Counsel for the intervenor will be provided with a single copy of protected material, except as otherwise agreed to by the United States Attorney.

Disclosure of the material or information contained therein is to be limited to: (1) the court; (2) counsel for intervenor and any professional, paralegal and clerical personnel who are engaged in assisting counsel in the case identified in the prior paragraph; (3) any person not employed by, or under contract with the intervenor who is retained by the attorneys for the intervenor as a consultant or expert witness to assist in the cases identified in the prior paragraph; and (4) any other person whom the court has deemed to be entitled to view the protected material.

Protected material received by counsel for the intervenor, or the information contained therein, is to be used only for the subject matter of People v. Reynolds, Case No. 96 CR 1959903.

In the absence of such agreement and for good cause shown, the brief period for retention of this material may be extended by order of the court.

This order does not prevent the United States Attorney from asserting any other legally cognizable privilege to withhold any document or information.

that pages 16 through 28 of Michael McDermott’s September 25, 2008 grand jury testimony may be disclosed subject to the terms and conditions of this protective order.

Counsel for the intervenor will be provided with a single copy of protected material, except as otherwise agreed to by the United States Attorney.

The protected material is only for use in the case entitled People of the State of Illinois v. Keith Mitchell, No. 92 C 19459 (Circuit Court of Cook County).

Protected material received by counsel for the intervenor, or the information contained therein, is to be used only for the subject matter of People v. Mitchell, No. 92 C 19459.

This order does not prevent the United States Attorney from asserting any other legally cognizable privilege to withhold any document or information.

Keith Mitchell has petitioned to intervene in the above-captioned case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and seeks transcripts of the grand jury testimony of a former Chicago police officer, Michael McDermott.

For the following reasons, Mitchell’s petition is granted and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois shall release to Mitchell some, but not all, of the grand jury testimony he seeks.

Specifically, the U.S. Attorney’s Office shall provide Mitchell with pages 16 through 28 of McDermott’s grand jury testimony from September 25, 2008 as it relates to McDermott’s interactions with Alfonzo Pinex because it is directly relevant to Mitchell’s claim that McDermott has mistreated detainees and perjured himself.

Moreover, “[t]he grand jury as a public institution serving the community might suffer if those testifying today knew that the secrecy of their testimony would be lifted tomorrow.” United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S. Ct. 983, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1958).

U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow Having determined that Mitchell is entitled to this portion of the grand jury transcripts, the court does not reach Mitchell’s additional argument that the U.S. Attorney’s denial of his request was arbitrary and capricious pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.

And if none of the individual defendants are found to have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the City argues, there will be no basis on which to impose liability on the City pursuant to Monell.

The possibility that the evidence will permit a finding that the plaintiff was tortured by a City employee that the plaintiff did not see fit to name in the complaint, while also finding that none of the individuals that the plaintiff did name as ...

None of the cases the plaintiff cites, however, address the question of whether, having obtained full compensation for constitutional violations caused by the acts of municipal employees, a plaintiff may still pursue a Monell claim against ...

This case arises out of the arrest and interrogation of plaintiff Ronald Kitchen, who claims that his conviction, death sentence, and twenty-one year incarceration were the product of a confession that Chicago Police officers obtained from him through torture.

It is well-settled that “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for monetary damages under § 1983 for conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Smith v. Power, 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, as Kitchen has argued, the facts alleged in the FAC, if true, plausibly show that ASA Lukanich was aware of Kitchen’s tortured interrogation and knowingly obtained a coerced and involuntary confession.

The courts of this district have repeatedly held that Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2003), does not cut off a plaintiff’s claim where the defendants are accused of “obstructing justice and violating [the plaintiff’s] right to a fair trial through actions they took outside the interrogation room.” Patterson v. Burge, 328 F.Supp.2d 878, 889 (N.D.Ill. 2004) (Gottschall, J.

LEXIS 79320, at *30 (finding that Gauger did not bar the plaintiff’s Brady claim where the “allegations relate to circumstances that substantially exceed what [the plaintiff] was aware of based on his presence at the interrogation”); Cannon v. Burge, No. 05 C 2192, 2006 WL 273544, *12, 2006 U.S. Dist.