STATE OF CONNECTICUT
`APPELLATE COURT
`
`To the Chief Clerk of the Appellate Court.
`The Appellate Court has decided the following case:
`
`Date: Hartford, July 3, 2018
`
`HSBC BANK USA, N.A., TRUSTEE
`
`V.
`
`MARK A. HALLUMS
`
`Docket No. AC 39955
`Trial Court Docket No. HHDCV116020746S
`
`The judgment is affirmed.
`
`Opinion Pet Curiam.
`
` eager-Judge,"
`
`Rescript
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`
`HSBC BANK USA, N.A., TRUSTEE
`1). MARK A. HALLUMS
`
`(AC 39955)
`Lavine, Bright and Bishop, Js.
`
`Syllabus
`
`The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property
`owned by the defendant. After the trial court rendered a judgment of
`strict foreclosure, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter
`alia, that the trial court improperly rendered a judgment when the plain-
`tiff lacked standing. Held:
`1. The defendant’s claim that the plaintiff lacked standing was unavailing;
`the trial court found that the plaintiffwas the holder of the note, endorsed
`in blank, and that it had been assigned the mortgage, those findings
`were supported by the record evidence, and the defendant submitted
`no proof that someone else was the owner of the note and mortgage.
`2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked
`jurisdiction to render a judgment of strict foreclosure after the defen—
`dant's debt was dischargedinbanluuptcy, the defendant failed to provide
`any authority to support his claim that, because he had listed his debt
`to the plaintiff as unsecured in his bankruptcy filings, the debt and note
`automatically became unsecured, despite the valid mortgage lien, as the
`law is clear that liens that survive discharge in bankruptcy include the in
`rem liability of mortgages, and a creditor's right to foreclose a mortgage
`survives or passes through bankruptcy proceedings, and the defendant
`could not avoid that conclusion by unilaterally describing his obligation
`as “unsecured” in his bankruptcy filings despite a valid mortgage lien.
`3. The defendant’s claims that the trial court improperly refused to apply
`the best evidence rule and the clean hands doctrine were unavailing,
`there having been no merit to those claims.
`
`Argued April 18—officially released July 3, 2018
`
`Procedural History
`
`Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
`erty owned by the defendant, and for other relief,
`brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
`of Hartford, where the court, Scholl, J., granted the
`plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to liability
`only; thereafter, the court, Dubay, J., rendered a judg—
`ment of strict foreclosure; subsequently,
`the court,
`Dubay, J., denied the defendant’s motion for reconsid-
`eration, and the defendant appealed to this court.
`Afiimed.
`~
`
`Mark A. Hallums, self-represented,
`(defendant).
`
`the appellant
`
`ChristaA. Menge, with whom, on the brief, was Jona-
`than A. Adamec, for the appellee (plaintiff).
`
`

`

`Opinion
`
`PER CURIAM. The defendant, Mark A. Hallums,
`appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure ren—
`dered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, HSBC
`Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee for the Registered Holders
`of Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. On appeal, the defen-
`dant claims that the court improperly: (1) rendered a
`judgment when the plaintiff lacked standing in the case;
`(2) rendered a judgment in the absence of jurisdiction
`because there was no state law right to pursue a foreclo-
`sure action in light of the defendant’s discharge of the
`debt in bankruptcy; and (3) refused to apply the best
`» evidence rule and the clean hands doctrine. We affirm
`
`the judgment of the trial court.
`
`The following facts inform our review. In March,
`2011, the plaintiff commenced an action seeking a judg-
`ment of strict foreclosure against the defendant, to
`which the defendant responded. On January 14, 2016,
`the trial court rendered summary judgment as to liabil-
`ity, finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the
`note, which was endorsed in blank, and that the plaintiff
`had been assigned the mortgage. The court also found
`that the defendant was in default on the payments due
`
`underthe note. The record supports those findings. On
`November 14, 2016, the court rendered a judgment of
`strict foreclosure, with a law day of February 6, 2017.
`On November 21, 2016, the defendant filed a motion
`for reconsideration, which the court denied. This
`appeal followed.
`
`The defendant first claims that the plaintiff lacks
`standing in the case. We disagree. “The rules for stand—
`ing inforeclosure actions when the issue of standing
`is raised may be succinctly Summarized as follows.
`When a holder seeks to enforce a note through foreclo-
`sure, the holder must produce the note. The note must
`be sufficiently endorsed so as to demonstrate that the
`foreclosing party is a holder, either by a specific
`endorsement to that party'or by means of a blank
`endorsement to bearer. If the foreclosing party shows
`that it is a valid holder of the note and can produce
`the note, it is presumed that the foreclosing party is
`the rightful owner of the debt. That presumption may
`be rebutted by the defending party, but the burden is
`on the defending party to provide sufficient proof that
`the holder of the note is not the owner of the debt, for
`example, by showing that ownership of the debt had
`passed to another party. It is not sufficient to provide
`that proof, however, merely by pointing to some docu—
`mentary lacuna in the chain of title that might give rise
`to the possibility that some other party owns the debt.
`In order to rebut the presumption, the defendant must
`prove that someone else is the owner of the note and
`debt. Absent that proof, the plaintiff may rest its stand-
`ing to foreclose on its status as the holder of the note.”
`(Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)
`
`

`

`Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Condron, 181 Conn. App.
`248, 254—55,
`A.3d
`(2018). As found by the trial
`court, and as supported by the record evidence, the
`plaintiff is the holder of the note, endorsed in blank,
`and it has been assigned the mortgage. The defendant
`has submitted no proof that someone else is the owner
`of the note and mortgage. Accordingly, the plaintiff
`has standing.
`
`The'defendant next claims that the trial court did
`
`not have jurisdiction to render a judgment of strict
`foreclosure in light of the defendant’s discharge of the
`debt in bankruptcy. We disagree. “Subject matter juris-
`diction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate
`the type of controversy presented by the action before
`it
`.[A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits
`ofa case over which it is Without jurisdiction .
`.
`.
`[T]his court has often stated that the question of subject
`matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic com-
`petency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties,
`or by the court sua sponte, at any time.” (Emphasis
`added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
`Bank National Trust Co. V. Thompson, 163 Conn. App.
`827, 831, 136 A.3d 1277 (2016).
`
`“ [A] creditor with a loan secured by a lien on assets
`' of the debtor who becomes bankrupt before the loan
`is repaid [has been allowed] to ignore the bankruptcy
`proceeding and look to the lien for the satisfaction of
`the debt.
`.
`.
`. A valid judicial lien is not affected by a
`discharge in bankruptcy. [T]he discharge in bankruptcy
`does not extinguish the underlying debt. It only prevents
`[the] debtor from being personally liable for the dis-
`charged debt and forecloses collection of any deficiency
`judgment, thereby limiting the claimant to enforce its
`collection efforts in in rem actions against property
`subject to a valid, prebankruptcy lien guaranteeing pay-
`ment of the debt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
`Rina Gnesi Co. v. Sbrigl’io, 98 Conn. App. 1, 12, 908
`A.2d 1, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 945, 912 A.2d 480 (2006).
`
`Although the defendant contends that the bankruptcy
`discharge order somehow prevents the court from con—
`sidering the plaintiff’s action for a judgment of strict
`foreclosure, the law is to the contrary. Nevertheless,
`during oral argument, the defendant explained that he
`had listed his debt to the plaintiff as “unsecured” in his
`bankruptcy filings, and, because of that, the debt and
`the note automatically became unsecured, despite the
`valid mortgage lien. We are unaware of any law, federal
`or state, that invalidates amortgage lien simply because
`the mortgagor lists the debt and the note as unsecured
`for purposes of banla‘uptcy, and the defendant points
`us to no such law.
`
`Indeed, put simply, the law is quite clear that liens
`that survive discharge in bankruptcy include, among
`others, the in rem liability of mortgages. See Johnson
`V. Home State Bank, 501 U.SI 78, 84, 111 S. Ct. 2150,
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991); 3 W. Norton & W. Norton,
`Bankruptcy Law and Practice (3d Ed. 2018) § 58:4. To
`that extent, the Bankruptcy Code provides that a credi-
`tor’s right to foreclose a mortgage survives or passes
`through the bankruptcy because a discharge extin-
`guishes only the in personam liability of the debtor, not
`the in rem liability. See Johnson V. Home State Bank,
`supra, 84 (“a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only
`one mode of enforcing a claim—namely, an action
`against the debtor in personam—while leaving intact
`another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem”).
`As explained in 3 W. Norton & W. Norton, supra, § 58:4,
`the Bankruptcy Code “does not bar the creditor from
`enforcing a valid, prebankruptcy lien or security inter-
`est against property that has been retained by the estate
`or by the debtor after discharge. .
`.
`. Actions to collect
`against the debtor personally are enjoined. The credi-
`tor’s action in enforcing alien is against the property
`and is an action in rem with no recourse available
`
`." (Emphasis added; footnotes
`.
`.
`against the debtor .
`omitted.) The defendant cannot avoid this conclusion
`by unilaterally describing in his bankruptcy filings his
`obligation as something it is not. We, therefcire, con—
`clude that the defendant’s claim is without merit.
`
`Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
`refused to apply the best evidence rule and the clean
`hands doctrine to this case. He argues that the trial
`court “simply chose to ignore key evidence by ignoring
`that it exists.” He also argues that the “loan was table-
`funded, which meant the transaction was predatory per
`se,” and that, therefore, the court should have applied
`the clean hands doctrine. We have considered the defen-
`
`dant’s arguments regarding these claims and conclude
`k
`that they are baseless.
`
`The judgment is affirmed.
`
`