Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 2061
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:14-cv-982-KNM
`LEAD CASE
`
`CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS
`EQUIPMENT LLC,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC., ET AL.,
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ JOINT SUR-REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 2062
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ...................... 1
`I.
`II. CLAIMS 5-7 AND 14-17 OF THE ’966 PATENT ARE INDEFINITE. ............................. 1
`A. Nothing in the Patent Requires Substituting Equation [3] into Claims 5 or 14. ............ 2
`B. Even After the Substitution Proposed by Plaintiff, Claims 5 and 14 Would Still
`Be Fatally Inconsistent With Claims 1 and 10. .............................................................. 3
`III. CLAIM 15 OF THE ’060 PATENT IS INDEFINITE. ......................................................... 4
`IV. CLAIMS 15 AND 23 OF THE ’556 PATENT ARE INDEFINITE. ................................... 6
`V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 7
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 2063
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Adv. Display Techs. v. AU Optronics Corp.,
`2012 WL 2872121 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2012) ............................................................................ 5
`
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`Fuji Photo Film Cp., Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Input/Output, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc.,
`2008 WL 5427982 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008) ............................................................................ 5
`
`Input/Output, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc.,
`2007 WL 6196070 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2007) ........................................................................ 5, 6
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) ..................................................................................................... 2, 3, 5, 6
`
`Nexus Display Techs. LLC v. Dell Inc.,
`2015 WL 5578735 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) ........................................................................... 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Prolifiq Software Inc. v. Veeva Sys. Inc.,
`2014 WL 3870016 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014) ............................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`- ii -
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 2064
`
`
`
`I.
`
`RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
`Defendants dispute the following numbered paragraphs from Plaintiff’s Statement of
`
`Undisputed Facts (see D.I. 160, at 11-12).
`
`1.
`
`Defendants dispute that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would
`
`understand how the variables set forth in one or more equations of the ’966 patent relate to each
`
`other by virtue of knowing algebra.
`
`2.
`
`Defendants dispute that a POSA would necessarily understand any particular
`
`relationship between the variables of equations [1] through [5] of the ’966 patent, which have no
`
`apparent relationship to each other. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Royer, effectively concedes that a
`
`POSA would not necessarily understand such relationships when he observes that “the Ppreamble
`variable in Claims 5 and 14 may be expanded as shown in Equation 3.”1 (D.I. 160-8 ¶ 58).
`4.
`Disputed because the ‘966 patent offers no such explanation. Defendants dispute
`
`that the equation set forth in Claims 1 and 10 of the ’966 patent may be expressed as f(0) = ΔPPC
`+ ΔPrampup when PO_UE_PUSCH = 0 given the other requirements of the claim, including the
`requirement to initialize as the recited equation.
`
`The remaining facts are undisputed, but are irrelevant to the issue of indefiniteness, for
`
`reasons described below and in previous briefing.
`
`II.
`
`CLAIMS 5-7 AND 14-17 OF THE ’966 PATENT ARE INDEFINITE.
`Claims 5 and 14 are inconsistent with the independent claims (1 and 10) from which they
`
`depend. The independent claims require that an initial transmit power depends on two variables:
`
`(1) a preamble power of a first message sent on an access channel; and (2) the second power
`
`control adjustment state f(0). (’966 patent at 12:67-13:3 and 14:58-61). Yet, it is undisputed that
`
`the second variable – f(0) – does not appear in the text of the equations for the initial transmit
`
`power (PMsg3) recited in claims 5 and 14.
`
`
`1 Unless otherwise noted, emphasis in this brief is added.
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 2065
`
`
`
`Plaintiff suggests that a summation of three other variables that can be used to calculate
`Ppreamble (i.e., Equation [3] in the patent) may be substituted for Ppreamble in the equations of claims
`5 and 14. The ’966 patent, however, never indicates that such substitution must be done. In any
`
`event, such a substitution would create a new and equally fatal inconsistency: the preamble
`
`power, having been replaced, would no longer appear in the equations of claims 5 and 14,
`
`despite being required by claims 1 and 10.
`
`Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine factual dispute precluding summary
`
`judgment that claims 5-7 and 14-17 are inconsistent with the claims from which they depend,
`
`and thus are invalid as indefinite.
`
`Nothing in the Patent Requires Substituting Equation [3] into Claims 5 or 14.
`A.
`As noted above, Plaintiff argues “the Ppreamble variable expressly recited in Claims 5 and
`14 (Equation 5 in the specification) may be represented as shown in Equation 3 of the
`specification … That is, Ppreamble = Ptarget + PL + ΔPrampup.” (D.I. 160 at 13). Plaintiff suggests
`that “substituting this equation into claim [sic: equation] 5 (recited in Claims 5 and 14) results
`
`in” a formula that avoids the inconsistency identified by Defendants. However, nothing in
`
`claims 5 or 14 requires this substitution, as Plaintiff’s permissive “may be” language confirms.
`
`(See also D.I. 160-8 ¶ 58).
`
`As explained in Section II.B below, the substitution would not avoid the fatal
`
`inconsistency. In any event, as a threshold matter, the suggested substitution is not indicated
`
`anywhere in claims 5 or 14, or anywhere in the ’966 patent specification. It is undisputed that
`
`claims 5 and 14 do not include Equation [3] or particularly point out or distinctly claim that
`Ppreamble in the claims is defined by Equation [3]. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S.Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis original) (“The Patent Act
`
`requires that a patent specification conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
`
`and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the] invention.).
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 2066
`
`
`
`At most, Equation [3] is one way of calculating preamble power (i.e., one embodiment).
`
`Because preamble power is not limited to Equation [3], a POSA would not know with reasonable
`
`certainty that claims 5 or 14 require the substitution proposed by Plaintiff. (D.I. 147-1 ¶¶ 67-68).
`
`Plaintiff’s expert effectively affirms that Plaintiff’s proposed substitution is optional, observing
`
`that “the Ppreamble variable in Claims 5 and 14 may be expanded as shown in Equation 3 of the
`’966 Patent.” (D.I. 160-8 ¶ 58). Arguing, as Plaintiff does, that Claims 5 and 14 are not
`
`indefinite because Ppreamble may be expanded using Equation 3 from the specification is akin to
`arguing that a claim is definite as long as it can be ascribed “some meaning” – an argument
`expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Nautilus. Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2130.2 The fact,
`undisputed by Plaintiff, that a POSA would not understand that the claims at issue require a
`
`substitution, renders the claims indefinite.
`
`B.
`
`Even After the Substitution Proposed by Plaintiff, Claims 5 and 14 Would
`Still Be Fatally Inconsistent With Claims 1 and 10.
`The substitution proposed by Plaintiff yields an intermediate equation, not recited in the
`
`claims, in which f(0) still fails to appear: PMsg3=min{Pmax, Ptarget + PL + ΔPrampup + Δ0,preamble_Msg3
`+ ΔPC_Msg3 + 10log10(MPUSCH(i)) + ΔTF(TF(i))}. (D.I. 160 at 13). Plaintiff asserts that the
`“claimed formula, thus, depends on f(0),” id., but Plaintiff’s logic is unclear. Plaintiff states that
`“f(0) = ΔPrampup + ΔPC_Msg3,” id., presumably suggesting that one could replace the latter two
`terms, in the intermediate equation on page 13 of Plaintiff’s brief, with f(0). Yet the equation
`
`appearing in independent Claims 1 and 10 shows that f(0) is not equal to ΔPrampup + ΔPC_Msg3.
`According to Plaintiff, making f(0) appear in this intermediate equation requires using another
`
`equation, P0_UE_PUSCH + f(0) = ΔPPC + ΔPrampup, and two additional assumptions not stated in the
`claims: (1) ΔPC_Msg3 = ΔPPC, and (2) P0_UE_PUSCH = 0, such that f(0) could then be substituted for
`ΔPrampup + ΔPC_Msg3 in the intermediate equation. (D.I. 147-1, ¶ 71; D.I. 160-8 ¶ 59.)
`
`2 Plaintiff’s arguments about inter partes reviews (IPRs) are likewise misplaced. Any
`construction applied in an IPR is not evidence that the claims are sufficiently definite. A
`different standard applies to the construction of claims in IPR proceedings. (D.I. 147 at 33-34.)
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 2067
`
`
`
`Even if one followed Plaintiff’s suggested substitution to the letter, the resulting equation
`
`for the initial transmit power PMsg3 still does not depend on both the preamble power and f(0) as
`claims 1 and 10 expressly require. After performing Plaintiff’s proposed substitution, Ppreamble is
`removed in favor of f(0). (D.I. 147 at 32; D.I. 147-1, ¶ 71). An equation in claims 5 and 14 that
`
`includes f(0) but not Ppreamble is utterly inconsistent with the requirement, of claims 1 and 10, that
`“the initial transmit power depends on a preamble power of a first message sent on an access
`
`channel and the second power control adjustment state f(0).” Plaintiff offered no reply on this
`
`point. Plaintiff also failed to locate any portion of the ’966 patent specification describing a
`
`formula for the transmit power PMsg3 that refers to both a preamble power of a first message, and
`the second power control adjustment state f(0). (D.I. 147 at 32; D.I. 147-1, ¶ 65).
`
`As originally explained by Dr. Singer – and unrefuted by Plaintiff – Plaintiff’s proposed
`
`substitutions fail to introduce dependence on both preamble power and a second power control
`
`adjustment state f(0). (D.I. 147-1, ¶¶ 70-71). Claims 5 and 14 are fatally inconsistent with
`
`claims 1 and 10, from which they depend, and therefore are invalid as indefinite.
`
`III. CLAIM 15 OF THE ’060 PATENT IS INDEFINITE.
`
`Plaintiff concedes that wireless transmission systems do not guarantee 100% fidelity, and
`
`that “accuracy” is judged based on a “degree of confidence.” (D.I. 160-8 ¶ 41; D.I. 160 at 14-
`
`15). This concession contradicts Plaintiff’s earlier argument, in its letter brief, that “accurate”
`
`means “free from error.” (D.I. 129-1 at 1). Because the parties are now in agreement that
`
`“accurate receipt” is a term of degree, the sole indefiniteness issue is whether “the patent
`
`provides ‘some standard for measuring that degree.’” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`
`783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`In their responsive claim construction brief, Defendants explained why such guidance is
`
`lacking in the ’060 patent specification. (D.I. 147 at 35-38.) In reply, Plaintiff did not identify
`
`any such guidance in the specification, but merely submitted an expert declaration arguing that
`
`extrinsic sources provide the requisite clarity. As an initial matter, it is the patent – not expert
`
`testimony or other extrinsic sources – which must distinguish between the degree(s) covered by
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 2068
`
`
`
`the claims and the degree(s) that the claims do not cover. Biosig, 783 F.3d at 1378; see also
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that for
`
`terms of degree, “we must look to the written description for guidance”).
`
`Further, as this District has explained, the purpose of the definiteness requirement is “to
`
`ensure that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of
`
`the legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public … can
`
`determine whether or not they infringe.” Input/Output, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc., 2008 WL 5427982,
`
`*25 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008). An expert declaration, generated after-the-fact for purposes of
`litigation,3 is not part of the public patent record.
`Courts in this District, both pre- and post-Nautilus, have found terms of degree indefinite
`
`
`when a patent fails to provide an objective boundary of claim scope, despite patentees’
`
`arguments that extrinsic sources such as expert testimony would provide a boundary. E.g.,
`
`Nexus Display Techs. LLC v. Dell Inc., 2015 WL 5578735, *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015)
`
`(“closely matching” held indefinite: [T]he specification fails to provide objective boundaries for
`
`determining whether a data rate ‘closely matche[s]’ another data rate.”); Adv. Display Techs. v.
`
`AU Optronics Corp., 2012 WL 2872121, *15 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2012) (“smooth bumps” held
`
`indefinite: “ADT cannot simply supplement the specification with an expert declaration absent
`
`some link in the written description tying the specific smoothness of the bumps to the purported
`
`functions of the invention.”); Input/Output, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc., 2007 WL 6196070 at *28 (E.D.
`
`Tex. Dec. 19, 2007) (“small positive difference” held indefinite: “The intrinsic evidence provides
`
`no guidance to suggest the construction provided by Dr. Schmidt.”) (report and
`
`recommendation), aff’d, 2008 WL 5427982 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2008).
`
`
`3 Cf. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that expert testimony
`is “less reliable” than the patent itself because it “is generated at the time of and for the purpose
`of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence”).
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 2069
`
`
`
`
`
`In any event, Plaintiff’s expert declaration fails to explain the boundaries of the term
`
`“accurate receipt” with reasonable clarity. The declaration notes the existence of technical
`
`protocols that utilize “error correction, redundancy, error-detection, and/or other techniques to
`
`verify that information is exchanged sufficiently.” (D.I. 160-8, ¶ 41). The declaration, however,
`
`does not reveal how many different such protocols exist in the field, what degree of accuracy
`
`each protocol deems “sufficient,” or how to determine which one(s) to associate with claim 15.
`
` Thus, even the expert declaration – which as a matter of law cannot provide a boundary
`that the specification lacks – fails to articulate metes and bounds for the term “accurate receipt.”4
`Absent “reasonably certain” boundaries, claim 15 is invalid. Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2124.5
`IV. CLAIMS 15 AND 23 OF THE ’556 PATENT ARE INDEFINITE.
`
`The dispute over claims 15 and 23 boils down to whether “type 1” and “type 2” power
`
`headroom reports are specific reports (as Defendants contend), or any two reports (as Plaintiff
`
`argues, i.e., “a first type” and “a second type”).
`
`
`4 Plaintiff’s papers suggest two possible types of “confirmation”: the terminal can internally self-
`confirm accuracy, or it can send an acknowledgement (“ACK”) message to the base station.
`(D.I. 160 at 14-15; D.I. 160-8 ¶ 42). Whether some kind of “confirmation” occurs in a
`commercial system, however, says nothing about the degree of accuracy required by the claim to
`satisfy the “accurate receipt” requirement. In any event, examples of what might be covered by a
`claim term do not establish the claim’s boundaries. E.g., Prolifiq Software Inc. v. Veeva Sys.
`Inc., 2014 WL 3870016, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014) (“[T]hat the specifications provide these
`examples does not mean that the patents provide an objective standard for what is meant by the
`term … a person skilled in the art must know not only what falls inside the scope of the claim
`term, but also what falls outside of it.”).
`5 Defendants also pointed out that there are two possible frames of reference for evaluating
`“accuracy” (i.e., accurate travel of the message from the base station to the terminal, or accurate
`processing of the message as it is received at the terminal). Plaintiff’s expert argues that the
`claims are focused on the former (D.I. 160-8 ¶ 39) but, again, the ’060 patent does not say so.
`Cf. Input/Output, 2007 WL 6196070 at *28 (“I/O principally relies upon the declaration of Dr.
`Schmidt for the proposition that ‘small’ can be understood with reference to the natural
`frequency and band of interest … However, the specification does not suggest that ‘small’
`should be evaluated from [that] frame of reference.”).
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 2070
`
`
`
`The most important evidence – to which Plaintiff did not muster a response – is that both
`
`terms are used as proper nouns throughout the specification. Indeed, they are almost universally
`
`capitalized. E.g., 3:42-44 (“FIG. 9 illustrates a format in which a single bit is used to indicate
`
`whether Type 1 power headroom report or Type 2 power headroom report is being used.”); 3:45-
`
`46 (“FIG. 10 illustrates a format in which Type 1 and Type 2 power headroom reports are
`
`indicated via the R bit”); 3:48-50; 5:30-31; 5:36-41; 5:42-44; 5:45-55; 6:59-62; 7:20-22. As
`
`proper nouns, “Type 1” and “Type 2” power headroom reports must mean something specific –
`
`not just “first” and “second” reports. Plaintiff was free to use more generic claim language (like
`
`“first” and “second”) but did not. A patent is a bargain between the patentee and the public, but
`
`is procured ex parte without public input. Thus, “as between the patentee who had a clear
`
`opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the
`
`patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for particular subject matter.”
`
`Fuji Photo Film Cp., Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The specific meanings of these phrases must be the “definitions” assigned to them at
`
`Column 5, lines 36-41, since it is undisputed that the phrases meant nothing to a POSA outside
`
`the context of the ’556 patent. (D.I. 147-1, ¶ 104).
`
`Plaintiff responds that “Type 1” and “Type 2” reports are “distinguishable according to
`
`whether or not the PUCCH transmission power is taken into account” (D.I. 160 at 16) since the
`
`Type 2 report includes PUCCH power and the Type 1 report does not. Yet that information
`
`comes straight from the definitions of the Type 1 and Type 2 reports, cited by Defendants.
`
`Plaintiff offers no reason to distinguish the reports based on just one aspect of the definitions,
`
`rather than simply using the definitions themselves. Of course, using the definitions of “Type 1”
`
`and “Type 2” in the specification would confirm the very inconsistency with dependent claims
`
`16 and 24 that Defendants contend renders both terms indefinite.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`Defendants respectfully request summary judgment that ’966 patent claims 5-7 and 14-
`
`17, ’556 patent claims 15 and 23, and ’060 patent claim 15 are invalid as indefinite.
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 2071
`
`
`
`Dated: November 30, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Michael N. Rader
`Richard L. Wynne
`Texas State Bar No. 24003214
`richard.wynne@tklaw.com
`THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP
`One Arts Plaza
`1722 Routh St., Suite 1500
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone: (214) 969-1386
`Facsimile: (214) 880-3267
`
`Michael N. Rader (pro hac vice)
`Charles T. Steenburg (pro hac vice)
`Chelsea A. Loughran (pro hac vice)
`W. Brett Morrison (pro hac vice)
`mrader@wolfgreenfield.com
`csteenburg@wolfgreenfield.com
`cloughran@wolfgreenfield.com
`wmorrison@wolfgreenfield.com
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210-2206
`Telephone: (617) 646-8000
`Facsimile: (617) 646-8646
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
`(USA) INC.
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 2072
`
`
`
`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
`State Bar No. 24001351
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Phone: (903) 934-8450
`Fax: (903) 934-9257
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`John C. Hueston
`Alex C. D. Giza
`Douglas J. Dixon
`HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
`620 Newport Center Dr., Ste. 1300
`Newport Beach, CA 92660
`Phone: (949) 229-8640
`JHueston@hueston.com
`AGiza@hueston.com
`DDixon@hueston.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR T-MOBILE USA,
`INC. AND T-MOBILE US, INC.
`
`
`/s/ Christopher W. Kennerly
`Christopher W. Kennerly
`TX Bar No. 00795077
`chriskennerly@paulhastings.com
`Jonas P. Herrell
`CA Bar No. 279075
`jonasherrell@paulhastings.com
`Paul Hastings LLP
`1117 S. California Ave.
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1106
`Telephone: (650) 320-1800
`Facsimile: (650) 320-1900
`
`Jeffrey D. Comeau
`CA Bar No. 259679
`jeffreycomeau@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4747 Executive Drive
`Twelfth Floor
`San Diego, CA 92121-3114
`Telephone: (858) 458-3000
`Facsimile: (858) 458-3005
`
`Trey Yarbrough
`TX Bar No. 22133500
`trey@yw-lawfirm.com
`Dallas William Tharpe
`TX Bar No. 24052036
`YARBROUGH WILCOX, PLLC
`100 E. Ferguson St., Suite 1015
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Telephone (903) 595-3111
`Facsimile (903) 595-019
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`AT&T MOBILITY LLC
`
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 2073
`
`
`
`/s/ Michael E. Jones
`Michael E. Jones
`State Bar No. 10929400
`Patrick C. Clutter, IV
`State Bar No. 24036374
`mikejones@potterminton.com
`patrickclutter@potterminton.com
`Potter Minton, P.C.
`110 N. College Ave., Suite 500
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Tel: (903) 597-8311
`Fax: (903) 593-0846
`
`Charles B. Molster, III
`Virginia State Bar No. 23613
`Thomas M. Dunham
`D.C. Bar No. 448407
`Corrine M. Saylor
`D.C. Bar No. 997638 (Pro Hac Vice)
`cmolster@winston.com
`tdunham@winston.com
`csaylor@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20006-3817
`Tel: (202) 282-5000
`Fax: (202) 282-5100
`
`Sarah J. Kalemeris
`IL Bar No. 6303644
`skalemeris@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 W Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Tel: (312) 558-5600
`Fax: (312) 558-5700
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR CELLCO
`PARTNERSHIP D/B/A/ VERIZON
`WIRELESS
`
`
`
`/s/ Mark McGrory
`Mark McGrory (pro hac vice)
`Megan J. Redmond
`Carrie A. Bader
`ERISE IP
`6201 College Boulevard, Suite 300
`Overland Park, KS 66211
`Office: 913-777-5600
`Fax: 913-777-5601
`Mark.mcgrory@eriseip.com
`Megan.redmond@eriseip.com
`Carrie.bader@eriseip.com
`
`Robert W. Weber
`Texas State Bar No. 21044800
`SMITH WEBER, L.L.P.
`5505 Plaza Drive
`P.O. Box 6167
`Texarkana, TX 75505-6167
`Tele: (903) 223-5656
`Fax: (903) 223-5652
`Email: bweber@smithweber.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR SPRINT
`SOLUTIONS, INC., SPRINT
`SPECTRUM, LP, BOOST MOBILE,
`LLC
`
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 2074
`
`
`
`/s/ Jose L. Patiño
`Jose L. Patiño (CA Bar No. 149568)
`jpatino@foley.com
`Christopher C. Bolten (CA Bar No. 268284)
`cbolten@foley.com
`Wendy W. Cheung (CA Bar No. 285802)
`wcheung@foley.com
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`3579 Valley Centre Drive, Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130-3302
`Telephone: 858.847.6700
`Facsimile: 858.792.6773
`
`Cynthia J. Rigsby (WI Bar No. 1025479)
`crigsby@foley.com
`Michelle A. Moran (WI Bar No. 1073953)
`mmoran@foley.com
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`777 E. Milwaukee Avenue
`Milwaukee, WI 53202-2400
`Telephone: 414.271.2400
`Facsimile: 414.297.4900
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`KYOCERA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Jaime B. Beaber
`
`Jamie B. Beaber (D.C. Bar No. 484186)
`Michael W. Maas (D.C. Bar No. 493685)
`Kfir B. Levy (D.C. Bar No. 9891212)
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`1999 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006-1101
`Telephone: (202) 263-3000
`Facsimile: (202) 263-3300
`jbeaber@mayerbrown.com
`mmaas@mayerbrown.com
`klevy@mayerbrown.com
`
`Allen F. Gardner
`State Bar No. 24043679
`POTTER MINTON P.C.
`110 N. College Avenue, Suite 500
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Facsimile: (903) 593-0846
`allengardner@potterminton.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR LG
`ELECTRONICS, INC. AND LG
`ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed
`electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on this November 30, 2015. As of this date
`all counsel of record have consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of
`this document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Michael N. Rader
`Michael N. Rader
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 6:14-cv-00982-KNM Document 165 Filed 11/30/15 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 2075
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`- 12 -
`
`