Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 1 of 15
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 6:21-cv-00520-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`PARKERVISION, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`v.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT LG ELECTRONICS, INC.’S
`OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE GILLILAND’S
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 2 of 15
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`OBJECTIONS..................................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Storage Terms (Term 1) .......................................................................................... 2
`
`Terms From The Prior Litigations (Terms 3-15, 18-30) ........................................ 8
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 3 of 15
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND DOCKET CITATIONS
`Abbreviation
`Description
`
`LG Electronics Inc.
`ParkerVision, Inc.
`LGE’s Opening Claim Construction Brief
`
`LGE
`ParkerVision
`LGE’s Opening
`Brief
`’706 patent
`’518 patent
`’902 patent
`’444 patent
`’835 patent
`’725 patent
`’513 patent
`’528 patent
`’736 patent
`’673 patent
`Asserted Patents
`
`Intel 108 CC Or.
`
`Intel 562 CC Or.
`
`Docket
`No.
`
`
`
`Dkt. 31
`
`Dkt. 32
`Dkt. 32-1
`Dkt. 32-2
`Dkt. 32-3
`Dkt. 32-4
`Dkt. 32-5
`Dkt. 32-6
`Dkt. 32-7
`Dkt. 32-8
`Dkt. 32-9
`
`
`Dkt. 32-11
`
`Dkt. 32-12
`
`Dkt. 32-14
`
`Dkt. 32-15
`
`Dkt. 32-16
`Dkt. 32-17
`Dkt. 37
`Dkt. 54
`
`Dkt. 55
`
`
`
`
`
`Dkt. 32-13 TCL/Hisense
`Special
`Master’s Rec. CC
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,049,706 to Cook et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 6,266,518 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 6,580,902 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 7,292,835 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 8,588,725 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 8,660,513 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 9,118,528 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 9,246,736 to Sorrells et al.
`U.S. Patent No. 9,444,673 to Sorrells et al.
`The ’706, ’518, ’902, ’444, ’835,’725,’513, ’528,’736,’673
`patents
`Claim Construction Order in ParkerVision, Inc. v. Intel
`Corp., No. 6:20-cv-00108, Dkt. No. 75 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
`26, 2021)
`Amended Claim Construction Order, ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`Intel Corp., No. 6:20-cv-00562, Dkt. No. 66 (W.D. Tex.
`Oct. 22, 2021)
`Special Master’s Recommended Claim Constructions,
`ParkerVision, Inc. v. Hisense Co., No. 6:20-cv-00870,
`Dkt. No. 51 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2021); Special Master’s
`Recommended Claim Constructions, ParkerVision, Inc. v.
`TCL Indus. Holdings Co., No. 6:20-cv-00945, Dkt. No. 49
`(W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2021)
`Final Written Decision, Intel Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc.,
`IPR2020-01265, Pap. 44 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2022)
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response, Farmwald v.
`ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2014-00948, Pap. 7 (P.T.A.B.
`Sept. 24, 2014)
`U.S. Patent No. 6,061,551 to Sorrells et al.
`’551 patent
`U.S. Patent No. 6,370,371 to Sorrells et al.
`’371 patent
`LGE’s Reply Brief LGE’s Reply Claim Construction Brief
`Markman Hearing Markman Hearing Transcript of Proceedings held on May
`10, 2022
`Magistrate Judge Gilliland’s Claim Construction Order
`and Memorandum in Support Thereof
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`’444 FWD
`
`IPR2014-00948
`POPR
`
`Order
`
`POSITA
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 4 of 15
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Electrolyte Techs. LLC v. Samsung SDI Co.,
`No. A:17-CV-0030-LY, 2018 WL 2770648 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2018) ....................................6
`
`Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc.,
`501 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................4
`
`Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`915 F. 3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019)...................................................................................................3
`
`Fairfield Indus., Inc. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc.,
`No. 4:14-CV-2972, 2015 WL 1034275 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) ......................................6, 7
`
`GREE, Inc. v. Supercell Oy,
`No. 2:19-CV-00071-JRG-RSP, 2020 WL 2476497 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2020) ........................6
`
`In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
`496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`In re Imes,
`778 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................3
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................3
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`731 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................3
`
`Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
`133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................4
`
`Multimedia Content Mgmt. LLC v. Dish Network Corp.,
`No. 6:18-CV-00207-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2019) .............................................................6
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................4, 5, 8
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................4
`
`Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co.,
`No. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG, 2021 WL 4168660 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2021) .............................4, 5
`
`iv
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`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 5 of 15
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`Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`511 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ......................................................................................................................1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 .............................................................................................................................1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 6 of 15
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Defendant LG Electronics Inc. (“LGE”) submits the
`
`following objections to Magistrate Judge Gilliland’s Claim Construction Order and Memorandum
`
`in Support Thereof (Dkt. 55) (“Order”), construing terms of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,049,706,
`
`6,266,518, 6,580,902, 7,110,444 (“the ’444 patent”), 7,292,835, 8,588,725, 8,660,513, 9,118,528,
`
`9,246,736, and 9,444,673 (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). The Order incorrectly found that
`
`the patentee did not act as a
`
`lexicographer
`
`in defining
`
`the
`
`terms “storage
`
`modules/devices/elements” (Term No. 1), and therefore erroneously construed the terms to mean
`
`“a [device / module / element] of an energy transfer system that stores non-negligible amounts of
`
`energy from an input electromagnetic signal.” Order at 16-19, 28 (emphasis added). LGE requests
`
`that the Court adopt the construction of Term No. 1 set forth in LGE’s Markman briefing (Dkt. 31,
`
`37) and at the Markman hearing (Dkt. 54).
`
`The Order also incorrectly construed Term Nos. 3-15 and 18-30. Rather than identify the
`
`evidence supporting the constructions or any analysis of the parties’ arguments, the Order provides
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`only the Court’s construction. These findings are therefore clearly erroneous and contrary to law
`
`for the reasons in LGE’s briefing. See Dkt. 31, 37. LGE therefore requests that the Court adopt
`
`LGE’s constructions for Term Nos. 3-15 and 18-30.
`
`LGE respectfully submits that the Order includes findings that are contrary to law and
`
`clearly erroneous factual determinations. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), LGE
`
`respectfully requests an order adopting its construction for Term Nos. 1, 3-15, and 18-30.
`
`
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 7 of 15
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`II.
`
`OBJECTIONS
`
`A.
`
`Storage Terms (Term 1)
`
`Order
`“a [device / module / element] of an energy
`transfer system that stores non-negligible
`amounts
`of
`energy
`from
`an
`input
`electromagnetic signal”
`
`LGE’s Proposed Construction
`“a module that stores a non-negligible amount
`of energy from an input electromagnetic (EM)
`signal”
`
`LGE objects to the Order’s construction of Term No. 1 because it is based on an erroneous
`
`
`
`finding that the patentees did not act as their own lexicographers to expressly define the terms
`
`storage module/device/element as “[a] [module] that stores a non-negligible amount of energy
`
`from an input electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Such a finding also contradicts: (1) established
`
`Federal Circuit precedent that “refers to” in a patent specification indicates lexicography, (2) the
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`Plaintiff’s admission in a prior proceeding that the applicants acted as their own lexicographers,
`
`and (3) the PTAB’s recent final written decision from IPR2020-01265 challenging the ’444 patent
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`(Dkt. 32-14) (“the ’444 FWD”)—which is now part of the intrinsic record—where the PTAB
`
`found that the patentee’s lexicography controls the construction of this term. The Order instead
`
`permitted Plaintiff to inject the phrase “of an energy transfer system” into the construction, which
`
`was an error as a matter of law.
`
`Lexicography In The Specification. The patentee expressly defines “storage modules” in
`
`the patents:
`
`FIG. 82A illustrates an exemplary energy transfer system 8202 for down-
`converting an input EM signal 8204. The energy transfer system 8202 includes a
`switching module 8206 and a storage module illustrated as a storage capacitance
`8208. The terms storage module and storage capacitance, as used herein, are
`distinguishable from the terms holding module and holding capacitance,
`respectively. Holding modules and holding capacitances, as used above, identify
`systems that store negligible amounts of energy from an under-sampled input EM
`signal with the intent of “holding” a voltage value. Storage modules and storage
`capacitances, on the other hand, refer to systems that store non-negligible
`amounts of energy from an input EM signal.
`
`2
`
`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 8 of 15
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`Dkt. 32-1 (“’518 patent”) at 66:11-23 (emphasis added).1 Consistent with this express definition,
`
`the specifications further state that the “goal of the storage modules” is “to store non-negligible
`
`amounts of energy transferred from the EM signal.” Id. at 99:51-53.
`
`The Order first commits legal error by disregarding the patentee’s express and
`
`unambiguous intent to invoke lexicography by using “refers to” to define the “storage” terms
`
`(Term No. 1). See In re Imes, 778 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the patentee
`
`“expressly and unambiguously” defined a term by using “refers to” in the specification); Microsoft
`
`Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 731 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that “refers to” in the
`
`specification was used to define a claim term); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566
`
`F.3d 1049, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that “refers to” in the specification was used to define a
`
`claim term). “When the patentee acts as its own lexicographer, that definition governs.” Cont’l
`
`Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F. 3d 788, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019). ParkerVision’s use of “refer to” is
`
`an express and unambiguous intent to invoke lexicography, and that definition must govern the
`
`construction.
`
`The Order, however, casts aside Federal Circuit precedent and erroneously found that
`
`“based on the words ‘refers to,’ a POSITA would not only look to [the definitional] sentence to
`
`understand the meaning of [the storage terms],” but would also look to the rest of the passage to
`
`assess whether this sentence is lexicography. Order at 16. This applies the wrong legal standard.
`
`Whether a POSITA would look to other portions of the specification is irrelevant because it is not
`
`a POSITA’s understanding that governs when lexicography applies. Rather, lexicography governs
`
`if the patentee expressed a clear intent to define the claim term, even if a POSITA would have
`
`
`1 The disclosure in the ’518 patent is representative of the disclosures in the other Asserted Patents.
`See Dkt. 31 at 3.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 9 of 15
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`otherwise ascribed a different meaning to that term. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`
`1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may reveal a special definition
`
`given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess.”
`
`(emphasis added)); see also Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 501 F. App’x 965, 969-70 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (affirming a lower court’s decision construing a claim term consistent with the
`
`patentee’s lexicography, even though patentee defined the claim term contrary to its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning as understood by a POSITA).
`
`The Order further errs by searching for meaning of the terms outside of the lexicographic
`
`sentence. See Order at 17-19. “When the specification explains and defines a term used in the
`
`claims, without ambiguity or incompleteness, there is no need to search further for the meaning of
`
`the term.” Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`That is precisely the case here, and the Order should not have looked elsewhere in the specification
`
`to construe the storage terms to import the extraneous requirement that they be part of “an energy
`
`transfer system.” See Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1138
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (because “the express definition is neither ambiguous nor incomplete,” the Court
`
`“need look no further for its meaning”). The patent’s express definition of the storage terms
`
`controls, and the Order is erroneous because it construed these terms contrary to this express
`
`definition. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
`
`(“[W]here a patent applicant has elected to be his own lexicographer by providing an explicit
`
`definition in the specification for a claim term . . . the definition selected by the patent applicant
`
`controls.”); Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co., No. 2:20-cv-00337-JRG, 2021 WL 4168660, at
`
`*16-17 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2021) (rejecting “an attempt to make [a lexicographical definition]
`
`more focused on the parties’ dispute” because “any modification or rearrangement of the
`
`4
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 10 of 15
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`lexicographical definition may intentionally or unintentionally alter the scope of the term”); see
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`also ’444 FWD at 37 (“It is not appropriate to re-write a definition expressly set forth in the patent
`
`simply because an assignee complains that the definition does not focus on ‘how the technology
`
`actually works.’”).
`
`ParkerVision’s PTAB Admission. ParkerVision’s previous agreement with LGE’s
`
`proposed construction in an earlier proceeding confirms that patentee used lexicography in the
`
`specification for the storage terms. In IPR2014-00948, relying on the same express definition
`
`above from the related ’551 patent, ParkerVision argued that the term “storage module” should
`
`“be construed to mean ‘an apparatus that stores non-negligible amounts of energy from the carrier
`
`signal.’”2 Dkt. 32-15 (“IPR2014-00948 POPR”) at 21-26, 37.3 In doing so, ParkerVision
`
`unequivocally stated that the PTAB should adopt the patent’s express definition: “[t]he
`
`Specification provides an explicit definition that supports this construction” and “[t]he
`
`incorporated ’551 Specification explicitly defines a storage module and draws the distinction
`
`between storage modules and holding modules.” Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The Order, however,
`
`glosses over ParkerVision’s admission that the patentee acted as a lexicographer to define the
`
`storage terms. Order at 16-19. As this Court has noted, “the intrinsic record that this Court must
`
`
`2 IPR2014-00948 challenged U.S. Patent No. 6,370,371 (Dkt. 32-17), which is related to the ’551
`patent and the ’902 patent. In arguing that its patents “explicitly” define “storage module,”
`ParkerVision relied on material incorporated from the ’551 patent.
`3 It is irrelevant that the PTAB used the broadest reasonable interpretation standard when
`construing the term in IPR2014-00948, whereas the Court will use the Phillips standard here. Both
`standards recognize that patentees can be lexicographers and define terms themselves, and that
`definition controls under either standard. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (using the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to analyze whether “the
`specification . . . provides a definition for claim terms”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (stating “the specification may reveal a special definition given to
`a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such
`cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 11 of 15
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`consider includes the positions and statements made by the Parties to the IPR.” See Multimedia
`
`Content Mgmt. LLC v. Dish Network Corp., No. 6:18-CV-00207-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2019).
`
`The Order erred in not even considering the statements ParkerVision made in IPR2014-00948.
`
`The PTAB’s ’444 FWD. LGE acknowledges that this Court previously included the
`
`phrase “of an energy transfer system” in its prior constructions. The Court, however, did not have
`
`the benefit of the PTAB’s recent ’444 FWD, where the PTAB fully considered and rejected the
`
`same construction ParkerVision proposes here in favor of the patentee’s express definition. ’444
`
`FWD at 32, 41. The PTAB’s decision and its detailed analysis is part of the patent’s intrinsic
`
`record and can be (and should be) considered by this Court as part of its claim construction
`
`analysis. See Advanced Electrolyte Techs. LLC v. Samsung SDI Co., No. A:17-CV-0030-LY, 2018
`
`WL 2770648, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2018) (“This court’s claim construction is informed and
`
`aided by the additional evidence of the PTAB’s construction.”); GREE, Inc. v. Supercell Oy, No.
`
`2:19-CV-00071-JRG-RSP, 2020 WL 2476497, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2020) (“The Court
`
`treats patent-owner and PTAB submissions in an Inter Partes Review or Post Grant Review as
`
`intrinsic evidence.”) (emphasis added); Fairfield Indus., Inc. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 4:14-
`
`CV-2972, 2015 WL 1034275, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (holding that the PTAB’s claim
`
`construction analysis in an IPR “serves as further intrinsic evidence”). LGE respectfully submits
`
`that, with the benefit of the PTAB’s analysis, the Court should modify its prior constructions to
`
`exclude “of an energy transfer system.”
`
`In the ’444 FWD, the PTAB found the same paragraph quoted above “critical” because it
`
`“provides a lexicographic definition of the systems to which the terms refer.” ’444 FWD at 35-
`
`36. That paragraph is reproduced again below:
`
`The terms storage module and storage capacitance, as used herein, are
`distinguishable from the terms holding module and holding capacitance,
`
`6
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`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 12 of 15
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`respectively. Holding modules ... identify systems that store negligible amounts of
`energy from an under sampled input EM signal with the intent of “holding” a
`voltage value. Storage modules ... on the other hand, refer to systems that store
`non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.
`
`E.g.,’518 patent at 66:15-23 (emphasis added).
`
`Crucial to the PTAB’s decision was the fact that the “energy transfer system” was not
`
`included in the “definition of the systems to which ‘storage element’ refers.” ’444 FWD at 37-38.
`
`Instead, the key aspect to storage elements is that they store non-negligible amounts of energy (as
`
`opposed to holding elements, which store negligible amount of energy). Id. Thus, the PTAB
`
`found that “to the extent a system stores non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM
`
`signal, it would be within the scope of the express lexicographic meaning of ‘storage module’
`
`whether or not it is also an energy transfer system.” Id.
`
`The PTAB also recognized why ParkerVision wanted to limit storage elements to “energy
`
`transfer systems”—it was a transparent litigation-induced attempt to backdoor into the claim the
`
`“low impedance load” requirement that this Court has repeatedly rejected. Id. at 38 n.12. As the
`
`PTAB explained, ParkerVision’s “attempt to read ‘energy transfer’ into the meaning of ‘storage
`
`element’ is not insignificant” because it would require “read[ing] into the meaning of the claim
`
`term ... low impedance load.” Id. This Court has rejected ParkerVision’s attempt to limit the
`
`Storage Terms to “driving a low impedance load” three times and should not permit ParkerVision
`
`to backdoor this requirement under the guise of “energy transfer system.” The Order fails to
`
`consider that ParkerVision’s construction implicitly injects this “low impedance load” limitation
`
`into the claims, even though the Court has thrice rejected such an attempt.
`
`ParkerVision’s proposed “energy storage system” requirement significantly changes the
`
`scope of the claims in a manner that is unsupported by the intrinsic evidence. The Court should
`
`find, as the PTAB did, that ParkerVision acted as its own lexicographer and reject ParkerVision’s
`
`7
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 13 of 15
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`attempt to limit the Storage Terms to an energy transfer system. If the patentees intended to limit
`
`the Storage Terms to “energy transfer systems,” it was, as the PTAB stated, incumbent upon the
`
`patentees to do so, and they did not. See also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“The construction that
`
`stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
`
`invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
`
`Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
`
`The Court should therefore sustain LGE’s objection to Term No. 1.
`
`B.
`
`Terms From The Prior Litigations (Terms 3-15, 18-30)
`
`The Order also incorrectly construed Term Nos. 3-15 and 18-30. See Order at 29-45. The
`
`Court permitted the parties to incorporate by reference briefing in prior cases for these terms, and
`
`the Order adopts the prior constructions from those cases. Id. at 2. However, the Order provides
`
`only the construction of each term, without any analysis supporting the construction. Id. Further,
`
`there is no written decision with analysis in any of the prior cases. See Dkt. 32-11, 32-12, 32-13.
`
`LGE respectfully objects to the constructions of Term Nos. 3-15 and 18-30 for the reasons
`
`identified in LGE’s Markman briefing for these terms (Dkt. 31, 37) and requests that the Court
`
`adopt LGE’s proposed constructions.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For at least the forgoing reasons, LGE respectfully requests the Court to issue an order
`
`adopting its constructions for Term Nos. 1, 3-15, and 18-30, as proposed in its claim construction
`
`briefing and at the claim construction hearing.
`
`
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`
`
`8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 14 of 15
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`Dated: July 6, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`TX State Bar No. 24001351
`303 S. Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`Steven Pepe
`Matthew Shapiro
`James Stevens
`Michael Morales
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1211 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036-8704
`Tel: 212.596.9000
`Fax: 212.596.9090
`Steven.Pepe@ropesgray.com
`Matthew.Shapiro@ropesgray.com
`James.Stevens@ropesgray.com
`Michael.Morales@ropesgray.com
`
`David S. Chun
`Stepan Starchenko
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1900 University Ave., 6th Floor
`East Palo Alto, CA 94303-2284
`Tel: 650.617.4000
`Fax: 650.617.4090
`David.Chun@ropesgray.com
`Stepan.Starchenko@ropesgray.com
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`Scott Taylor
`(Admission application forthcoming)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`Prudential Tower
`800 Boylston Street
`Boston, MA 02199-3600
`Tel: 617.951.7000
`Fax: 617.951.7050
`Scott.Taylor@ropesgray.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant LG Electronics Inc.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00520-ADA Document 59 Filed 07/06/22 Page 15 of 15
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on July 6, 2022, all counsel of record who are
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`deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document.
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
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`10
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