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`”quwoabEda/f):,we7C(7
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`0/001?0£238
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`DOCKET NO. HHD-CV 18-6090687
`
`SUPERIOR COURT
`
`CATHERINE M. KOEHLER
`
`JUDICIAL DISTRICT
`
`v.
`
`OF HARTFORD
`
`SOUTHERN CONN. ST. UNIVERSITY
`
`FEBRUARY 26, 2019
`
`MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS g# 102)
`
`The plaintiff, Catherine M. Koehler, alleges the following facts in her complaint: The
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`plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Southern Connecticut State University, as a full—time,
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`tenure track science education faculty member. At all times relevant to the present action, the
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`defendant was aware that the plaintiff was forty years old or older. During the academic year of
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`2012-2013, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a tenure track assistant professor. The defendant
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`issued the plaintiff successive annual renewals for the next three years. During the fourth annual
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`renewal process, the defendant denied the plaintiffs application for a fifth academic year of
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`employment on May 17, 2016. Following the denial, the plaintiff accepted a final annual
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`appointment that expired on May 31, 2017 which also ended the plaintiff 5 employment.
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`The defendant employed Steve Breese as the dean of the School of Arts and Sciences.
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`Breese recommended that the plaintiff not be renewed after performing the evaluation that
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`determined whether the plaintiff should be contractually renewed. The defendant adopted
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`Breese’s nonrenewal recommendation. Article 4.11.9 of American Association of University
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`Professors’ labor agreement (AAUP labor agreement) sets forth the criterion for recommending
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`full-time teaching. The plaintiff alleges that Breese failed to utilize, follow, and comply with the
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`criterion set forth in the AAUP labor agreement by using at least one extra-figfiiggerion
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`when he evaluated the plaintiff, which violated the collective bargaining agliegge‘nt.‘ ”5'9
`L U (I
`i
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`HARTFORD JD.
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`(01%)”
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`

`

`A union grievance was filed in connection with the defendant’s decision not to renew the
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`plaintiff’s contract. An arbitration committee rendered an opinion and award on the plaintiffs
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`grievance of the nonrenewal on March 6, 2017. The arbitration committee ordered the defendant
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`to engage in a contractually compliant process in evaluating the plaintiff for reappointment. On
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`March 14, 2017, the defendant notified the plaintiff that her renewal was denied, after Breese
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`conducted the reappointment evaluation and recommended that the plaintiff not be renewed.
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`On March 16, 2017, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant with the
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`Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) asserting claims of age
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`and gender discrimination. On June 15, 2017, the plaintiff filed a second complaint against the
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`defendant with the CHRO. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiff received a release ofj urisdiction
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`from the CHRO.
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`On March 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a two count complaint against the defendant alleging
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`age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
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`(CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a—60. In its prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks appropriate
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`damages that include compensatory damages, damages for back pay, front pay, prej udgment
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`interest, postjudgment interest, and an injunction requiring removal of any and all adverse
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`information contained in the plaintiffs personal file.
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`On June 4, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court
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`lacks jurisdiction for the claims found in both counts one and two because: (1) sovereign
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`immunity bars the claims for inj unctive relief, interest, and consequential damages, (2) the
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`complaint and summons fail to name an individual defendant in his or her official capacity as
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`required for a claim of injunctive relief and there is no jurisdiction for such an action against a
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`

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`state agency, and (3) the Court lacks jurisdiction for the claims prior to September 17, 2016
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`pursuant to § 46a-82 because the plaintiff filed the underlying administrative complaint with the
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`Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on March 16, 2017 and subsequent complaint
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`on June 15, 2017. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion on July 27, 2018. The defendant
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`filed a reply to the objection on September 4, 2018. On October 29, 2018, the parties’ arguments
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`were heard at short calendar.
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`“A motion to dismiss .
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`.
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`. properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially
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`asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be
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`heard by the court. .
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`.
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`. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record,
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`the court is without jurisdiction.” Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe ofIndians ofConnecticut, 282
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`Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). “When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question
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`raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the
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`allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. .
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`.
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`. In this regard, a court must take the
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`facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the
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`allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.” (Internal quotation
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`marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). “In contrast, if the
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`complaint is supplemented by undisputedfacts established by affidavits submitted in support of
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`the motion to dismiss .
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`.
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`. other types of undisputed evidence .
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`.
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`. and/or public records of which
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`judicial notice may be taken .
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`.
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`. the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may
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`consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of
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`the allegations of the complaint. .
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`.
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`. Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on
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`them by the [supplementary undisputed facts].” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
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`

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`footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52. Furthermore, “[w]here a
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`motion to dismiss implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the court may dismiss portions of a
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`complaint, including individual paragraphs within counts.” Harmon v. University of
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`Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-15-67056506-S
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`(October 7, 2015, Peck, J.).
`
`I
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`FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
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`“It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy
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`exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the
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`matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaCroix v. Board ofEducation, 199 Conn. 70,
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`83-84, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). “The failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates the
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`subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Johnson v. Dept. ofPublic Health, 48 Conn. App. 102,
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`108, 710 A.2d 176 (1998).
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`“General Statutes § 46a—100 permits a person to file an action in Superior Court claiming
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`violation of the CFEPA after that person has filed a complaint with the CHRO and obtained a
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`release from the commission.
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`[C]ourts have consistently upheld the requirement that
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`complainants exhaust their administrative remedies or obtain a release of administrative
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`jurisdiction from the CHRO as a prerequisite to Superior Court jurisdiction over the
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`complainant’s claims.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bjorlin v.
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`MacArthur Equities, Ltd., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-l l-
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`6021296-S (December 11, 2014, Bellis, J.).
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`“Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject
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`

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`matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an
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`administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative
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`forum. .
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`.
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`. In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed.” (Internal
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`quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education ofConnecticut, Inc., 147 Conn. App.
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`730, 746, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
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`“A primary purpose of the doctrine is to foster an orderly process of administrative
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`adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency’s findings
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`and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that,
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`entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need
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`for judicial review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn.
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`558, 564, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). “Finally, it is the plaintiff‘s burden to plead facts sufficient to
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`show that it exhausted its administrative remedies when required.” (Internal quotation marks
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`omitted.) Bjorlin v. MacArthur Equities, Ltd., supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,
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`Docket No. CV-11-6021296-S.
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`The defendant argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over discrete acts of alleged
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`discrimination pleaded in support of the plaintiff s CFEPA claims that occurred prior to the
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`statutory filing period because such claims are untimely and were not independently exhausted.
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`The defendant argues, pursuant to § 46a—82, that the court lacks jurisdiction for any claims prior
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`to September 17, 2016, because the plaintiff filed the underlying administrative complaint with
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`the CHRO on March 16, 2017. The plaintiff counters with several arguments: (1) the failure to
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`meet the 180 day time limit pursuant to § 46a—82 (f) is not a jurisdictional defect, (2) the
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`defendant admits that any actionable harm within September 17, 2016, and June 15, 2017, would
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`

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`be timely, (3) there was a continuing course of age discrimination being committed by the
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`defendant that extends the statute of limitations under the continuing violation theory, (4) the
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`CHRO’s decision not to dismiss the complaints on untimeliness grounds is proof that the cases
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`were timely filed with the CHRO, (5) equitable tolling permits the plaintiff to avoid the bar of the
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`statute of limitations because the plaintiff did not discover the age discrimination until Breese’s
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`arbitration testimony, and (6) the 180 day limitations period does not cut off relevant evidence.
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`In response to the plaintiff’ s contentions, the defendant argues the plaintiff s complaint does not
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`allege facts that establish equitable tolling or a continuing course of conduct. The defendant
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`argues further that the CHRO’s failure to dismiss this action prior to a hearing does not establish
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`jurisdiction.
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`General Statutes 46a-82 (f) provides in relevant part: “Any complaint filed pursuant to
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`this section must be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of
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`discrimination, except that any complaint by a person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of
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`subsection (a) of section 46a-80 must be filed within thirty days of the alleged act of
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`discrimination.” “Our Supreme Court scrutinized [§ 46a—82 (f)] in Williams v. Commission on
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`Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 777 A.2d 645, aff’d after remand, 67 Conn.
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`App. 316, 786 A.2d 1283 (2001), and concluded that the time limit contained therein is not
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`subject matter jurisdictional .
`.
`. but rather operates as a statute of limitations. .
`.
`. The court
`explained: [T]he failure to meet the 180 day time limit in [§ 46a—82 (0] is [not] without
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`consequence. .
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`.
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`. [I]f a time requirement is deemed to be mandatory, it must be complied with,
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`absent such factors as consent, waiver or equitable tolling. Thus, a complaint that is not filed
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`Within the mandatory time requirement is dismissible unless waiver, consent, or some other
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`compelling equitable tolling doctrine applies.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
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`omitted.) Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 194, 928 A.2d 586 (2007), aft” d, 289
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`Conn. 57, 956 A.2d 579 (2008).1
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`The plaintiff filed the underlying complaint on March 16, 2017, and received a release of
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`jurisdiction on December 6, 2017 after filing a second complaint on June 15, 2017. Based on
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`these undisputed procedural facts, any actionable age discrimination had to occur on or after
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`September 17, 2016, which is 180 days prior to the filing of the underlying complaint with the
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`CHRO. Therefore, absent a factor, such as equitable tolling, the court may not properly exercise
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`subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff 5 claims prior to September 17, 2016.
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`The plaintiff argues, in her opposition memorandum to the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
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`that equitable tolling permits the plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations because the
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`plaintiff discovered the age bias in February of 2017, when Breese testified in the arbitration.
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`“Usually, in employment discrimination cases, time limits will not be tolled absent some
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`behavior of the employer designed to delay the filing of the complaint or fraud.” Williams v.
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`Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 67 Conn. App. 316, 329, 786 A.2d 1283 (2001).
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`Construing the allegations in a manner most favorable to the pleader, the complaint is devoid of
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`any allegations concerning the defendant’s behavior that was designed to delay the filing of the
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`complaint or constituted fraud.
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`1 “[I]n an age discrimination action [brought under § 46a—60] in which the allegedly
`discriminatory practice is the termination of employment, the alleged act of discrimination
`transpires on the final date of employment, rather than when the employee receives notice of
`termination. Accordingly, any complaint must be filed with the commission within 180 days of
`that date.” Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188, 219, 928 A.2d 586 (2007), aff’d, 289
`Conn. 57, 956 A.2d 579 (2008). The defendant is not contesting whether the discrete acts that
`occurred within the 180-day period, such as the plaintiff s termination, are actionable.
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`7
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`

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`The plaintiff also argues that there was a continuing course of age discrimination that was
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`committed by the defendant via Breese’s alleged impermissible use of age in denying the
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`plaintiff’s employment renewal, and thus, the May 2016 employment nonrenewal was timely
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`brought and actionable. “Connecticut has recognized the doctrine of continuing violation for
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`purposes of tolling the statute of limitations for claims falling under the Connecticut Fair
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`Employment Practices Act. .
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`.
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`. Under the doctrine, all events alleged in a plaintiff’ s complaint
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`may be actionable, regardless of timing, if the incidents relate to a de facto policy or practice
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`arising from specific and related acts of discrimination that an employer continues to tolerate. .
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`.
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`.
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`However, discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even though they are
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`related to alleged acts alleged in timely filed charges. .
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`.
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`. The existence of past acts and the
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`employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence .
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`.
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`. does not bar employees from filing charges
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`about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges
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`addressing those acts are themselves timely filed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
`
`omitted.) Nelson v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-06-
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`5001428-S (September 27, 2012, Gilardi, J. T.R.). “Discrete acts such as termination, failure to
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`promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are individual acts that occur at a fixed time. .
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`.
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`.
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`Accordingly, plaintiffs alleging such discriminatory action must exhaust the administrative
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`process regardless of any relationship that may exist between those discrete claims and any
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`others.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hurley v. Naugatuck Board ofEducation, Superior
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`Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-15-6029009-S (July 22, 2016, Roraback,
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`J.). In the present case, the May 2016 employment nonrenewal constitutes a discrete act, which
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`

`

`is the failure to promote, that is time barred, and thus, not actionable.2
`
`II
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`SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
`
`“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is
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`therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kizis v.
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`Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 51, 794 A.2d 498 (2002). “The principle that the
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`state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our
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`case law. .
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`.
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`. It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in
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`ancient common law. .
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`.
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`. Not only have we recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but
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`[w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a
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`suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in
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`effect, against the state. .
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`.
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`. Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under
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`our jurisprudence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284
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`Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).
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`“When the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that
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`intent by using explicit statutory language. .
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`.
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`. Accordingly, in an action seeking damages
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`against the state, a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show
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`that .
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`.
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`. the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived
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`the state’s sovereign immunity.” Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 802, l A.3d 39 (2010).
`
`
`2 Although the May 2016 employment nonrenewal is not actionable, this does not bar the
`plaintiff from using the incident as evidence to help prove her case of discrimination. See Nelson
`v. Bridgeport, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-06-5001428-S (“[e]ven if incidences of
`alleged discrimination are time-barred, they can still be used in conjunction with non-limited
`events as circumstantial evidence to help prove a case of discrimination”).
`
`9
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`

`

`“[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are [three]
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`exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication,
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`statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity .
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`.
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`. (2) when an action seeks declaratory or
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`injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated
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`the plaintiff s constitutional rights .
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`.
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`. and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive
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`relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in
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`excess of the officer’s statutory authority.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
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`Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636.
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`“For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well
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`established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly
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`construed. .
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`.
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`. Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect
`
`which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity. .
`
`.
`
`. For a claim made
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`pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he
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`allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly
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`demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests. .
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`.
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`. For a claim under the
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`third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in
`
`excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that
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`reasonably support those allegations. .
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`.
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`. In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint
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`to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign
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`immunity grounds is proper.” (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) ld., 349-50.
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`The defendant argues that the plaintiff’ s prayer for relief seeks relief that is barred by
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`sovereign immunity under § 46a—104. The defendant argues that the relief that is barred by
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`10
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`

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`sovereign immunity includes front pay, bonuses, lost pension/employee/retirement benefits,
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`interest, prejudgment interest, post judgment interest, job reinstatement, an injunction requiring
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`the removal of any and all adverse information contained in the plaintiffs personnel file, and
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`consequential relief.
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`General Statutes § 46a -104 provides: “ The court may grant a complainant in an action
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`brought in accordance with section 46a -100 such legal and equitable relief which it deems
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`appropriate including, but not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorney’s
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`fees and court costs. The amount of attorney’s fees allowed shall not be contingent upon the
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`amount of damages requested by or awarded to the complainant.” Moreover, “[General Statutes]
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`§ 46a -104 does not authorize an award of punitive damages in employment discrimination
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`cases.” Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 324 Conn. 470, 486, 153 A.3d 615 (2016).
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`Sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff’s claim for an injunction requiring the
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`removal of any and all adverse information contained in the plaintiffs personnel file as § 46a -
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`104 expressly waives the state’s immunity with regard to temporary or permanent injunctive
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`relief. Section 46a - 104, furthermore, expressly waives the state’s immunity with regard to legal
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`and equitable relief which the court deems appropriate. The plaintiff s claim for job
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`reinstatement, which is equitable relief, and, front pay, which is legal relief, are not barred by
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`sovereign immunity. See Cohen v. University ofHartford, Superior Court, judicial district of
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`Hartford, Docket No. X03-CV-l2—6032265—S (May 9, 2017, Moukawsher, J.) (“Front pay and
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`back pay are damages, not equitable relief. They can be calculated in current dollar amounts—by
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`simple arithmetic for back pay and by calculating the present value of any front pay.”); see also
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`Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supra, 324 Conn. 479 (“legal .
`
`.
`
`. relief, which is defined
`
`11
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`

`

`as money damages” [internal quotation marks omitted]).
`
`Moreover, “[§] 46a -104 expressly waives the state’s immunity with regard to back pay,
`compensatory damages, attorneys fees, and court costs.” Dietrich v. UConn Health, Superior
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`Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV—l6—6071866-S (June 15, 2017, Epstein, J.);
`
`see also Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supra, 324 Conn. 482 (“[t]hus, it appears that the
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`legislature deemed the remedies expressly authorized in the act, including back pay,
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`compensatory damages, attomey’s fees, and costs, to be sufficient to carry out its remedial
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`purpose”). Compensatory damages that include bonuses, lost pension/employee/retirement
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`benefits, and emotional distress are not barred by sovereign immunity. See id.
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`However, “[i]n previously analyzing § 46a -104, the Appellate Court [in Ware v. State,
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`118 Conn. App. 65, 88, 983 A.2d 853 (2009)] concluded that the legislature did not, either
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`expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waive the state’s sovereign immunity
`
`from liability for punitive damages under the fair employment act.” Chouhan V. University of
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`Connecticut Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-09-
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`6002439-S (November 5, 2013, Wiese, .1.) “Furthermore, the reasoning of the Appellate Court
`
`in [Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65, 88, 983 A.2d 853 (2009)] with regard to punitive damages
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`equally applies to the plaintiff’ 5 claim for interest.” Id. Thus, sovereign immunity does bar the
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`plaintiffs claim for punitive damages and interest.
`
`“Statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. .
`
`.
`
`. Where
`
`there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least
`
`rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
`
`Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636.
`
`12
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`

`

`Therefore, § 46a -104 will not be construed to waive the state’s immunity with regard to the
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`plaintiffs claims for relief with regard to consequential damages.
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`For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims
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`prior to September 17, 2016 and to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for relief with regard to punitive
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`damages, interest, and consequential damages is granted. For the reasons set forth above, the
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`defendant’s motion to dismiss the remainder ofthe plaintiffs claims for reliefi/synied.
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`, "/
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`
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`l3
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`Checklist for Clerk
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`Docket Number: HHDCV18-6090687S
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`Case Name:
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`Koehler V. Southern
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`Memorandum of Decision dated: 2/26/19
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`File Sealed:
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`les
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`Memo Sealed:
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`)Les
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`EQ X
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`No X
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`This Memorandum of Decision may be
`released to the Reporter of Judicial Decisions
`for Publication
`2;
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`This Memorandum of Decision may NOT be
`released to the Reporter of Judicial Decisions
`for Publication
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`\\CO95\Common\Hartford JD Policy Manual\Sealed files\MOD memo.d0c
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`2i: EFBED
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`res; 2-5 2819
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`‘fARTFORD J.D.
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`C12 KOEHLER, CAT
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`Edison
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`Case Information 2
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`Edison System Status: UP 2/26/2019 2:48:35 PM
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`HHDCV186090687S KOEHLER, CATHERINE M. V. SOUTHERN
`CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY
`Future Trial Date: 10/30/2019
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`TL: No Ty:M90 PS:HD1
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`Info—1! Info-2 Notlces Exhibits MedRecs WhereIsIt? AppealsLog E-File Internet Audit CalHist WFQ JOEQ \fl’F Companions
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`[WFQ-NewEntry]
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`RD: 4/3/2018
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`Non-Resact28 Resact: 36 Total:44 $360.00
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`SC: 20
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`FSM:
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`TRIAL LIST / STATUS INDICATORS
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`Type
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`Caseflow Marking
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`CFMK Date
`10/30/2019
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`PARTY/APPEARANCE INFORMATION ~
`P-
`CATHERINE M. KOEHLER
`‘
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`01
`_
`Plaintiff
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`_
`,
`_
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`fcg‘ggffflml & “SSOCIATES ”‘9 ‘_
`-
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`1 MARKET SQUARE
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`NEWINGTON CT 06111
`y'
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`
`:_
`Filed: 3/8/2018 Phone: 86066708391 q :
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`SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT sTATE- _ _
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`°1 UNIVERSITY
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`ATTY: NANCY A BROUILLET(422623‘)_._;
`DISPOSITION
`AG-EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ,
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`55 ELM ST PO BOX 120
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`HARTFORD CT 06141
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`Filed: 4/4/2018 Phone:
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`Description
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`Key Point
`
`File Date
`Writ Entry Coded
`Return Date
`Trial List Claim Coded
`Marking Date
`Verdict/Trial Complete
`Init Disp Coded
`Disposition Date
`Appeal-Int Filed
`Appeal-S/C Filed
`
`Date
`03/08/2018
`03/08/2018
`04/03/2018
`
`10/30/2019
`
`Disp of Appeal
`Last Action
`
`02/04/2019
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`NON-RESACT ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
`#
`File Date
`Filed By
`4/4/2018
`422623
`
`1
`
`APPEARANCE
`Appearance
`
`8/6/2018
`
`422623
`
`10/2/2018
`
`422623
`
`10/12/2018
`
`422623
`
`11/28/2018
`
`422623
`
`12/7/2018
`
`422623
`
`CLAIM/RECLAIM
`Claim/Reclaim
`
`CLAIM] RECLAIM
`Claim/Reclaim
`
`CLAIM/ RECLAIM
`Claim/Reclaim
`
`CLAIM/ RECLAIM
`Claim/Reclaim
`
`CLAIM/RECLAIM
`Claim/Reclaim
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`1/15/2019
`
`422623
`
`CLAIM/RECLAIM
`
`http://edison/rptcasesjdds.asp?csdist=HHD&csnum=186090687
`
`2/26/2019
`
`