DOCKET NO: AANCV186026817S
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`SUPERIOR COURT
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`ORDER 438578
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`CINOTTI, LUCIA
`
` V.
`SOVRAN ACOUISITION LIMITED
`PARTNERSHIP DBA UNCLE B Et Al
`
`JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ANSONIA/
`MILFORD
` AT MILFORD
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`3/4/2020
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`ORDER
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`ORDER REGARDING:
`09/30/2019 154.00 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby:
`
`ORDER: DENIED
`
`Familiarity with the case law and arguments recited by each party is presumed and need not be generally
`repeated.
`
`By this lawsuit, the plaintiff brings a claim in negligence against the defendant and moving party, Sovran
`Acquisition Limited Partnership dba Uncle Bob's Self Storage (Self Storage). More specifically, the
`plaintiff claims that on or about August 16, 2015, she rented a climate-controlled storage unit at Self
`Storage and moved nearly all of her belongings into the storage unit. The plaintiff further alleges, inter
`alia, that on or about February 16, 2016, a water pipe burst at the Self Storage premises and that as a
`result, her property was damaged or destroyed. Based on the foregoing and other allegations, the
`plaintiff brings a claim in negligence against Self Storage (Count One), seeking damages in connection
`with her alleged property losses.
`
`Self Storage has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, pursuant to written contracts
`between the parties, the plaintiff released Self Storage from any claims of water damage. Self Storage
`seeks judgment as a matter of law based on the exculpatory clause.
`
`It is undisputed that on August 16, 2015, the plaintiff signed a document entitled "Rental Agreement -
`Connecticut," which reads, in part, as follows: "ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY IS STORED BY
`CUSTOMER AT CUSTOMER’S SOLE RISK. INSURANCE IS CUSTOMER’S SOLE
`RESPONSIBILITIY. CUSTOMER UNDERSTANDS THAT LANDLORD WILL NOT INSURE
`CUSTOMERS PROPERTY. As a condition of leasing an enclosed storage Space, Customer must
`provide insurance protecting the personal property stored Space, Customer must provide insurance
`protecting the personal property stored within the enclosed storage space against fire, burglary or other
`damage. Customer expressly releases Landlord from any losses, claims, suits, and/or damages or right of
`subrogation caused by fire, theft, burglary, water, rain storms, tornado, explosion, riot, rodents, civil
`disturbances, government action, insects, mildew, mold, black mold, dust, sonic boom, vehicles,
`unlawful entry or any other cause whatsoever whether property is stored in an enclosed or open storage
`Space . . . ."
`
`The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense accompanying a trial
`where there is no real issue to be tried. Dowling v. Kielak, 160 Conn. 14, 16, 273 A.2d 716 (1970). The
`standard of review applicable to motions for summary judgment is well established in our law. “Practice
`Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits
`and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
`moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary
`judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . .
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`The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of]
`material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
`of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate
`the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than issue determination, is
`the key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as a trier of fact when ruling on a motion for
`summary judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine
`whether any such issues exist.” (Brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Northrup v.
`Witkowski, 175 Conn. App. 223, 230-31, 167 A.3d 443 (2017). “It is not enough for the moving party
`merely to assert the absence of any disputed factual issue; the moving party is required to bring forward .
`. . evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to show the absence of any material
`dispute.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doty v. Shawmut Bank, 58 Conn.
`App. 427, 430, 755 A.2d 219 (2000). The legal standard applicable to the movant is strict. See Ramirez
`v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008) (“courts hold the movant to a
`strict standard”); Anderson v. Gordon, Muir & Foley, LLP, 108 Conn. App. 410, 416, 949 A.2d 488
`(2008). “The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.” (Internal
`quotation marks omitted.) Doty v. Shawmut Bank, supra, 431.
`
`"[The] law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence. . . ."
`(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of
`Connecticut, Inc., 265 Conn. 636, 643, 829 A.2d 827 (2003). "Releases that waive a plaintiff's right to
`recover in negligence from defendants are governed by Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of
`Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. at 636. In Hyson, the court stated that there is widespread support in
`other jurisdictions for 'a rule requiring that any agreement intended to exculpate a party for its own
`negligence state so expressly. See 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 195, comment (b) (1981) (‘[l]
`anguage inserted by a party in an agreement for the purpose of exempting him from liability for
`negligent conduct is scrutinized with particular care and a court may require specific and conspicuous
`reference to negligence under the general principle that language is interpreted against the draftsman’); 1
`E. Farnsworth, Contracts (2d Ed.1998) § 4.29a, p. 587 (‘[c]ourts have often found exculpatory clauses
`couched in general language insufficient to bar claims for liability for negligence’); but see 1 E.
`Farnsworth, supra, § 4.29a, at pp. 587-88 (‘not all courts have been so demanding’). Hyson v. White
`Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. at 642. Connecticut, specifically,
`requires that 'a party cannot be released from liability for injuries resulting from its future negligence in
`the absence of language that expressly so provides ... A requirement of express language releasing the
`defendant from liability for its negligence prevents individuals from inadvertently relinquishing valuable
`legal rights.' Id., at 643." Nanengast v. Hatch, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford,
`Docket No. CV040085957S (Dec. 12, 2005, Hartmere, J.) (2005 WL 3624582, *3).
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`Moreover, "[subsequent] Connecticut caselaw confirms that the Hyson rule is to be strictly applied when
`determining whether or not exculpatory/indemnity clauses release a defendant from liability in
`negligence claims." (Citations omitted.) Colagiovanni v. New Haven Acquisition Corp., Superior Court,
`judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV0308041 (Nov. 15, 2006, Robinson, J.) (42
`Conn. L. Rptr. 423) (2006 WL 3491737, *4); accord Lavin v. Absolute Tank Removal, LLC, Superior
`Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV044003218 (Jan. 29, 2007, Owens,
`J.T.R.) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 751) (2007 WL 448030).
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`In this case, the exculpatory language relied upon by Self Storage does not expressly provide that it is
`being released from liability for its own future negligence. As a result, its reliance upon the exculpatory
`clause as a defense to the plaintiff's claim in negligence is unavailing. Colagiovanni v. New Haven
`Acquisition Corp., supra, 2006 WL 3491737, *4 ("[Explicit] reference to negligence is required to
`render valid an agreement releasing a party from liability for [its] own negligence."); Nanengast v.
`Hatch, supra, 2005 WL 3624582, *3) (denying summary judgment and holding that release is
`insufficient because "[the] release in the present case . . . does not specifically state that the plaintiff is
`releasing the defendant[] from liability for their own negligence.")
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Self Storage's reliance on the court's decision in Berlin v. Public Storage, Inc.,
`Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV075007494 (Aug. 5, 2011,
`Tyma, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 474) (2011 WL 3928582), is misplaced. In Berlin, the exculpatory clause at
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`issue provided that the defendant would not be responsible for any damage to property from any cause,
`"including without limitation the defendant's active or passive acts, omissions, NEGLIGENCE or
`conversion . . . ." (Emphasis supplied by capitalization). Id., 2011 WL 392582, *3. Thus, Berlin involved
`contractual language that expressly released the defendant from its own negligence; as a result, it is
`readily distinguishable from this case.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
`
`Judicial Notice (JDNO) was sent regarding this order.
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`438578
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`Judge: W GLEN PIERSON
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`This document may be signed or verified electronically and has the same validity and status as a document with a physical
`(pen-to-paper) signature. For more information, see Section I.E. of the State of Connecticut Superior Court E-Services
`Procedures and Technical Standards (https://jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/e-standards.pdf), section 51-193c of the
`Connecticut General Statutes and Connecticut Practice Book Section 4-4.
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