Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 1 of 28 PageID# 20400
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`
`Civil No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
`
`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. and
`R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY,
`
`Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants,
`
`v.
`
`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA, INC.; and PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.,
`
`Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`BY PLAINTIFFS RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND
`R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 2 of 28 PageID# 20401
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`THE ’374 PATENT IS INVALID AS ANTICIPATED UNDER 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(a)(1) ......................................................................................................................... 1
`A.
`A Reasonable Jury Could Not Conclude That The ’374 Patent Is Entitled
`To The June 2010 Priority Date Of The ’949 PCT Application ............................ 1
`There Is No Genuine Dispute That The VUSE Solo Anticipates The As-
`serted Claims Of The ’374 Patent .......................................................................... 6
`DEFENDANTS CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY OF THE VUSE ALTO, SOLO
`G1, VIBE, OR CIRO PRODUCTS INFRINGE THE ’911 PATENT .............................. 7
`A.
`Reynolds Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On The Claim That The Solo
`G1, Vibe, Ciro, And Alto Products Literally Infringe The ’911 Patent ................. 7
`The Vuse Alto Does Not Literally Infringe The ’911 Patent ................................. 8
`Defendants’ Arguments Against Prosecution History Estoppel Fail ................... 12
`1.
`Defendants Omit And Misstate The Relevant Legal Standards .............. 12
`2.
`Defendants Cannot Assert Infringement Under The Doctrine Of
`Equivalents As To The Solo G1, Vibe, And Ciro.................................... 14
`Defendants Cannot Assert Infringement Under The Doctrine Of
`Equivalents As To The Alto .................................................................... 16
`DEFENDANTS CANNOT SHOW WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT ............................... 17
`III.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 20
`
`B.
`
`B.
`C.
`
`3.
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 3 of 28 PageID# 20402
`
`
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................17
`
`Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`935 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................3
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................11
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
`876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................19
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
`198 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ....................................................................................19
`
`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) ..................................................................................6
`
`Audio MPEG, Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`No. 2:15cv73, ECF No. 940 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2017) .....................................................19, 20
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................11
`
`Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc.,
`160 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)................................................................................................13
`
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................19
`
`Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
`647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
`346 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................7
`
`DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................13
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 4 of 28 PageID# 20403
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc.,
`108 F.3d 529 (4th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Diamond Grading Techs. Inc. v. Am. Gem Soc’y,
`No. 2:14-cv-1161-RWS-RSP, 2016 WL 3902482 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016)........................18
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................12
`
`Felix v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
`562 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................15
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..............................................................................12, 13, 14, 15
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002) .................................................................................................................15
`
`Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc.,
`744 F.3d 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................3
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .................................................................................................18, 19, 20
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,
`523 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................15
`
`i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................20
`
`Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc.,
`302 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................10
`
`Kinlaw v. Nwaokocha,
`No. 3:17-cv-772, 2019 WL 3268834 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2019) .............................................7, 8
`
`Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)..................................................................................................6
`
`Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
`107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..........................................................................................2, 4, 5
`
`-iii-
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 5 of 28 PageID# 20404
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`MedIdea, L.L.C. v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,
`422 F. Supp. 3d 459 (D. Mass. 2019) ......................................................................................10
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................10
`
`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)......................................................................................1, 2, 4, 5
`
`Rivera v. U.S.I.T.C.,
`857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3
`
`Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Techs. Corp.,
`459 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................10
`
`Split Pivot, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp.,
`987 F. Supp. 2d 838 (W.D. Wis. 2013) ...................................................................................13
`
`State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
`751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)................................................................................................17
`
`Stored Value Sols., Inc. v. Card Activation Techs., Inc.,
`499 F. App’x 5 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................................10
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc.,
`No. 1:10-cv-115, 2019 WL 1233882 (E.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2019) (O’Grady, J.) .......................18
`
`Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc.,
`247 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................12
`
`Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................16
`
`Univ. of Va. Patent Found. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
`755 F. Supp. 2d 709 (W.D. Va. 2010) ...............................................................................15, 17
`
`Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`201 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................7
`
`Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
`581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................10
`
`-iv-
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 6 of 28 PageID# 20405
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`WCM Indus. v. IPS Corp.,
`721 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................19
`
`Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
`442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................10
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................................................................................................1
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ........................................................................................................................9
`
`-v-
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 7 of 28 PageID# 20406
`
`
`
`I.
`
`THE ’374 PATENT IS INVALID AS ANTICIPATED UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
`As Reynolds explained in its opening brief, a reasonable factfinder can come to only one
`conclusion from the evidence: The asserted claims of the ’374 Patent are not entitled to the June
`2010 priority date of the ’949 PCT Application because the ’949 PCT Application’s written de-
`scription does not support them, and as a result the VUSE Solo anticipates the asserted claims.
`Dkt. 686 at 17-18. In their response, Defendants have not shown a genuine issue of material fact
`concerning the priority date of the ’374 Patent, but have instead offered an expert opinion that
`attempts alchemy—purporting to transform the ’949 Application so that it discloses things it does
`not disclose by its own terms. And Defendants fare no better in suggesting without any evidence
`at all—much less evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact in the face of Reynolds’s
`evidence—that the accused VUSE Solo might have changed in some way so that it does not antic-
`ipate the ’374 Patent. Therefore, and as explained further below, the Court should grant Reyn-
`olds’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity as to the ’374 Patent.
`
`A. A Reasonable Jury Could Not Conclude That The ’374 Patent Is Entitled To The June
`2010 Priority Date Of The ’949 PCT Application
`Defendants do not and cannot dispute the governing rule “that a patent application is enti-
`tled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier
`application provides support for the claims of the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Nor do
`Defendants meaningfully dispute that the ’374 Patent substantially changed the language of the
`’949 PCT Application, so that there “is more new material in the specification of the ’374 Patent
`than there is original material from the ’949 Application.” Compare SUF ¶ 7 (so observing), with
`CF ¶ 7 (purporting to dispute this fact, but relying only on an expert’s opinion that a POSA would
`have understood the ’949 PCT Application to cover the limitations captured in the undisputedly
`new language of the ’374 Patent). Specifically, the ’374 Patent indisputably describes its mem-
`brane using language different from the language used in the ’949 PCT Application:
`
`1
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 8 of 28 PageID# 20407
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` The ’949 PCT Application describes “a rigid or semi-rigid conductive membrane (121),
`such as a metallic sheet”—but never a flexible membrane.
` The ’374 Patent describes “a flexible and conductive membrane which is under lateral
`or radial tension” and “[i]n some embodiments … made of metal, … carbonized or
`metalized soft and resilient plastic materials such as PPS (Polyphenylene Sulfide), or
`carbon or metal coated soft and resilient plastic materials.”
`Compare SUF ¶¶ 8-12 (describing these differences in the ’949 PCT Application and ’374 Patent),
`with CF ¶¶ 8-12 (purporting to dispute these facts, but in fact relying only on a smattering of other
`sources to suggest that a POSA would understand the ’949 PCT application to cover the limitations
`captured in the undisputedly new language of the ’374 Patent). Defendants have not carried and
`cannot carry their burden of coming forward with evidence showing that the ’949 PCT Application
`supports the claims of the ’374 Patent, despite the obviously and materially different language.
`See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1303-06 (party claiming earlier priority date must come forward with
`evidence capable of establishing entitlement to that earlier priority date).
`
`In resisting that conclusion, Defendants begin by missing the point. No one claims that the
`’949 PCT Application’s omission of the word “flexible” is, on its own, dispositive. Dkt. 733 at 4.
`Rather, as Reynolds clearly explained in its opening brief, the point is that the ’374 Patent trans-
`forms the description in the ’949 PCT Application by substituting (1) a “flexible” membrane
`“made of … metalized … soft and resilient plastic materials” (Pltff’s Exh. A at 5:24-29) for (2) a
`“rigid or semi-rigid” and “metallic” membrane (Pltff’s Exh. D at 6:18-21)—a different thing.
`1.
`
`In seeking to broaden the scope of the ’949 PCT Application to support the asserted
`claims of the ’374 Patent, Defendants rely on the testimony of their expert, Mr. McAlexander. See
`Dkt. 733 at 4-6. Specifically, Defendants point to Mr. McAlexander’s claim that a POSA reading
`the ’949 PCT Application would understand it to describe a “flexible” membrane because the ’949
`PCT Application stated that its disclosure of a “rigid or semi-rigid” membrane is non-exclusive.
`Id. at 5. But that argument is nothing more than an attempt to use the state of the art to fill a hole
`in the written description, contrary to the settled rule that “a prior application itself must describe
`[the] invention … in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inven-
`tor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
`
`2
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`

`

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`
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`107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also Rivera v. U.S.I.T.C., 857 F.3d
`1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The knowledge of ordinary artisans may be used to inform what is
`actually in the specification, but not to teach limitations that are not in the specification, even if
`those limitations would be rendered obvious by the disclosure in the specification.”) (internal ci-
`tation omitted). Moreover, in describing the membrane as “rigid or semi-rigid,” the ’949 PCT
`Application points away from a “flexible” membrane—making it particularly improper to rely on
`the supposed knowledge of a POSA to bridge the gap from the ’949 PCT Application to a “flexi-
`ble” membrane.
`
`Defendants likewise misplace their reliance on Mr. McAlexander’s opinion that a POSA
`would understand the ’949 PCT Application to cover a “flexible membrane” because it describes
`the membrane as “deformable,” “semi-rigid,” and “resilient.” Dkt. 733 at 5-7. That reliance is
`misplaced because Mr. McAlexander’s opinion violates a cardinal rule that words in patent appli-
`cations (as in legal documents generally) are not read in isolation, but rather in the context of the
`application as a whole. See, e.g., Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 935 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed.
`Cir. 2019). The context of the ’949 PCT Application makes plain that the membrane is not flexi-
`ble: “[T]he air-flow sensor comprises a rigid or semi-rigid conductive membrane (121), such as
`a metallic sheet which are mounted above a conductive back plate.” Pltff’s Exh. D at 6:18-21
`(emphasis added). In contrast, the items of prior art discussed in Defendants’ brief use the term
`“flexible” to describe their membranes—which only underscores that the ’949 PCT Application
`does not describe a flexible membrane. See Defts’ Exh. 4 at 3:36-39 (McLaughlin Patent); Defts’
`Exh. 5 at 1:56-60 (Ball Patent). Indeed, Mr. Liu would have had no need to add the word “flexible”
`to the ’374 Patent if the words carried over from the ’949 PCT Application—e.g., “deformable,”
`“resilient” (Dkt. 733 at 6-7)—already described a flexible membrane; Defendants’ contrary posi-
`tion would render “flexible” superfluous in the ’374 Patent. See, e.g., Frans Nooren Afdichtings-
`systemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (patents should be read
`so that terms are not rendered superfluous).
`
`3
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`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 10 of 28 PageID# 20409
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`
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`2.
`As explained in Reynolds’s opening brief, the Court should grant summary judg-
`
`ment even if the ’949 PCT Application supports a claim for a “flexible” membrane, because it
`cannot support a claim to a conductive membrane made of “‘soft … plastic materials’ such as
`PPS,” as claimed by the ’374 Patent. Dkt. 686 at 15-16. Defendants once again begin with an
`irrelevancy, noting that an application need not describe every embodiment of the claimed inven-
`tion. Dkt. 733 at 8. The relevant rule here is that a patentee cannot claim an earlier priority date
`based on an application if the patent transformed or broadened the invention described in the earlier
`application. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1311. To be clear, Defendants are wrong to suggest
`the PowerOasis rule turns solely on the strength of an expert’s declaration, Dkt. 733 at 10; rather,
`it requires a comparison of the patent-at-issue with the application on which the claim to an earlier
`priority date is based, 522 F.3d at 1311.
`
`Here, that comparison shows that the ’374 Patent expands on and transforms the ’949 PCT
`Application. Just as the patent in PowerOasis transformed the “user interface” from part of the
`vending machine to something remote from the vending machine, so the ’374 Patent transformed
`the “conductive membrane” from a “metallic sheet” (’949 PCT Application) to a piece of “soft …
`plastic material such as PPS” (’374 Patent).
`
`In response, Defendants rely entirely on Mr. McAlexander, claiming that he has “opine[d]
`in detail how” disclosures in the ’949 PCT Application “convey to a POSA that the inventor pos-
`sessed the claimed ‘flexible conductive membrane,’ including a membrane made of soft plastic
`material coated with metal.” Dkt. 733 at 10. But in his expert report, Mr. McAlexander makes no
`effort to tie an opinion concerning the use of a plastic membrane to the ’949 PCT Application’s
`disclosures, instead basing his opinion on what he claims would have been obvious to a POSA.
`RJR Exh. E ¶¶ 578-87. The opinions expressed in Mr. McAlexander’s report are thus legally
`irrelevant here. See, e.g., Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571-72; PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1311. And
`while Mr. McAlexander later testified during his deposition that a POSA could read the ’949 PCT
`Application’s reference to a “metallic sheet” or resilient “metallic membrane” to describe a soft
`plastic membrane coated with metal (Defts’ Exh. 1 at 238-40), the ’949 PCT Application says
`
`4
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`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 750 Filed 06/22/21 Page 11 of 28 PageID# 20410
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`nothing about soft plastic, and in fact points away from a soft plastic membrane (coated or other-
`wise): A “metallic sheet” is not soft plastic—and certainly not when that metallic sheet is “resili-
`ent” and “rigid or semi-rigid.” SUF 10.
`
`In sum, Mr. McAlexander’s opinion concerning what a POSA might know both (1) reads
`into the ’949 PCT Application things that it does not describe and (2) contradicts the ’949 PCT
`Application’s terms. For both of those independent reasons, Mr. McAlexander’s opinion cannot
`satisfy Defendants’ burden of coming forward with evidence of entitlement to the ’949 PCT Ap-
`plication’s priority date. See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571-72 (“It is not sufficient for purposes of
`the written description requirement … that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in
`the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned,
`but failed to disclose.”); Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1366 (Fed.
`Cir. 2011) (expert testimony concerning skill in the art cannot contradict terms of disclosure).
`3.
`
`Defendants likewise misplace their reliance on the fact that the ’374 Patent contains
`two figures that also appear in the ’949 PCT Application. Dkt. 733 at 6. Those figures simply do
`not speak to the key issue here, because they say nothing at all about the type of material used for
`the respective conductive membranes of the ’949 PCT Application and ’374 Patent. See Pltff’s
`Exh. D (’949 PCT Patent, Figs. 6B and 6C); Pltff’s Exh. A (’374 Patent, Exhs. 3A and 3B). In
`fact, the discussion that accompanies those figures confirms that, despite the similarly stylized
`depictions, the membranes are made of different materials: In explaining its figures, the ’949 PCT
`Application refers to “the resilient metallic membrane” described in that application (Pltff’s Exh.
`D at 8-9), whereas the ’374 Patent’s figure refers to that Patent’s “flexible and conductive mem-
`brane which is under lateral or radial tension and spans across a central aperture defined by the
`ring spacer under radial tensions” (Pltff’s Exh. A at 3:23-26). And, as already discussed, that
`means the ’374 Patent is not entitled to the priority date of the ’949 PCT Application, because the
`’949 PCT Application does not support its claims. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1311.
`4.
`
`
`As a matter of law, it is irrelevant that Mr. Liu claims
`. Dkt. 733 at 7. As the Federal
`
`5
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`
`
`Circuit has “repeatedly stated,” “actual ‘possession’ or reduction to practice outside of the speci-
`fication is not enough. Rather, … it is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”
`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). And, in any
`event, Mr. Liu
`
`and so his testimony would not suffice to cover the invention claimed in the ’374 Patent
`even if inventor testimony could broaden the ’949 PCT Application’s disclosure. Ex. T (Liu Tr.)
`at 109:9-110:10; see also id. at 35:4-36:12, 91:24-92:13, 93:7-95:12.
`
`Mr. Liu’s actions are relevant in another respect, however. Specifically, Mr. Liu’s choices
`in drafting the ’374 Patent—in 2015, after the success of VUSE Solo—confirm that he understood
`that the ’949 PCT Application does not cover flexible membranes made of metalized soft plastic,
`like PPS. In rewriting the ’949 PCT Application’s specification for use in the ’374 Patent, Mr. Liu
`changed “rigid or semi-rigid” to “flexible,” deleted “metallic sheet having a good axial resilience
`property,” and added new materials (including PPS) for use in the membrane. SUF ¶ 12. Mr. Liu
`would have had no reason to make those changes if the ’949 PCT Application already covered
`flexible membranes made of soft plastic, like those used in VUSE Solo. Common sense thus
`confirms what settled law establishes: The ’374 Patent is not entitled to the priority date of the
`’949 PCT Application. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1438 (Fed. Cir.
`1984) (in determining priority date, “the circumstances surrounding the prosecution of the patent
`in the PTO must be examined”).
`
`B. There Is No Genuine Dispute That The VUSE Solo Anticipates The Asserted Claims
`Of The ’374 Patent
`Defendants end their discussion of the ’374 Patent with an argument that the Court should
`deny summary judgment even if the ’374 Patent bears a July 2015 priority date because the VUSE
`Solo sold before that date might not have anticipated the ’374 Patent. Specifically, Defendants
`claim the VUSE Solo has practiced the ’374 Patent since September 2019, but they speculate—
`without any evidence whatsoever—that the VUSE Solo might somehow have been materially dif-
`ferent before 2015. Dkt. 733 at 10. Defendants had ample opportunity during discovery to inquire
`
`6
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`
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`into any changes in the VUSE Solo, so it is entirely their own fault that they now must rely on
`speculation—which is insufficient to prevent summary judgment. See Bouchat v. Baltimore Ra-
`vens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). In any event, Defendants bafflingly
`ignore the evidence, discussed in Reynolds’s opening brief, showing that since it first went on the
`market, the VUSE Solo has not changed in any way that matters here: Each unit has throughout
`that time contained
`
`
`, as confirmed by bills of materials from March 7, 2013
` and July 7, 2014
`, submitted as Exhibit C to
`Reynolds’s brief. SUF ¶ 4. But in an overabundance of caution, Reynolds submits as Exhibit U
`to this Reply the declaration of Eric Hunt, Director in Vapor Product Deployment for Reynolds,
`which
`
`. In short, there has been no relevant change to the accused product, which suffices to demon-
`strate anticipation as a matter of law. See Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366
`(Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`II.
`
`DEFENDANTS CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY OF THE VUSE ALTO, SOLO G1,
`VIBE, OR CIRO PRODUCTS INFRINGE THE ’911 PATENT
`A. Reynolds Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On The Claim That The Solo G1, Vibe,
`Ciro, And Alto Products Literally Infringe The ’911 Patent
`Defendants concede that they have no evidence to support the claim that the Vuse Solo G1,
`Vibe, and Ciro products literally infringe the ’911 patent. Dkt. 733 at 17. Instead of summary
`judgment, Defendants contend that these literal infringement claims are “moot” because their ex-
`pert offered no opinion of literal infringement and because Reynolds “failed to meet and confer
`with PMP/Altria on this issue.” Id. at 18. A party’s failure to adduce evidence creating a genuine
`issue of fact does not moot a request for summary judgment—that is precisely what summary
`judgment is for. If Defendants wished to moot the issue, they should have withdrawn the claims.
`That’s what happened in Kinlaw v. Nwaokocha, No. 3:17-cv-772, 2019 WL 3268834 (E.D. Va.
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`July 19, 2019), Defendants’ sole authority. See id., at *1 (noting that “counsel for Kinlaw repre-
`sented that he was withdrawing claims”). Reynolds in fact asked Defendants if they were “drop-
`ping any claims or infringement theories from its infringement allegations for the ‘911 patent,”
`and offered “to meet and confer” on that issue. Ex. V, June 1, 2021 E-mail from J. Michalik to J.
`Koh. Defendants’ response asserted “[n]ow is not the appropriate time for Counterclaim-plaintiffs
`to evaluate further narrowing the case for trial based on dropping existing asserted claims.” Ex.
`W, June 2, 2021 E-mail from W. Orlady to J. Michalik. Even now, Defendants’ response does not
`say that they are withdrawing these literal infringement claims, only that their sole expert on in-
`fringement of the ’911 patent has not offered a literal infringement opinion. In light of that con-
`cession, summary judgment of no literal infringement is appropriate, but the Court should at min-
`imum note in its order that the claim of literal infringement has been withdrawn.
`B. The Vuse Alto Does Not Literally Infringe The ’911 Patent
`Defendants’ expert does offer a literal infringement opinion as to Reynolds’s Alto product,
`but as Reynolds explained, that opinion is legally barred by the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer
`and, in any event, the expert failed to measure the “largest cross-sectional dimension x” of the
`alleged cavity as required by claim 1 of the patent. On the first point, Defendants respond that the
`Court rejected prosecution disclaimer in its claim-construction order—but notably, Defendants do
`not address the merits of Reynolds’s prosecution-disclaimer argument. So, if the Court disagrees
`that its order preempts prosecution disclaimer, it should accept Reynolds’s contention that Dr.
`Abraham’s literal infringement opinion as to Alto embraces structures affirmatively disclaimed
`during the prosecution history, because Defendants have offered no argument to rebut it.
`The Court’s November 24, 2020 claim-construction order did not address, let alone reject,
`Reynolds’s prosecution-disclaimer arguments prompted by Dr. Abraham’s infringement theory
`and claim interpretation disclosed for the first time on March 12, 2021. The parties disputed three
`claim terms in the ’911 Patent—(1) “at least one cavity in a wall of the aerosol-forming chamber,”
`(2) “blind hole,” and (3) “recessed in the wall of the aerosol-forming chamber.” Dkt. 729-4. For
`the second of these—“blind hole”—Reynolds made no prosecution disclaimer arguments at all, as
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`confirmed by Defendants’ own summary. See id. For the other two, Reynolds did rely on the ’911
`prosecution history, but only PMP’s statements during prosecution about the meaning of “in a wall”
`and “recessed in the wall” as related to the location of the claimed cavity or blind hole. See, e.g.,
`Dkt. 310 at 24 (Defendants arguing: “The parties dispute whether ‘wall’ should be given its ordi-
`nary meaning (as [Defendant] contends) or whether it should be rewritten as ‘the inside surface of
`the hollow housing which encloses the aerosol-forming chamber . . . . RJR relies heavily on the
`prosecution history to supports its construction.”); id. at 26-27 (Defendants arguing that “[n]either
`the specification nor the file history support” replacing “ ‘recessed’ with ‘positioned behind’” and
`“‘wall’ with ‘the inner space defined by the wall’”). The Court declined to construe these terms,
`concluding that they should be “given their common meaning,” and “[n]one of the terms were
`modified by a clear disclaimer in the prosecution.” Dkt. 360 at 1. But Reynolds’s present prose-
`cution-disclaimer challenge to Dr. Abraham’s literal infringement opinion has nothing to do with
`whether “in a wall” means “the inside surface of a hollow housing” or whether “recessed” means
`“positioned behind.” Dr. Abraham opines that Alto infringes the ’911 Patent because the “raised
`lip[s]” in the mouthpiece create open-sided spaces that are “consistent with the plain and ordinary
`meaning of the term ‘cavity.’” Dkt. 686 at 20. That opinion runs headlong into Defendants’
`successful prosecution argument to the Examiner that the Ro