Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 31215
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
`
`Original Version Filed: March 5, 2021
`Public Version Filed: March 11, 2021
`
`))))))))))
`
`
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`PORTIONS OF DR. MARTIN RINARD’S EXPERT REPORT
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`Of Counsel:
`Seth Ard
`Beatrice Franklin
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`bfranklin@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`John Lahad
`Ibituroko-Emi Lawson
`Burton DeWitt
`Robert Travis Korman
`Brenda Adimora
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`elawson@susmangodfrey.com
`bdewitt@susmangodfrey.com
`tkorman@susmangodfrey.com
`badimora@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kalpana Srinivasan
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 31216
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`
`
`Kemper Diehl
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101-3000
`kdiehl@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: March 5, 2021
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`
`
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`
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 31217
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
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`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ..................................................................... 1
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`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 1
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 2
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2
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`I. THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE DR. RINARD’S OPINIONS THAT ARE
`INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. ................................... 2
`
`A. The Court should exclude Dr. Rinard’s “that can be searched for” construction and
`related opinions. ...................................................................................................................... 3
`
`II. DR. RINARD FAILS TO APPLY THE PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING OF
`TERMS GOOGLE DID NOT ASK THE COURT TO CONSTRUE. ....................................... 7
`
`A. The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s construction of “analyzing, in a computer process,
`first information in a document.” ............................................................................................ 7
`
`B. The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s construction of “performing an action using at
`least part of the second information.” ..................................................................................... 9
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`C. The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s constructions requiring the first computer program
`to “perform an action.” ......................................................................................................... 11
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 13
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`i
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 31218
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases 
`
`Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape A/S,
`No. 17-1646-LPS, 2020 WL 4926164 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2020) ........................................ passim
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................... 12, 14
`
`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
`509 U.S. 579 (1993) ............................................................................................................ 1, 3, 4
`
`EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc.,
`154 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D. Del. 2016) ........................................................................................ 4, 12
`
`EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc.,
`No. 13-1985-RGA, 2016 WL 775742 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2016) .................................................. 9
`
`Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... 10, 11
`
`Integra Lifesciences Corp. v. HyperBranch Medical Tech., Inc.,
`No. 15-819-LPS, 2018 WL 1785033 (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2018) ..................................................... 6
`
`Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC,
`232 F. Supp. 3d 632 (D. Del. 2017) .................................................................................... 14, 15
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
`449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................... 12, 17
`
`Personalized User Model, L.L.P. v. Google Inc.,
`No. 09-525-LPS, 2014 WL 807736 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2014) ..................................................... 5
`
`Plastic Omnium Advanced Innovation & Research v. Donghee Am., Inc.,
`387 F. Supp. 3d 404 (D. Del. 2018) ............................................................................................ 4
`
`Rules 
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 702(c) ................................................................................................................... 11
`Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(d) ........................................................................................................... 1,3, 4
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 31219
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`Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L. (“Arendi”) moves to exclude portions of the expert report of
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`Defendant Google LLC’s (“Google”) expert Dr. Martin Rinard because it advances and relies on
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`claim constructions that are inconsistent with the Court’s constructions and impermissibly narrow
`
`the plain and ordinary meaning of unconstrued claim terms.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
`
`This case involves Arendi’s U.S. Patent No. 7,917,843 (the “’843 Patent”). Arendi alleges
`
`that Google’s devices and applications infringe claims 1, 8, 23, and 30 of the ’843 Patent. The
`
`Court construed certain claim terms on August 19, 2019 (D.I. 144), fact discovery closed on
`
`December 13, 2019 (D.I. 174), and expert discovery closed on January 22, 2021 (D.I. 210).
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`Dr. Rinard advances multiple opinions that violate the basic standards of Daubert v.
`
`Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. These
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`opinions should be excluded for at least the following reasons:
`
`1.
`
`Dr. Rinard applies a construction of the claim term “to determine if the first
`
`information is at least one of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for” that is
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`inconsistent with the Court’s construction. He improperly re-argues claim construction—
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`extensively citing the intrinsic record—to add a limitation that the Court did not.
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`2.
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`Dr. Rinard applies constructions of other claim terms that are narrower than their
`
`plain and ordinary meaning. Google did not ask the Court to construe these terms. Claim
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`construction is for the Court, not technical experts, and the Court should exclude Dr. Rinard’s
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`improper constructions and related opinions.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 31220
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`
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`
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`At Markman, the Court construed certain claim terms in the ’843 Patent at the parties’
`
`request. See D.I. 141. On October 20, 2020, Google served Dr. Rinard’s expert report, in which
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`he opines that the accused Google products do not infringe the asserted claims of the ’843 Patent.
`
`Declaration of Kemper Diehl (“Diehl Decl.”), Ex. 1.
`
`ARGUMENT
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`Because expert witness testimony has the potential to “be both powerful and quite
`
`misleading,” Federal Rule of Evidence 702 creates “a gatekeeping role for the judge” to “ensur[e]
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`that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”
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`Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 597 (citation omitted). Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible
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`only if (1) “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) “the testimony is the product of
`
`reliable principles and methods,” and (3) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and
`
`methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(d); see also Plastic Omnium Advanced
`
`Innovation & Research v. Donghee Am., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 404, 410 (D. Del. 2018) (Stark, J.),
`
`aff’d, 943 F.3d 929 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “The party offering the expert testimony bears the burden of
`
`proving admissibility.” EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92 (D. Del. 2016)
`
`(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10).
`
`I.
`
`THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE DR. RINARD’S OPINIONS THAT ARE
`INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION.
`
`“[E]xpert testimony inconsistent with the Court’s claim construction is unreliable and
`
`unhelpful to the finder of fact” and should be excluded. Personalized User Model, L.L.P. v. Google
`
`Inc., No. 09-525-LPS, 2014 WL 807736, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2014) (Stark, J.) (striking portions
`
`of expert report submitted by another Google expert in this case, Edward Fox, for contradicting
`
`Court’s claim construction); see also Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1321
`
`2
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 31221
`Case 1:13-cv-00919—LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 31221
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`(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“No party may contradict the court’s construction to a jury”). Expert opinions
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`that “narrow[] the Court’s construction” are likewise untenable. Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape A/S,
`
`No. 17-1646-LPS, 2020 WL 4926164, at *7 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2020) (Stark, J.); see also Integra
`
`Lifesciences Corp. v. vaerBranch Medical Tech., Inc, No. 15-819-LPS, 2018 WL 1785033, at
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`*5 0). Del. Apr. 4, 2018) (excluding expert opinions that narrowed Court’s construction).
`
`A.
`
`The Court should exclude Dr. Rinard’s “that can be searched for”
`
`construction and related opinions.
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`The Court provided the following claim construction:
`
`Claim Term
`
`Court’s Construction
`
`“to determine if the first information is at
`least one of a plurality of types of information
`that can be searched for”
`
`“to determine if the first information belongs
`to one or more of several predefined
`categories of identifying information (e.g., a
`name) or contact information (e.g., a phone
`number, a fax number, or an email address)
`that can be searched for in an information
`
`source external to the documen .”
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`D.I. 140 at 13. Despite the clarity of the Court’s construction that there need only be a single
`
`determination of whether the first information “belongs to one or more of several predefined
`
`categories of identifying .
`
`.
`
`. or contact information .
`
`.
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`. that can be searched for in an information
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`source external to the document,” Dr. Rinard argues that this claim step also requires
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard
`
`Report] 1] 255; see also id. 1[ 448
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`contradict the claim language and Comt’s construction, and seek to argue claim scope to the jury.
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`.1 These opinions must be excluded because they
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`1 Dr. Rinard’s improper opinions construing and applying his construction of the “can be searched
`for” term appear in paragraphs 255—56, 440—53, and 531-74 of his report. See Diehl Decl., Ex. 1.
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 31222
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`
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`First, Dr. Rinard’s opinions contradict the Court’s construction by imposing a requirement
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`that the Court did not. See Align Tech., 2020 WL 4926164, at *8 (excluding expert opinions that
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`added claim limitation because “[t]he Court did not read such a limitation into the claims at claim
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`construction”). Specifically, Dr. Rinard opines that there must be an
`
`
`
` (Diehl Decl.,
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`Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 255) whereas the Court’s construction requires only a determination of
`
`whether first information “belongs to one or more of several predefined categories” of the specified
`
`type. D.I. 140 at 13 (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the Court’s construction, and the
`
`claim language itself, is that the phrase “that can be searched for” modifies the allowable
`
`“predefined categories” and does not specify a distinct analyzing step to be made. Because the
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`eligible “predefined categories” necessarily consist of types of information “that can be searched
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`for,” there is no requirement to also determine if the information “can be searched for,”
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`
`
`. Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 255; see also id. Ex. 2 [Rinard Dep. Tr.] at
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`189:17-21
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`
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`In imposing the additional requirement of analyzing to determine searchability, Dr. Rinard
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`construes the claim as if it read:
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`. . . analyzing, in a computer process, first information from the document to
`determine if the first information is at least one of a plurality of types of
`information, and also analyzing the first information to determine if it is of a type
`that can be searched for . . .
`
`If the Court had intended to require a special determination of
`
`
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`it would have adopted such language in its construction. It did not.
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`4
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 31223
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`
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`The Court’s finding that the required determination was limited to predefined categories
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`of information further undercuts Dr. Rinard’s insistence on analyzing to determine searchability.
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`D.I. 140 at 13. By specifying that the relevant categories of information are designated in advance,
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`and that the only determination to be made is whether the first information belongs to one of them,
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`the Court’s construction is clear that there is no separate step of also determining the information’s
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`searchability.
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`Even had Google pressed Dr. Rinard’s construction arguments during Markman, which it
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`did not, Dr. Rinard’s reading would have contravened the ’843 Patent. The “analyzing” described
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`in the specification does not include the step of determining searchability. For example, in
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`describing Figure 1, the specification states:
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`The program analyzes what the user has typed in the document at step 4, for
`example, by analyzing (i) paragraph/line separations/formatting, etc.; (ii) street,
`avenue, drive, lane, boulevard, city, state, zip code, country designators and
`abbreviations, etc.; (iii) Mr., Mrs., Sir, Madam, Jr., Sr. designators and
`abbreviations, etc.; (iv) Inc., Ltd., P.C., L.L.C, designators and abbreviations, etc.;
`and (v) a database of common male/female names, etc. If the program find an e-
`mail address mailing list/category name telephone number or other information, at
`step 10 an appropriate action is performed by the program . . .
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent] at 4:25-42. This exemplary embodiment is focused on identifying
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`the predefined categories of information, like addresses or names, not determining their
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`searchability. See also id. at Fig. 1. Fig 2, 5:9-57. Dr. Rinard’s opinions must be stricken because
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`they seek to add limitations to the claim language in contradiction to the plain meaning of the
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`Court’s construction. See EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc., No. 13-1985-RGA, 2016 WL 775742,
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`at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2016) (striking expert opinions that added limitations to claim terms).
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`Second, Dr. Rinard’s opinions must also be excluded because he improperly seeks to re-
`
`argue claim construction at trial. Dr. Rinard’s report re-raises the same purported evidence of claim
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`meaning that Defendants advanced at Markman. Compare Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶
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`5
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 31224
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`
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`446 with D.I. 118 at 13 (citing the same statements from IPR Proceedings). Indeed, Dr. Rinard re-
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`hashes the actual arguments the parties made during Markman and advances his own analysis of
`
`the ’843 Patent’s prosecution history to support his construction. Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard
`
`Report] ¶¶ 443-45, 447-48 (
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`). All of this is improper. Parties cannot present expert testimony at trial that
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`“amount[s] to arguing claim construction to the jury.” EMC, 2016 WL 775742, at *4 (citation
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`omitted); Align Tech., 2020 WL 4926164, at *5-6 (striking opinions where expert interpreted
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`prosecution history and “adopt[ed] a construction of the claim term” that “narrow[ed] the claim
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`scope from the plain and ordinary meaning”). Moreover, Dr. Rinard’s reliance on inventor
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`testimony (i.e., the testimony of Atle Hedløy) is particularly inappropriate not only because Dr.
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`Rinard grossly mischaracterizes it,2 but also because advancing inventor testimony in support of
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`claim constructions is legally impermissible even at the Markman stage. Howmedica Osteonics
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`Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The testimony of an
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`inventor ‘cannot be relied on to change the meaning of the claims.’” (citations omitted)).
`
`
`2 Dr. Rinard advances a truncated and misleading quote from Mr. Hedløy’s deposition, claiming
`that
`
` Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report]
`¶ 415. But this quotation omits critical words. Mr. Hedløy was testifying about the advantages of
`the invention, including that “the user can access -- can perform these tasks with a minimal number
`of actions or key strokes. Does not have to learn or even have access to directly the database or
`the second application of database where the data is stored.” Diehl Decl., Ex. 4 [Atle Hedløy Dep.
`Tr.] at 127:24-128:17.
` Dr. Rinard misleadingly
`alters its meaning.
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`6
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 31225
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`
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`II.
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`DR. RINARD FAILS TO APPLY THE PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING OF
`TERMS GOOGLE DID NOT ASK THE COURT TO CONSTRUE.
`
`Expert opinions that contradict and narrow the plain and ordinary meaning of unconstrued
`
`claim terms are not the “product of reliable principles and methods” and should be excluded. Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 702(c).
`
`A.
`
`The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s construction of “analyzing, in a
`computer process, first information in a document.”
`
`Dr. Rinard improperly construes the claim term “analyzing, in a computer process, first
`
`information in a document,” which Google did not ask the Court to construe, to forbid analysis of
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`any additional text. Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 454-69. In full, the claim element reads
`
`as follows:
`
`“while the document is being displayed, analyzing, in a computer process, first
`information from the document to determine if the first information is at least one
`of a plurality of types of information that can be searched for in order to find second
`information related to the first information;”
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent] at 10:43-48 (emphasis added). Dr. Rinard argues that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(emphasis added). Dr. Rinard then applies this construction to conclude that there is no
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` Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 457
`
`infringement where Arendi
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`[Rinard Dep. Tr.] at 184:12-185:13.
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`
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` Id. ¶ 458; see also id. Ex. 2
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`Google did not ask the Court to construe this term; yet, Dr. Rinard now offers a construction
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`inconsistent with its plain and ordinary meaning. Dr. Rinard adds a limitation by effectively
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`inserting the word “only” into the claim language to make it read: “analyzing, in a computer
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 31226
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`
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`process, only first information in a document.” See Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 454-60.
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`The claim language includes no such limitation. Because Dr. Rinard “adopts a construction of the
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`claim term” that “narrows the claim scope from the plain and ordinary meaning, and then applies
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`that construction throughout his . . . non-infringement analyses,” these opinions must be excluded.
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`Align Tech., 2020 WL 4926164, at *8; see also EMC, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 109 (“Expert testimony
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`based on an impermissible claim construction is properly excluded as irrelevant and on the basis
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`that the evidence could confuse the jury”); Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209,
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`1224 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony as irrelevant where it was based
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`on an impermissible claim construction).
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`Moreover, rather than apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the unconstrued claim
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`language, as required, Dr. Rinard relies on his own reading of the prosecution history to advocate
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`for his construction. Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 454-56 (
`
`
`
`). These
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`prosecution history arguments are again improper because experts cannot argue claim construction
`
`at trial. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“it is improper
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`to argue claim construction to the jury because the ‘risk of confusing the jury is high when experts
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`opine on claim construction’”).
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`Even if Google had made these arguments at Markman, they would fail. The specification
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`shows that analyzing is not limited to first information. For example, in Figs. 1 and 2, step 4 is
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`described as “Analyze what the user has typed in the document.” Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent]
`
`at Fig. 1. There is no limitation that the document can contain only “first information” at this point,
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`or that, if the document contains additional information, only the first information be analyzed. Id.
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`This step involves analyzing all entered text. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that if the analyzing finds
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`8
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 31227
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`
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`“nothing or not interpretable” upon analyzing the entered text at step 6, then it proceeds to “give
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`message and quit” at step 8. Clearly, if the analyzing can find “nothing” in what a user has typed,
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`it is not required to only analyze first information that exists in the document. Example 2 from the
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`specification even shows additional information being analyzed. Fig. 5 shows that the document
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`contains a name (“John Smith,” the first information), and an address, which is not part of the first
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`information. When step 4 is conducted, all of the text is analyzed (i.e., “John Smith 222 5th Ave.
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`New York, NY 10028”), and only the name is identified as first information. Under Dr. Rinard’s
`
`interpretation, this embodiment would not practice the claim because text other than the first
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`information has been analyzed.
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`Dr. Rinard’s opinions are analogous to the opinions this Court struck in Align
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`Technologies, where an expert similarly opined “based on his analysis of the prosecution history,”
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`that the applicant had narrowed the claims “during prosecution to overcome prior art rejections”
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`such that they no longer covered certain embodiments in the specification. Align Tech., 2020 WL
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`4926164, at *5. The Court struck the expert’s opinions for improperly narrowing the claim term’s
`
`plain and ordinary meaning, and it should do the same here.
`
`B.
`
`The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s construction of “performing an action
`using at least part of the second information.”
`
`Dr. Rinard also improperly construes the claim element of “performing an action using at
`
`least part of the second information,” which Google did not ask the Court to construe, by opining
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`that actions involving the display of second information are not
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`
`
` Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 386-400. In full, the claim element
`
`reads as follows:
`
`providing an input device, configured by the first computer program, that allows a
`user to enter a user command to initiate an operation, the operation comprising (i)
`performing a search using at least part of the first information as a search term in
`order to find the second information, of a specific type or types, associated with the
`9
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 31228
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`search term in an information source external to the document, wherein the specific
`type or types of second information is dependent at least in part on the type or types
`of the first information, and (ii) performing an action using at least part of the
`second information;
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent] at 10:50-60 (emphasis added).
`
`Again improperly arguing claim construction based on the intrinsic record, Dr. Rinard
`
`conducts his own analysis the ’843 Patent’s specification and prosecution history to identify “
`
`96
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`
`
`
`
`. Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 393-
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`
`
`
`
`). These opinions must be excluded because
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`they seek to argue claim construction at trial, Cordis, 561 F.3d at 1337, and improperly seek to
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`“import limitations from the specification into the claims through expert testimony.” Kraft Foods
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`Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, 232 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634-35 (D. Del. 2017) (Stark, J.).3
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`Further, these opinions deviate from and narrow the claim term’s plain and ordinary
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`meaning. Nothing in the claim language limits the meaning of “performing an action using at least
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`part of the second information” to exclude actions that involve displaying second information to
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`the user. Indeed, in its recent decision in the related case Arendi v. HTC Corp., the Court explicitly
`
`
`3 Dr. Rinard’s effort to re-argue claim construction at trial is particularly improper because it relies
`on mischaracterizing the prosecution history. Dr. Rinard opines that
`
`
`that Arendi distinguished in prior art. Ex. 1 [Rinard Report]
`¶ 396. This argument mischaracterizes the prosecution history because Arendi distinguished the
`URL-hyperlinking prior art not because displaying webpages does not constitute an “action,” but
`rather because the prior art did not disclose any search for second information.
`10
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 31229
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`
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`recognized that the “action” can be “use of second information by display of the second
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`information.” Arendi v. HTC Corp., No. 12-1600-LPS, D.I. 152 at 6 (D. Del. Dec. 15, 2020).
`
`Nonetheless, Dr. Rinard narrows the claim language by asserting that
`
`
`
` Diehl
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`Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 396. Addressing several of the actions identified by Arendi’s
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`technical expert, Dr. Rinard contends that
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`234:6. This argument relies on Dr. Rinard’s faulty construction defining the “action” as only
`
` Id. ¶ 397; see also id. Ex. 2 [Rinard Dep. Tr.] at 231:8-
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`placing the telephone call or creating the text message—and arbitrarily
`
`
`
`
`
`.
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`Dr. Rinard’s narrower construction deviates from the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim, by
`
`placing an unfounded limitation on what can constitute an “action using at least part of the second
`
`information,” and should be excluded. Align Tech., 2020 WL 4926164, at *8.
`
`C.
`
`The Court should strike Dr. Rinard’s constructions requiring the first
`computer program to “perform an action.”
`
`Dr. Rinard also opines, contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language,
`
`that the “first computer program” must perform the “action” prompted by the user’s command.
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶¶ 411-32. In full, the relevant claimant element reads:
`
`providing an input device, configured by the first computer program, that allows a
`user to enter a user command to initiate an operation, the operation comprising (i)
`11
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 31230
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`
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`performing a search using at least part of the first information as a search term in
`order to find the second information, of a specific type or types, associated with the
`search term in an information source external to the document, wherein the specific
`type or types of second information is dependent at least in part on the type or types
`of the first information, and (ii) performing an action using at least part of the
`second information;
`
`Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent] at 10:50-60.
`
`Google did not ask the Court to construe this language, yet again Dr. Rinard improperly
`
`recites prosecution history, IPR proceedings, and inventor testimony to argue claim construction
`
`and fabricate a requirement
`
`
`
` Diehl Decl., Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 423
`
`(emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 404-10 (reciting external sources for claim construction
`
`purposes).
`
`These opinions create and then apply a claim limitation—that the first computer program
`
`must perform an action using at least part of the second information—that does not exist. Dr.
`
`Rinard concludes that there is no infringement because
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Diehl Decl.,
`
`Ex. 1 [Rinard Report] ¶ 413 (emphasis added). But there is nothing in the claim language that,
`
`when given its plain and ordinary meaning, requires the first computer program to “perform[] an
`
`action using at least part of the second information.” See Diehl Decl., Ex. 3 [’843 Patent] at 10:50-
`
`60; 10:66-11:3. In its recent decision in the related case Arendi v. HTC Corp., the Court held that
`
`“[t]he second information must be used to perform an action, but that action is not required to be
`
`performed in the first computer program.” Arendi v. HTC Corp., No. 12-1600-LPS, D.I. 152 at 4
`
`(D. Del. Dec. 15, 2020) (emphasis in original). The Court’s holding on the meaning of this claim
`
`12
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 314 Filed 03/11/21 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 31231
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`
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`language puts the issue to rest, and Dr. Rinard’s unsupported contradictory construction must be
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`excluded. Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1224 n.2.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Arendi requests that the Court exclude the opinions of Google’s
`
`expert Dr. Rinard as identified in the accompanying proposed order.
`
`
`Of Counsel:
`Seth Ard
`Beatrice Franklin
`Max Straus
`SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`sard@susmangodfrey.com
`bfranklin@susmangodfrey.com
`mstraus@susmangodfrey.com
`
`John Lahad
`Ibituroko-Emi Lawson
`Burton DeWitt
`Robert Travis Korman
`Brenda Adimora
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002-5096
`jlahad@susmangodfrey.com
`elawson@susmangodfrey.com
`bdewitt@susmangodfrey.com
`tkorman@susmangodfrey.com
`badimora@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kalpana Srinivasan
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Kemper Diehl
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101-3000
`kdiehl@susmangodfrey.com
`
`Dated: March 5, 2021
`
`
`
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`
`/s/ Eve H. Ormerod
`Neal C. Belgam (No. 2721)
`Eve H. Ormerod (No. 5369)
`1000 West Street, Suite 1501
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-8400
`nbelgam@skjlaw.com
`eormerod@skjlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L.
`
`13
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`