Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 164 Filed 06/08/22 Page 1 of 26 Page ID #:7488
`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 164 Filed 06/08/22 Page1of26 Page ID #:7488
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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`Case No.: CV 19-06301-AB (KS)
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`Date:
`
`June 8, 2022
`
`Title: Philips North America LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc. et al
`
`Present: The Honorable ANDRE BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge
`
`Carla Badirian
`N/A
`
`Deputy Clerk
`
`Court Reporter
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`Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s):
`
`Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
`
`Jean-Paul Ciardullo
`Eley O. Thompson
`Ruben J Rodrigues
`LucasI. Silva
`
`John W. Custer
`
`Rachael D. Lamkin
`Michelle L. Marriott
`
`Proceedings:
`
`[IN CHAMBERS] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING-IN-
`PART AND DENYING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
`FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`Defendants Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin Ltd. (collectively,
`“Defendants”) move for summary judgment that the accused Garmin watches do
`not infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,277,377 (“the ’377 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No.
`9,801,542 (“the °542 Patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents’’), and that the
`Asserted Patents are invalid. (““D-MSJ,” Dkt. No. 145.) Plaintiff Philips North
`America LLC (“Plaintiff”) opposed (“P-Opp.,” Dkt. No. 154), and Defendants
`replied (“D-Reply,” Dkt. No. 153).
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`CV-90 (12/02)
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`Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment that Defendants’ Forerunner 301
`system does not render the claims of the ’377 Patent invalid or to preclude
`Defendants from relying on the Forerunner 301 system as prior art to the ’377
`Patent for failing to timely disclose the reference. (“P-MSJ,” Dkt. No. 136.)
`Defendants opposed (“D-Opp.,” Dkt. No. 150), and Plaintiff replied (“P-Reply,”
`Dkt. No. 158).
`
`The Court deems the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument.
`
`(See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.) For the reasons explained below, the
`Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-
`PART Defendants’ motion.
`
`
`I.
`
`TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
`
`A. The ’542 Patent
`
`
`The ’542 Patent is titled “Health Monitoring Appliance.” The earliest patent
`
`application it claims priority to is U.S. Patent Application No. 11/433,900, filed on
`May 12, 2006. The ’542 Patent lists Bao Tran and Ha Tran as the named inventors.
`The ’542 Patent issued on October 31, 2017.
`
`
`The ’542 Patent generally relates to monitoring various physiological
`parameters of a patient without using invasive wiring. See ’542 Patent at 1:23–44.
`According to the ‘542 Patent, the invention—due to its wireless nature—enables
`monitoring patient physiology without severely complicating sensitive medical
`procedures. See id. Figure 15A, reproduced below, “shows a system block diagram
`of the network-based patient monitoring system in a hospital or nursing home
`setting”:
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`Id. at 62:60–62, Fig. 15A. The patient monitoring system in Figure 15A includes a
`“a patient component 215,” “a server component 216,” “a client component 217,”
`“one or more mesh network patient transmitters 202,” “one or more Web servers
`205,” “one or more waveform servers 204,” “one or more mesh network receivers
`211,” “the network 105,” “the hospital database 230,” “a plurality of nurse
`computer user interface[s] 208,” “an applet,” “a network client component 217,” “a
`series of workstations 106,” “media player applets 210,” and “a path 221.” Id. at
`62:60–67, 63:1–23.
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`
`Plaintiff asserts independent Claim 13 of the ’542 Patent and claims that
`depend therefrom. See Dkt. No. 145 at 3. Claim 13 of the ’542 Patent recites:
`
`
`13. A method for maintaining wellness in a user
`comprising the following steps:
`a. using one or more sensors physically coupled to the
`user and connected to a network, to monitor one or
`more vital parameters, providing data
`representative of the user’s physical condition;
`b. analyzing the one or more vital parameters using a
`statistical analyzer, trained with training data
`representing physiological conditions determined
`to be undesirable for the user to analyze the vital
`parameters to determine if the physiological
`conditions are undesirable; and
`c. generating a warning indication when the user’s
`physical condition is undesirable.
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`’542 Patent, Claim 13.
`
`
`B. The ’377 Patent
`
`
`
`The ’377 Patent is titled “Method and Apparatus for Monitoring Exercise
`with Wireless Internet Connectivity” and claims priority to Provisional Patent
`Application No. 61/172,486, filed on December 17, 1999. The ’377 Patent issued
`on October 2, 2012. According to the specification, the ’377 Patent:
`
`[R]elates to monitoring of living subjects, and more particularly to
`health-monitoring of persons where measured or input health data is
`communicated by a wireless device to and from a software application
`running on an internet-connected server and where the same may be
`studied and processed by the software application, a health
`professional, or the subject.
`
`
`See ’377 Patent at 1:35–41. The ’377 Patent discloses that the invention meets the
`need of “reduc[ing] health care costs through providing educational health care
`information and interactive physiological monitoring in the home environment by
`means of a user-friendly, interactive system.” See id. at 2:2–5. Figure 2,
`reproduced below, “illustrates an embodiment of a wireless health-monitoring
`apparatus according to the present invention”:
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`Id. at 5:26–28, Fig. 2. The wireless health monitoring system in Figure 2 includes
`“a[] [health monitoring device] 11, which may include an optional monitor screen
`40, coupled via an optional adaptor 42 to a [wireless web device] 12.” Id. at
`6:46–48. The “[wireless web device] 12 connects wirelessly via an antenna 60.” Id.
`at 6:48–49.
`
`Plaintiff asserts independent Claim 1 of the ’377 Patent and claims that
`
`depend therefrom. See Dkt. No. 145 at 3. Claim 1 of the ’377 Patent recites:
`
`
`1. A method for interactive exercise monitoring, the
`method comprising the steps of:
`a. downloading an application to a web-enabled wireless
`phone directly from a remote server over the
`internet;
`b. coupling the a web-enabled wireless phone to a device
`which provides exercise-related information;
`c. rendering a user interface on the web-enabled wireless
`phone;
`d. using the application, receiving data indicating a
`physiologic status of a subject;
`e. using the application, receiving data indicating an
`amount of exercise performed by the subject;
`f. wherein at least one of the data indicating a physiologic
`status of a subject or the data indicating an amount
`of exercise performed by the subject is received
`from the device which provides exercise-related
`information, and wherein the data indicating a
`physiologic status of a subject is received at least
`partially while the subject is exercising;
`g. sending the exercise-related information to an internet
`server via a wireless network;
`h. receiving a calculated response from the server, the
`response associated with a calculation performed
`by the server based on the exercise-related
`information; and
`i. using the application, displaying the response.
`
`’377 Patent, Claim 1.
`
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
`material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A fact is
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`material when, under the governing law, the resolution of that fact might affect the
`outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
`dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
`verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The burden of establishing the absence of a
`genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at
`322–23, and the court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the
`light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
`(2007).
`
`To meet its burden, “[t]he moving party may produce evidence negating an
`essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the
`moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence
`of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of
`persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099,
`1106 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving
`party cannot simply rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or
`“metaphysical doubt” about a material issue of fact precludes summary judgment.
`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
`There is no genuine issue for trial where the record taken as a whole could not lead
`a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 587.
`
`III.
`
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`Plaintiff seeks judgment that Defendant’s Forerunner 301 system does not
`invalidate the claims of the ’377 Patent or, alternatively, for an order by the Court
`that Defendants are precluded from relying on the Forerunner 301 system. (See
`generally P-MSJ.) Defendants seek judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of
`the asserted claims in this matter. (See generally D-MSJ.) The Court considers
`each argument below.
`
`
`A. Whether Defendants’ Can Rely on the Forerunner 301 System
`
`
`
`Plaintiff asserts that Defendants should be precluded from relying on the
`Forerunner 301 system as invalidating prior art for failing to disclose the reference
`in their invalidity contentions and in the parties’ joint stipulation to limit the
`asserted prior art. (See generally P-MSJ.) According to Plaintiff, the parties’
`agreed to be bound by Northern District of California Local Patent Rule (“L.P.R.”)
`3-3, and Defendants did not identify the Forerunner 301 system in their invalidity
`contentions as required by that rule. (See id. at 4–6.) Instead, Plaintiff asserts that
`Defendants first disclosed the Forerunner 301 system as invalidity prior art in their
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`expert reports, which Plaintiff contends is improper. (See id. at 6–8.) Plaintiff also
`argues that Defendants’ disclosure of the Forerunner 301 system for other patents
`is insufficient to disclose the reference for the ’377 Patent. (See id. at 8–9.)
`Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that per the parties’ stipulation, Defendants chose
`seven prior art references to assert against the ’377 Patent, and the Forerunner 301
`system was not included. (See id. at 9–11 (citing Dkt Nos. 89, 90).) Finally,
`Plaintiff argues that the Court should not allow Defendants to amend their
`contentions now because they cannot show good cause for their delay and Plaintiff
`would be prejudiced. (See id. at 11–13.)
`
`Defendants respond that the Court cannot grant judgment of no invalidity
`based on the Forerunner 301 system because Plaintiff does not compare the system
`to the claims of the ’377 Patent. (See D-Opp. at 2–3.) Instead, Defendants assert
`that Plaintiff’s motion would be better suited as a motion to strike or motion in
`limine. (See id. at 3–6.) Defendants also argue that the Court never adopted the
`L.P.R.s, nor did it adopt L.P.R. 3-6 “relating to supplementation or amendment of
`invalidity contentions.” (See id. at 7–8.) Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff
`was not prejudiced by its belated disclosure because it had notice that the
`Forerunner 301 system could be used as invalidity prior art for the ’377 Patent
`because Defendants identified the prior art reference for other related patents and
`conducted significant discovery for the reference. (See id. at 9–12.) Finally,
`Defendants aver that there was good cause for their untimely disclosure because
`Plaintiff did not produce its interrogatory response regarding the priority date for
`the ’377 Patent until just before the close of fact discovery. (See id. at 12–15.)
`
`The Court will preclude Defendants from relying on the Forerunner 301
`system as invalidating prior art for the ’377 Patent. In patent cases, courts often
`require the parties to exchange infringement and invalidity contentions “to provide
`early notice of their infringement and invalidity” theories. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v.
`Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Requiring
`the exchange of contentions is “designed [to] make the parties more efficient, to
`streamline the litigation process, and to articulate with specificity” infringement
`and invalidity theories. Intertrust Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV 01-
`1640 SBA, 2003 WL 23120174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2003).
`
`When a party opposing a claim of patent infringement serves its invalidity
`contentions, typically those contentions must identify “each item of prior art that
`allegedly anticipates each asserted claim or renders it obvious,” including the
`“number, country of origin, and date of issue” of each prior art patent, and the
`“title, date of publication, and where feasible, author and publisher” of each prior
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`art publication. See L.P.R. 3-3(a). Additionally, invalidity contentions should
`explain “[w]hether each item of prior art anticipates each asserted claim or renders
`it obvious.” Id. at L.P.R. 3-3(b). “If obviousness is alleged,” invalidity contentions
`should include “an explanation of why the prior art renders the asserted claim
`obvious, including an identification of any combinations of prior art showing
`obviousness.” Id. Further, invalidity contentions should include “[a] chart
`identifying specifically where and how in each alleged item of prior art each
`limitation of each asserted claim is found,” and disclose “[a]ny grounds of
`invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) or
`enablement or written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112(1) of any of the asserted
`claims.” Id. at L.P.R. 3-3(c)-(d).
`
`“[C]ourts agree that the degree of specificity” required for contentions is that
`which is enough “to provide reasonable notice” to the opposing party. Geovector
`Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., No. CV 16-02463 WHO, 2017 WL 76950,
`at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Under L.P.R. 3-6, a party may amend its invalidity contentions “only by
`order of the Court upon a timely showing of good cause.” L.P.R. 3-6. To determine
`whether a party has shown good cause, a court considers (1) “whether [the party]
`was diligent in amending its contentions” and (2) whether the non-moving party
`will suffer prejudice. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 195, 201
`(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366–68). To show diligence, the
`party seeking leave to amend must show that it “promptly mov[ed] to amend when
`[the] new evidence is revealed in discovery.” O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1363. “The
`party seeking to amend its contentions bears the burden of establishing diligence.”
`Etilize, 257 F.R.D. at 201 (citing O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366).
`
`Although there is “no need to consider the question of prejudice” without
`diligence, “a court in its discretion may elect to do so.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung
`Elecs. Co., No. CV 12-00630 LHK, 2012 WL 5632618, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15,
`2012). Thus, “courts have granted a plaintiff’s request to amend when the request
`does not appear to be motived by gamesmanship or when there is still ample time
`left in discovery.” Dobeck v. Cobra Eng’g, Inc., No. SACV 16-1570 JVS (FFMx),
`2017 WL 8186769, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2017) (citing OpenDNS, Inc. v. Select
`Notifications Media, LLC, No. CV 11-05101 EJD (HRL), 2013 WL 2422623, at *3
`(N.D. Cal. June 3, 2013)).
`
`As a preliminary matter, the Court treats Plaintiff’s summary judgment
`motion as a motion to strike. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the Court and the
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`parties agreed that the L.P.R.s governed the parties’ infringement and invalidity
`contentions, including the disclosure requirements for those contentions. (See Dkt.
`Nos. 46 at 3, 54 at 4.) Accepting Defendants’ position that there were no specific
`disclosure requirements for subsequent amendments in this case would render the
`parties’ contentions meaningless. Defendants also had at least two opportunities to
`identify the Forerunner 301 system as invalidating prior art for the ’377 Patent,
`both in their invalidity contentions and in their stipulated list of asserted prior art,
`yet failed to do so. Defendants’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s support for the
`priority date of the ’377 Patent are also insufficient to show good cause for their
`amendment. Additionally, Defendants have not shown that they were diligent in
`requesting leave to amend their contentions, and the Court declines to consider the
`prejudice to Plaintiff given the late stage of this matter.
`
`Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’
`from relying on the Forerunner 301 system as invalidating prior art for the ’377
`Patent.
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`
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`B. Whether Defendants Infringe the Asserted Claims
`
`
`1. Direct Infringement
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`
`
`Determining patent infringement is a two-step process. Cybor Corp. v. FAS
`Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “First, the court determines the
`scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed
`claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.” Id. (citations omitted).
`“Whether an accused device or method infringes a claim either literally or under
`the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact.” Schoell v. Regal Marine Indus.,
`Inc., 247 F.3d 1202, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`Because the ultimate burden of proving infringement rests with the patentee,
`an accused infringer moving for summary judgment may establish that summary
`judgment is proper “either by providing evidence that would preclude a finding of
`infringement, or by showing that the evidence on file fails to establish a material
`issue of fact essential to the patentee’s case.” Novartis Corp. v. Ben Venue Labs.,
`Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic,
`Inc., 843 F.3d 942, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (under the second step, “a grant of
`summary judgment of noninfringement is proper when no reasonable factfinder
`could find that the accused product contains every claim limitation or its
`equivalent”). If the moving party meets this threshold requirement, the burden
`shifts to the party asserting infringement to set forth, by declaration or as otherwise
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`permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine
`issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
`
`In construing the claim language, the Court begins with the principle that
`“the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.”
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal
`quotation marks omitted). Further, this ordinary and customary meaning “is the
`meaning that the [claim] term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
`application.” Id. at 1313. “[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to
`read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
`disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`specification.” Id.
`
`
`“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a
`person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim
`construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely
`accepted meaning of commonly understood words. In such circumstances general
`purpose dictionaries may be helpful.” Id. at 1314 (internal citation omitted). In
`other cases, “determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim
`requires examination of terms that have a particular meaning in a field of art.” Id.
`In those cases, “the court looks to those sources available to the public that show
`what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to
`mean.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These sources include “the words of
`the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history,
`and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of
`technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`
`But it is improper to read limitations from the specification into the claim.
`Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘[I]f
`we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim, in order to limit
`such claim . . . we should never know where to stop.’” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d
`at 1312)). “We do not import limitations into claims from examples or
`embodiments appearing only in a patent’s written description, even when a
`specification describes very specific embodiments of the invention or even
`describes only a single embodiment, unless the specification makes clear that ‘the
`patentee . . . intends for the claims and the embodiments in the specification to be
`strictly coextensive.’” JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d
`1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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`2.
`
`Claim 13 of the ’542 Patent
`
`Defendants argue that the accused Garmin watches do not infringe Claim 13
`of the ’542 Patent, the only independent claim asserted from the ’542 Patent,
`because they are not “trained with training data representing physiological
`conditions determined to be undesirable for the user.” (D-MSJ at 3–5.) In the
`Court’s claim construction order, the Court rejected Defendants’ argument that the
`term “undesirable for the user” in Claim 13 was indefinite, stating, “Defendants
`have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that one of skill in the art in
`health monitoring could not determine what would be undesirable for a patient,
`given the patient’s individual characteristics.” (“Claim Construction Order,” Dkt.
`No. 102 at 41.) Defendants now argue that because the physiological condition
`needs to be undesirable to a specific user, the training data representing the
`physiological condition needs to come from the same user. (D-MSJ at 4 (citing
`Claim Construction Order at 41).) Defendants argue that the accused watches are
`not trained by the same user because they are “pre-trained by one hundred and
`fifty-eight (158) people in Finland before the accused devices are ever sold to ‘the
`user’ in the United States.” (Id. at 5 (citing “D-SUF,” Dkt. No. 142 ¶¶ 1–2, 5–6).)
`Thus, Defendants assert that the accused watches do not infringe Claim 13.
`
`Plaintiff responds that material disputes of fact preclude summary judgment
`as to whether the accused watches infringe Claim 13 of the ’542 Patent. According
`to Plaintiff, “[t]he claim does not require that the ‘training data’ of limitation 1(b)
`be derived from a particular user”; “[r]ather, ‘training data’ must merely represent
`physiological conditions determined to be undesirable for the user[.]” (P-Opp. at
`8–9 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ interpretation of the
`claim language renders the term “representing” meaningless. (Id. at 9 (citing Merck
`& Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).)
`Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants reference the Court’s Claim Construction
`Order out of context. (See id. at 9–10.) Additionally, Plaintiff avers that the
`specification “clearly contemplates the [claimed] statistical analyzer being trained
`prior to the collection of the specific user’s vital signs that are fed to the statistical
`analyzer.” (Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) (citing ’542 Patent at 9:19–41).)
`Because Plaintiff introduced evidence that the accused watches were trained with
`data “representing physiological conditions determined to be undesirable for the
`user,” Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny Defendants’ motion. (See id. at
`10–11 (citing Dkt. No. 146-2 ¶¶ 348, 354; Dkt. No. 153-2 at 13:2–17:11).)
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`Defendants reply that “the user” in step (a) of Claim 13 must be the same as
`in step (b), meaning the training data representing the user’s undesirable
`physiological conditions must come from the user. (D-Reply at 10–11.) Defendants
`argue that their interpretation does not render the term “representing” meaningless
`because the “training data” still represents the specific user’s physiological
`conditions. (Id. at 11.) Defendants also agree that the specification discloses that
`the claimed “statistical analyzer” can be trained in advance but argues that the
`specification still only discloses using the specific user’s data to train the
`“statistical analyzer” to recognize the user’s “undesirable” conditions. (Id. at 12
`(citing ’542 Patent at 34:44–53, 36:19–20).)
`
`
`The Court finds that the intrinsic evidence does not support limiting the term
`“training data” to data from the claimed “user.” First, the claim language does not
`require the “training data” to come from the claimed user. Step a. of Claim 13
`recites using sensors to monitor a user’s vital parameters, which provide “data
`representative of the user’s physical condition.” ’542 Patent, Claim 13. Step b. of
`Claim 13 recites analyzing that data with a statistical analyzer to determine if the
`user’s current condition is “undesirable.” Id. The statistical analyzer is trained with
`a separate set of “training data representing” “physiological conditions”
`determined to be “undesirable” to the specific user. Id. Thus, a plain reading of the
`claim language suggests that the claimed “statistical analyzer” determines whether
`the user’s condition is undesirable by comparing the data representing the user’s
`current condition with the “training data” representing the undesirable
`physiological conditions generally. In other words, the claimed “statistical
`analyzer” can be trained with “training data” representative of certain
`“physiological conditions” prior to use, the user can later choose which of those
`“physiological conditions” are “undesirable,” and the “statistical analyzer” can
`then monitor the user for those conditions.
`
`Second, the specification supports interpreting the claimed “training data” to
`include data from individuals other than the user. For example, the specification
`discloses that the “statistical analyzer” will send the user a warning when the
`“statistical analyzer” determines that a user’s glucose level is outside of “a well-
`established range” set by the training data. See ’542 Patent at 9:21–32. That
`suggests that the “training data” comes from many individuals to determine the
`“desirable” range for glucose levels. If the “statistical analyzer” determined the
`range solely based on the user’s own data, the range could still include
`“dangerous” glucose levels associated with “undesirable” physiological conditions.
`Although Defendants cite instances where the “training data” may come from the
`user, Defendants have not shown that the specification expresses a clear intent to
`
`CV-90 (12/02)
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 164 Filed 06/08/22 Page 13 of 26 Page ID #:7500
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`limit the scope of the term “training data” to data from the claimed user. See
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365
`(Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ interpretation requiring the
`training data to come from the user.
`
`Given that the Court construes the term “training data” to include data from
`
`individuals other than the claimed user, there is at least a genuine dispute of
`material fact whether the accused Garmin watches infringe Claim 13 of the ’542
`Patent. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Defendants’
`non-infringement defense for Claim 13 of the ’542 Patent.
`
`
`3. Claim 1 of the ’377 Patent
`
`Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot prove that anyone performed all the
`claimed steps of the method recited in Claim 1 of the ’377 Patent, the only
`independent claim of the ’377 Patent asserted. (See D-MSJ at 5–6.) The Court
`previously found that Claim 1 of the ’377 Patent requires “real-time monitoring
`and uploading of information while a user is exercising.” (Claim Construction
`Order at 34.) As both parties agree, “The data gathered by the Accused Devices
`can be divided into two categories: data gathered when the watch is ‘in Activity’
`mode [i.e., exercise training data] and data gathered when not ‘in Activity’ mode
`(or all day data),” such as steps taken. (D-MSJ at 6; D-SUF ¶ 25.) According to
`Defendants, “Both types of data get sent from the watch to the phone application to
`Garmin’s servers and back to the application when the watch and phone
`application/server perform a ‘sync.’” (D-MSJ at 6.)
`
`Defendants argue that the “sync” function of the accused watches does not
`send data in real time while the user is exercising. (D-MSJ at 6.) For the data
`collected during Activity mode, Defendants assert the accused watches block “all
`syncing of data between the watch and server/application while the user is
`exercising in Activity mode.” (Id. at 7 (citing D-SUF ¶¶ 10, 11).) Defendants also
`argue that Plaintiff “has no evidence that any user has ever chosen to exercise out
`of Activity mode.” (Id. (citing D-SUF ¶¶ 21–24).) As Defendants argue, no user
`would exercise outside of Activity mode either because Activity mode collects,
`stores, and analyzes specific exercise data that the user would lose if she exercised
`outside of Activity mode. (See id. at 7–8 (citing D-SUF ¶¶ 51–62).)
`
`For the “synced” data outside of Activity mode, Defendants contend that
`“[s]ynced data is by definition and function historical data,” and cannot be “real-
`time” data collected while the user is exercising. (See id. at 8 (citing D-SUF ¶ 8).)
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`CV-90 (12/02)
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` CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
`13
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`Case 2:19-cv-06301-AB-KS Document 164 Filed 06/08/22 Page 14 of 26 Page ID #:7501
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`Defendants also aver that although the accused watches display real-time data
`outside of Activity mode, such as heart rate, “No athlete would stop her run, save
`her training data, perform a sync, and then wait for the data to return to her phone
`application if one wants real time data during exercise.” (See id. at 8–9 (citing
`D-SUF ¶¶ 8, 16).)
`
`Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot prove