Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 1 of 39 PageID# 18796
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`
`
`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND R.J.
`REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
`
`
`Plaintiffs-Counterclaim
`Defendants,
`
`
`v.
`
`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA INC.; PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.
`
`
`Defendants-Counterclaim
`Plaintiffs.
`
`Case No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`OPPOSITION TO RJR’S PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 2 of 39 PageID# 18797
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY OF THE ’374 PATENT
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ..........................................................1
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................3
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims Of The ’374 Patent Are Entitled To The June 29,
`2010 Priority Date Of Their Parent Application ......................................................4
`
`RJR Has Not Met Its Burden Of Showing That The VUSE Solo
`Anticipates The Asserted Claims Of The ’374 Patent ...........................................10
`
`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’911 PATENT
`
`I.
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ........................................................11
`
`A.
`
`Material Facts That RJR Omits ..............................................................................11
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`PMP/Altria’s Expert Opinions On Infringement .......................................12
`
`RJR’s Expert Opinions ..............................................................................12
`
`B.
`
`PMP/Altria’s Responses To RJR’s Statement Of Undisputed Facts .....................13
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .....................................................................................................15
`
`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO LITERAL INFRINGEMENT ............................17
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Summary Judgment Of No Literal Infringement By The Vuse Solo G1,
`Vibe, And Ciro Is Moot .........................................................................................17
`
`There Are Triable Factual Issues Regarding Literal Infringement By The
`Vuse Alto ...............................................................................................................18
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Court Previously Rejected RJR’s Disclaimer Argument ....................18
`
`There Are Technical Factual Disputes Between The Experts ...................19
`
`IV.
`
`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INFRINGEMENT UNDER DOE ......................20
`
`A.
`
`There Are Factual Disputes Related To The Vuse Solo G1, Vibe, And
`Ciro ........................................................................................................................20
`
`1.
`
`Prosecution History Estoppel Does Not Apply .........................................21
`
`i
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 3 of 39 PageID# 18798
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`2.
`
`Vitiation Does Not Apply ..........................................................................22
`
`B.
`
`No Summary Judgment Of No Infringement Under DOE For the Vuse
`Alto ........................................................................................................................23
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Dr. Abraham Only Offers An Opinion That The VUSE Alto
`Literally Meets The Numerical Range Limitation .....................................23
`
`Prosecution History Estoppel Does Not Apply .........................................23
`
`Dr. Abraham’s DOE Opinions Are Not Conclusory .................................24
`
`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ........................................................25
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................27
`
`THERE ARE GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT ABOUT RJR’S
`WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’545, ’911, AND ’265 PATENTS .....................28
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................30
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 4 of 39 PageID# 18799
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods. Inc.,
`876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................. 29
`
`Audio MPEG, Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-73 Opinion and Order (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2017) ............................................ 28, 29
`
`Bradford Co. v. Conteyor N. Am., Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`Charles Mach. Works, Inc. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.,
`723 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................. 17
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,
`339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................. 8, 24
`
`Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.,
`559 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................. 16
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc.,
`933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................. 15
`
`Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................. 18
`
`Falkner v. Inglis,
`448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................... 16, 17, 21
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-03999, 2015 WL 7351450 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) ....................................... 17, 21
`
`Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC,
`806 F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .................................................................................... 16, 22
`
`Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
`339 U.S. 605 (1950) .................................................................................................................. 16
`
`Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`884 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................... 4, 5, 7, 8
`
`iii
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 5 of 39 PageID# 18800
`
`Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp.,
`492 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................. 15
`
`i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................. 28, 29
`
`Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`281 F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Va. 2003) .................................................................................. 20, 22
`
`Intendis GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA,
`822 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 16, 17
`
`Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co.,
`171 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Conn. 2001) ......................................................................................... 23
`
`Kinlaw v. Nwaokocha,
`No. 3:17-cv-772, 2019 WL 3268834 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2019) ................................................ 18
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`McGinley v. Luv N’ Care Ltd.,
`819 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .............................................................................................. 6
`
`Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,
`851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................. 9, 10
`
`Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`Tobinick v. Olmarker,
`753 F.3d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`UCB, Inc. v. Watson Labs. Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................. 17
`
`Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
`581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................. 19
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................. 28
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 6 of 39 PageID# 18801
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`WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp.,
`721 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................ 25, 28, 30
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 7 of 39 PageID# 18802
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`
`
`’265 Patent
`’268 Patent
`’374 Patent
`’545 Patent
`’911 Patent
`’639 Application
`Parent Application
`McLaughlin
`Ball
`Accused Products
`Altria
`CF
`
`FDA
`IDS
`PMP/Altria
`
`PTO
`Purported SUF
`
`RJR
`
`RJR’s Br.
`
`RJR Ex.
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,814,265
`U.S. Patent No. 9,814,268
`U.S. Patent No. 10,420,374
`U.S. Patent No. 6,803,545
`U.S. Patent No. 10,104,911
`U.S. Patent Application 10/161,639
`PCT/IB2010/052949
`U.S. Patent No. 8,661,910
`U.S. Patent No. 5,134,886
`The VUSE Alto, Solo, Vibe, and Ciro
`Refers collectively to ALCS and PMUSA
`Counterstatement of Material Facts as
`contained herein
`U.S. Food and Drug Administration
`Information Disclosure Statement
`Refers collectively to Philip Morris Products
`S.A. (“PMP”), Altria Client Services LLC,
`(“ALCS”) and Philip Morris USA Inc.
`(“PMUSA”)
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
`The purported Statement of Undisputed Facts
`presented in RJR’s Brief
`Refers collectively to RAI Strategic Holdings,
`Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company
`Dkt. 690 (RJR’s Memorandum in Support of
`Partial Motion for Summary Judgment)
`Exhibit to RJR’s Br.
`
`
`
`vi
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 8 of 39 PageID# 18803
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`NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY OF THE ’374 PATENT
`
`RJR asks the Court to rule that, as a matter of law, the asserted claims of the ’374 Patent
`
`should not receive the benefit of the June 29, 2010 filing date of their Parent Application, and that
`
`the claims are therefore anticipated by a different version of the VUSE Solo than the accused
`
`version. RJR contends that there is no genuine dispute that the Parent Application fails to provide
`
`written description for the claimed “flexible conductive membrane.” RJR is wrong. As detailed
`
`by PMP/Altria’s expert, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would readily understand
`
`from the Parent Application that the inventor possessed a “flexible conductive membrane.” RJR
`
`misstates the law and asks the Court to resolve technical disputes between the experts about written
`
`description – an issue of fact – that should properly be resolved at trial.
`
`I.
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`1.
`
`Disputed. The ’374 Patent is directed not only to a puff sensor, but an electronic
`
`vaping device that comprises an improved and novel puff sensor. RJR Ex. A.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Undisputed.
`
`Undisputed.
`
`Disputed. RJR has not met its burden of showing that the version of VUSE Solo
`
`purportedly sold more than one year before the filing of the ’374 Patent and the accused VUSE
`
`Solo are the same. RJR’s technical expert, Dr. Blalock, has not provided any opinion on the issue.
`
`RJR Ex. F ¶¶ 283-85, 300-01; Dkt. No. 694-6 (PMP/Altria Br.) ¶¶ 597-98. PMP/Altria’s technical
`
`expert, Mr. McAlexander, addresses infringement by the version of VUSE Solo sold after the ’374
`
`Patent was granted in September 2019.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`
`
`Undisputed.
`
`Undisputed.
`
`Disputed. The ’374 Patent properly claims priority to its Parent Application. Mr.
`1
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 9 of 39 PageID# 18804
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`McAlexander details how the Parent Application provides written description support for each
`
`limitation of the asserted claims of the ’374 Patent. Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 578-98; Ex. 1 (McAlexander
`
`Tr.) at 229:17-240:21, 241:11-242:22, 243:15-244:12.
`
`8.
`
`Disputed. The ’374 Patent’s description of the conductive membrane as “flexible
`
`and resilient” is not “new matter.” To the contrary, the Parent Application describes a conductive
`
`membrane that is flexible and resilient. Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 578-98; Ex. 1 at 229:17-240:21-242:22,
`
`243:15-244:12; RJR Ex. D at 3:4-12, 4:6-15, 7:4-7, 7:22-8:14, 10:18-21, Figs. 6A, 6B, 6C, claims
`
`2, 7, 8; Ex. 2 (Liu Tr.) at 34:25-35:22, 91:19-94:23, 98:16-99:7; Dkt. No. 694-4 ¶¶ 341-48; Ex. 3
`
`(Blalock Tr.) at 198:5-200:19; Ex. 4 (McLaughlin) at 3:36-39; Ex. 5 (Ball) at 1:56-60, 3:39-44.
`
`9.
`
`Disputed. The ’374 Patent’s description at col. 5, ll. 24-29 is not “new matter.”
`
`Mr. McAlexander has explained that the Parent Application reasonably conveys to those skilled
`
`in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed “flexible conductive membrane” of the
`
`’374 Patent. See CF 8.
`
`10.
`
`Disputed. Mr. McAlexander has detailed that the Parent Application describes a
`
`conductive membrane that is flexible and does not limit the disclosed conductive membrane to a
`
`“rigid” or “semi-rigid” membrane. See CF 8.
`
`11.
`
`Disputed. Mr. McAlexander has detailed that the Parent Application reasonably
`
`conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed “flexible
`
`conductive membrane” of the ’374 Patent. See CF 8.
`
`12.
`
`Disputed. The specification of the ’374 Patent did not “change[] the description of
`
`the membrane (1) from ‘rigid or semi-rigid’ to ‘flexible’ and (2) from made of a ‘metallic sheet’
`
`to made of ‘soft . . . plastic,’ such as [Polyphenylene Suflide],” as RJR contends. See CF 8.
`
`13.
`
`Disputed. Dr. Blalock’s characterization that a PPS membrane “can in no way be
`
`
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 10 of 39 PageID# 18805
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`construed as rigid or semi-rigid” is incorrect. As Mr. McAlexander explains,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14.
`
`Disputed. The Court did not “decline[] to issue any claim construction” for the
`
`identified claim term. Instead, the Court rejected RJR’s proposed construction of the term,
`
`concluding that “none of the fifteen terms in dispute should be modified,” “[t]hey are all well
`
`known common English words given their common meaning,” and “[n]one of the terms were
`
`modified by a clear disclaimer in the prosecution[.]” Dkt. No. 360 (Claim Construction Order).
`
`15.
`
`Disputed. PMP/Altria do not rely on any purported “new matter” in the ’374 Patent
`
`to accuse the VUSE products of infringing the asserted claims of the ’374 Patent. The Parent
`
`Application discloses a “flexible conductive membrane.” See CF 8.
`
`16.
`
`Disputed. PMP/Altria and its expert, Mr. McAlexander, has refuted Dr. Blalock’s
`
`opinions that: (1) the asserted claims of the ’374 Patent are not entitled to the priority date of the
`
`Parent Application and (2) the VUSE Solo anticipates the asserted claims of the ’374 Patent unless
`
`it does not infringe them. See CF 4, 8.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`“[W]hether a priority document contains sufficient disclosure to comply with the written
`
`description [requirement] is a question of fact.” Bradford Co. v. Conteyor N. Am., Inc., 603 F.3d
`
`1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2010).1 RJR bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
`
`that the asserted claims should not have the benefit of their Parent Application’s filing date. Tech.
`
`Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`“In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed
`
`
`1 All emphases added unless noted otherwise.
`
`
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`3
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 11 of 39 PageID# 18806
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`does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Pozen Inc.
`
`v. Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[The] patent
`
`specification is written for a person of skill in the art, and such a person comes to the patent with
`
`the knowledge of what has come before. Placed in that context, it is unnecessary to spell out every
`
`detail of the invention in the specification; only enough must be included to convince a person of
`
`skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention[.]” Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Thus, the test “is whether the disclosure of the [earlier]
`
`application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
`
`possession of the claimed subject matter as of that earlier filing date.” Hologic, Inc. v. Smith &
`
`Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`The Asserted Claims Of The ’374 Patent Are Entitled To The June 29, 2010
`Priority Date Of Their Parent Application
`
`The ’374 asserted claims recite, in relevant part, a capacitor with a “flexible conductive
`
`membrane” that is “configured to deform” in response to airflow through the device. RJR Ex. A
`
`at claims 1-10, 16-25. RJR argues that the Parent Application does not provide written description
`
`support for the “flexible conductive membrane” because it supposedly “described a ‘rigid or semi-
`
`rigid’ conductive membrane—but never a flexible one.” RJR Br. at 15. RJR is wrong.
`
`Initially, RJR relies on the legal irrelevancy that the specific word “flexible” is not used in
`
`the Parent Application. RJR Br. at 15-16. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected that an
`
`earlier application must use the claim language to provide priority. Pozen, 696 F.3d at 1167 (“As
`
`this court has explained, ‘[i]n order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure
`
`as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter
`
`at issue.’”) (citation omitted). Instead, the written description requirement “can be satisfied by
`
`
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`4
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 12 of 39 PageID# 18807
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`words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc.” Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381
`
`F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
`
`Moreover, nothing in the Parent Application limits the disclosed conductive membrane to
`
`a “rigid or semi-rigid” membrane. RJR relies exclusively on a single disclosure in the “Exemplary
`
`Embodiments” section. But as Mr. McAlexander explains, that is merely a non-limiting example.
`
`Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶ 584; Ex. 1 at 237:8-13. Indeed, the Parent Application expressly instructs that
`
`“the embodiments are only for illustrations and should not be used as restrictive example when
`
`interpreting the scope of the invention.” RJR Ex. D at 10:18-21. Even if the Parent Application’s
`
`disclosure was somehow limited to a “rigid or semi-rigid” membrane (it is not), Mr. McAlexander
`
`explains
`
`fact precludes summary judgment.
`
`
`
` That genuine issue of material
`
`As Mr. McAlexander details, the Parent Application contains ample disclosure that
`
`“reasonably conveys” to a POSA that the inventor had possession of the claimed “flexible
`
`conductive membrane” at the time of his invention.2 Hologic, 884 F.3d at 1361. In particular, the
`
`“Summary of the Invention” in the Parent Application repeatedly discloses a conductive
`
`membrane of a capacitor that is “adapted to deform” in response to airflow through the device:
`
`In an embodiment, the air-flow sensor may comprise a conductive air-baffle
`surface which is spaced apart from a base conductive surface, and the air
`baffle surface is adapted to deform in response to air flow through the
`apparatus.
`
`RJR Ex. D at 4:6-10, see also id. at 3:4-12.
`
`
`2 RJR’s contention that “an obvious variant” is insufficient to meet the written description
`requirement is a straw man. RJR Br. at 14, 17. Mr. McAlexander does not opine that a “flexible
`conductive membrane” is an “obvious variant” – he opines that a POSA would understand the
`Parent Application teaches a flexible conductive membrane.
`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 13 of 39 PageID# 18808
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`
`
`The originally filed claims of the Parent Application also recite a conductive membrane
`
`that is “adapted to deform.” Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1297 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2017) (“Original claims are part of the original specification and in many cases will satisfy
`
`the written description requirement.”); Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶ 581; RJR Ex. D at claims 2, 7, 8.
`
`
`
`In addition, the parent specification states that the “deformable” conductive membrane
`
`should have “good axial resilience property” so it can “return to its neutral or standby condition
`
`quickly or immediately after inhaling stops[.]” RJR Ex. D at 7:4-7; see also id. at 7:22-8:14.
`
`
`
`As Mr. McAlexander explains, a POSA would readily understand that such disclosure of a
`
`“deformable” and “resilient” membrane discloses a membrane that is “flexible” – that is, a
`
`“flexible” membrane is both “deformable” and “resilient,” and, as discussed below, was used in
`
`capacitors at the time of the Parent Application. Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 578-87; Ex. 1 at 229:17-233:13,
`
`235:11-238:12; 240:9-21, 241:19-24, 243:15-244:12. Indeed, it should be dispositive that Figures
`
`6B and 6C in the Parent Application illustrating the operation of the “deformable” and “resilient”
`
`membrane are identical to Figures 3A and 3B in the ’374 Patent that indisputably illustrate the
`
`operation of the claimed “flexible conductive membrane.” McGinley v. Luv N’ Care Ltd., 819 F.
`
`App’x 913, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding parent application supported claimed “generally flat”
`
`limitation where the parent included the same figure that the patentee relied on in the later-filed
`
`CIP application as support for the limitation); compare RJR Ex. D at Figs. 6B and 6C with RJR
`
`Ex. A at Figs. 3A and 3B. Those Figures are enough to deny RJR’s motion.
`
`
`
`
`
`Further, the language used to describe the “deformable” and “resilient” membrane and the
`
`claimed “flexible conductive membrane” is substantially identical. The ’374 Patent claims state
`
`that the “flexible conductive membrane” is “configured to deform.” The ’374 patent specification
`
`also states that the “flexible conductive membrane” is “deformable,” “resilient” and capable of
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 14 of 39 PageID# 18809
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`“return[ing] to its neutral state . . . when the airflow stops.” See RJR Ex. A at 3:29-35, 3:40-42,
`
`4:1-6, 4:66-5:2, 5:35-40.
`
`
`
` RJR’s
`
`contention that the ’374 Patent “expanded and transformed what the [Parent Application]
`
`disclosed” is at most a factual dispute to be resolved at trial. RJR Br. at 15. More accurately, it is
`
`a baseless contention refuted by undisputed fact testimony.
`
`RJR next ignores the state of the art at the time of the Parent Application. It shows that a
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`POSA would have understood that the Parent Application’s disclosure of a “deformable” and
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`“resilient” conductive membrane discloses a “flexible” conductive membrane. Hologic, 884 F.3d
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`at 1364 (it is proper to “consider[] what the specification reasonably conveys to the skilled artisan
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`who has knowledge of the prior art.”); Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶ 585. Here, the record evidence shows
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`that a POSA would have known that flexible membranes were used in capacitors at the time of the
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`Parent Application. The very prior art references about which Dr. Blalock opines show this. For
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`example, he opines that McLaughlin (filed on Jan. 19, 2007) and Ball (filed on Aug. 16, 1991)
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`disclose a capacitor with a “flexible conductive membrane.” Dkt. No. 694-4 ¶¶ 341-48; Ex. 3 at
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`198:5-200:19.
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`RJR’s expert, Dr. Blalock, makes the conclusory assertion that the Parent Application
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`discloses only a “rigid or semi-rigid membrane.” RJR Br. at 16. But Dr. Blalock fails to offer any
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`explanation for why a POSA would purportedly limit the Parent Application’s disclosure of a
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`“deformable” and “resilient” membrane to a “rigid or semi-rigid membrane.” Worse, Dr. Blalock
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`admitted at his deposition that he did not know whether flexible membranes were used in
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`7
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 15 of 39 PageID# 18810
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`capacitors at the time of the Parent Application because he never investigated it. Ex. 3 at 176:3-
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`17, 178:6-10; see also id. at 148:16-149:1. Dr. Blalock’s admitted failure to consider the
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`knowledge of the POSA at the time of the invention renders his opinions unreliable and potentially
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`inadmissible, but at the very least factually disputed. Hologic, 884 F.3d at 1364.
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`Last, RJR argues that “[e]ven if the [Parent Application] could support a claim to a
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`narrower interpretation of ‘flexible conductive membrane,’ it cannot support the ‘flexible
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`conductive membrane’ as claimed in the ’374 Patent because the scope of that term was broadened
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`by the new matter added in the specification of the ’374 Patent.” RJR Br. at 15-16. RJR contends
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`that the Parent Application “does not support a claim to a conductive membrane made of soft
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`plastic like PPS—rather than metal.” Id. RJR is wrong for three reasons.
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`First, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[a]n applicant is not required to describe in
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`the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.” Cordis
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`Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Tobinick
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`v. Olmarker, 753 F.3d 1220, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“application need only reasonably convey to
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`one skilled in the art that Tobinick had possession of at least one embodiment”). Instead, “[a]
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`specification may, within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1, contain a written description of
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`a broadly
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`claimed
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`invention without describing
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`all
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`species
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`that
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`[the]
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`claim
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`encompasses.” Cordis, 339 F.3d at 1365 (citation omitted). Thus, the Parent Application does not
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`need to identify every conceivable material that could be used to construct the “flexible conductive
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`membrane.”
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`Second, to the extent RJR contends that the Parent Application does not disclose a
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`membrane made entirely of plastic, that is irrelevant. The limitation at issue is a “flexible
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`conductive membrane.” By contrast, a membrane made entirely of plastic is not conductive.
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`
`
`8
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 16 of 39 PageID# 18811
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`Indeed, the ’374 Patent discloses “metalized soft and resilient plastic materials such as a PPS.”
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`RJR (misleadingly) omits the language in bold. See, e.g., RJR Br. at 16.
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`Third, RJR misstates what the Parent Application discloses. It discloses, for example, a
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`“metallic sheet” and “resilient metallic membrane.” RJR Ex. D at 7:4-7, 7:22-8:4. As Mr.
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`McAlexander explains,
`
`
`
`
`
` A POSA would have known that a “resilient metallic membrane” includes
`
`those made of a flexible plastic material coated with metal. Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶ 584. Indeed, Dr.
`
`Blalock, himself, relies on prior art references that disclose a “flexible conductive membrane”
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`made of such material.3 Accordingly, a POSA reading the Parent Application would readily
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`understand that the inventor possessed a “flexible conductive membrane” made of a soft plastic
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`material coated with metal at the time of his invention.
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`RJR relies solely on PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008) to argue that “claims encompassing the new matter lose the priority date of the earlier
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`application even if that application would support a narrower version of the claim.” RJR Br. at
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`14. PowerOasis is inapposite. There, the original application described a vending machine with
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`a “display” or “user interface.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1307. The later-filed application added
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`language describing a “customer interface” located remotely from the vending machine, such as
`
`on a user’s laptop. Id. The Federal Circuit found that the original application did not adequately
`
`disclose a “customer interface” because there was “no disclosure in the Original Application of a
`
`
`3 Ex. 4 at 3:36-39 (“[p]referably, the metalized membrane 203 is comprised of a flexible
`aluminized Mylar [i.e., a plastic material].”); Ex. 5 at 3:39-44 (“[t]he diaphragm is of a non
`conductive plastic material such as polycarbonate . . . [and] is metalized with a material such a[s]
`nickel . . . .”); see also Ex. 3 at 198:8-22.
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`9
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 17 of 39 PageID# 18812
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`user interface that is either located on a customer’s laptop or even separate from the vending
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`machine itself.” Id. at 1308-09. The court did not credit “PowerOasis’s conclusory expert
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`declaration” because the expert did not “show anywhere in the Original Application where a
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`customer interface is located on a customer’s laptop either expressly or inherently.” Id. at 1308-
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`10. Here, by contrast, Mr. McAlexander points to numerous disclosures in the Parent Application
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`and opines in detail how such disclosures convey to a POSA that the inventor possessed the
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`claimed “flexible conductive membrane,” including a membrane made of a soft plastic material
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`coated with metal. Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 578-87; Ex. 1 at 229:17-233:13, 235:11-240:21, 241:19-24,
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`243:15-244:12.
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`B.
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`RJR Has Not Met Its Burden Of Showing That The VUSE Solo Anticipates
`The Asserted Claims Of The ’374 Patent
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`If the Court denies RJR’s motion as to the priority date of the asserted claims, then there is
`
`no dispute that the VUSE Solo is not prior art and does not anticipate the asserted claims of the
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`’374 Patent. RJR Ex. F ¶ 285; Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 595-96. But even if the asserted claims have the
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`later July 7, 2015 priority date (they do not), RJR has not met its burden of showing that the VUSE
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`Solo device that was purportedly sold in the United States more than one year prior to July 7, 2015
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`anticipates the asserted claims.
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`RJR provides only attorney argument for its assertion that the VUSE Solo it contends was
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`sold prior to the filing of the ’374 Patent and the Accused VUSE Solo are the same. See RJR’s
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`Purported SUF 4. RJR’s expert, Dr. Blalock, curiously provided no opinion or analysis to support
`
`that assertion. RJR Ex. F ¶¶ 283-85, 300-01; Dkt. No. 694-6 ¶¶ 597-98. And Mr. McAlexander’s
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`report does not support RJR’s assertion because it addresses infringement by the VUSE Solo that
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`was sold after the ’374 Patent was granted in September 2019. RJR has a gaping failure of proof
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`that VUSE Solo is prior art regardless of the filing date afforded the ’374 Patent.
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`
`
`10
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 729 Filed 06/16/21 Page 18 of 39 PageID# 18813
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`NO SUMMARY