`
`SUPERIOR COURT
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`ORDER 439588
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`DELGADILLO, DENNIS
`
` V.
`MICHAEL A. WILSON CUSTOM
`CARPENTRY & DESIGN, LLC Et Al
`
`JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WINDHAM
` AT PUTNAM
`
`11/13/2020
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`ORDER
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`ORDER REGARDING:
`10/16/2020 246.00 MOTION FOR WRITTEN DETERMINATION THAT APPEALED ISSUES
`SIGNIFICANT TO OUTCOMEPB SEC 61-4
`
`The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby:
`
`ORDER: DENIED
`
`“When the trial court renders a judgment to which this section applies, such judgment shall not
`ordinarily constitute an appealable final judgment. Such a judgment shall only be considered an
`appealable final judgment only if the trial court makes a written determination that the issues resolved
`by the judgment are of such significance to the determination of the outcome of the case that the delay
`incident to the appeal would be justified, and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having
`appellate jurisdiction concurs.” P.B. § 61–4a.
`“The policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to
`facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level. (Internal quotation marks
`omitted.) Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 284 Conn. 16, 33, 930 A.2d 682 (2007).” O'Connor v.
`Med–Center Home Health Care, Inc., 308 Conn. 338, 244 (2011).
`“In the language of Section 61–4, the right to bring an immediate interlocutory appeal from a trial court's
`ruling must be based on a threshold judicial determination that the issues resolved by that ruling are of
`such significance to the outcome of the case that the delay incident to the appeal would be justified.”
`ShareAmerica, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, Superior Court judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury,
`Civil Complex Litigation Docket No. X02 CV93–0150132 (July 23, 1999, Sheldon, J.) [25 Conn. L.
`Rptr. 160]. “A major consideration for this court is the interplay between the claims that were ruled on in
`the motions to strike and the claims that remain pending in this case.” Baker v. Cheshire, Superior Court,
`judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 07–5013602S (July 11, 2008, Robinson,
`J.).
`“…[T]he purpose of Section 61–4 is to create a narrow exception to our final judgment rule for those
`rare and special cases where interlocutory review of a trial court's pretrial ruling will resolve or greatly
`streamline the resolution of the entire case. In those limited circumstances, the purpose of the final
`judgment rule—to promote efficiency in the handling of cases by avoiding the added cost, delay and
`administrative burden of piecemeal litigation—is better served by granting the right to an immediate
`appeal than, as usual, postponing any appeal until the rights of all parties have been fully adjudicated in
`the trial court. Only if the trial judge, who knows the case personally and understands the interplay
`among its several claims, and the chief judge of the appellate court having jurisdiction, who knows the
`current status of his or her appellate docket, are mutually satisfied that the possible benefits of early
`appellate review exceed the likely costs and burdens of such review should the motion be granted.
`Other considerations include whether an appellate ruling would likely have the practical effect of ending
`the case in the trial court, so that the appellate court would not be faced with deciding the same case
`twice. See the discussion in Royal Indemnity Company v. Terra Firma, Inc., 2006 Ct. Sup. 20624
`(Beach, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 296]. DiTeresi v. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., No. FSTCV065001340S,
`2012 WL 898793, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2012).
`Regardless of the outcome of the sought after appeal, this case would continue against the remaining
`defendants. Consequently, this court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for written determination.
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`Short Calendar Results Automated Mailing (SCRAM) Notice was sent on the underlying motion.
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`439588
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`Judge: MATTHEW EDWARD AUGER
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`This document may be signed or verified electronically and has the same validity and status as a document with a physical
`(pen-to-paper) signature. For more information, see Section I.E. of the State of Connecticut Superior Court E-Services
`Procedures and Technical Standards (https://jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/e-standards.pdf), section 51-193c of the
`Connecticut General Statutes and Connecticut Practice Book Section 4-4.
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