Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 895 Filed 01/21/22 Page 1 of 30 PageID# 24648
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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`Case No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
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`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
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`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND
`R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
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`Plaintiffs and
`Counterclaim Defendants,
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`v.
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`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA INC.; and PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.
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`Defendants and
`Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
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`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PMI/ALTRIA’S OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 895 Filed 01/21/22 Page 2 of 30 PageID# 24649
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 895 Filed 01/21/22 Page 2 of 30 PagelD# 24649
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`L
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`MIL NO. 1: PRECLUDE RJR FROM RELYING ON NON-COMPARABLE
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`AGREEMENTS TO SUGGEST THE AMOUNT OF A REASONABLE
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`ROYALTY oocccccescsscesesscevesvesesvesesessesestivestsivesseseieseseststiseiteiteiteseseseistitesitieitesieiteseesees 1
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`Il.
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`MILNO. 2: PRECLUDE RJR FROM VIOLATINGITS STIPULATION
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`REGARDING THE PRIOR ART ooccescoscoscsscovescsecsessesessesiesisiisisitsitesesiessesiesiesiestesesieeseesees 3
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`Il. MILNO.3:NO ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, OR TESTIMONY ABOUT PRIOR
`ART INVALIDITY NOT DISCLOSED IN EXPERT REPORTS-o....c-ccscsscssessessessesseseesee. 5
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`IV. MILNO.4:NO REFERENCE TO PRACTICING THE PRIOR ART AS AN
`ALLEGED NON-INFRINGEMENT DEFENSE...0.----:ssccscssesscsscsesssesecsessesivsseseeseesessessessees 5
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`Vv.
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`MILNO. 5: PRECLUDE RJR’S EXPERTS FROM RELYING ON HEARSAY
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`CONVERSATIONS WITH UNDISCLOSED THIRD-PARTIES AND
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`EVIDENCE PRODUCEDIN VIOLATION OF THE COURT’S DISCOVERY
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`ORDER ooo scoscoscosessessesssssesvesesivesesesssisiteitessitsieseisiessisteiseisisiteseseieistisesiviveseiteiteseesees 7
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`VL MILNO. 6: PRECLUDE RJR FROM ARGUING THATIT LACKS CONTROL
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`OVER SUPPLIERS OF THE ACCUSED PRODUCTS. .o.-.-c-scoccocssessessessessessessesvesessessessee: 9
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`VIL MIL NO. 7: PRECLUDE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY FROM RJR’S FACT
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`WITNESSES ABOUT ALLEGED NON-INFRINGEMENT ORINVALIDITY ........... 10
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`VIII. MIL NO. 8: NO REFERENCE TO RJR’S PATENT INFRINGEMENT
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`CLAIMSoooccccccccsscsscsvcssesecsessessesiesssesieiseiusiveitesssesiesesieiseiieitesessiesiesiteesieiesiestiteseeseeseees ll
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`IX. MILNO.9: NO ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, OR TESTIMONY ABOUT THE
`PENDING ITC INVESTIGATION OR
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`vcvsssssstissitisssesisiissiesvesesiesseeseees 13
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`X.|MIL NO. 10: NO REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWN CLAIMS OR DEFENSES........... 14
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`MIL NO. 11: NO REFERENCE TO PMI/ATRIA’S DECISION NOT TO SUE
`THIRD PARTIES FOR INFRINGING THE ASSERTED PATENTS..0.cccccccccscceseeseeseees 15
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`XII MIL NO. 12: NO REFERENCE TO
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`WITH
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`THIRD-PARTY PATENT NUMBERSoooeoccccsscesessoeesossssessesceueeveseeeee 17
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`XIII. MIL NO. 13: PRECLUDE RJR FROM REFERENCING THE ABSENCE OF
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`CHARLES HIGGINS AT TRIAL -o.2.ccsccscoscsscssesecsscssesesivessivssessesieissiesitsiesiesieseeeivesteseeses 19
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`XIV. MIL NO. 14: NO ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, OR TESTIMONY
`CHALLENGING FDA’S PMT AND MRTP AUTHORIZATIONSFORIQOS............20
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 895 Filed 01/21/22 Page 3 of 30 PageID# 24650
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys.,
`889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................. 5, 6
`
`Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc.,
`No. 04-cv-2355, 2010 WL 11470982 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2010) .................................................... 11
`
`Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-6544, 2019 WL 2330855 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019) ......................................... 11, 13
`
`Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.,
`No. 06-cv-2768, 2017 WL 2362400 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2017) ................................................. 10
`
`Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc.,
`389 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005) ....................................................................................... 10
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
`950 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................... 15
`
`Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co. v. Danko Mfg., LLC,
`No. 19-cv-162, 2021 WL 4078282 (D. Neb. Sept. 8, 2021) ..................................................... 10
`
`AVM Techs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`No. 15-cv-33, 2017 WL 2938191(D. Del. Apr. 19, 2017) .......................................................... 1
`
`Baratto v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc.,
`701 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2010) ................................................................................... 11
`
`Blancha v. Raymark Indus.,
`972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................ 12, 20
`
`Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd.,
`No. 16-cv-3714, 2018 WL 7456042 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2018) ................................................. 4
`
`Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp.,
`No. 14-cv-130, 2017 WL 3222547 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2017) ..................................................... 7
`
`Elbit Sys. Land and C4I Ltd., v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC,
`No. 15-cv-37, 2017 WL 11658860 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 25, 2017) ................................................... 16
`
`Electro-Mech. Corp. v. Power Distrib. Prods., Inc.,
`No. 11-cv-71, 2013 WL 1859229 (W.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) ................................................... 16
`
`Hale Cty. A&M Transp., LLC v. City of Kansas, Mo.,
`No. 12-cv-265, 2014 WL 545779 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2014) ................................................... 19
`
`ii
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`
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`HTC Corp. v. Tech. Props. Ltd.,
`No. 08-cv-882, 2013 WL 4782598 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013) .................................................. 14
`
`HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen Frog, LLC,
`949 F.3d 685 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................... 10
`
`Hypertherm, Inc. v. Am. Torch Tip Co.,
`No. 05-cv-373, 2009 WL 435324 (D.N.H. Feb. 19, 2009) ....................................................... 11
`
`I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc.,
`No. 11-cv-512, 2012 WL 12068846 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2012) ............................................... 1, 2
`
`IA Labs CA, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
`857 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 2012) ........................................................................................... 14
`
`Image Processing Tech., LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 20-cv-50, Dkt. 171 (E.D. Tex. June 8, 2020) ..................................................................... 15
`
`In re Bankatlantic Bancorp., Inc. Secs. Litig.,
`No. 07-cv-61542, 2010 WL 11426137 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2010) ............................................ 14
`
`In re Biogen,
`No. 10-cv-2734, 2018 WL 3613162 (D.N.J. July 26, 2018) ............................................... 19, 20
`
`In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig.,
`No. 11-cv-9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) ...................................................... 2
`
`In re Liquid Toppings Dispensing Sys. (’447) Patent Litig.,
`No. 18-md-02832, 2021 WL 2410344 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2021) ............................................. 10
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co.,
`750 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ......................................................................................... 16
`
`Magna Elecs., Inc. v. TRW Auto. Holdings Corp.,
`No. 12-cv-654, 2016 WL 4238769 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2016) ........................................ 13, 14
`
`Metaswitch Networks Ltd. v. Genband US LLC,
`No. 14-cv-744, 2016 WL 3618831 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2016) ..................................................... 5
`
`MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc.,
`10 F.4th 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2021) .................................................................................................... 3
`
`Nobelbiz, Inc. v. Glob. Connect, L.L.C.,
`No. 12-cv-244, 2015 WL 11072170 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2015) .................................................. 6
`
`iii
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 895 Filed 01/21/22 Page 5 of 30 PageID# 24652
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`
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`Packet Intel. LLC v. NetScout Sys., Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-230, 2017 WL 11631146 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) ................................................ 6
`
`Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co.,
`No. 12-cv-499, 2015 WL 13921493 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2015) .................................................. 16
`
`Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
`810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`Realtime Data LLC v. Echostar Corp.,
`No. 17-cv-84, 2018 WL 10466786 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2018) ................................................. 15
`
`S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
`318 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 5, 8
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. NVIDIA Corp.,
`No. 14-cv-757, 2016 WL 754547 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2016) ......................................... 13, 16, 17
`
`Secure Axcess LLC v. Bank of America Corp.,
`No. 10-cv-670, Dkt. 651 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) ................................................................... 19
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-115, 2018 WL 11388472 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) ......................................... passim
`
`United States v. Aramony,
`166 F.3d 655 (4th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................................... 10
`
`Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`421 F. Supp. 3d 911 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) ............................................................................ 4
`
`Wonderland Nurserygoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC,
`No. 12-cv-196, 2014 WL 289446 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2014) ............................................... 11, 12
`
`Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n. Sys., Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`19 U.S.C. § 1337 ........................................................................................................................... 13
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`35 U.S.C. § 1 ................................................................................................................................. 13
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 4
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 26 .................................................................................................................. 5, 8, 11
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 37 .............................................................................................................. 3, 5, 8, 10
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`FED. R. EVID. 401-402 ............................................................................................................. 13, 18
`
`iv
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`FED. R. EVID. 403 ................................................................................................................... passim
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`v
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`I.
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`MIL NO. 1: PRECLUDE RJR FROM RELYING ON NON-COMPARABLE
`AGREEMENTS TO SUGGEST THE AMOUNT OF A REASONABLE ROYALTY
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`“[T]he Federal Circuit has made clear that non-comparable licensing cannot be used as the
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`basis for determining a reasonable royalty.” I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., No. 11-cv-512, 2012
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`WL 12068846, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2012). This Court has in turn precluded parties from using
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`“[t]he amounts paid” in “not comparable” licenses “to suggest a reasonable royalty rate” at trial.
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`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., No. 10-cv-115, 2018 WL 11388472, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2018).
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`The Court should do the same here because RJR intends to do exactly that. See Ex. 1 at 2.
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`PMI/Altria’s damages expert, Paul Meyer, relies on
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` (Ex. 2 (Meyer Op.) ¶¶ 27-28), and
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`explains that all other agreements produced are not comparable to the hypothetical negotiation
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`license. See id. ¶¶ 282-314. RJR’s damages expert, Ryan Sullivan, relies on just one:
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`. Ex. 3 (Sullivan Rbt.) ¶¶ 263-65. And like Mr. Meyer, Dr. Sullivan addresses
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`several other agreements (see id. ¶¶ 229-57), but also ultimately concludes that they are not
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`comparable. See Ex. 4 (Sullivan Dep.) at 49:8-21. Thus, all agreements other than
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` are undisputedly not comparable to the hypothetical
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`negotiation. The Court should bar RJR from using these non-comparable agreements at trial to
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`suggest a low royalty rate for the asserted patents for three reasons.
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`First, “[a] non-comparable license is irrelevant to prove a reasonable royalty.” AVM Techs.
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`LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 15-cv-33, 2017 WL 2938191, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 19, 2017). Here, both
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`1
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`parties’ damages experts agree that
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` are not comparable. See supra at 1. The remaining agreements are
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`thus legally irrelevant to prove a reasonable royalty and cannot be used for that purpose at trial.
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`TecSec, 2018 WL 11388472, at *8; see also Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 15-cv-4431,
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`2021 WL 4077563, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2021) (excluding expert’s opinions because he did “not
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`make a showing of baseline comparability” between license and the hypothetical negotiation).
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`Second, any probative value that the subject agreements have to damages is substantially
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`outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and unfairly prejudicing
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`PMI/Altria. FED. R. EVID. 403. For example, RJR apparently seeks to use
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` to suggest a low royalty rate for that patent. But this agreement is undisputedly not
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`comparable:
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`at 49:22-50:15
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` Ex. 3 (Sullivan Rbt.) ¶ 306; Ex. 4 (Sullivan Dep.)
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`; see also Ex. 2 (Meyer Op.) ¶¶ 184-90 (same). Accordingly, allowing RJR to reference
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`the consideration in that agreement would unfairly prejudice PMI/Altria by yielding damages not
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`“adequate to compensate for the infringement,” which is contrary to “[t]he overall goal of patent
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`damages.” In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig., No. 11-cv-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
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`*13 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); I/P Engine, 2012 WL 12068846, at *2 (finding that references to non-
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`comparable agreements are “likely to confuse the jury and allow them to give impermissible
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`weight to the amounts … associated with those agreements”). Any such use invites error and will
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`result in jury confusion regarding proper consideration of only comparable agreements.
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`2
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`Third, RJR should be barred from relying on the subject agreements because it did not
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`identify them as comparable during discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. In response to an interrogatory
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`asking RJR to identify the agreements it contends are comparable,
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`, see Ex. 4 (Sullivan Dep.)
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`at 49:22-50:8). Ex. 5 (11/25/20 RJR Resp. to Interr. 4) at 6. Having failed to identify any other
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`agreement as allegedly comparable during discovery, RJR should be barred from relying on them
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`for damages purposes at trial. MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 10 F.4th 1358, 1369
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021) (affirming order precluding party from relying on untimely disclosed licenses).
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`II. MIL NO. 2: PRECLUDE RJR FROM VIOLATING ITS STIPULATION
`REGARDING THE PRIOR ART
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`To avoid the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) denying institution of its inter partes
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`review (“IPR”) petitions for the ’545 and ’556 Patents, RJR stipulated that if the PTAB instituted
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`IPR of those patents, RJR would “not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that
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`could have been reasonably raised in the IPR[s].”1 See Exs. 6-7 (Stipulations). The PTAB
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`instituted IPR on these two patents, making these stipulations binding.
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`For the ’545 and ’556 Patents, the only invalidity grounds that RJR’s technical experts rely
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`on in their reports are typical anticipation and obviousness grounds based on publicly available
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`patents and publications. Cf. Ex. 8 (Blalock Op.) ¶¶ 2-3 (identifying invalidity grounds) and Ex.
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`9 (Kodama ’556 Op.) ¶¶ 3-9 (same) with Ex. 10 (’545 IPR) at 13-14 (same) and Ex. 11 (’556 IPR)
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`at 10-11 (same). Accordingly, RJR indisputably “could have raised” all of these same invalidity
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`1 All emphasis added, and internal quotations and citations omitted, unless otherwise noted.
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`3
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`arguments in its IPR petitions, which RJR filed after serving expert reports in this case.2 RJR’s
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`stipulations therefore prohibit RJR from advancing invalidity arguments at trial for the ’545 and
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`’556 Patents. The Court should enforce these binding stipulations and RJR’s expert disclosures
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`by barring RJR from advancing prior art invalidity arguments as to the ’545 and ’556 Patents at
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`trial. See, e.g., Wi-LAN, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 925 (granting summary judgment on obviousness
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`based on prior art that reasonably could have been raised in an IPR proceeding).
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`RJR suggested during the parties’ meet and confer that its stipulations do not bar RJR from
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`presenting the subject references for issues other than anticipation and obviousness, such as an
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`alleged “valuation” of the asserted patents for damages purposes. RJR is wrong. This is nothing
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`more than end run around its binding stipulations. As an initial matter, courts construe IPR
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`estoppel as “broad.” Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 16-cv-3714, 2018 WL 7456042, at
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`*8 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2018) (citing legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) and explaining
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`that “estoppel provisions mean that your patent is largely unchallengeable by the same party”)
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`And RJR plainly wants to make this end run. RJR’s technical expert for the ’545 Patent opines
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`the ’545 Patent
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` but this opinion is based entirely on his prior art invalidity analysis. Ex. 13 (Blalock Rbt.)
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`¶¶ 175-84. In other words, RJR just wants to present the invalidity case it “raised or could have
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`2 Should RJR argue that it may rely on prior art not expressly discussed in its IPR petitions at trial,
`RJR would be wrong. That is because such arguments, even if properly disclosed in this case,
`“could have been reasonably raised in the IPR [petitions],” as RJR filed such petitions after serving
`opening expert reports in this case. See Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 3d 911, 925
`(S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) (“[C]ourts have held that the identification of prior art in invalidity
`contentions generated prior to the filing of the IPR petition is sufficient to establish … that the
`references ‘reasonably could have [been] raised’ in the IPR”); Ex. 12 (4/12/21 RJR Resp. to Interr.
`2) at 136-38 (final amendment of ’545 and ’556 Patent invalidity contentions on Feb. 20, 2021);
`Ex. 8 (Blalock Op.) (invalidity expert report dated Feb. 24, 2021); Ex. 9 (Kodama ’556 Op.)
`(same); Ex. 10 (’545 IPR) (IPR filed Mar. 26, 2021); Ex. 11 (’556 IPR) (IPR filed Feb. 27, 2021).
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`4
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`raised in its IPRs” (but stipulated not to) under the guise of rebutting damages. It would be
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`fundamentally unfair to PMI/Altria to allow RJR—who used those stipulations to convince the
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`PTAB to institute IPR on the ’545 and ’556 Patents—to ignore them now. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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`Consistent with RJR’s stipulation, the Court should preclude RJR from presenting argument,
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`evidence, or testimony at trial based on ’556 and ’545 Patents allegedly practicing the prior art.
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`III. MIL NO. 3: NO ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, OR TESTIMONY ABOUT PRIOR
`ART INVALIDITY NOT DISCLOSED IN EXPERT REPORTS
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`As part of the meet and confer process, PMI/Altria asked RJR to stipulate that it would not
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`advance any prior art invalidity arguments not disclosed in its expert reports. Without explanation,
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`RJR refused. See Ex. 1 at 2-3 (rejecting PMI/Altria’s proposed stipulation No. 3). The Court
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`should therefore preclude RJR from advancing such arguments. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 37; see also
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`S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 595-98 (4th Cir. 2003).
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`IV. MIL NO. 4: NO REFERENCE TO PRACTICING THE PRIOR ART AS AN
`ALLEGED NON-INFRINGEMENT DEFENSE
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`This is RJR’s second attempt to make an end run around its stipulations to the PTAB that
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`it would not raise any invalidity arguments that it “raised or could have raised” in its IPR petitions.
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`And it’s even worse than the first. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that there is no
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`“practicing the prior art defense” to infringement. See, e.g., Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech,
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`LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n. Sys., Inc., 522
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`F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “The problem with such a defense is that it can potentially allow
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`a defendant to skirt evidentiary hurdles and conflate the infringement and invalidity inquiries” by
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`relying on “purported similarities between the accused product and the prior art.” 01 Communique
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`Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., 889 F.3d 735, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As such, trial courts routinely exclude
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`arguments, evidence, or testimony based on this alleged defense at trial. See Metaswitch Networks
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`Ltd. v. Genband US LLC, No. 14-cv-744, 2016 WL 3618831, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2016)
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`5
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`(excluding “broad-strokes opinions” that “constitute an impermissible practicing the prior art
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`defense”); Nobelbiz, Inc. v. Glob. Connect, L.L.C., No. 12-cv-244, 2015 WL 11072170, at *3 (E.D.
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`Tex. Sept. 2, 2015) (precluding “evidence or argument comparing the allegedly invalidating
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`references to anything other than the language of the asserted claims”); Packet Intel. LLC v.
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`NetScout Sys., Inc., No. 16-cv-230, 2017 WL 11631146, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (same).
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`RJR seeks to contradict the law (and present its stipulated-away invalidity case through the
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`back door) by suggesting to the jury that it does not infringe the ’556 Patent because the accused
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`Solo, Vibe, Ciro, and Alto products (“Accused Products”) are similar to the prior art. RJR’s
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`technical expert for the ’556 Patent, Mr. Kodama, discusses various prior art e-vapor devices and
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`concludes that
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` Ex. 35 ¶ 55. Notably, Mr. Kodama does not opine that any of
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`those prior art e-vapor devices invalidate the ’556 Patent (nor could he, in view of RJR’s prior art
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`stipulation discussed above in MIL No. 2); Mr. Kodama only opines that
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`
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` Id.
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`Accordingly, this “defense” was never proper—it was neither an invalidity defense nor a proper
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`non-infringement defense. See, e.g., 01 Communique, 889 F.3d at 742 (rejecting non-infringement
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`“defense” based on “purported similarities between the accused product and the prior art”).
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`Allowing Mr. Kodama to present these opinions will only serve to confuse and mislead the
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`jury, who will be asked to decide whether the Accused Products infringe the ’556 Patent—not
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`whether
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` FED. R. EVID. 403. And,
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`should the jury consider the Accused Products when deciding invalidity, it would be legal error
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`and unfairly prejudice PMI/Altria. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1570
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`(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A determination of anticipation … may be reached by comparing only the
`
`6
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`claims and a prior art disclosure.”). Mr. Kodama’s opinionsPo
`I 51 teisinare purpose, other than to
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`improperly suggest a legally erroneous“practicing the priorart” defense; they should be excluded.
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`V.
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`MIL NO. 5: PRECLUDE RJR’S EXPERTS FROM RELYING ON HEARSAY
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`CONVERSATIONS WITH UNDISCLOSED THIRD-PARTIES AND EVIDENCE
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`PRODUCEDIN VIOLATION OF THE COURT’S DISCOVERY ORDER
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`RJR’s experts seek to rely on conversations they had with third-party individuals that were
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`neveridentified during discovery, in RJR’s initial disclosures or anywhereelse, and disclosed for
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`the first time in rebuttal expert reports. But Rules 26 and 37 bar RJR from relying on evidence
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`that RJR failed to timely disclose. See Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No. 14-cv-130,
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`2017 WL 3222547,at *8 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2017) (striking expert’s reliance on data that defendant
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`“failed to disclose ... in a timely fashion”and “on which [Defendants’ expert] clearly relied”’).
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`Specifically, RJR’s technical expert for the ’265 Patent, Dr. Jeffrey Suhling, relies on
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`Rot) 913,87, 89-94; see aso| 9rrr
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`a. RJR and Dr. Suhling should be barred from relying on these heretofore undisclosed
`BE 82:0 sc25005
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`3BO, as RJRmaywronglyclaim.
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`

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`First, RIK never dsoEE i ts Roe
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`26 initial disclosures as “individual[s] likely to have discoverable information.” FED. R. Crv.P.
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`26)()(A)().ii
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`Their identities were never properly disclosed, and RJR should not be permitted to disclose them
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`for the first time in its rebuttal expert report. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; S. States, 318 F.3d at 597.
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`Second, RJR nevereven producedthe
`po before Dr. Suhling’s rebuttal expert report. Ex. 14 (Suhling Rbt.) § 93. a.
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`however, is responsive to at least PMI/Altria’s RFP No. 109, which requests all documents
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`describing Ex. 16 (8/11/20 PMI/Altria’s 1st Set ofRFPs).
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`Moreover, Magistrate Judge Buchannan previously ordered RJR to produce responsive technical
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`documents from its suppliers, including Smoore, by November3, 2020. Dkt. 263. RJR requested
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`an extension of this deadline and, in granting this extension, the Court stated that RJR may “have
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`until November 13, 2020, to produce remaining technical documents from their suppliers” (such
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`as Smoore) and “/njo further extensions will be granted.” Dkt. 304. RJR did not produce the
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`photographby that deadline. RJR’s production ofFo in March 2021 wastherefore in
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`clear violation of the Judge Buchannan’s Order and should be excluded.4 Moreover, RJR’slate
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`disclosure of thePo surprised and unfairly prejudiced PMI,as it had no opportunity
`
`to depose any fact witness on the picture or otherwise seek discovery aboutit. See, e.g., TecSec,
`
`4 PMI/Altria’s motion to compel, which Magistrate Judge Buchannan
`granted, expressly
`sought
`
`
`eames suchas the
`documents from RJR’s suppliers
`
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`Dkt. 214; Dkt. 219-4 at 2; Dkt. 263.
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`
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`2018 WL 11388472, at *2 (“Adobe’s failure to properly disclose these exhibits has prejudiced
`
`TecSec by denying [it] the opportunity to examine the documents and depose Adobe’s witnesses
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`on them.”). RJR and Dr. Suhling should be precluded from relying on that picture at trial.
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`VI. MIL NO. 6: PRECLUDE RJR FROM ARGUING THAT IT LACKS CONTROL
`OVER SUPPLIERS OF THE ACCUSED PRODUCTS
`
`
`
` As a defense to inducement and willful infringement, RJR seeks to
`
`argue that
`
` See, e.g., Ex. 17 (4/28/21 RJR Resp. to Interr. 29)
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`at 3-4. But RJR already made and lost this argument before Magistrate Judge Buchanan. During
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`discovery, RJR refused to produce documents from its suppliers, arguing that it did not control
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`them. Dkt. 146. PMI/Altria moved to compel, arguing the opposite and relying, inter alia, on
`
`
`
` See Dkt. 127. Magistrate Judge Buchanan granted
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`PMI/Altria’s motion to compel, holding squarely that RJR controlled its suppliers, including with
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`respect to even its most guarded IP, the source code that operates the Accused Products. Dkt. 203
`
`at 11:25-12:4 (THE COURT: “I think that you do have control over the ability to produce the
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`source code.”); see also, e.g., id. at 8:15-19 (THE COURT: “Reynolds does have the ability to,
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`essentially, inspect the source code to make sure that it is compliant with the specifications that
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`Reynolds has given the supplier.”). Promptly after the hearing, RJR exercised its control and
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`produced materials in its suppliers’ possession.
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`Adding insult to injury,
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`
`
`
`
`
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` At bottom, Magistrate Judge Buchanan’s order is the law of the case on this
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`9
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`

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`
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`issue and RJR should not be permitted to contradict or circumvent it at trial. See, e.g., United
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`States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999).
`
`VII. MIL NO. 7: PRECLUDE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY FROM RJR’S FACT
`WITNESSES ABOUT ALLEGED NON-INFRINGEMENT OR INVALIDITY
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`RJR seeks to have certain fact witnesses offer lay opinion testimony on technical topics
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`that are exclusively reserved for experts, such as alleged non-infringement and invalidity. But “it
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`would be inappropriate, under Federal Rule of Evidences 701 and 702, for a lay witness, not
`
`previously qualified as an expert, to offer an opinion on the technical question of infringement.”
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`Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-cv-2768, 2017 WL 2362400, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. May 31,
`
`2017); see also, e.g., HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen Frog, LLC, 949 F.3d 685, 688-89 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
`
`(holding that trial court erred by admitting lay testimony on obviousness from fact witness);
`
`Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 344, 353 (D. Conn. 2005) (precluding lay
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`witness opinion testimony); Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co. v. Danko Mfg., LLC, No. 19-cv-162, 2021
`
`WL 4078282, at *1 (D. Neb. Sept. 8, 2021) (same); In re Liquid Toppings Dispensing Sys. (’447)
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`Patent Litig., No. 18-md-02832, 2021 WL 2410344, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2021) (same).
`
`For example, RJR’s Vice President of Scientific & Regulatory Affairs, Dr. James Figlar,
`
`intends to testify that RJR is not
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 18 (6/24/21 Figlar Dep.) at 10:1-22; see also, e.g., id. at 11:1-13:10. Dr.
`
`Figlar has not been disclosed, much less qualified, as an expert in this case.5 And his proposed
`
`
`5 Should RJR seeks to use Dr. Figlar’s testimony to rebut willfulness, that also fails. For example,
`RJR never identified Dr. Figlar or disclosed his opinions in response to PMI/Altria’s interrogatory
`seeking the basis for RJR’s contention that it allegedly does not willfully infringe. Ex. 17 (4/28/21
`RJR Resp. to Interr. 29) at 1-6. RJR may not now rely upon Dr. Figlar’s undisclosed opinions to
`rebut willfulness (or for any other purpose) at trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
`
`10
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`

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`
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`testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that must come from an
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`expert. See, e.g., Baratto v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (W.D. Wis.
`
`2010) (“It would be impossible for an untrained layman to speak to” how an invention “relate[s]
`
`to any of the accused products”). RJR never identified Dr. Figlar (or any other RJR employee) as
`
`an expert with “specialized knowledge,” much less served a report disclosing any expert opinions,
`
`as required. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(c). The Court should therefore prohibit Dr. Figlar from
`
`opining on expert issues, including alleged non-infringement and invalidity. See Hypertherm, Inc.
`
`v. Am. Torch Tip Co., No. 05-cv-373, 2009 WL 435324, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 19, 2009) (“Given the
`
`legal landscape, no lay opinion testimony will be permitted on the issue[] of infringement.”).
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`VIII. MIL NO. 8: NO REFERENCE TO RJR’S PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
`
`This trial concerns only PMI/Altria’s claims of patent infringement against RJR. Yet RJR
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`seeks to reference its patent infringement claims before the jury, even though they have been stayed
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`and are unrelated to this case.6 The Court should bar such references for two reasons. See Am.
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`Tech. Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio