`
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`elawson@susmangodfrey.com
`bdewitt@susmangodfrey.com
`tkorman@susmangodfrey.com
`badimora@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kalpana Srinivasan
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kemper Diehl
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101-3000
`kdiehl@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: March 5, 2021
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 3 of 47 PageID #: 31234
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................... 1
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 1
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 3
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 5
`1.
`IPR Estoppel bars defendants from asserting the invalidity of the asserted claims in
`view of the following prior art, including in combination. .................................................... 6
`2. Google and Motorola impermissibly combine multiple references and devices in a
`single alleged piece of prior art. ............................................................................................. 25
`A. Defendants’ Apple Data Detector System did not exist. ............................................. 26
`B. Defendants’ LiveDoc System did not exist: ................................................................. 31
`C. Defendants’ Selection Recognition Agent did not exist. ............................................ 32
`D. Defendants’ Eudora System did not exist. .................................................................. 34
`3. The two demonstrative Apple Data Detector and LiveDoc laptops do not qualify as
`prior art. ................................................................................................................................... 35
`4. Google and Motorola have failed to present any evidence supporting the affirmative
`defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, laches, or limitation on damages
`under 35 U.S.C. § 286. ............................................................................................................ 37
`A. 35 U.S.C. § 286 does not limit the damages sought by Arendi ................................... 37
`B. The limitation on damages under 35 U.S.C. § 288 does not apply. ........................... 38
`C. The record does not support Defendants’ defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, or
`unclean hands. ..................................................................................................................... 39
`D. Motorola’s laches defense does not apply. Arendi does not seek damages from
`more than six years pre-suit. .............................................................................................. 39
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 40
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 4 of 47 PageID #: 31235
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ.,
`212 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................26
`
`Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc.,
`No. 14CV6544KAMGRB, 2019 WL 365709 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2019) ............................8, 36
`
`Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple,
`832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................4, 6
`
`Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp.,
`No. 2000-1511, 2001 WL 35738792 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 31, 2001) ...............................................38
`
`California Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd.,
`No. CV 16-3714-GW(AGRX), 2019 WL 8192255 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019),
`order corrected, No. CV 16-3714-GW, 2019 WL 8807924 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
`21, 2019) ....................................................................................................................................7
`
`CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
`526 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) ...................................................6
`
`Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`631 F. Supp. 2d 484 (D. Del. 2009) .........................................................................................39
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001)....................................................................................................5
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966) .................................................................25
`
`HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC,
`817 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................8
`
`Hyatt v. Boone,
`146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998)................................................................................................30
`
`Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Aptiv Servs. US LLC,
`No. 1:17-CV-01194-JDW, 2020 WL 4335519 (D. Del. July 28, 2020) ................................6, 8
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc.,
`878 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................26
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 5 of 47 PageID #: 31236
`
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................26
`
`Nextec Applications v. Brookwood Cos.,
`703 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) .....................................................................................26
`
`Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co.,
`No. 15 C 1067, 2019 WL 861394 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2019) ..................................................7, 8
`
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,
` 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ..........................................................................................................7, 8
`
`SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC,
`137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) ...............................................................................................................40
`
`Scripps Clinic & Rsch. Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs.
`v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ......................................................................26
`
`Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.,
`817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................8
`
`Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc.,
`726 F.2d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1984)..................................................................................................26
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc.,
`432 F. Supp. 3d 448, 453 (D. Del. 2020) ...........................................................................6, 7, 8
`
`Willis Elec. Co. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd.,
`No. 15-CV-3443-WMW-KMM, 2019 WL 5541407 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2019) .................6, 24
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ....................................................................................................................1, 25, 35
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ..................................................................................................................25, 30, 35
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ................................................................................................................................5
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 285-288 ..................................................................................................................3, 4
`
`35 U.S.C. § 286 ..............................................................................................................3, 37, 38, 40
`
`35 U.S.C. § 288 ....................................................................................................................3, 38, 39
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) ...................................................................................................................6, 7
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 6 of 47 PageID #: 31237
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Abowd, et al., “Applying Dynamic Integration as a Software Infrastructure for
`Context-Aware Computing,” GVU Technical Report, GIT-VU-97-18 (1997) ..........................9
`
`Abowd, et al., “Context-awareness in Wearable and Ubiquitous Computing,”
`GVU Technical Report, GIT-GVU-97-11 (1997) ......................................................................9
`
`Dey, “Context-Aware Computing: The CyberDesk Project,” Future Computing
`Enviromnents, AAAI ‘98 Spring Symposium (1998) ..................................................................9
`
`Dey, et al., “CyberDesk: A Framework for Providing Self-Integrating Context-
`Aware Services,” Knowledge Based Systems, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1998) ........................................9
`
`Dey, et al, “CyberDesk: A Framework for Providing Self-Integrating Ubiquitous
`Software Services,” GVU Technical Report, GIT-GVU-97-10 (1997) ......................................9
`
`Dey, et al., “CyberDesk: The Use of Perception in Context-Aware Computing,”
`PUI ‘97 (1997) ...........................................................................................................................9
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 .............................................................................................................................5
`
`Framework for Providing Self-Integrating Ubiquitous Software Services,
`Technical Report, GVU Center, Georgia Institute of Technology, GIT-GVU -
`97-10, June 1997 ......................................................................................................................10
`
`http://www.cc.gatech.edu/fce/cyberdesk .......................................................................................10
`
`Wood, et al., “CyberDesk: Automated Integration of Desktop and Network
`Services,” GVU Technical Report, GIT-GVU-97-11 (1997) .....................................................9
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 7 of 47 PageID #: 31238
`
`Plaintiff Arendi S.a.r.l. (“Arendi”) respectfully submits this Opening Brief in Support of
`
`its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), Motorola Mobility
`
`LLC (“Motorola”) and Google LLC (“Google,” collectively “Defendants”) have asserted grounds
`
`of invalidity that they reasonably could have raised during inter partes review and are estopped
`
`from pursuing them in litigation. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 448,
`
`453 (D. Del. 2020). In addition, Defendants’ invalidity and anticipation case relies on prior art
`
`without demonstrated proof of its existence. Other defenses raised in their Answers find no support
`
`in the record and Defendants offered no support for these boiler plate defenses in discovery.
`
`
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS
`
`In these actions for patent infringement, Arendi alleges that Defendants infringe claims 1,
`
`8, 23, and 30 (“Asserted Claims”) of U.S. Patent 7,917,843 (“’843 Patent”). In their Answers,
`
`Motorola and Google each asserted affirmative defenses including invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§
`
`102 and 103, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and limitations on damages under 35 U.S.C. §§
`
`286 and 288. D.I. 99; D.I. (Motorola) 9.1 Google further asserted the affirmative defenses of waiver
`
`and unclean hands. D. I. 99. Motorola further asserted the affirmative defense of laches. D.I. 9.
`
`The Court entered its claim construction order on August 19, 2019, D.I. 144, fact discovery closed
`
`on December 13, 2019, D.I. 174, and expert discovery closed on January 22, 2021, D.I. 210.
`
`
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`Google and Motorola cannot establish genuine disputes of a material fact for the aforenoted
`
`affirmative defenses:
`
`1. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), Defendants are estopped from asserting grounds of
`
`invalidity that each raised or reasonably could have raised during inter partes review.
`
`
`1 D.I. numbers are to the Google docket unless otherwise noted.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 8 of 47 PageID #: 31239
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`Therefore, Google and Motorola are estopped from asserting each piece of prior art detailed
`
`in Section 1 of the Argument (pages 6 et seq.), including in combination with one another.
`
`The Court should enter partial summary judgment holding that this prior art does not render
`
`the ’843 Patent invalid either independently or in combination with one another.
`
`2. Each Defendant and their expert improperly merge distinct references and systems to create
`
`a posited “Apple Data Detectors System,” “LiveDoc System,” “Selection Recognition
`
`Agent System” and “Eudora System.” Neither Defendant can show that these aggregate
`
`systems ever existed and, therefore, cannot rely on them to establish invalidity under 35
`
`U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103. The Court should enter partial summary judgment holding that these
`
`alleged “systems” do not render the ’843 Patent invalid, including in combination with
`
`prior art.
`
`3. Defendants cannot establish that the two demonstrative laptops that form part of its
`
`aggregated “Apple Data Detectors System” and “LiveDoc System” qualify as prior art.
`
`Evidence in the record establishes that the systems were created during the pendency of
`
`this litigation and does not show that such systems existed prior to November 10, 1998.2
`
`The Court should enter partial summary judgment holding that these alleged “systems” do
`
`not render the ’843 Patent invalid either independently or in combination with prior art.
`
`4. Defendants have not presented any evidence supporting the affirmative defenses of
`
`equitable estoppel, waiver, laches, unclean hands, or damages limitations pursuant to 35
`
`U.S.C. §§ 286 and 288. The defenses are consigned to bare conclusory statements in their
`
`
`2 November 10, 1998 is the filing date of the parent U.S. application of the’843 Patent to which
`the ’843 Patent claims priority. The ’843 Patent also claims priority to a Norwegian patent
`application filed September 3, 1998. To the extent that Apple contests the earlier September 3
`priority date, it is unnecessary to resolve that dispute in order to decide the present motion: there
`is no evidence that the relevant art existed before either date.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 9 of 47 PageID #: 31240
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`Answers, and Google and Motorola have not set forth any evidence supporting these
`
`equitable affirmative defenses in discovery. Further, section 286 is inapplicable as Arendi
`
`does not seek damages prior to the prescribed statutory period. Section 288 is inappropriate
`
`because at the time Arendi filed suit, there had been no finding of validity related to the
`
`’843 Patent. The Court should enter partial summary judgment against each of these
`
`affirmative defenses.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`Arendi filed its complaint against Motorola for infringement of the ’843 Patent on
`
`
`
`November 29, 2012. D.I. (Motorola) 1. That complaint also asserted infringement of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,496,854 (“’854 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,306,993 (“’993 Patent”), the relevant claims
`
`of which have since been held unpatentable or indefinite. The ’843 Patent is a continuation of the
`
`’854 Patent. All three patents claim priority to the same foreign patent application, Norwegian
`
`Patent No. 984,066, and their specifications substantially overlap. Compare D.I. 112-1, at 2-29
`
`with id. at 34-67 and with id. at 72-94.
`
`Motorola answered on January 21, 2013, asserting the following affirmative defenses:
`
`non-infringement, invalidity, no injunctive relief, laches, equitable estoppel, damages limitations
`
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 285-288, and substantial non-infringing use. D.I. 9 (Motorola), at 6-8.
`
`Arendi filed its complaint against Google for patent infringement of the ’843 Patent on
`
`May 22, 2012. D.I. 1. That complaint also asserted infringement of the ’854 Patent, U.S. Patent
`
`Nos. 6,323,853 (“’853 Patent) and U.S. Patent 7,921,356 (“’356 Patent”). All four patents belong
`
`to the same family. Google answered on July 22, 2013. D.I. 9.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 10 of 47 PageID #: 31241
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`On December 2, 2014, Google, Motorola and Apple Inc.3 jointly petitioned for inter partes
`
`review of certain claims of the ’843 Patent, including all four Asserted Claims. Ex. 1 (Petition).4
`
`Those parties simultaneously petitioned for IPR of Arendi’s ’993 Patent and ’854 Patent. Ex. 2
`
`(Petition (’993 Patent)); Ex. 3 (Petition (’854 Patent)); Ex. 4 (Petition (’854 Patent)). On February
`
`20, 2014, Google further petitioned for IPR of the ’356 Patent. Ex. 5 (Petition). On February 21,
`
`2014, Google and Motorola jointly petitioned for IPR of the ’853 Patent. Ex. 6 (Petition).
`
`On June 11, 2018, the PTAB instituted IPR of the ’843 Patent in view of the Pandit patent.
`
`Ex. 7, at 18-19. The PTAB entered its Final Written Decision on June 9, 2015, finding the Asserted
`
`Claims unpatentable for obviousness over Pandit. Ex. 8. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed
`
`the finding of unpatentability. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Following IPR, Arendi filed an Amended Complaint against Google on December 21,
`
`2018, alleging infringement of the ’843, ’854, ’356, and ’993 Patents. D.I. 97. Arendi’s claims
`
`under the ’854, ’356, and ’993 Patents have since been held unpatentable or indefinite, leaving
`
`only the asserted claims of the ’843 Patent at issue. Google answered on January 11, 2019,
`
`asserting the following affirmative defenses: non-infringement, invalidity, damages and costs
`
`limitations pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 285-288, no injunctive relief, estoppel, waiver, unclean hands,
`
`prosecution history estoppel, substantial non-infringing use, and patent exhaustion and/or implied
`
`license. D.I. 99, at 7-10.
`
`On January 17, 2014, Google and Motorola jointly served their Initial Invalidity
`
`Contentions. D.I. 32. They jointly served Amended Initial Invalidity Contentions on March 27,
`
`2019. D.I. 103. Fact discovery closed in this case on December 13, 2019, D.I. 174, and expert
`
`
`3 Apple Inc. is the defendant in the related case Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., C.A. 12-1596-LPS.
`4 All exhibits belong to the Declaration of Seth Ard, filed concurrently herewith, unless specifically
`noted.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 11 of 47 PageID #: 31242
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`discovery closed on January 22, 2021, D.I. 210. Google and Motorola served two joint expert
`
`reports germane to the present motion: On August 7, 2020, they served the “Expert Report of
`
`Edward Fox, Ph.D. on the Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843.” D.I. 214; Ex. 9 (“Opening
`
`Report”). On December 4, the parties served the “Reply Expert Report of Edward Fox, Ph.D. on
`
`the Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843.” D.I. 234; Ex. 10 (“Reply Report”).
`
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
`
`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 56(a). An assertion that a fact cannot be—or, alternatively, is—genuinely disputed must be
`
`supported either by citing to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
`
`documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
`
`those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
`
`materials,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
`
`genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).
`
`A patent’s presumption of validity can only be overcome through clear and convincing
`
`evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`Thus, “a moving party seeking to have a patent held not invalid at summary judgment must show
`
`that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear and
`
`convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could
`
`invalidate the patent.” Eli Lilly & Co., at 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 12 of 47 PageID #: 31243
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`1. IPR Estoppel bars defendants from asserting the invalidity of the asserted claims in
`view of the following prior art, including in combination.
`
`Defendants are estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) from asserting that a “claim is invalid
`
`on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during [an] inter partes
`
`review” that resulted in a final written decision. On December 2, 2013, Defendants petitioned for
`
`IPR. See generally Ex. 1. On June 11, 2018, the PTAB instituted IPR of the ’843 Patent, including
`
`of asserted claims 1, 8, 23 and 30, in view of Pandit. Ex. 7, at 18-19. The PTAB entered its Final
`
`Written Decision on June 9, 2015, finding inter alia claims 1, 8, 23 and 30 of the ’843 Patent
`
`unpatentable for obviousness over Pandit. Ex. 8. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the
`
`finding of unpatentability. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Defendants are clearly estopped from raising Pandit—having actually pressed that ground
`
`of invalidity during IPR. But Defendants are also estopped from asserting any other ground of
`
`invalidity that they reasonably could have raised in their petition to institute IPR but did not raise.
`
`“References that an alleged infringer ‘reasonably could have raised’ include ‘any references that
`
`were known to the petitioner or that could reasonably have been discovered by a skilled searcher
`
`conducting a diligent search.’” Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 448,
`
`453 (D. Del. 2020) (quoting Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. IBM Corp., No. CV 13-2072
`
`(KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912 , at *11 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017)); see also Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Aptiv
`
`Servs. US LLC, No. 1:17-CV-01194-JDW, 2020 WL 4335519, at *3 (D. Del. July 28, 2020).
`
`Although not required, “[o]ne way to show what a skilled search would have found would be (1)
`
`to identify the search string and search source that would identify the allegedly unavailable prior
`
`art and (2) present evidence, likely expert testimony, why such a criterion would be part of a skilled
`
`searcher’s diligent search.” Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at
`
`*9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016); see also Willis Elec. Co. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd., No. 15-CV-3443-
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 13 of 47 PageID #: 31244
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`WMW-KMM, 2019 WL 5541407, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2019) (holding that “standard must
`
`certainly be met by prior art listed on the face of patents relevant to the litigation at hand”).
`
`IPR estoppel applies not only to prior art references; it also bars Defendants from raising
`
`prior art systems that are cumulative of estopped references. IPR estoppel “extend[s] to invalidity
`
`‘grounds’ that include a physical product when a patent or prior art publication—to which the
`
`physical product is entirely cumulative—was reasonably available during the IPR.” Wasica, 432
`
`F. Supp. 3d at 453; see also Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 15 C 1067,
`
`2019 WL 861394, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2019) (“Where . . . a petitioner had reasonable access
`
`to printed publications corresponding to or describing a product that it could have proffered during
`
`the IPR process, it cannot avoid estoppel simply by pointing to its finished product (rather than the
`
`printed materials) during litigation.”); California Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. CV 16-3714-
`
`GW(AGRX), 2019 WL 8192255, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019), order corrected, No. CV 16-
`
`3714-GW (AGRX), 2019 WL 8807924 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (forbidding “swapping labels
`
`for what is otherwise a patent or printed publication invalidity ground in order to “cloak” its prior
`
`art ground and “skirt” estoppel”).
`
`Thus, in Wasica, the petitioner could not rely on certain ZR-1 Sensors as an invalidating
`
`system because the printed “Siuru” publication “disclose[d] all of the relevant features of the ZR-
`
`1 Sensors” and “Siuru reasonably could have been raised during the IPR.” 432 F. Supp. 3d at 453.
`
`This Court noted that “[p]hysical products cannot be raised during IPR proceedings” but that
`
`“patents or printed publications that relate to and describe a physical product can, like other patents
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`and printed publications, be raised in an IPR.” Wasica, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 453. Because the Siuru
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`publication could have been raised, its counterpart ZR-1 Sensors system was estopped, including
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`in combination with other estopped prior art: “Since the estoppel provision, § 315(e)(2), applies
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 14 of 47 PageID #: 31245
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`to grounds, a petitioner is estopped from proceeding in litigation on those grounds, even if
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`the evidence used to support those grounds was not available to be used in the IPR.” Id. at 454
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`(emphasis in original).
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`Neither Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016), nor HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, 817 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
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`counsel a contrary result. Shaw concerned grounds included in the petition to institute but for which
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`the PTAB affirmatively declined to institute IPR; Shaw does to apply to grounds that the petitioner
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`declined to raise in its petition in the first place. Microchip Tech. Inc., No. 1:17-CV-01194-JDW,
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`2020 WL 4335519, at *3; see also, e.g., Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc.,
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`No. 14CV6544KAMGRB, 2019 WL 365709 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2019).5 Especially in the wake of
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`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu—which made the circumstances faced by Shaw impossible by barring
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`the institution of IPR for less than all petitioned grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018)—both Shaw and
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`HP have been limited to their facts. E.g., Microchip Tech. Inc., No. 1:17-CV-01194-JDW, 2020
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`WL 4335519, at *3 (noting since SAS “district courts reject the argument that IPR estoppel does
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`not apply to non-petitioned grounds”).
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,859,636 (“Pandit”): Defendants are estopped from asserting Pandit as
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`invalidating prior art—including in combination with the references and systems discussed below.
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`5 As one court noted, “while it makes sense that noninstituted grounds do not give rise to estoppel
`because a petitioner cannot—to no fault of its own—raise those grounds after the institution
`decision, when a petitioner simply does not raise invalidity grounds it reasonably could have raised
`in an IPR petition, the situation is different” because the petitioner has waived the opportunity to
`assert them. Oil-Dri Corp. of Am., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at *8. Moreover,
`extending Shaw to nonpetitioned grounds would be “contrary to the plain language of the statute
`by “render[ing] the ‘reasonably could have raised’ language nearly meaningless” and “invites
`parties to take ‘a second bite at the apple.’” Id. (quoting Parallel Networks, No. CV 13-2072
`(KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at *12).
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`8
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 15 of 47 PageID #: 31246
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`Pandit was actually raised by Defendants during IPR, and it formed the basis of the PTAB’s Final
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`Written Decision. Ex. 1, at 48-51; see generally Ex. 8.
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,946,646 (“Miller”); “From Documents to Objections: An Overview
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`of LiveDoc”; “Drop Zones: An Extension of LiveDoc”; U.S. Patent No. 5,644,735 (“Luciw”):
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`Defendants cannot raise Miller, the two LiveDoc articles or Luciw as part of an obviousness
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`combination with other references that Defendants reasonably could have raised during IPR.
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`Defendants actually raised each of these references independently as a ground for invalidity in
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`their Petition for IPR of the ’843 Patent. See generally Ex. 1. Thus, Defendants indisputably knew
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`of these references and could have raised each of these references as part of obviousness
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`combinations.
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`CyberDesk: IPR estoppel applies to the “CyberDesk” prior art asserted by Defendants,
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`together with its obviousness combinations. The CyberDesk references were readily available to
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`Defendants when they petitioned for IPR. The ’843 Patent itself cites seven CyberDesk
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`references.6 Ex. 11 (’843 Patent), at 1, 4. Arendi produced copies of CyberDesk references with
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`the file wrapper for the ’843 Patent on August 27, 2013, months before Defendants petitioned for
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`IPR. Ex. 12, at 11708-46, 12007-24; Ex. 13; S. Ard. Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. Documents in the produced
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`file wrapper even showed that the CyberDesk references had previously been asserted as
`
`
`6 Dey, et al., “CyberDesk: The Use of Perception in Context-Aware Computing,” PUI ’97 (1997);
`Dey, “Context-Aware Computing: The CyberDesk Project,” Future Computing Environments,
`AAAI ’98 Spring Symposium (1998); Dey, et al., “CyberDesk: A Framework for Providing Self-
`Integrating Context-Aware Services,” Knowledge-Based Systems, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1998); Wood,
`et al., “CyberDesk: Automated Integration of Desktop and Network Services,” GVU Technical
`Report, GIT-GVU-97-11 (1997); Abowd, et al., “Applying Dynamic Integration as a Software
`Infrastructure for Context-Aware Computing,” GVU Technical Report, GIT-GVU-97-18 (1997);
`Abowd, et al., “Context-awareness in Wearable and Ubiquitous Computing,” GVU Technical
`Report, GIT-GVU-97-11 (1997); Dey, et al, “CyberDesk: A Framework for Providing Self-
`Integrating Ubiquitous Software Services,” GVU Technical Report, GIT-GVU-97-10 (1997).
`
`9
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 315 Filed 03/11/21 Page 16 of 47 PageID #: 31247
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`invalidating prior art against Arendi’s related ’853 Patent. E.g, Ex. 12, at 1683-84. Arendi served
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`additional copies of CyberDesk references on October 18, 2013. E.g., Ex. 14; Ex. 15; Ex. 16; Ex.
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`17; Ex. 18; S. Ard. Decl., ¶¶ 16-20. Once one of the CyberDesk references was identified, the
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`remainder of the references could reasonably have been discovered. The articles share overlapping
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`titles, authorship and institutional affiliation (Georgia Tech), and they cross-reference one another.
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`E.g., Ex. 17, at AHL0121563; ARENDI-DEFS00021056, at ’58 (Dey Depo. Ex. 23). They are also
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`posted to the single CyberDesk homepage under the heading “CyberDesk and Related P