We certified to the Ohio Supreme Court a controlling question of law in this matter: “Whether the Ohio Product Liability Act, Ohio Revised Code § 2307.71 et seq., as amended in 2005 and 2007, abrogates a common law claim of absolute public nuisance resulting from the sale of a product in commerce in which the plaintiffs seek equitable abatement, including both monetary and injunctive remedies?” In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 82 F.4th 455, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2023).

The Ohio Supreme Court accepted our question, 222 N.E.3d 661 (Ohio 2023), and has now answered it “in the affirmative,” Slip Op.

More specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court answered that “all common-law public-nuisance claims

The district court previously concluded to the contrary, and ultimately entered a $650 million abatement order and an injunction requiring defendants to “undertake certain actions to ensure they are complying fully with the Controlled Substances Act and avoiding further improper dispensing conduct.” The parties do not dispute that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision on the certified question resolves this appeal and that it requires us to reverse the district court’s judgment as to plaintiffs’ common-law absolute public nuisance claims.

We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment, dissolve the injunction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s answer to our certified question.

In a published opinion issued today in the related case of Fuqua v. Raak, No. 21-15492, we have held that Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014), forecloses suits seeking monetary damages under RLUIPA against individual prison officials.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Francisco and Camit on the ground that there was no evidence that they were personally involved in the challenged actions that allegedly burdened Fuqua’s Free Exercise rights.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (citation omitted).

The district court concluded that there was a triable issue as to whether Starns had violated Fuqua’s Free Exercise rights under the Turner factors, but it held that Starns was entitled to qualified immunity because “a reasonable official in Defendant Starns’ position would not have understood that his implementation of [prison] policy under these circumstances was unlawful.” In arguing for a contrary conclusion, Fuqua relies on Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001), but that case is “materially distinguishable” in a way that precludes it from clearly establishing the applicable law here.

Mayweathers involved prison officials’ appeal of a preliminary injunction in favor of a class of Muslim inmates who sought to avoid discipline “for missing work to attend hour-long Friday Sabbath services called Jumu’ah.” 258 F.3d at 933.