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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 1 of 13
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`WO
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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`Ralph T Reilly,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Steve Wozniak, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`No. CV-18-03775-PHX-MTL
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`ORDER
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`Defendants Steve Wozniak (“Wozniak”), Woz U Education LLC, Woz U Education
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`Holdings, LLC, and Southern Careers Institute, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a
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`Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505 and LRCiv 54.2. (Doc.
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`192.) For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion.1
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Ralph T. Reilly commenced this action against Defendants in November
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`2018. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendants “used, applied, and exploited” Plaintiff’s
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`copyrighted work in marketing and publicizing an education technology platform called
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`“Woz U.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.) Plaintiff alleged claims of breach of an implied-in-fact contract,
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`money had and received, copyright infringement, declaratory relief, and accounting. (Id.)
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`Reilly is an Assistant Professor of Management Information Systems at the Barney
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`School of Business, University of Hartford. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3; Doc. 99 at 2.) In September 2010,
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`he emailed Wozniak, the co-founder of Apple Computers Inc., expressing his desire to start
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`1 Miranda Martinez, a second-year law student at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of
`Law at Arizona State University, assisted in drafting this Order.
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 2 of 13
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`a “high tech” university. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4; at 16.) Wozniak replied, noting Reilly’s “great idea.”
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`(Id.) Wozniak provided some advice but explained that he was “too busy to do anything
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`more.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims that he and Wozniak took steps to develop the idea over
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`the next two years. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he created a website and logo for the
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`project and obtained copyright protection for the “graphic images, photographs, and
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`tangible expressions” attached as Exhibit I to the Complaint. (Id. at 4.)
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`Plaintiff later discovered that Wozniak had entered into a business arrangement with
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`Defendant Southern Careers Institute, Inc. to develop Woz U. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff
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`argued that, “[a]s introduced to the public, Woz U included graphic design, course design
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`and course outline which were substantially similar” to those created by Plaintiff and
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`disclosed to Wozniak. (Doc. 128 at 6.) Plaintiff nevertheless emailed Wozniak to
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`congratulate him on the launch of Woz U. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) Wozniak responded, stating, “You
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`are right on the mark. You had the right idea . . . I doubt it would have happened without
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`your initial idea.” (Id.) Plaintiff initiated this action after Wozniak refused to compensate
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`Plaintiff for what he claimed to be his idea. (Id. at 7.)
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`On Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for
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`money had and received and accounting as preempted by the Copyright Act. (Doc. 99.)
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`The Motion was also denied with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.2 (Id.)
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`The Court then granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim
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`for breach of implied-in-fact contract, but denied summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
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`claims for copyright infringement and declaratory judgment. (Doc. 180.)
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`In June 2021, jury trial commenced concerning Plaintiff’s claim for copyright
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`infringement. (Doc. 173.) The Jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. (Doc. 182.)
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`Defendants
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`now
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`seek
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`attorneys’
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`fees
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`and
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`costs
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`in
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`the
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`amount
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`of
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`$156,474.19. (Doc. 192 at 1.) This figure consists of $153,270.00 in attorneys’ fees and
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`2 The Court construed Plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment as a request for a
`remedy, rather than as a separate cause of action. (Doc. 145 at 16.) See Snyder v. HSBC
`Bank, USA, N.A., 913 F. Supp. 2d 755, 770 (D. Ariz. 2012) (noting that a declaratory
`judgment “is a remedy for an underlying cause of action; it is not a separate cause of
`action.”).
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 3 of 13
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`$3,204.19 in costs, plus all costs and fees associated with filing a reply in support of its
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`Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Id.)
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`The Court has significant discretion under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505, to
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`award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. Moi v. Chihuly Studio, Inc., 846
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`F. App’x 497, 500 (9th Cir. 2021). In determining whether to exercise such discretion, the
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`court might consider: (1) the degree of success obtained, (2) motivation, (3) frivolousness,
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`(4) the objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s arguments, and (5) the need to
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`advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. Love v. Assoc’d Newspapers, Ltd.,
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`611 F.3d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 2010). The factors are not exclusive and do not all need to be
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`met. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1996).
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`If a court determines that fees are warranted under the Copyright Act, the court must
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`then consider the reasonable value of the work performed. The Traditional Cat Ass’n v.
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`Gilbreath, 340 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have significant discretion in
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`determining whether an award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
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`U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The reasonableness of a requested fee award is generally analyzed
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`under the lodestar approach, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours
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`reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc, 523
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`F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir.
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`1993).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Award of Attorneys’ Fees
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`The Court’s analysis begins with a discussion of the five factors courts might
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`consider in determining whether to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party
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`under the Copyright Act. The factors in this case favor an award of attorneys’ fees.
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`i.
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`Degree of Success Obtained
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`Defendants argue that this factor weighs in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees
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`because they prevailed on the claims and “Plaintiff’s claims were completely lacking in
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 4 of 13
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`any merit.” (Doc. 192 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that while the jury ultimately found in favor
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`of Defendants, an award of attorneys’ fees would not further the purposes of the Copyright
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`Act. (Doc. 198 at 4.)
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`A district court may consider, among other things, the total success on the merits in
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`deciding whether to grant attorneys’ fees. See Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755
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`F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2014). The focus in the fees determination, however, is whether
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`successful prosecution or defense furthers the purposes of the Copyright Act. Shame On
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`You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 893 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting district court did not
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`err in placing greater emphasis on the outcome of the Copyright Act claim since the focus
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`in a fees determination is whether it furthers the purpose of the Copyright Act).
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`In the present case, Defendants prevailed on the merits with regard to all three of
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`Plaintiff’s substantive claims for relief. (Doc. 99, Doc. 145 at 16.) The Court granted
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim with respect to Plaintiff’s claims
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`for money had and received and accounting. (Doc. 99 at 20.) The Court also granted
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`Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied-in-
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`fact-contract. (Doc. 145 at 16.) As such, the only claim remaining at trial was Plaintiff’s
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`claim for copyright infringement. (Id.) The Jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants
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`on this claim. (Doc 182.) Defendants’ success on the merits of several claims leading up to
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`trial bolsters Defendants’ overall degree of success in this litigation. While courts should
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`place the most emphasis on the outcome of the copyright claim, other claims may be
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`considered with less weight in the overall analysis. Shame On You Prods, Inc., 893 F.3d at
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`667. Defendants also prevailed in defending against Plaintiff’s copyright infringement
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`claim. Accordingly, Defendants have obtained a high degree of success.
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`An award of attorneys’ fees would similarly promote the purposes of the Copyright
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`Act. Courts have found that “a successful defense furthers the purposes of the Copyright
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`Act just as much as a successful infringement suit.” Inhale, Inc., 755 F.3d at 1043.
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`Particularly on this record, given Plaintiff’s insistence on arguing that his “great idea” was
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`copyrightable, the Defendants’ success promotes the purposes of the Copyright Act
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 5 of 13
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`because it reinforces the very tenants of the Act: an idea is not copyrightable subject matter.
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`Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (finding
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`that no author may copyright facts or ideas); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.
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`2003) (noting that the Copyright Act denied artists the exclusive rights to ideas and
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`standard elements in their works); Corbello v. Valli, 974 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2020).
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`Given Defendants’ success in this litigation, coupled with the furtherance of the purposes
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`of the Copyright Act, the Court finds that this factor weights in favor of awarding attorneys’
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`fees.
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`ii. Motivation
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`Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claims were motivated by an improper
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`purpose. (Doc. 192 at 5.) Specifically, Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s conduct in this
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`lawsuit was motivated by the desire to extract a large and unjustified payout. (Id.) Plaintiff,
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`however, contends that his motivation was simply to obtain compensation for a “great
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`idea.” (Doc. 198 at 5–6.) Plaintiff also argues that his copyright claims withstood pretrial
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`attacks and that he did not seek to delay proceedings or unreasonably increase costs. (Id.)
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`Courts have found that where “plaintiff’s motivation for filing suit was not a good
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`faith belief in the merits of its claim, but an attempt to coerce Defendants to pay money to
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`settle,” the factor weighs in favor of awarding fees. Shame On You Prods., Inc. v. Banks,
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`No. CV1403512MMMJCX, 2016 WL 5929245, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016), aff’d,
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`893 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2018). At the settlement conference in this matter, both parties were
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`informed that it was highly likely that the Defendants would prevail on summary judgment
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`or at trial. (Doc. 192 at 2.) Plaintiff and his counsel disagreed with this assessment and
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`demanded that Defendants pay him $2,959,858. (Id.) Plaintiff rejected the Defendants’
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`settlement offer of $20,000 and did not make a counteroffer. (Id.) At trial, however,
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`Plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury for a damages award of $500,000. (Id.) See Ingram v.
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`Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Lewis v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,
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`No. C 12-–1096 CW, 2014 WL 4953770, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 25, 2014) (finding
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`improper motive when plaintiff pursued an unreasonable copyright claim and made an
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 6 of 13
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`unreasonable demand of $1.2 million to settle the claim). While it is plausible that Plaintiff
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`simply sought compensation for the alleged copyright infringement, it is also plausible that
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`he was motivated by the possibility of a large settlement. Accordingly, the Court finds that
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`this factor is neutral.
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`iii.
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`Frivolousness and Objective Reasonableness
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`Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous and not objectively
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`reasonable because Plaintiff “made no colorable argument at trial that any website owned
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`and operated by the Defendants was similar to his copyrighted website.” (Doc. 192 at 3.)
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`Defendant claims that Plaintiff chose to focus his time at trial proving he had a “great idea”
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`rather than the attempting to show the alleged copying of protected elements of any
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`copyrighted work. (Id.) In contrast, Plaintiff argues that his copyright claims were
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`objectively reasonable because this Court found that Plaintiff’s copyrighted materials
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`contained obvious similarities to those developed by Defendants. (Doc. 198 at 4.)
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`A relevant factor in determining whether attorneys’ fees are warranted is “whether
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`the positions advanced by the party against whom fees are sought were frivolous.” Shame
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`On You Prods., 2016 WL 5929245, at *6 (citing Columbia Pictures Television Inc. v.
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`Krypton Rd. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001)). Courts have noted,
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`however, that frivolousness is not a prerequisite to an award of attorneys’ fees. Fogerty, 94
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`F.3d at 558. A claim is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.”
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`Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In contrast, a claim is objectively
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`unreasonable if a Plaintiff should have known from the outset of the case that the chance
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`of success in the case was slim. SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273,
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`1280 (9th Cir. 2013).
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`Here, while Plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous, they were objectively
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`unreasonable. This Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with regard
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`to Plaintiff’s copyright claim. (Doc. 145.) In doing so, the Court was required to apply a
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`two-part test to determine whether Defendants’ work was “substantially similar to the
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`plaintiff’s copyrighted work.” Id. (citing Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815,
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 7 of 13
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`822 (9th Cir. 2002)). First, the “extrinsic test” compares the “objective similarities of
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`specific expressive elements in the two works.” Id. The second prong, the “intrinsic test,”
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`“test[s] for similarity of expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer,
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`with no expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 637
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`(9th Cir. 2008)). A district court “applies only the extrinsic test on a motion for summary
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`judgment, as the intrinsic test is reserved exclusively for the trier of fact.” Williams v. Gaye,
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`895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018).
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` In assessing the extrinsic test, the Court found that Plaintiff’s copyrighted materials
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`contained similarities to those developed by Defendants. (Id. at 14.) Because there was an
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`issue of material fact as to the similarities between Defendants’ work and Plaintiff’s
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`copyrighted materials, the claim survived summary judgment and was reserved for the Jury
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`to decide. (Doc. 145, Doc. 182.) Because the claim did not lack an arguable basis in either
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`fact or law, the Court finds that it was not frivolous.
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`The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff’s claims were objectively unreasonable.
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`Defendants argue that Plaintiff “produced no evidence that any of the Defendants utilized
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`any idea, business plan, curricula, images, sales strategy or educational training concept
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`that he created.” (Doc. 124 at 6–7.) This argument is persuasive. Plaintiff’s briefs and
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`evidence produced at trial consistently stressed the notion that Defendants copied
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`Plaintiff’s “great idea.” (Doc. 1, Doc. 198.) Plaintiff produced minimal evidence at trial
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`demonstrating any similarities between Plaintiff’s copyrighted materials and those
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`developed by Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff’s argument rested entirely on the premise that
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`Plaintiff’s “great idea” had been taken by Defendants. By choosing to focus on his idea
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`and not the protected elements of his copyrighted work, Plaintiff should have known from
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`the outset of the case that the chance of success in the case was slim. SOFA Entm’t, Inc,
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`709 F.3d at 1280. It is Hornbook law that ideas are not copyrightable subject
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`matter. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a). This factor, to which the Court attaches “substantial
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`weight,” weighs in favor of a fee award. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct.
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`1979, 1981–1982 (2016).
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`iv.
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`Considerations of Compensation and Deterrence
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`Defendants claim that awarding fees will encourage creators to continue producing
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`original works “without fear of having to defend against baseless claims.” (Doc. 192 at 5.)
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`Defendants believe such an award is necessary to show Plaintiff, and others, that they
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`cannot pursue meritless claims against deep-pocketed defendants. (Id.) On the other hand,
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`Plaintiff claims that “no purpose of the Copyright Act is served by penalizing Plaintiff for
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`seeking public credit and compensation.” (Id.)
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`Courts must be “faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act” in awarding
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`attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 and must consider that each party generally bears its
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`own attorneys’ fees. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533–34 (1994). The Court
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`finds that an award of fees here would further the purposes of the Copyright Act. Copyright
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`protection is designed “to promote the creation and publication of free expression.” Eldred
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`v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). Awarding fees to Defendants in this case may protect
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`creators from defending against baseless claims. An award of attorneys’ fees will similarly
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`deter others from seeking copyright protection of ideas, which are plainly unprotectable
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`under copyright law. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 1029 (noting that awarding attorneys’ fees
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`encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright infringement).
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`v.
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`Balancing the Factors
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`Having considered all of the factors, an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is
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`appropriate. Defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs because of
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`their success on the merits of the litigation and because Plaintiff’s claims were objectively
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`unreasonable.
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`
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`B.
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`Lodestar Determination
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`Having determined an award of attorneys’ fees appropriate, the Court will now
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`determine the reasonable hourly rate and number of hours reasonably expended to
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`determine the fee award. Defendants request attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
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`$156,474.19. (Doc. 192 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that this fee amount is unreasonable and
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`excessive. (Doc. 198 at 7.)
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 9 of 13
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`The Court has significant discretion in determining whether an award of attorneys’
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`fees is reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. In evaluating a request for attorneys’ fees, the
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`Court shall provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for a fee award. Id. at 437.
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`The Court, however, is not required to set forth an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee request.
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`Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gates v.
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`Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Chalmers v. Los Angeles, 796
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`F.2d 1205, 1211 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a brief explanation of how the court arrived
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`at its figures sufficient). The reasonableness of a requested fee award is generally analyzed
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`under the lodestar approach, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours
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`reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978; Intel Corp.,
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`6 F.3d at 622. In a motion for attorneys’ fees, the party petitioning for attorneys’ fees bears
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`the burden of establishing entitlement to an award by submitting detailed time records
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`justifying the hours expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
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`i.
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`Related Claims
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`As a preliminary matter, Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees with regard to all
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`claims brought during this litigation. Under the Copyright Act, courts can award fees not
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`only based on defense of a copyright infringement claim, but also fees incurred to defend
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`other claims based on the same allegations. Ent. Rsch. Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp.,
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`Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1230 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a party is entitled to recover fees as
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`a prevailing party on a copyright claim as well as “any related claims.”). The Court is
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`persuaded by Defendants’ argument that all five claims brought by Plaintiff were
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`“inextricably tied to his copyright claim.” (Doc. 192 at 8.) Plaintiff’s claims of breach of
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`an implied-in-fact contract, money had and received, copyright infringement, declaratory
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`relief, and accounting all arose out of the claim that Plaintiff had not been compensated for
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`his “great idea.” (Doc. 1, Doc. 192.) Accordingly, Defendants may recover fees based on
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`the defense of all five of Plaintiff’s claims brought during this litigation.
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`ii.
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`Reasonable Hourly Rate
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`The reasonableness of an hourly rate depends on “the rate prevailing in the
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 10 of 13
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`community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and
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`reputation.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995)
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`(quoting Chalmers, 769 F.2d at 1210–11). The relevant community for the purposes of
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`determining a reasonable hourly rate is the forum in which the district court sits. Gonzalez,
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`729 F.3d at 1205.
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`The Court has reviewed Defendants’ Affidavit in support of their application for
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`attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 192 at 14.) As articulated in Defendants’ Affidavit, Mr. Schern billed
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`at a rate of $325 per hour, while Mr. Finter billed at a rate of $300 per hour. (Id.) Ms.
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`Bernzen, a paralegal assisting on the matter, billed at an hourly rate of $95. (Id.) The Court
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`finds that the requested hourly rates are reasonable based on the prevailing market rates.
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`HTS, Inc. v. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d 927, 961–962 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding hourly rates
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`ranging from $325–$450 per hour reasonable for intellectual property attorneys in the
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`Phoenix area); Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. CV-17-02133-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL
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`5684192, at *13 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2019) (finding rates ranging from $215 to $350
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`reasonable). The Court similarly finds the requested hourly rate of $95 for Ms. Bernzen’s
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`paralegal services reasonable. Kaufman v. Warner Bros Entm’t Inc., No. CV-16-02248-
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`PHX-JAT, 2019 WL 2084460, at *12–13 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2019) (finding hourly rates
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`ranging from $105–$240 per hour reasonable for paralegals).
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`iii. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
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`Having addressed the reasonableness of the hourly rates, the Court now determines
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`the reasonable number of compensable hours. See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1201–03. To do
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`so, the Court must review the billing records submitted by Plaintiff’s Counsel and “exclude
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`those hours for which it would be unreasonable to compensate.” Id. After thoroughly
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`reviewing each time entry, the Court finds that a reduction in hours is warranted. The
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`itemized statement of fees provided by Defendants’ Counsel includes several de minimis
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`time entries for clerical tasks and court communications. (See, e.g., 6/3/21 time entry
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`“email discussion with
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`the court’s clerk
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`regarding exhibits and
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`technology
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`issues.”) (Doc. 192 at 37.) Tasks that are clerical in nature are not recoverable as part of a
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 11 of 13
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`reasonable fee award. Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding
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`that clerical tasks like filing and document organization “should have been subsumed in
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`firm overhead”); Robinson v. Plourde, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (D. Haw. 2010) (“Tasks
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`such as reviewing Court-generated notices, notifying clients of court hearings, filing
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`documents with the Court, communication with court staff, scheduling, and corresponding
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`regarding deadlines, are clerical and not compensable.”). After a thorough review of the
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`billing entries, the Court finds that Defendants did not deduct such clerical entries, instead
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`including entries for scheduling, review of minute orders, and communications with Court
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`staff. Robinson, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (“[C]lerical or ministerial costs are part of an
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`attorney’s overhead and are reflected in the charged hourly rate.”). The Court has noted
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`each clerical entry that was not deducted and thereby reduces the billed amount by 2.90
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`hours.
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`Defendants also included several block-billed time entries. The practice of block
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`billing violates Rule 54.2(e) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides that
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`billing records must provide an “itemized account” of “[t]he time devoted to each
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`individual unrelated task performed.” LRCiv 54.2(e)(1)(B); Moshir v. Automobili
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`Lamborghini Am. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (D. Ariz. 2013) (noting that block-billing
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`makes it “nearly impossible for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the hours
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`spent on each task.”). The Court has noted the entries that are problematic due to block
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`billing and will reduce those time entries by 20% unless the entry is flawed for an additional
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`reason, in which case a further reduction will be indicated. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Scott
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`Homes Multifamily Inc., No. CV-12-02119, 2016 WL 5118316, at *18 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21,
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`2016) (reducing an award of attorneys’ fees for hours billed on certain dates by 20%
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`because the billing entry did not fully comport with the requirements of Local Rule
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`54.2(e)). The total amount of time reduced for a block-billing violation is 29.74 hours.
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`The Court also has discretion to reduce a fee award for duplicative, unnecessary, or
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`excessive billing. See Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. But Defendants’ itemized statement
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`does not contain duplicative or unnecessary bills. As such, the Court does not exercise its
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 12 of 13
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`discretion to reduce the fee award for these reasons.
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`Further, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should
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`be allowed to the prevailing party” unless “a federal statute, these rules, or a court order
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`provides otherwise[.]” Defendants have submitted a satisfactory Bill of Costs to support its
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`Motion. (Doc. 192 at 40–43.) Defendants are therefore entitled to reasonable fees and costs.
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`iv.
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`Lodestar Figure
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`In sum, the hourly billing rates charged by Defendants’ counsel and counsel’s staff
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`are reasonable. After the Court’s discretionary deduction of hours not reasonably
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`expended, 480.18 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend on a case of this type,
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`which was ongoing for almost three years. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Scott Homes
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`Multifamily Inc., No. CV-12-02119, 2016 WL 5118316, at *18 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2016)
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`(concluding that the 2,891.70 hours that a defendant’s counsel expended while litigating a
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`case lasting more than three years was reasonable). Under the lodestar method, the Court
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`multiplies the number of hours expended by the timekeeper’s hourly rate:
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`Timekeeper
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`MAS
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`AMF
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`JCS
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`AB
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`Rate
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`$325
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`$300
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`$300
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`$95
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`Hours Expended
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`Total
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`19.80
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`402.98
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`45.40
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`12.00
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`$6,435.00
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`$120,894.00
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`$13,620.00
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`$1,140.00
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`Lodestar Figure
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`$142,089.00
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`Accordingly, the Court will award Defendants’ $142,089.00 in attorneys’ fees and
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`$3,204.19 in costs. The Court has itemized its reductions to Defendants’ fee award in the
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`spreadsheets attached as appendices to this Order. The Court also declines to award
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`Defendants costs and fees associated with filing a reply in support of this Motion for
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`Attorneys’ Fees.
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`Case 2:18-cv-03775-MTL Document 203 Filed 11/18/21 Page 13 of 13
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`Accordingly,
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`IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc.
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`192) is granted.
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`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff shall pay $142,089.00 in attorneys’ fees
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`and $3,204.19 in costs to Defendants within 30 days from the date of this order.
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`IT IS FINALLY ORDERED Defendants shall file a notice of satisfaction within
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`7 days of receipt of the full amount of attorneys’ fees and costs contemplated by the order.
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`Dated this 18th day of November, 2021.
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