throbber
Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 1 of 21 PageID# 28765
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND
`R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs and
`Counterclaim Defendants,
`
`v.
`
`
`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA INC.; and PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants and
`Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
`
`
`
`Case No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PMI/ALTRIA’S OPPOSITION TO RJR’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`THE TESTIMONY OF STACY EHRLICH
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 2 of 21 PageID# 28766
`
`
` TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Ms. Ehrlich Is Undisputedly Qualified To Testify As An FDA Expert ..................2
`
`Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions In This Case .......................................................................3
`
`The Development Of E-Cigarette Laws And Regulations ......................................3
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 702 ............4
`
`Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Based On Experiential Expertise ...................5
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions Are Reliable And Will Help The Jury ...............................6
`
`Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions Are Not Speculative ..........................................................9
`
`Ms. Ehrlich Does Not Offer Legal Opinions .........................................................12
`
`Ms. Ehrlich Does Not Offer Opinions On “Extraneous Topics” ...........................14
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................15
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 3 of 21 PageID# 28767
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Aloe Vera of Am. Inc. v. United States,
`No. 99-cv-01794, 2014 WL 3072981(D. Ariz. July 7, 2014) ..................................................... 6
`
`Am. Academy of Pediatrics v. FDA,
`No. PWG-18-883, Mem. (May 15, 2019) ................................................................................. 14
`
`Audio MPEG, Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-73, Dkt. 830 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2017) ...................................................................... 9
`
`Belville v. Ford Motor Co.,
`919 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................... 11
`
`Bockelman v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
`No. 10-cv-1001, 2011 WL 5180382 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011) .................................................... 6
`
`Crouch v. John Jewell Aircraft, Inc.,
`No. 07-cv-638, 2016 WL 157464 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2016) ...................................................... 8
`
`De Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P’ship,
`No. 16-cv-563, 2017 WL 4509869 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2017) ............................................. 6, 7, 8
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`764 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d, 700 F. 3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................. 9
`
`Estate of Lance ex rel. Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist.,
`No. 11-cv-00032, 2012 WL 1668198 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2012) ............................................... 5
`
`In re Zetia,
`No. 2:18-md-2836, 2021 WL 6690348 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2021) .......................................... 6, 7
`
`Kirksey v. Schindler Elevator Corp.,
`No. 15-cv-0115, 2016 WL 5213928 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 2016) ................................................. 5
`
`Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
`526 U.S. 137 (1999) .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Mobility Workx, LLC v. Cellco P’ship,
`2019 WL 5721814 (E.D. Tex. 2019) ................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`Poly-Am., Inc. v. Serrot Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 300-cv-1457, 2002 WL 1996561 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2002) .............................................. 6
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 4 of 21 PageID# 28768
`
`Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc.,
`22 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2013) ............................................................................................ 7
`
`Shire Viropharma Inc. v. CSL Behring LLC,
`No. 17-cv-414, 2021 WL 1227097 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2021) ..................................................... 10
`
`The Harvester, Inc. v. Rule Joy Trammell + Rubio, LLC,
`No. 09-CV-358, 2010 WL 2653373 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2010)...................................................... 5
`
`Touchcom, Inc. v. Berreskin & Parr,
`No. 7-cv-114, 2010 WL 4393282 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010) ................................................. 5, 11
`
`Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. ex rel. Palumbo v. Volunteers of Am. Ky., Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-301, 2012 WL 3610250 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2012) .................................................... 8
`
`U.S. v. Wilson,
`484 F 3d 267 (4th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................... 5, 7, 8
`
`United States v. Barile,
`286 F. 3d 749 (4th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................. 12, 13
`
`United States v. Mallory,
`988 F. 3d 730 (4th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................................... 11
`
`United States v. Offill,
`666 F. 3d 168 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................................ 12, 13, 14
`
`VS Techs., LLC v. Twitter, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-43, 2011 WL 4744572 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) ...................................................... 8
`
`Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB,
`178 F. 3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co.,
`No. 13-cv-1192, 2016 WL 5349093 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2016) ............................................... 6, 11
`
`Zak v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-13437, 2021 WL 4481588 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2021) .......................................... 12
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`21 U.S.C. § 387 ............................................................................................................................... 4
`
`FED. R. EVID. 702 .............................................................................................................. 4, 5, 8, 14
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 5 of 21 PageID# 28769
`
`
`I.
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Court should deny RJR’s motion to exclude the opinions of PMI/Altria’s regulatory
`
`expert, Stacy Ehrlich. None of RJR’s four arguments provides a basis for exclusion.
`
`First, Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are supported by a reliable methodology and based on
`
`sufficient facts and data. She anchors her opinions in her experiential expertise from decades of
`
`work before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), relevant materials on which others
`
`in her field reasonably rely, input from PMI/Altria’s technical experts, and extensive record
`
`evidence. In light of the specialized e-cigarette industry at issue in this case, Ms. Ehrlich’s
`
`testimony is essential to help the jury understand what RJR describes as FDA’s “complex
`
`regulatory scheme.” Dkt. 825 at 6.
`
`
`
`Second, Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are not speculative, far from it. RJR’s contrary arguments
`
`seek to impose requirements on Ms. Ehrlich’s testimony that contradict the law. For example, Ms.
`
`Ehrlich is not required to know FDA’s state of mind or be able to predict its actions. Nor is she
`
`required to quantify the value RJR receives from using PMI/Altria’s patented technology. At most,
`
`RJR’s criticisms go to weight, not admissibly, and are not grounds for exclusion.
`
`
`
`Third, Ms. Ehrlich does not offer legal opinions. The opinions that RJR seeks to exclude
`
`are FDA’s own characterizations of e-cigarettes or observations about the landscape of tobacco
`
`product regulation and related industry practices.
`
`
`
`Fourth, Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are highly probative to multiple damages issues and,
`
`contrary to RJR’s argument, do not encompass “extraneous topics.” Mot. at 1. Since RJR’s
`
`argument merely rehashes the meritless positions that RJR advances in its Motion in Limine Nos.
`
`1-3, and 11 (Dkts. 825, 870), these arguments should be rejected for the reasons set forth in
`
`PMI/Altria’s oppositions to those motions.
`
`Ms. Ehrlich is undisputedly qualified, and her opinions are reliable, relevant, and will help
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 21 PageID# 28770
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 21 PagelD# 28770
`
`the jury decide hotly disputed issuesat trial. Thus, RJR’s motion should be denied.
`
`Il.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Ms. Ehrlich Is Undisputedly Qualified To Testify As An FDA Expert
`
`RJR does not challenge Ms. Ehrlich’s qualifications, nor could it. Ms. Ehrlich is a Harvard-
`
`trained lawyer with more than twenty-five years of experience in FDA regulation. Ex. A (Ehrlich
`
`Op.) 9 5-6. She has counseled numerousclients, including the Coalition of Independent Tobacco
`
`Manufacturers of America with which she worked to negotiate the small business provisions of
`
`the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”). Jd. § 7. Her FDA experience
`
`is extensive, encompassing rulemaking, guidance development,Po
`
`NS0 Eich Dep) «
`
`44:20-45:21; Ex. E (Ehrlich ITC Test.) at 1403:13-1404:10-11. Ms. Ehrlich experience provides
`
`unique insight into FDA’s policies and actions through cumulative exposure to confidential
`
`communications with FDA on behalf of clients.
`
`Ms.Ehrlich has served on the Board of Directors of the Food and Drug Law Institute and
`
`has consistently been ranked in The Best Lawyers in America© and Super Lawyers© for her FDA
`
`know-how. Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) § 8; Ex. B (Ehrlich Webpage). She regularly lectures on tobacco
`
`product regulation, tackling such subjects as PMT compliance and youth use of e-cigarettes. Ex.
`
`A (Ehrlich Op.) § 8; Ex. B (Ehrlich Webpage). She also has authored chapters in FDA-related
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 7 of 21 PageID# 28771
`
`books, such as Food and Drug Law & Regulation, How to Work with the FDA and Insights into
`
`Working with FDA: Takeaways and Experiential Tips. Ex. B (Ehrlich Webpage).
`
`B. Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions In This Case
`
`In this case, Ms. Ehrlich opines that RJR derives particular regulatory benefits from its
`
`infringement of the Asserted Patents because this technology strengthens RJR’s pending PMTAs
`
`and prospective MRTPAs for the accused VUSE e-cigarettes (“Accused Products”). Ex. A
`
`(Ehrlich Op.) ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. D (Ehrlich Dep.) 99:23-100:4, 103:2-105:8, 204:14-205:21.
`
`There can be no credible dispute that PMT authorization is extremely valuable (really,
`
`commercially essential) to RJR.
`
` Ex. F (Mody ITC Rpt.) at 99.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ITC Dep.) at 49:4-52:3.
`
` Ex. G (Figlar
`
`
`
` See, e.g., Ex. H (Aug. 2021 FDA
`
`PR); Ex. I (Figlar ITC Tr.) 99:11-16, 100:8-13. Should that occur, RJR would forego
`
`
`
` potential revenue. Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) ¶¶ 3-4; see Ex. J (Meyer Op.) ¶ 486.
`
`The Development Of E-Cigarette Laws And Regulations
`
`C.
`
`The “Deeming Rule,” effective on August 8, 2016, gave FDA regulatory authority over e-
`
`
`
`cigarettes under the TCA and required that each e-cigarette earn PMT authorization before it can
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 8 of 21 PageID# 28772
`
`be legally sold in the United States. 81 Fed. Reg. at 28975-76 (May 10, 2016); 21 U.S.C.
`
`§ 387a(b). Consequently, as FDA has explained, all e-cigarettes on sale as of August 8, 2016,
`
`were instantly rendered illegal. See Ex. K (Apr. 2020 FDA Guidance) at -4128. To blunt this
`
`harsh effect, FDA unveiled a compliance policy whereby companies could continue to sell any e-
`
`cigarettes already on the U.S. market as of August 8, 2016, until a specified deadline for submitting
`
`PMTAs. 81 Fed. Reg. at 28977-80. This policy, however, “did not confer lawful marketing status
`
`on new tobacco products being marketed without the necessary premarket authorization.”2 Ex. K
`
`(Apr. 2020 FDA Guidance) at -4122.
`
`
`
`PMT authorization has proven extremely difficult to earn. Out of millions of PMTAs
`
`reviewed, FDA has only authorized one e-cigarette, the VUSE Solo, and only partially – granting
`
`applications for tobacco-flavored VUSE Solos, but issuing ten marketing denial orders for other
`
`flavors of that model. Ex. L (FDA Slides) at 11, 14; Ex. M (Clissold Dep.) 36:3-6.
`
`
`
`
`
` See Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.)
`
`¶¶ 143-144; Ex. N (Clissold Rbt.) ¶¶ 29-31; Ex. M (Clissold Dep.) 38:17-39:2.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`A.
`
`Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 702
`
`Expert testimony may be admitted if:
`
`(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
`trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
`testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of
`reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the
`principles and methods to the facts of the case.
`
`FED. R. EVID. 702.
`
`
`2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 9 of 21 PageID# 28773
`
`
`
`Daubert provides “a “flexible” framework for evaluating expert opinions and, accordingly,
`
`the Court has “considerable leeway in deciding . . . how to go about determining whether particular
`
`expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). “Where
`
`the expert’s qualifications are challenged, the test for exclusion is a strict one, and the purported
`
`expert must have neither satisfactory knowledge, skill, experience, training nor education on the
`
`issue for which the opinion is proffered.” The Harvester, Inc. v. Rule Joy Trammell + Rubio, LLC,
`
`No. 09-CV-358, 2010 WL 2653373, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2010). To be admissible, “[a] court
`
`need not determine that the expert testimony . . . is irrefutable or certainly correct.” Touchcom,
`
`Inc. v. Berreskin & Parr, No. 7-cv-114, 2010 WL 4393282, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010). In
`
`sum, “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” FED. R. EVID. 702
`
`advisory committee notes (2000 amendments).
`
`B.
`
`Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Based On Experiential Expertise
`
`Like many testifying experts, Ms. Ehrlich’s expertise is grounded in her professional
`
`experience. Because “Daubert principles do not bar an expert’s opinion as unreliable merely
`
`because it is grounded in personal knowledge or experience,” the use of experiential experts is
`
`widely accepted. Kirksey v. Schindler Elevator Corp., No. 15-cv-0115, 2016 WL 5213928, at *3
`
`(S.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 2016); see U.S. v. Wilson, 484 F 3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2007). Indeed, “[a]
`
`witness’ experience, studies and education, combined with a review of the relevant materials can
`
`provide a reliable basis for expert testimony.” Estate of Lance ex rel. Lance v. Lewisville Indep.
`
`Sch. Dist., No. 11-cv-00032, 2012 WL 1668198, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2012). The Fourth
`
`Circuit has recognized that, “although ‘[e]xperiential expert testimony . . . does not rely on
`
`anything like a scientific method,’ such testimony is admissible under Rule 702.” The Harvester,
`
`Inc., 2010 WL 2653373, at *2. The experiential witness must simply “explain how [his]
`
`experience leads to the conclusion reached, why [his] experience is a sufficient basis for the
`5
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 10 of 21 PageID# 28774
`
`opinion, and how [his] experience is reliably applied to the facts.” De Reyes v. Waples Mobile
`
`Home Park Ltd. P’ship, No. 16-cv-563, 2017 WL 4509869, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2017); see In
`
`re Zetia, No. 2:18-md-2836, 2021 WL 6690348, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2021). Where, as here,
`
`an experiential expert is providing opinions relevant to damages, they are “not required to
`
`quantitatively assess the impact upon damages for [the] underlying summary to be reliable.” Aloe
`
`Vera of Am. Inc. v. United States, No. 99-cv-01794, 2014 WL 3072981, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 7,
`
`2014); see Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., No. 13-cv-1192, 2016 WL 5349093, at *9 (D.S.C.
`
`Sept. 26, 2016).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`RJR provides no viable basis on which to grant its motion. Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are
`
`reliable and apply her experiential expertise to a sound methodology to reach opinions that are
`
`closely tied to the facts of this case. She offers no legal opinions, but rather identifies and applies
`
`policies and conclusions FDA has made and communicated. And she does not opine on
`
`“extraneous topics,” but explains how RJR derives added regulatory value from infringing the
`
`Asserted Patents, which will help the jury assess the appropriate royalty damages.
`
`A. Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions Are Reliable And Will Help The Jury
`
`RJR contends that Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions should be excluded because they are purportedly
`
`unreliable and not based on sufficient facts or data. Mot. at 7-12. Both arguments lack merit.
`
`First, RJR’s argument that Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are unreliable because she somehow
`
`“lacks personal knowledge” of “the methodology used by the FDA in issuing a PMTA
`
`authorization” is legally and factually baseless. Mot. at 8, 13-14. “[I]t is clearly the case that an
`
`expert opinion need not be based on personal knowledge.” Bockelman v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 10-
`
`cv-1001, 2011 WL 5180382, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011); see Poly-Am., Inc. v. Serrot Int’l, Inc.,
`
`No. 300-cv-1457, 2002 WL 1996561, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2002) (holding that an expert
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 11 of 21 PageID# 28775
`
`did not need to have personal knowledge about the practices of the companies on which he was
`
`opining for his opinions to be admissible).
`
`Instead, Ms. Ehrlich draws on her decades of FDA work
`
`
`
` complements that experience with a fulsome evaluation of documentary evidence on
`
`which experts in her field would reasonably rely, and then applies that knowledge and analysis to
`
`the record evidence. See Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) ¶¶ 7-8, 57, 86-126, 167-173; Ex. D (Ehrlich Dep.)
`
`37:14-24, 39:22-40:13, 44:20-45:21. The use of experiential experts like Ms. Ehrlich is a widely
`
`accepted practice. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wilson, 484 F 3d at 274; Zetia, 2021 WL 6690348, at *6; De
`
`Reyes, 2017 WL 4509869, at *2.
`
`Second, RJR’s argument that Ms. Ehrlich’s “methodology is not reliable” because she
`
`allegedly “did not take into account pertinent facts and data” should be rejected. Mot. at 8. “[A]n
`
`expert’s reliance on some facts but not others is not always cause to exclude such testimony under
`
`Daubert” because “it is not the district court’s role under Daubert to evaluate the correctness of
`
`facts underlying an expert’s testimony.” Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 22 F. Supp.
`
`3d 585, 596 (E.D. Va. 2013). Regardless, Ms. Ehrlich considered all of the relevant facts, and
`
`none of the “pertinent facts” that RJR identifies shows that her methodology is unreliable.
`
`For example, RJR argues that Ms. Ehrlich did not review “the technical aspects of [RJR’s]
`
`PMTAs or the asserted patent claims.” Mot. at 2. No surprise. Ms. Ehrlich is a regulatory expert
`
`on FDA-related issues. See supra § II(A). She is not a technical expert and thus did not analyze
`
`the technical aspects of any issue in this case. Instead, she relied on PMI/Altria’s technical experts
`
`for her understanding of certain technical issues relevant to her opinions. Ex. D (Ehrlich Dep.)
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 12 of 21 PageID# 28776
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 12 of 21 PagelD# 28776
`
`10:3-13, 39:22-40:2, 42:25. Mot. at 8-9. Thisis entirely proper.’ See, e.g., Crouch v. John Jewell
`
`Aircraft, Inc., No. 07-cv-638, 2016 WL 157464, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2016); Travelers Cas.
`
`Ins. Co. ofAm. ex rel. Palumbo v. Volunteers ofAm. Ky., Inc., No. 10-cv-301, 2012 WL 3610250,
`
`at *6 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2012).
`
`As the Fourth Circuit has explained, there are “meaningful differences in how reliability
`
`must be examined with respect to expert testimony that is primarily experiential in nature as
`
`opposedto scientific.” U.S. v. Wilson, 484 F. 3d at 274. Although experiential expert testimony
`
`“does not rely on anything like a scientific method,” Federal Rule of Evidence 702 specifically
`
`contemplates that an expert may be qualified on his/her experiences, along with other knowledge,
`
`skill, training, or education. Jd. The expert simply must explain how his/her experiencesserve as
`
`a sufficient basis for the opinions offered, how that experience leads to the conclusions reached,
`
`and how he/she applied that experience to the facts of the case. Jd. Ms. Ehrlich has done exactly
`
`that, and, thus, her testimony fulfills the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.4 See §§
`
`II(A)-(B), II, supra. At most, the scope of Ms. Ehrlich’s review is a matter for cross-examination
`
`that goes to weight, not admissibility. See, e.g., De Reves, 2017 WL 4509869,at *2; VS Techs.,
`
`LLC v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-43, 2011 WL 4744572, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
`
`3 Unsurprisingly, RJR’s non-technical experts did the same. See, e.g.,
`
`
`
`4 RJR argues that Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions regarding RJR’s MRTPAsare unreliable, absent an
`analysis as to “how the patented technology may be addressed.” Mot. at 15. As discussed, Ms.
`Ehrlich need not provide any technical analysis for her opinions to be reliable. Moreover, her
`MRTPA-related opinionsare not speculative because she: (1) considered the patented technology
`(using input from PMI/Altria’s technical experts); (2) is undisputedly familiar with MRTP
`
`
`requirements; (3) understands that MRTPA and PMTAanalysis have similarities; and (4) has
`reviewed RJR 30(b)(6)
`testimon
`
`See Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) 4 167-173.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 13 of 21 PageID# 28777
`
`The cases RJR relies on are inapposite. See Mot. at 9, 11. In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi
`
`AB, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the admission of a medical expert’s testimony, finding that his
`
`“alleged failure to account for all possible alternative causes” of the patient’s problems did not
`
`render his opinions untrustworthy, invalid, or inadmissible. 178 F. 3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 1999).
`
`In Audio MPEG, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., the court excluded a technical expert’s opinion because, “[a]side
`
`from listing the patents reviewed and briefly describing them,” the expert set out “no further facts
`
`or data.” No. 15-cv-73, Dkt. 830 at 16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2017). And in ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson
`
`Software, Inc., the court excluded a damages expert’s royalty opinions because they were based
`
`on questionable, minimally probative documents using speculative calculations “without
`
`explaining at all” how he reached his conclusions. 764 F. Supp. 2d 807, 815 (E.D. Va. 2011),
`
`aff’d, 700 F. 3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In contrast, Ms. Ehrlich relies on her experiential expertise,
`
`input from PMI/Altria’s technical experts, and extensive record evidence—all of which she
`
`reliably applied to the facts of the case. Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) at Ex. 2. This is precisely the type of
`
`analysis that the experts in RJR’s cases failed to undertake.
`
`B. Ms. Ehrlich’s Opinions Are Not Speculative
`
`RJR contends that Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are speculative. Mot. at 12-16. RJR is wrong,
`
`and, again, its criticisms go to the weight of her opinions, not their admissibility.
`
`First, the Court should reject RJR’s argument that Ms. Ehrlich’s limited use of the word
`
`“may” in her report somehow “confirms that her opinions are speculative.” Mot. at 13. RJR omits
`
`that, in every single paragraph of Ms. Ehrlich’s report that RJR cites,
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. A (Ehrlich Op.) ¶¶ 86, 98, 102, 104, 109, 111, 115, 118, 124; see
`
`id. ¶ 130
`
`
`
` In addition,
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 14 of 21 PageID# 28778
`
`(Ehrlich Dep.) 98:13-18, 100:24-101:2, 103:13-17, 105:3-8, 111:9-20, 133:15-21, 137:12-138:2,
`
`
`
` Id. ¶ 85; Ex. D
`
`138:22-139:19, 145:2-11, 159:3-16; see Shire Viropharma, 2021 WL 1227097, at *5.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Second, RJR argues that Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are speculative because she does not
`
`“know exactly what FDA considers” or how “FDA would view the patented technology.” Mot. at
`
`13. This argument invites legal error. It would effectively force Ms. Ehrlich to opine on FDA’s
`
`state of mind or guarantee FDA’s course of action, which, as RJR itself has argued to this Court,
`
`would be improper. Dkt. 885 at 18 (“Courts uniformly hold that expert testimony about … state
`
`of mind is inadmissible.”). RJR cites no case requiring Ms. Ehrlich to “know exactly what FDA
`
`considers” for her opinions to be admissible. None exists. Cf. Shire Viropharma Inc. v. CSL
`
`Behring LLC, No. 17-cv-414, 2021 WL 1227097, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2021) (“It is well settled
`
`that experts may not provide testimony concerning the ‘state of mind’ … of defendants,
`
`corporations, regulatory agencies, and others.”).
`
`Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions properly reflect her experience, reliance on technical experts where
`
`appropriate, and analysis of relevant record evidence. See, e.g., Ex. D (Ehrlich Dep.) at 74:5-11,
`
`75:17-20. That she cannot and will not speak on behalf of FDA does not render her opinions ipse
`
`dixit; it affirms their reliability. See Mot. at 8. Grounded in her personal extensive experience,
`
`and informed by her analysis of the record evidence in this case, Ms. Ehrlich will describe the
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 15 of 21 PageID# 28779
`
`regulatory benefits RJR receives from its infringement of the Asserted Patents due to that
`
`technology’s importance in PMT authorization for the Accused Products.
`
`The cases RJR relies on are easily distinguished. In United States v. Mallory, the Fourth
`
`Circuit affirmed the exclusion of an expert’s testimony “because her opinion did not rest on
`
`sufficient facts or data.” 988 F. 3d 730, 742 (4th Cir. 2021). And in Belville v. Ford Motor Co.,
`
`the Fourth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of an expert’s testing method that was “purely
`
`theoretical,” “did not reflect real-world results,” and had previously been “rejected by NASA and
`
`NHTSA.” 919 F.3d 224, 234 (4th Cir. 2019). In contrast, Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are firmly
`
`grounded in voluminous facts and data from the record evidence, and informed by her decades of
`
`experience and relevant industry materials. See § II(A), supra. And her analytical methodology
`
`and approach have not been rejected by FDA or other agencies.
`
`Third, Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions are not speculative merely because she does not quantify the
`
`benefit that RJR derives from infringing the Asserted Patents. See Mot. at 14-16. “There is nothing
`
`in Daubert that requires an expert to rely on a quantifiable theory.” Wickersham, 2016 WL
`
`5349093, at *9. This is particularly true where, as here, an experiential expert is providing opinions
`
`that explain how and why that the infringer’s use of the patented technology is valuable, and then
`
`a qualified damages expert uses those opinions as one input into in his royalty calculation. In such
`
`an analysis, “the law remains clear; mathematical precision in royalty calculations is not required.”
`
`Mobility Workx, LLC v. Cellco P’ship, 2019 WL 5721814, at *16 (E.D. Tex. 2019); see Touchcom,
`
`2010 WL 4393282, at *4 (admitting testimony from an experiential expert on valuation of patented
`
`technology without requiring a specific percentage of value).5 Regardless, disputes about alleged
`
`
`5 RJR’s kitchen sink arguments include attacking the reasonable royalty analysis of Paul Meyer,
`PMI/Altria’s damages expert. See Mot. 15. Such arguments are irrelevant to this motion and
`11
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 16 of 21 PageID# 28780
`
`“arbitrary value assignments are better left to cross examination.” Mobility Workx, 2019 WL
`
`5721814, at *16; accord Zak v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-cv-13437, 2021 WL 4481588, at *3 (E.D.
`
`Mich. Sept. 30, 2021) (“[D]isputes with an expert’s conclusion apportioning relative value among
`
`patents in a transaction go to the weight that should be afforded an expert’s opinion, not its
`
`admissibility.”).
`
`C. Ms. Ehrlich Does Not Offer Legal Opinions
`
`RJR contends that Ms. Ehrlich offers legal opinions. Mot. at 16-17. She does not. RJR’s
`
`argument rests on the false premise that, because Ms. Ehrlich’s opinions relate to an admittedly
`
`“complex regulatory scheme,” they must be legal in nature. Dkt. 825 at 6. Not so. As the Fourth
`
`Circuit has held, in cases where “the legal regime is complex and . . . testimony would be helpful
`
`in explaining it to the jury, the testimony may be admitted.” United States v. Offill, 666 F. 3d 168,
`
`175 (4th Cir. 2011) (permitting expert testimony on the specialized regime of U.S. Securities and
`
`Exchange Commission). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has affirmed the admissibility of expert
`
`testimony addressing FDA’s premarket approval process for medical devices, which is similar to
`
`FDA’s PMT and MRTP authorization processes at issue in this case. See United States v. Barile,
`
`286 F. 3d 749, 761 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Opinion testimony on whether the data submitted [to FDA]
`
`in a 510(k) submission were reasonable would not merely state a legal conclusion and therefore is
`
`not excludable on the ground that it invades the province of the jury.”). Here, as in Offill, Ms.
`
`Ehrlich’s “specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence” and
`
`should be allowed. 666 F.3d at 175.6
`
`
`incorrect for the reasons explained in the opposition to RJR’s motion to exclude his opinions. See
`Dkt. 892.
`6 Even if the handful of statements that RJR points to are legal conclusions (and they are not), the
`Fourth Circuit has recognized that courts have “consistently” admitted such testimony where, as
`12
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 17 of 21 PageID# 28781
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 1017 Filed 02/11/22 Page 17 of 21 PagelD# 28781
`
`None of RJR’s arguments shows otherwise. For example,PO
`
`SSii 2crecitationofEDA’s long
`
`standing conclusion, using FDA’s own terminology. See, e.g., Ex. P (FDA Sharpless Statement)
`
`at 6 (testifying before Congress that no e-cigarette “in the United States is on the marketlegally”):
`
`Ex. K (Apr. 2020 FDA Guidance) at -4121 (“[I]it is illegal to market any new tobacco product
`
`without premarket authorization.”);’ Ex. R (Jan. 2020 Azar Statement) (“HHS is taking a
`
`comprehensive, aggressive approach to enforcing the law passed by Congress, under which noe-
`
`cigarettes are currently on the market legally.”).Pe
`
`Po RJR fails to articulate any basis to support its superficial mischaracterization
`
`of Ms. Ehrlich’s undisputed factual recitation of FDA’s statement of policy. Mot. at 16-17.
`
`Likewise, Ms. Ehlch’s pinion regne
`I© See F<. (sich Op)
`
`here, the issues involve “highly technical legal issues”or “‘a specialized industry.” Offill, 666 F.3d
`at 175; see Barile, 286 F.3d at 760 n.7.
`7 “New tobacco products”are “those that were not commercially marketed in the United States as
`of Febru

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket