throbber
Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 1 of 14
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-00272-ADA
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC.;
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC; and
`AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSED MOTION FOR
`PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 2 of 14
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1 
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 2 
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`A. 
`
`The Specification Lacks Words Restricting A “Routing Message” To Having A Time-To-Live
`
`Field. 2 
`
`B. 
`
`The Specification And The Claims Show That The Time-To-Live Field Has Nothing To Do
`
`With Routing. .......................................................................................................................................... 4 
`
`C. 
`
`Claim Differentiation Shows That The Claimed Routing Message Does Not Require A Time-
`
`To-Live Field. ......................................................................................................................................... 6 
`
`III.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 7 
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 3 of 14
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................ 4
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................... 3
`
`Liebel- Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)...................................................... 3
`
`MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................................... 5
`
`Pisony v. Commando Constr., Inc., No. W-17-CV-00055-ADA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31524 (W.D.
`
`Tex. Jan. 23, 2019) .................................................................................................................................. 3
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 4 of 14
`
`ABBREVIATION
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`TERM
`
`VoIP-Pal
`
`Amazon
`
`Defendant
`
`Plaintiff VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services,
`
`LLC, and Amazon Web Services, Inc.
`
`Amazon
`
`The ’606 patent or the patent-in-suit
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,218,606
`
`The ’005 patent
`
`The ’864 patent
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,179,005
`
`U.S. Patent No. 11,171,864
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 5 of 14
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Contrary to what Amazon claims, VoIP-Pal has a proper basis for reconsideration because
`
`requiring a “routing message” to include a time-to-live field is clearly erroneous. Amazon repeatedly
`
`argues that a time-to-live field is a non-optional field of a routing message. But this argument is
`
`nothing more than clever misdirection. The Federal Circuit has unequivocally held that in order to
`
`limit the claims to a single embodiment, the patentee must have had a clear intent to limit the claim
`
`scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction. Amazon identifies no such
`
`words or expressions in the ’606 patent. Rather, the ’606 patent claims evidence the patentee’s intent
`
`not to limit the claims to an embodiment of a routing message that has a time-to-live field. Thus, this
`
`limitation is clearly erroneous under the law.
`
`Even if the Court determines that VoIP-Pal has not met the reconsideration standard, which it
`
`should not, the Court can still modify its construction through rolling claim construction. VoIP-Pal
`
`notes this authority in its Motion and Amazon neglects to address it.1
`
`Finally, Amazon mischaracterizes the parties’ dispute at the Claim Construction Hearing. At
`
`the hearing, the parties argued whether the Court should adopt VoIP-Pal’s proposed construction of
`
`“routing message” (plain and ordinary meaning) or Amazon’s proposed construction (a message that
`
`includes a callee user name field, a route field, and a time-to-live field). The parties did not argue
`
`whether “routing message” should be construed to have only two fields (a callee user name field and a
`
`route field) and not a third time-to-live field. VoIP-Pal’s Motion merely asks the Court to fine tune its
`
`construction of “routing message,” not to reconsider the parties’ original dispute, and should be
`
`granted.
`
`1 Dkt. No. 89 at 3-4.
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 6 of 14
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`The Specification Lacks Words Restricting A “Routing Message” To Having A
`Time-To-Live Field.
`
`
`The central premise of Amazon’s argument—that the specification defines a routing message to
`
`have three non-optional fields is clearly erroneous. Amazon relies on Figure 15 of the ’606 patent to
`
`support this assertion.2 Amazon contends that because Figure 15 labels two fields of a routing
`
`message as “optional” that the other fields shown are non-optional.3 But under Amazon’s theory,
`
`Figure 15 shows four non-optional fields—a callee username field, a route field, a time-to-live field,
`
`and an other field—not three. The portion of the specification that Amazon relies on to support its
`
`argument that a generic routing message has three non-optional fields expressly states that such a
`
`message has at least a fourth field:
`
`Referring to FIG. 15, a generic routing message is shown generally at 352 and includes
`an optional supplier prefix field 354, and optional delimiter field 356, a callee user
`name field 358, at least one route field 360, a time-to-live field 362 and other fields
`364.4
`
`
`Thus, Amazon’s own evidence undercuts its argument that a routing message has three non-optional
`
`fields. The specification explains that a routing message is used to route a call and neither the other
`
`field nor the time-to-live field play any part in that functionality. The fact that these fields are not
`
`labeled as optional in the Figure 15 embodiment of the invention does not change the character of what
`
`a routing message is, what it does, and how it should be properly construed.
`
`
`
`Amazon misleadingly and erroneously asserts that the Summary of the Invention does not “use
`
`permissive language when describing that the routing message contains those three required fields.”5
`
`Amazon purposefully does not assert the Summary uses restrictive language to characterize a routing
`
`
`
`2 Dkt. No. 91 at 2.
`3 Id.
`4 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 21:47-51 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 7 at 3.
`5 Dkt. No. 91 at 2.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 7 of 14
`
`message. That is because not using permissive language is not the same as using restrictive language.
`
`To limit a claim term to a single embodiment, Amazon must demonstrate that the patentee had “a clear
`
`intent[] to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”6
`
`Amazon, however, identified no such words of exclusion or restriction, either in its claim construction
`
`briefs, in its Opposition, or at the Claim Construction Hearing. Indeed, the portion of the Summary
`
`that Amazon relied on at the Claim Construction Hearing to make its non-use of permissive language
`
`argument contains no words of restriction.7 In fact, that portion of the Summary indicates that the
`
`routing message has a timeout value, which is not a field that Amazon claims a routing message
`
`requires; yet elsewhere, permissive language is used.8 Without words expressly requiring a routing
`
`message to have a time-to-live field, the Court’s construction of this term is clearly erroneous.
`
`
`
`The Court has previously rejected attempts to limit claims to a single embodiment where the
`
`defendant failed to identify words of exclusion or restriction. In Pisony v. Commando Constr., Inc.,
`
`the Court applied the Federal Circuit’s holding in Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp. and rejected
`
`the defendants’ argument that their construction was required because the figures of the patent-in-suit
`
`show only a single embodiment.9 The defendants did not identify any words of exclusion or restriction
`
`but rather merely attempted to advance a construction that would preclude a finding of infringement:
`
`The Court finds no ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction’ limiting
`the extendible mast to a vertical pole. Defendants have not and cannot now make or
`support any such allegation. The Court determines that the intrinsic record is devoid of
`an intent to limit the ‘extendible mast’ to a vertical pole; rather, this is an effort on the
`
`
`6 See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liebel-
`Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original) (internal
`quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
`7 See Ex. 7 at 9 (citing ’606 patent at 6:1-11).
`8 Id.; compare Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3:49-54 (a parallel feature description that instead uses permissive
`language (“may”)).
`9 See Pisony v. Commando Constr., Inc., No. W-17-CV-00055-ADA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31524, at
`*10-11 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2019).
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 8 of 14
`
`part of Defendants to obtain a construction that would preclude infringement on its
`part.10
`
`
`The same is true in this case—Amazon identifies no words restricting a routing message to
`
`having a time-to-live field yet advocates for a construction that it believes precludes
`
`infringement.11 Because Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp. equally applies to the facts in
`
`this case, the Court’s construction of “routing message” is clearly erroneous and should be
`
`modified to exclude the time-to-live field.
`
`B.
`The Specification And The Claims Show That The Time-To-Live Field Has
`Nothing To Do With Routing.
`
`Amazon again uses selective wording in trying to tie the time-to-live field to the routing
`
`
`
`message. Tellingly, Amazon never refutes VoIP-Pal’s argument that the time-to-live field has nothing
`
`to do with routing. Instead, Amazon argues that calculating a time to live for a particular call depends
`
`in part on the route of the call.12 But this argument is irrelevant. The relevant point is the reverse—the
`
`route of the call does not depend on the time to live. The portion of the specification that is calculating
`
`a cost per second for a call proves this point. Determining how to route a call does not depend on how
`
`much the call costs. Amazon cites no evidence that a time to live is needed to route a call.
`
`Amazon’s heavy reliance on Figures 15, 16, 25, and 32 of the ’606 patent to assert that every
`
`embodiment of a routing message includes a time-to-live field also injects error into the construction.
`
`Drawings in a patent need not illustrate the full scope of the invention.13 Defining an invention by
`
`what is shown in the figures precisely invokes the dangers of importing limitations from the
`
`specification into the claims that the Federal Circuit has expressly warned against:
`
`
`
`10 Id.
`11 See Dkt. No. 92 (arguing that the Court’s Claim Construction Order is case dispositive on the issue
`of infringement).
`12 Dkt. No. 91 at 3, n.3.
`13 See Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 9 of 14
`
`[P]atent coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the
`figures. … To hold otherwise would be to import limitations onto the claim from the
`specification, which is fraught with danger.”14
`
`
`Nowhere does the patent use words that restrict “a routing message” to what is shown in Figures 15,
`
`16, 25, and 32. Rather, it states expressly that the Figures “illustrate embodiments” of the invention
`
`and that each of these figures is only a “representation” of a routing message.15 Amazon pointlessly
`
`argues that the ’606 patent does not disclose an embodiment of a routing message that excludes a time-
`
`to-live field or states that it is optional.16 But again, the relevant inquiry is whether the specification
`
`states that the time-to-live field is required, which the specification does not.
`
`
`
`Amazon’s claim that the patent never says that a routing message can exclude a time-to-live
`
`field also is not accurate.17 The plain claim language indicates that a routing message need not have a
`
`time-to-live field. All the claims require is that the routing message identify a route, as shown by the
`
`claim language introducing a routing message in each independent claim:
`
`[Claims 1 and 19] producing a routing message identifying a first network address
`associated with the first network element …
`
`producing a routing message identifying a second network address associated with the
`second network element18
`…
`[Claim 21] produce a routing message identifying a first Internet Protocol (IP) network
`address associated with the first network element …
`
`produce a routing message identifying a second Internet Protocol (IP) network address
`associated with the second network element …19
`
`
`Contrary to what Amazon claims, the specification’s description of setting a time to live to a maximum
`
`value for free calls and subscriber-to-subscriber calls does not confirm that the time-to-live field is a
`
`
`14 See MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`15 See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11:1-5, 11:9-10, 11:45-50, 12:1-4, 12:19-21.
`16 Dkt. No. 91 at 4; compare ’Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3:49-54 (a routing message “may” have a “time value”).
`17 Dkt. No. 91 at 5.
`18 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 37:57-60, 37:62-65, 40:24-26, 40:29-31 (emphasis added).
`19 Id. at 41:12-14, 41:17-20 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 10 of 14
`
`non-optional part of a routing message.20 The claims say nothing about free calls. Although the
`
`claims cover subscriber-to-subscriber calls, the claims say nothing about setting a time to live to a
`
`maximum value for such calls; all they require is producing a routing message that identifies a second
`
`network address or a second Internet Protocol network address.21 In other words, the plain claim
`
`language shows that the inventors never intended that the claimed routing message include a time-to-
`
`live field because it is not required to practice the claims.
`
`
`
`Finally, Amazon contests that column 27, lines 40-59 of the ’606 patent supports VoIP-Pal’s
`
`argument that the time-to-live field is not used to route a message.22 But Amazon fails to explain how
`
`this portion of the specification, or any portion of the specification for that matter, shows that the time-
`
`to-live field is used, let alone required, to route a message. Instead, Amazon merely states that because
`
`this portion of the specification refers to Figures 16, 25, and 32 that that is somehow sufficient to show
`
`that the time-to-live field is used to route a message. It is not. The specification expressly states the
`
`time-to-live field is used to “hold[] a value representing the number of seconds the call is permitted to
`
`be active, based on subscriber available minutes and other billing parameters.” 23 Amazon cannot
`
`explain how that value impacts the routing of a message—it does not.
`
`C.
`
`Claim Differentiation Shows That The Claimed Routing Message Does Not
`Require A Time-To-Live Field.
`
`Amazon’s arguments that claim differentiation does not apply lack merit. First, Amazon
`
`
`
`argues that it is the timeout value limitation of dependent claim 18 of the ’005 patent that
`
`differentiates the claim from independent claim 1 of the ’005 patent.24 But Amazon fails to inform
`
`the Court what the timeout value is. It represents “a time that the call controller should wait for a
`
`
`
`20 Dkt. No. 91 at 5.
`21 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 37:57-60, 37:62-65, 40:24-26, 40:29-31, 41:12-14, 41:17-20.
`22 Dkt. No. 91 at 5.
`23 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 21:55-60.
`24 Dkt. No. 91 at 6-7.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 11 of 14
`
`response from the associated gateway before giving up and trying the next gateway.”25 Thus, like the
`
`time value recited in claim 18, which Amazon agrees is the time to live, the timeout value also has
`
`nothing to do with determining the route of the call. In other words, both the time value and the
`
`timeout value differentiate claim 18 of the ’005 patent from claim 1 of the ’005 patent. The
`
`information needed to route the call—the identity of a network address or gateway—is contained in
`
`claim 1 of the ’005 patent just as it is in claim 1 of the ’606 patent.26
`
`Second, Amazon argues that claim differentiation does not apply between claim 1 of the ’606
`
`patent and claim 1 of the ’864 patent because the latter recites more than just a time to live; it also
`
`recites additional limitations for calculating the time to live.27 But that distinction proves VoIP-Pal’s
`
`point. Claim 1 of the ’864 patent claims an embodiment where the time of the call is limited whereas
`
`claim 1 of the ’606 patent does not. There is simply no reason that the embodiment of the routing
`
`message in claim 1 of the ’606 patent must have a time-to-live field because that field is not used to
`
`perform any of the limitations of the ’606 patent claims.
`
`Third, despite what Amazon claims, the International Searching Authority’s opinion—that the
`
`original claims directed to operating a call routing controller to produce a routing message were a
`
`distinct invention from the original claims directed to determining a time to permit a communications
`
`session to be conducted—is evidence that the embodiment of a routing message claimed in the ’606
`
`patent does not include a time-to-live field for the same reason. The time-to-live field serves no
`
`purpose in that embodiment because it is not used to route a call. In fact, it is not used at all.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`
`In conclusion, the Court should reconsider the term “routing message” and construe the term to
`
`mean “a message that includes a callee user name field and a route field.”
`
`
`25 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 24:67-25:3.
`26 Dkt. No. 89 at 8 (comparison table).
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 12 of 14
`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 12 of 14
`
`27 Dkt. No. 91 at 7.
`27 Dkt. No. 91 at 7.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 13 of 14
`
`
`
`Dated: March 29, 2023
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` By: /s/Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`lewis@hudnelllaw.com
`Nicolas S. Gikkas
`nick@gikkaslaw.com
`Hudnell Law Group P.C.
`800 W. El Camino Real Suite 180
`Mountain View, California 94040
`T: 650.564.3698
`F: 347.772.3034
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 93 Filed 03/29/23 Page 14 of 14
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
`
`electronic service are being served with a copy of PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S REPLY IN
`
`SUPPORT OF OPPOSED MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION via the Court’s CM/ECF system under the Federal Rules of Civil
`
`Procedure and Local Rule CV-5(b)(1) this 29th day of March, 2023.
`
`
`
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`
`
`By: /s/Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`lewis@hudnelllaw.com
`Hudnell Law Group P.C.
`800 W. El Camino Real Suite 180
`Mountain View, California 94040
`T: 650.564.3698
`F: 347.772.3034
`
`10
`
`

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