Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 5569
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`C.A. No. 12-1595-LPS
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`C.A. No. 12-1596-LPS
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`C.A. No. 12-1599-LPS
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`C.A. No. 12-1601-LPS
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`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC. and
`LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A.,
`INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`MICROSOFT MOBILE INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`f/k/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 5570
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`C.A. No. 12-1602-LPS
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`C.A. No. 13-919-LPS
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`C.A. No. 13-920-LPS
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`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS (USA)
`INC. f/k/a SONY ERICSSON MOBILE
`COMMUNICATIONS (USA) INC.,
`SONY CORPORATION and
`SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`OATH HOLDINGS INC., and OATH INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`v.
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`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 5571
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`STEP ONE: THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE DIRECTED TO ABSTRACT
`IDEAS ................................................................................................................................ 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Not Directed to Technological Improvements ............. 1
`
`Arendi’s Cited Cases Do Not Support Patent Eligibility of the Asserted
`Claims .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`III.
`
`STEP TWO: THE ASSERTED CLAIMS DO NOT RECITE AN INVENTIVE
`CONCEPT ......................................................................................................................... 8
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 5572
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................9
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v CLS Bank Int’l.,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) ...............................................................................................................1
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................1, 2
`
`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`BSG Tech. LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................9
`
`Core Wireless Licensing SARL v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................4, 5, 6
`
`Data Engine Tech., LLC v. Google, LLC,
`906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018)............................................................................................4, 6, 7
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). (Opp. .) ...................................................................................8
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ...................................................................................................................8
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................4, 7
`
`Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd.,
`754 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................8
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 5573
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`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................1, 8
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................3, 7
`
`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................4
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................................................................................................5, 8
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 5574
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Nothing in Arendi’s brief alters the conclusion that the asserted claims are directed to the
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`abstract idea of identifying information in a document, searching for related information in a
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`separate source, and using the found information in some way. Instead, Arendi’s brief
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`underscores that the claims recite nothing more than this abstract idea with an instruction to “do
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`it on a computer,” which cannot confer eligibility. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229,
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`1243 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358
`
`(2014)).
`
`II.
`
`STEP ONE: THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE DIRECTED TO ABSTRACT IDEAS
`
`Arendi does not dispute that the alleged invention merely automates the human activity
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`of looking up information manually, as reflected in the patent specifications. (Opening Br. at 4-
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`5.) Indeed, Arendi’s technology tutorial confirms that “[t]he claimed invention” merely “replaces
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`[the] cumbersome manual process, either automatically or based on a minimal number of user
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`commands or inputs,” of analyzing, looking up and maintaining information in a database.
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`(Arendi Tutorial at 2:55-3:45; Ex. A (Tutorial Tr.) at 3:22-4:14.) Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
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`Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (relying on plaintiff’s tutorial which
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`“demonstrate[d] that the concept [was] well-known and abstract”). Despite this, Arendi contends
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`that the claims allegedly relate to improvements in computer technology. (Opp. at 4-14.) Yet
`
`Arendi cannot point to any claim elements that improve the functioning of a computer, and its
`
`cited cases are inapposite.
`
`A.
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Not Directed to Technological Improvements
`
`The asserted claims are not directed at improvements in computer functionality. (Opening
`
`Br. at 11-13.) Instead, they recite only features (e.g., “computer-implemented,” “first computer
`
`program,” “second computer program,” “computer process”) that the specifications confirm are
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`1
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 5575
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`generic and conventional. (Id. at 11-13.) Arendi does not dispute this point, admitting that the
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`claims “recite computer elements not because those components are inventive…” (Opp. at 19.)
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`Faced with the specifications, Arendi contends that the claims purportedly recite “a
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`specific way of improving information searching and retrieval between two different computer
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`programs without disrupting the user’s work or requiring the user to be familiar with and have
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`access to an external information source.”1 (Opp. at 4; see also id. at 8, 10-12.) Arendi is wrong.
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`To start, the claims fail to recite a specific way of achieving their stated results that
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`sufficiently specifies how to achieve them, such as specific software programming details.
`
`(Opening Br. at 11-13.) “Generally a claim that merely describes an ‘effect or result dissociated
`
`from any method by which it is accomplished’ is not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.”
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`Ameranth, 842 F.3d at 1244 (citation omitted). Moreover, the asserted claims do not suggest, let
`
`alone require, that the user’s work is not “disrupt[ed]” or that the user is not otherwise “familiar
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`with and [has] access to an external information source.” To the contrary, every asserted claim
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`requires the user to enter a command using a generic “input device” that results in information
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`being searched for in a source external to the document. E.g., ’843 patent, claim 1 (“providing an
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`input device . . . that allows a user to enter a user command to initiate an operation”). Indeed,
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`several of the scenarios in Arendi’s tutorial show that the user needs to “stop working” in the
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`Microsoft Word document while she interacts with Arendi’s alleged invention.2 (Arendi Tutorial,
`
`
`1 Arendi makes the same flawed argument in response to Defendants’ discussion of the
`similarities to the Content Extraction case, despite the fact that those claims were directed to the
`abstract idea of extracting data from documents, recognizing specific information from the
`extracted data, and storing that information in a memory. (Compare Opening Br. at 14 with Opp.
`Br. at 12 n.2.)
`2 Although Arendi’s so-called “Real-World Examples” do not reflect the teachings of the patents
`(see Defendants’ Comments Re Arendi’s Tutorial), they do reflect Arendi’s infringement theory.
`In each “Example,” the user does not “continue working” in the document as Arendi suggests the
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`
`2
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 5576
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`at 6:28-7:03; Ex. A at 6:13-7:8.) Similarly, the asserted claims are either silent about the
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`properties of the external information source (e.g., ’843, claim 1; ’356, claim 1), or specifically
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`state that the contact database can be “separately accessed and edited by a user.” (e.g., ’993,
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`claim 1). The claims do not require that the external information source otherwise be
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`inaccessible to the user, or be difficult for the user to interact with and update, as Arendi now
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`urges. (Opp. at 4-5.)
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`Even if the claims did include the limitations Arendi reads in (which they do not), those
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`features would not confer eligibility. The claims would still be impermissibly abstract, stating
`
`only desired functional results: identify information in a document, search for related
`
`information in a separate source (whether or not the user stops working on the document or that
`
`source is accessible to the user), and use the found information in some way. Interval Licensing
`
`LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“the act of providing someone an
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`additional set of information without disrupting the ongoing provision of an initial set of
`
`information is an abstract idea”).
`
`While Arendi argues that Defendants’ analogies are “divorced from the technological
`
`reality of the inventions and the problems they intend to solve,” Arendi fails to identify any
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`element of any asserted claim that is not captured by Defendants’ analogies. (Opp. at 11-12.) As
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`an initial matter, Arendi mischaracterizes the analogies. None of the analogies requires the user
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`to “cease work and relinquish” the document to another person, nor does any analogy require “a
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`second person” to retrieve information from a database. (Id. at 1-2.) The only analogy that
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`involves a second person is Defendants’ ’843 analogy, but even there, Sam Smith performs every
`
`
`claims require (Opp. at 12; see also 4, 8, 10-11); rather, the search for second information
`involves leaving the alleged “document” altogether. (Arendi Tutorial at 7:04-9:07; Ex. A at
`6:24-8:15.)
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 5577
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`step of the method. (Opening Br. at 5-6.) In that illustration, Sam Smith may receive a draft letter
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`from Jane Jones, but Sam Smith alone performs each step. (Id.) Arendi argues that the ’843
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`claims enable the user “to continue working on the letter while that information is searched for
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`and retrieved” (Opp. at 12), but as discussed above, nothing in the claims contains any such
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`feature. Even if they did, the claims would still mirror real-world human activity: Sam may
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`continue working in the letter while he looks up an address in an address book, in his mind, or by
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`asking someone.
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`For the ’993 and ’356, Arendi contends that the claims “contemplate doing more with the
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`retrieved information, such as sending an email or fax.” (Opp. at 12.) But the claims do not
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`require email or fax. They state only the generic functional result of initiating any “electronic
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`communication” or “action,” such as the phone call in Defendants’ analogy. (E.g., ’993 claim 1,
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`“initiating an electronic communication using the first contact information”; ’356 claim 2,
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`“performing an action having a type.”) Finally for the ’854 patent, Arendi asserts that the
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`analogy “eviscerates the entirety of the patent specification, the invention’s purpose, and the
`
`advantages over the prior art,” but provides no support for this conclusory attorney argument.3
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`Arendi also mischaracterizes Defendants’ argument regarding the asserted claims’ failure
`
`to describe how any of the alleged functionality is performed. (Opp. at 12-13.) Contrary to
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`Arendi’s suggestion, Defendants did not argue in this motion that the claims are fatally
`
`indefinite. Rather, Defendants established that the claims are functionally drafted, with no
`
`elements specifying how the claimed functionality is executed or how the claimed results are
`
`
`3 Section II of the Opening Brief (at 1) refers to claim 101 of the ’854 patent (which is asserted
`against Google and Oath), though that claim inadvertently was not referenced again in Section
`IV.C.2 (at 6-7). To be clear, Defendants assert that claim 101 is invalid for the same reasons
`explained in Section IV.C.2 with regard to all other claims of the ’854 patent.
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`4
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 5578
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`achieved. (Opening Br. at 12.) Arendi does not identify any claim language that specifies how
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`text in a document is analyzed to identify particular types of information, how the database is
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`searched using identified information, or how an action is performed using any found
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`information. (Opp. at 12-13.) The claims lack “the specificity required to transform a claim from
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`one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
`
`LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`B.
`
`Arendi’s Cited Cases Do Not Support Patent Eligibility of the Asserted
`Claims
`
`Arendi’s reliance on Enfish, Ancora, Core Wireless, Data Engine, and Finjan is
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`misplaced. (Opp. at 5-11.) Unlike the claims found eligible in those cases, the asserted claims
`
`here recite only functional results to be achieved by generic and conventional computer
`
`components, which fails under § 101. (Opening Br. at 12.)
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`In Enfish, the claims were found patent-eligible because they were directed to a specific
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`“self-referential table for a computer database,” that was claimed using a specific four-step
`
`algorithm described in means-plus-function limitations, which “improve[d] the way a computer
`
`stores and retrieves data in memory.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336-37
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). In contrast, Arendi’s asserted claims do not provide any specific improvement
`
`to the operation of a computer. They claim only desired results to be somehow achieved, using
`
`some unspecified underlying programming details, in a generic and conventional computer
`
`environment. Even the specifications fail to provide any software algorithms, as the Court
`
`appreciated in holding indefinite multiple means-plus-function elements of the ’854 claims.
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`Similarly, the Ancora claim was directed to a “concrete assignment of specified functions
`
`among a computer’s components to improve computer security.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC
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`Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The court found that claim “specifically
`
`5
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 5579
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`identifies how that functionality improvement is effectuated in an assertedly unexpected way: a
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`structure containing a license record is stored in a particular, modifiable, non-volatile portion of
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`the computer’s BIOS.” Id. at 1348-49. Arendi claims no specific improvement to computer
`
`functionality like that claimed in Ancora.4 Arendi’s only alleged improvement is “eliminating
`
`the user’s need to stop working in a document” (Opp. at 11), but that is not recited or required in
`
`any asserted claim, and is merely an abstraction of real-world human activity as discussed
`
`previously.
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`In Core Wireless, the Federal Circuit found the claims to be directed to “an improved
`
`user interface for computing devices” and “a particular manner of summarizing and presenting
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`information in electronic devices.” Core Wireless Licensing SARL v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d
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`1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The court determined that the claims were not abstract because
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`they “disclose[d] a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user,”
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`reciting limitations requiring “a particular manner by which the summary window must be
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`accessed” and that the “application summary window list a limited set of data.” Id. at 1362-64.
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`Unlike Core Wireless, the claims here do not recite any improved user interface, are drafted
`
`solely in functional language, and contain no limitations reciting how to achieve the recited
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`functional results.
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`Data Engine highlights that the claims must recite the purported improvement. Data
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`Engine Tech., LLC v. Google, LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018). There, the court found one set
`
`of claims patent eligible because they “recite[ed] a specific structure (i.e., notebook tabs) within
`
`a particular spreadsheet display that performs a specific function (i.e., navigating within a three-
`
`
`4 Arendi includes an unsupported statement in its Step One analysis arguing that patent eligibility
`“does not rise or fall on the flow charts” in the patents. (Opp. at 14.) But Arendi merely points to
`a figure in the Ancora patent that was not addressed by the Ancora court.
`
`6
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 5580
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`dimensional spreadsheet).” Id. at 1010-11. Specifically, those claims recited numerous specific
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`limitations for achieving the benefits described in the patent, including displaying “a row of
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`spreadsheet page identifiers along one side of the first spreadsheet page” that represented a
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`“notebook tab,” a “user-settable identifying character to label the notebook tab,” “navigating
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`through the various spreadsheet pages through selection of the notebook tabs” and a “formula
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`that uses the identifying character to operate on information spread between different spreadsheet
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`pages that are identified by their tabs.” Id. at 1008, 1010-1011. In contrast, Arendi’s claims
`
`neither refer to nor require any specific structures or functions, nor does Arendi identify any.
`
`Instead, Arendi includes a page-long chart simply listing a Data Engine claim next to ’843 claim
`
`1 and concludes they are similar without any explanation. (Opp. at 10.) The asserted claims are
`
`not similar because, unlike the Data Engine claim, Arendi’s claims do not recite specific
`
`limitations specifying a particular way of achieving the recited desired results. Section II.A,
`
`supra.
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`Indeed, Arendi’s claims are more similar to the Data Engine claims found unpatentable
`
`(which Arendi’s Opposition ignores). Those claims were directed to an abstract idea similar to
`
`the Arendi claims: “collecting spreadsheet data, recognizing changes to spreadsheet data, and
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`storing information about the changes.” Id. at 1012-13. Those claims were ineligible because
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`they were directed to “mere automation” of “manually tracking modifications” in a spreadsheet,
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`id., just like Arendi’s claims merely automate a manual process. Like Arendi’s claims, the
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`ineligible Data Engine claims did not recite any “specific technical solution and improvement.”
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`Id. at 1012-13.
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`Finjan is also inapposite. The claims there were found to be eligible because they were
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`directed to “a method of providing computer security by scanning a downloadable and attaching
`
`7
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 5581
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`the results of that scan to the downloadable itself in the form of a ‘security profile.’” Finjan, Inc.
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`v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018). That court noted that, as construed,
`
`the claimed “security profile approach” of “behavior-based” virus scanning “enable[d] more
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`flexible and nuanced virus filtering” over traditional methods of virus scanning. Id. at 1304.
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`Other than declaring that the Finjan and Arendi claims are “specific,” Arendi does not describe
`
`the basis for its conclusion, and does not offer any explanation as to why the Arendi claims are
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`concrete, non-abstract and patent-eligible. (Opp. at 8.) They are not. Arendi’s claims do not
`
`include limitations specifying how the recited results are accomplished, do not specify the use of
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`any concrete or unconventional computer hardware, do not include any specific or unusual
`
`algorithms, and do not require any defined or unique programming. Interval, 896 F.3d at 1344-
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`46.
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`III.
`
`STEP TWO: THE ASSERTED CLAIMS DO NOT RECITE AN INVENTIVE CONCEPT
`
`Arendi does not identify any inventive concept set forth in the asserted claims. It does not
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`dispute that the claims recite only conventional components. (Opp. at 19 (the claims “recite
`
`computer elements not because those components are inventive”).) Instead, Arendi tosses out a
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`number of disjointed arguments that find no support in the claim language.
`
`Arendi first argues that the asserted claims are similar to those in DDR Holdings, LLC v.
`
`Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). (Opp. at 15.) But nothing in Arendi’s claims
`
`“breaks with the expected sequence of events” when a user wishes to use information in a
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`document to search for related information in an external source (like a contact database).
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`Arendi’s claims merely indicate that the user inputs a “user command” (or a “single execute
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`command”) into a generic “input device” to cause a generic “computer program” to perform the
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`search (in an unspecified way), rather than performing the search (and any subsequent actions)
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`manually. (’843, 10:50-65; ’993, 13:29-58.) Moreover, while DDR Holdings addressed a
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`8
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 5582
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`problem “unique” to the Internet, the asserted claims do not address a problem or process that
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`only arose with the internet. By Arendi’s (and the patents’) own admission, the claims simply
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`automate the processes for looking up and using related information that were, for decades,
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`performed by people using pens, paper, and address books. Tellingly, even when Arendi
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`attempts to “[c]ompare” the asserted claims to those in DDR Holdings, Arendi improperly relies
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`on the Arendi patent specifications rather than the claim language. (Opp. at 15-16.)5
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`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“an inventive
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`concept must be evident in the claims”).
`
`Arendi next contends that the asserted claims are similar to those at issue in Amdocs and
`
`BASCOM. However, in those cases, the claims were directed to “narrowly circumscribed”
`
`inventions that constituted a “technical improvement over prior art technologies and served to
`
`improve the performance of the system itself.” Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841
`
`F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
`
`827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Notably, Arendi fails to identify anything in the asserted
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`claims that is similar to the “specific location for” a computer virus “filtering system” that could
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`be customized by users in BASCOM, or the specific “distributed architecture” for data gathering,
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`filtering and enhancement addressed in Amdocs. Id.; Amdocs, 841 F.3d, at 1299-1306. Instead,
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`Arendi generally contends that the claims recite an inventive concept because the user does not
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`5 The Court need not take as true the specification’s self-serving statement that it provides a
`“novel” method and system. Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd., 754 F. App’x 996, 999 (Fed.
`Cir. 2018) (plaintiff “cannot render its complaint immune from dismissal by merely asserting
`that its methods are ‘novel’ and ‘improve the technology . . .’”). Moreover, “[e]ligibility and
`novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874
`F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of
`the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
`within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Symantec, 838 F.3d at 1315
`(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981)).
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`9
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 5583
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`have to “manually” designate or reenter “contact information” or “separately launch” another
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`application. (Opp. at 17-18.) However, simply automating an abstract idea does not render
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`claims patent-eligible. BSG Tech. LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
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`2018).
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`Likewise, the BASCOM court found that the claims included specific requirements for the
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`claimed “filtering tool,” including that the “filtering tool [be] at a specific location, remote from
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`the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” BASCOM, 827
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`F.3d at 1350. Arendi identifies no such specific, narrowing limitations in the claims, because
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`none exist.
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`Arendi finally argues that the claims are not claimed “at an unacceptable level of
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`generality,” but Arendi misses the point. (Opp. at 19-20.) In Arendi’s cited example (’843, claim
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`1), the cited claim language does not explain, for example, how the “first information” is
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`analyzed. Arendi’s claims fail at Step Two because they merely recite “a desired function or
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`outcome,” such as analyzing information in a document, “without providing any limiting detail
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`that confines the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem.” Affinity Labs of Texas,
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`LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`The Court should grant Defendants’ motion and enter judgment accordingly.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 5584
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`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
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`/s/ Denise S. Kraft
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`Denise S. Kraft (#2778)
`Brian A. Biggs (#5591)
`Erin E. Larson (#6616)
`1201 North Market Street, Suite 2100
`Wilmington, DE 19801-1147
`(302) 468-5700
`denise.kraft@dlapiper.com
`brian.biggs@dlapiper.com
`erin.larson@dlapiper.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Jeremy A. Tigan (#5239)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`jtigan@mnat.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Microsoft Mobile,
`Inc.
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`FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C.
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`/s/ Jeremy D. Anderson
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`Jeremy D. Anderson (#4145)
`222 Delaware Avenue, 17th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 652-5070
`janderson@fr.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants LG Electronics, Inc.,
`LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. and
`LG Electronics MobileComm U.S.A., Inc.
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Rodger D. Smith II
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`Rodger D. Smith II (#3778)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`rsmith@mnat.com
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`Attorney for Defendants Sony Mobile
`Communications (USA) Inc., Sony Corporation
`and Sony Corporation of America
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 5585
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` MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Brian P. Egan (#6227)
`Anthony Raucci (#5948)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`began@mnat.com
`araucci@mnat.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants Oath Holdings Inc.
`and Oath Inc.
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`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
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`/s/ David E. Moore
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`David E. Moore (#3983)
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 North Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 984-6000
`dmoore@potteranderson.com
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants Motorola Mobility
`LLC f/k/a Motorola Mobility, Inc. and
`Google LLC
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`September 6, 2019
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-LPS Document 154 Filed 09/06/19 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 5586
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on September 6, 2019, I caused the foregoing to be electronically
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`filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`September 6, 2019, upon the following in the manner indicated:
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`Neal C. Belgam, Esquire
`Eve H. Ormerod, Esquire
`Beth A. Swadley, Esquire
`SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS, LLP
`800 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1000
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`John P. Lahad, Esquire
`SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
`100 Louisiana Street, Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`Stephen D. Susman, Esquire
`Seth Ard, Esquire
`Max I. Straus, Esquire
`Beatrice Franklin, Esquire
`SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`Kemper Diehl, Esquire
`SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
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