Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:134
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
`
`
`
`DANIEL J. SCHACHT, #259717
`dschacht@donahue.com
`MARIO M. CHOI, #243409
`mchoi@donahue.com
`HAYLEY M. LENAHAN (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`hlenahan@donahue.com
`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`Attorneys at Law
`1999 Harrison Street, 26th Floor
`Oakland, California 94612-3520
`Telephone: (510) 451-3300
`Facsimile:
`(510) 451-1527
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`MARY BONO
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`CHER, individually and as Trustee of
`The Veritas Trust,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MARY BONO, individually and as
`Trustee of the Bono Collection Trust,
`and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOx)
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES IN
`SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`April 11, 2022
`Date:
`8:30 a.m.
`Time:
`Judge: Hon. John A. Kronstadt
`Ctrm:
`10B
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM IN
`SUPPORT OF
`MOTION TO
`DISMISS
`
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOx)
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 2 of 23 Page ID #:135
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`
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`I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1
`II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................... 1
`III. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`The First Count Should Be Dismissed Because the
`Termination Provisions of the Federal Copyright Act
`Preempt any State Law Contract Claim ..................................... 5
`1.
`The Copyright Terminations ............................................ 5
`2.
`The Termination Right is Broad and Inalienable,
`and Supersedes Any Agreement to the Contrary,
`Including the MSA ........................................................... 6
`The Heirs Had and Have the Sole Right to
`Terminate Sonny’s Original Grants, and All
`Terminated Rights Revert to Them .................................. 8
`The MSA Cannot Affect the Heirs’ Rights to
`Terminated Copyrights ..................................................... 8
`The Heirs’ Termination Rights Have Supremacy
`Under Federal Law ......................................................... 10
`a)
`Any Claim of Rights as Community Property
`Fails ...................................................................... 12
`The Court Should Dismiss the Second Count for Breach
`of Contract ................................................................................ 15
`IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 17
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
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`- i -
`
`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 3 of 23 Page ID #:136
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page
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`
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`Cases
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Berry v. Berry,
`277 P.3d 968 (Haw. 2012) ............................................................................. 13, 15
`
`Boggs v. Boggs,
`520 U.S. 833 (1997) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Brown-Thomas v. Hynie,
`Case No. 2:18-cv-00307-SVW-JPR, 2018 WL 3811353 (C.D. Cal.
`Aug. 7, 2018) ......................................................................................................... 8
`
`Chae v. SLM Corp.,
`593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 11
`
`Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn,
`532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008) ........................................................... 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15
`
`Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc.,
`981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993) .................................................................................. 7
`
`Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,
`318 U.S. 643 (1943) .......................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`Free v. Bland,
`369 U.S. 663 (1962) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Goldstein v. California,
`412 U.S. 546 (1973) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Hays v. Temple,
`23 Cal. App. 2d 690 (1937) ................................................................................. 10
`
`Hines v. Davidowitz,
`312 U.S. 52 (1941) .............................................................................................. 11
`
`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
`
`
`
`
`
`- ii -
`
`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 4 of 23 Page ID #:137
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
`439 U.S. 572 (1979) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Page
`
`Howell v. Howell,
`137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) ........................................................................................ 11
`
`In re Marriage of Worth
`195 Cal. App. 3d 768 (Ct. App. 1987). ................................................... 12, 13, 14
`
`Marvel Characters Inc. v. Simon,
`310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 10
`
`McCarty v. McCarty,
`453 U.S. 210 (1981) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................... 7, 8
`
`Navarro v. Block,
`250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 5
`
`Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck,
`537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 8
`
`Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,
`55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999), rev'd, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.
`2000) ............................................................................................ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
`
`Starr v. Baca,
`652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Stewart v. Abend,
`495 U.S. 207 (1990) ........................................................................................ 7, 10
`
`Tocher v. City of Santa Ana,
`219 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 11
`
`Wissner v. Wissner,
`338 U.S. 655 (1950) ............................................................................................ 11
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
`
`
`
`
`
`- iii -
`
`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
`
`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 5 of 23 Page ID #:138
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`
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`Statutes
`
`17 U.S.C. § 101 ........................................................................................................... 6
`
`17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ...................................................................................................... 5
`
`17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) ................................................................................................. 5
`
`17 U.S.C. § 203 ............................................................................................... 7, 12, 14
`
`17 U.S.C. § 203(a) ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(B) ............................................................................................ 6
`
`17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(4) ................................................................................................. 7
`
`17 U.S.C. § 301(a) .................................................................................................... 12
`
`17 U.S.C. § 302 ........................................................................................................... 7
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304 ............................................................................................... 8, 14, 15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c) .................................................................... 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) ................................................................................................. 8
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(B) ........................................................................................ 7, 8
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A) ............................................................................................ 3
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) ......................................................................................... 6, 7, 9
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6) ........................................................................................... 8, 10
`
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(D) ............................................................................................ 7
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`17 U.S.C. § 304(d) ...................................................................................................... 7
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`17 U.S.C. § 304(d)(1) ................................................................................................. 7
`
`Cal. Prob. Code §§ 6400-6414 ................................................................................... 5
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
`
`
`
`
`
`- iv -
`
`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
`
`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 6 of 23 Page ID #:139
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`Page
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`
`
`Other Authorities
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 .......................................................................................................... 4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)................................................................................................. 4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) ................................................................................................ 4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .......................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 6A.03 ................................................................................................................ 13
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 6A.03[C][1] ................................................................................................ 14, 15
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 9.06[A] ................................................................................................................ 7
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 11.01[A]. ............................................................................................................. 6
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 11.02[A] .............................................................................................................. 7
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 11.07[D][3] ....................................................................................................... 12
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 9.08 ..................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
`§ 9.11[B][1] ........................................................................................................... 7
`
`U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ....................................................................................... 12
`
`U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2............................................................................................ 11
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
`OAKLAND
`
`
`
`
`
`- v -
`
`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 7 of 23 Page ID #:140
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Cher seeks to invert the Supremacy Clause, claiming that her state
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`law rights under a 1978 contract with her ex-husband, the late Sonny Bono, trump
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`the rights specifically given to Sonny’s heirs – Defendant Mary Bono and Sonny’s
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`children – by Congress via the Copyright Act, to terminate certain of Sonny’s grants
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`of copyright. The law, however, is clear that Defendant’s right to terminate certain
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`grants pursuant to the Copyright Act preempts Plaintiff’s state law contract claims.
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`Plaintiff’s first claim for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that her state
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`law contract rights supersede Defendant’s rights to terminate pursuant to the
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`Copyright Act, fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed with prejudice.
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`Plaintiff’s second claim for breach of contract should be dismissed because, and to
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`the extent that, it incorporates her claim that her state law contract rights preempt
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`Defendant’s right to terminate pursuant to the Copyright Act.
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`II.
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`In or about 1964, Plaintiff Cher (“Cher” or “Plaintiff”) and the late Sonny
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`Bono (“Sonny”)1 began performing together and recorded multiple musical
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`compositions, including musical compositions written by Sonny during their
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`marriage. ¶ 9.2 On or about February 1, 1974, Cher and Sonny separated and, in 1975,
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`divorced, subject to the disposition of their community property. ¶ 12.
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`On or about August 10, 1978, Cher and Sonny entered into a written Marriage
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`Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), in which Sonny irrevocably assigned to Cher,
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`as her sole and separate property throughout the world and in perpetuity, fifty percent
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`of the income from musical composition royalties, record royalties, and other assets
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`OAKLAND
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`1 The reference to Cher and Sonny without honorifics is done for clarity, and not
`meant to disrespect either. Both achieved mononymous fame.
`2 “¶” and “¶¶” hereinafter refers to paragraphs of the Complaint for Declaratory
`Relief; and Breach of Contract, filed October 13, 2021 (ECF No. 1).
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`- 1 -
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`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 8 of 23 Page ID #:141
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`that they owned as of their February 1, 1974 separation.3 ¶¶ 13-17 4
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`Sonny died in January 1998. ¶ 20. Sonny’s widow, Defendant Representative
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`Mary Bono (“Mary”),5 was appointed administrator of his Estate. ¶ 21. In July 1998,
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`Cher filed her creditor’s claim against the Estate, raising Sonny’s obligations to her
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`under the MSA. ¶ 22. In or before July 1999, Mary, as administrator of Sonny’s
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`estate, and Cher settled Cher’s claims, under which agreement (the “Agreement re
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`Creditor’s Claim”) they confirmed Plaintiff’s “ongoing rights under the terms and
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`conditions of the [MSA]” and agreed to “cooperate in developing a mutually
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`acceptable mechanism for the collection and proper disbursement of such royalties
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`to Cher6 and to the heirs after the closing of this estate.” ¶ 23. Cher conceded at the
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`time, and still concedes, that Mary properly accounted for all the royalties due to her.
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`¶ 23. The probate court, in August 1999, confirmed the Agreement re Creditor’s
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`Claim, and Plaintiff continued receiving sums pursuant to the MSA. ¶¶ 24-25.
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`Pursuant to the probate court’s order, the residue would be distributed to Sonny’s
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`heirs, namely Mary, Chesare Bono, Chianna Bono, Christy Bono, and Chaz Bono
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`(née Chastity Bono) (together, the “Heirs”). ¶ 24.
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`OAKLAND
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`In or about 2016, a majority of the Heirs issued a notice of termination pursuant
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`to 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) to various music publishers or other companies to whom Sonny
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`3 The MSA is attached as Exhibit A to Defendant Mary Bono’s Request for Judicial
`Notice in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (the “Request for Judicial
`Notice”), which is filed concurrently herewith.
`4 Prior to this litigation, as part of Cher’s sale of her interest in musical compositions
`and other assets to an unrelated third party, Cher asked Mary to agree that Cher
`possessed an ownership interest in the musical compositions authored by Sonny
`contrary to the plain language of the MSA, presumably to try to take advantage of
`the lower tax rate provided for by such a reclassification. Cher now concedes that she
`was granted only a royalty interest. See Compl. 5:4-5, 6:12-13, 9:14-16; 15:25-17:2,
`17:8-21, 18:12-21, 18:25-27; see also id. ¶¶ 10-11, 16-17, 19, 22-23, 25-26, 31, 35-
`37, 41-42, 48, 50.
`5 “Representative Bono” is the proper form of address. However, both Mary Bono
`and Sonny Bono were members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and so
`Representative Mary Bono is referred to herein as “Mary” to avoid confusion.
`6 The role of Cher and Mary as trustees of their respective trusts is irrelevant for all
`purposes of this motion. As in the Complaint, references to Cher and Mary are to
`them both individually and in their role, if any, as trustee.
`
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`- 2 -
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`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`
`
`

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`Case 2:21-cv-08157-JAK-RAO Document 18-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 9 of 23 Page ID #:142
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`had granted a transfer or license of copyright, or rights under them, in musical
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`compositions authored or co-authored by Sonny, with effective dates of termination
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`ranging from 2018 to 2026.7 ¶ 33. By law, the earliest any notice could have been
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`served is 2008, approximately ten years after Sonny’s death. 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 304(c)(4)(A) (a notice of termination may not be sent more than ten years before
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`the termination date); see also Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978, 983
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`(9th Cir. 2008).
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`Cher asserts claims for declaratory relief as to the effect of the Heirs’ Section
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`304(c) termination on Plaintiff’s rights under the MSA (¶¶ 39-44) and for breach of
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`contract (¶¶ 45-50). She claims that “even if, and to the extent that, the Heirs § 304(c)
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`notice of termination is valid and effective” the notice has no effect on her right to
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`royalties from the subject copyrights. ¶ 41; see also ¶ 42 (“Plaintiff further contends
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`that, despite the Heirs’ notice of termination, Plaintiff, individually or as the Trustee
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`of The Veritas Trust: (a) Continues to own and owns an undivided fifty percent of
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`the Royalties, from any and all sources, including whether those sources are music
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`publishers or other companies identified in the Heirs’ notice of termination or others
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`taking their place upon termination of Sonny’s grants to them”).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) a claim may be
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`dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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`550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The purpose of this is to “give fair notice of what the
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`claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and to “enable the opposing party to
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`defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011);
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`OAKLAND
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`7 The notice of termination is attached as Exhibit B to the Request for Judicial Notice.
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`- 3 -
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`MEMO ISO MOT. TO DISMISS
`2:21-CV-08157 JAK (RAOX)
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`

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`#:143
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability
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`requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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`unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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`When determining whether a pleading adequately states a plausible claim for
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`relief, the court must first take “note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
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`claim” and then undergo a two-prong approach. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. First, the
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`courts identify which statements in the complaint are factual allegations and which
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`are legal conclusions. While a court “must take all of the factual allegations in the
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`complaint as true,” it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
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`factual allegation” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.
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`at 678.
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`Second, the Court decides whether, in the specific context of the case, the
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`factual allegations, if assumed true, allege a plausible claim. Id. at 679. The factual
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`allegations that are taken as true “must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
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`that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of
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`discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, the
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`plaintiff must plead “plausible grounds to infer” that her or his claims rise “above the
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`speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. A claim is facially plausible when
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`there are sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that the
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`defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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`A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted if a court concludes
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`that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts, as opposed to statements of law, sufficient
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`to provide a defendant fair notice of the basis for a claim and grounds upon which it
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`rests. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in
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`conjunction with Rule 8, which requires that a complaint include a “short and plain
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`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`8(a)(2). In doing so, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise and direct.” Fed. R.
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`DONAHUE FITZGERALD LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`OAKLAND
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`Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Under Rules 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2), dismissal is proper for “an absence
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`of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block,
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`250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
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`A. THE FIRST COUNT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE
`TERMINATION
`PROVISIONS OF
`THE
`FEDERAL
`COPYRIGHT ACT PREEMPT ANY STATE LAW CONTRACT
`CLAIM.
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`1.
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`The Copyright Terminations
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`The works at issue – musical compositions and sound recordings – are subject
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`to the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (copyright law protects “original works of
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`authorship” which include “musical works, including any accompanying words …
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`[and] sound recordings”). A copyright interest is considered a “personal property”
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`asset that may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by
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`operation of law, may be bequeathed by will, or may pass as personal property by the
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`applicable laws of intestate succession. § 201(d)(1). In this case, there are three
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`relevant grants of copyright that are governed by state law, either under state contract
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`law or state intestate succession law. First, Sonny granted his copyright interests to
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`music publishers and other companies prior to 1978, which were the grants Sonny’s
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`Heirs later terminated. ¶ 36. Second, Sonny granted part of his remaining copyright
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`interest – specifically, a fifty percent royalty interest – to Cher pursuant to the 1978
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`MSA. ¶ 13 (noting that the MSA “is expressly governed by California law and was
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`subsequently approved by the California Superior Court in their marital dissolution
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`action.”). Third, Sonny’s remaining copyright interests passed upon his death
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`pursuant to California’s intestacy laws to his widow and four adult children. See Cal.
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`Probate Code §§ 6400-6414.
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`The copyright terminations at issue are, in contrast, a statutory creation of
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`Congress. They are intended to allow authors and their heirs to recapture the
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`ownership and value of any copyright that they bargained away years earlier. Under
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`the Copyright Act of 1909, a copyright consisted of two 28-year terms. Melville B.
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`OAKLAND
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`Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (“NIMMER”) § 9.08. When the
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`first term expired, the author could apply to renew the copyright for a second term.
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`The purpose of this renewal process was to grant authors and their families a second
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`opportunity to market their works after an original transfer of copyright, when they
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`might be in a better bargaining position and have a better sense of the economic value
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`of the work. 3 NIMMER § 11.01[A]. This purpose was largely frustrated by Fred
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`Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), wherein the Supreme
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`Court held that an author could assign her or his renewal copyright at any time,
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`including at the time of the original grant and before the renewal could be secured.
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`See also 3 NIMMER § 11.01[A].
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`In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress extended the term of copyright and
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`enacted the current termination provisions essentially to overturn Fred Fisher and
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`ensure that authors and authors’ heirs, not grantees, would benefit from this extended
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`term. See Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 984 (“The 1976 Act, and in particular its twin
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`termination of transfer provisions, were in large measure designed to assure that its
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`new benefits would be for the authors and their heirs. Thus, with the termination of
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`transfer provisions, authors or their heirs are able to negotiate additional
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`compensation for previously granted rights. Without such a right of termination, the
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`Extended Renewal Term would constitute a windfall to grantees.”).
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`2.
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`The Termination Right is Broad and Inalienable, and
`Supersedes Any Agreement to the Contrary, Including the
`MSA
`
`The termination right is broad: “Termination of the grant may be effected
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`notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a
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`will or to make any future grant.” 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (emphasis added); see also
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`§ 203(a)(2)(B) (similar language); Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 983 (“Under 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 101, the term ‘including’ is ‘illustrative’ not ‘limitative’ and thus we must interpret
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`the term ‘agreement[s] to the contrary’ under § 304(c)(5) as inclusive of agreements
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`other than the two examples Congress explicitly mentioned.”); id. at 985 (noting the
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`“broadly worded ‘notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary’ proviso”);
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`3 NIMMER § 11.02[A] (“A ‘transfer’ [which may be terminated] includes not only
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`assignments … but also any other conveyance of copyright or of any exclusive right
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`comprised in a copyright.”). The only grant that cannot be terminated is a grant by
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`will, which is not at issue here. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(B).
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`In 1998, Congress reaffirmed its approach, as summarized succinctly by the
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`Ninth Circuit in Classic Media:
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`In 1998, Congress reaffirmed its objectives with respect to
`the 1976 Act’s termination provisions. The Sonny Bono
`Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, effective October
`27, 1998, extended the term of protection for works created
`prior to January 1, 1978 from 75 to 95 years. 17 U.S.C.
`§ 304(d). This term extension was intended, once again, to
`benefit authors and their heirs, and not to serve as a
`windfall for grantees. Accordingly, Congress coupled the
`extended term with a new termination right for authors and
`their statutory heirs, provided they had not already
`exercised their termination right under § 304(c). The same
`broadly worded “notwithstanding any agreement to the
`contrary” proviso in § 304(c)(5) applies to the termination
`provision in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
`Act. See id. § 304(d)(1); see also 3 NIMMER § 9.11[B][1],
`pp. 9–152 to 9–153.
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`532 F.3d at 985. “The 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but provides
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`an inalienable termination right.” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (citing
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`17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 302); see also Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 985 (applying this quote
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`from Stewart, as it applies to § 203, to the identical language of “its close
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`counterpart,” § 304(c)); Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679,
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`684 (2d Cir. 1993) (“there is a strong presumption against the conveyance of renewal
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`rights”) (citing 2 NIMMER § 9.06[A] at 9–71 to 9–72; Fred Fisher, 318 U.S. 643).
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`Termination rights are inalienable until the author or the author’s heirs serves the
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`notice of termination or, in certain situations, has the right to serve such notice.
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`17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(4) and 304(c)(6)(D); Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 987 (discussing
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`the “distinct factual scenario” of Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th
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`Cir. 2005) (further grant to original grantee’s successor is effective where heir had
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`the right to serve a termination notice)).
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`3.
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`The Heirs Had and Have the Sole Right to Terminate Sonny’s
`Original Grants, and All Terminated Rights Revert to Them
`
`Where an author has died, as here, “his or her termination right is owned, and
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`may be exercised … by the widow … and [t]he author’s surviving children.”
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`17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2); see also Classic Media, 532 F.3d at 983 (“The Act also created
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`a right of termination, under § 304(c), which allows an author, if he is living, or his
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`widow and children, if he is not, to recapture, for the Extended Renewal Term, the
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`rights that had previously been transferred to third parties.”); Brown-Thomas v.
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`Hynie, Case No. 2:18-cv-00307-SVW-JPR, 2018 WL 3811353, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
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`7, 2018) (“A previous spouse i