Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 5276
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
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`MAXELL, LTD.,
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`
`
`Plaintiff
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`Civil Action No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`APPLE INC.’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO
`PREVENT DEPOSITION OF IN-HOUSE LITIGATION COUNSEL
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 5277
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
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`MATERIAL FACTS ......................................................................................................... 1
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`III.
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`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 2
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`IV. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`Maxell’s Attempt To Depose Apple’s In-House
`Litigation Counsel Is Squarely Prohibited By Shelton. ......................................... 3
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`Shelton Factors 2 and 3: Maxell Cannot Show That Mr. Stein Has
`Non-Privileged Information That Is Relevant And Crucial To Its Case. .............. 4
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`Shelton Factor 1: Maxell Cannot Prove That Any Non-Privileged
`Information Known To Mr. Stein Cannot Be Obtained By Other Means. ............ 6
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`D.
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`Maxell Lacks A Good-Faith Basis To Seek Mr. Stein’s Deposition. .................... 7
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 7
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`i
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 5278
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Angelicare, LLC v. St. Bernard Par.,
`No. CV 17-7360, 2018 WL 1172947 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2018)................................................... 3
`
`Asarco LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
` No. 2:12-CV-00283-EJL-REB, 2016 WL 1755241 (D. Idaho May 2, 2016) ........................... 5
`
`Chesher v. Allen,
`122 F. App’x 184 (6th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... 1
`
`Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc.,
`No. CIV.A. 6:07-CV-559, 2009 WL 2174925 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 2009) ............................ 2, 3
`
`Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 4:14-CV-371, 2016 WL 242801 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2016) ............................................ 2, 7
`
`McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
`No. 3:14-CV-2498-B, 2016 WL 3033544 (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2016 ........................................ 6
`
`Murphy v. Adelphia Recovery Tr.,
`No. 3-09-MC-105-B, 2009 WL 4755368 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2009) .......................................... 7
`
`Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
`No. A-09-CA-711 LY, 2010 WL 5174366 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2010) ................................. 3, 6
`
`Nguyen v. Excel Corp.,
`197 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 1, 2
`
`Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc.,
`281 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 5
`
`Secure Energy, Inc. v. Coal Synthetics,
`No. 4:08CV01719 JCH, 2010 WL 199953 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2010) ........................................ 2
`
`Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp.,
`805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,
`267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Vazquez v. Cent. States Joint Bd.,
`No. 04 C 1798, 2009 WL 1530709 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2009) ...................................................... 6
`
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`ii
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 5279
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page(s)
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`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) ....................................................................................................................... 2
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3) ................................................................................................................... 7
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5) ................................................................................................................... 7
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`Local Rule AT-3(h)......................................................................................................................... 7
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`iii
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: 5280
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Courts in this and other districts uniformly hold that depositions of litigation counsel
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`(including in-house litigation counsel) constitute “an abuse of the discovery process” that
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`“lowers the standards of the profession,” and are permissible only in rare situations where no
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`other means of discovery is available and the information sought is crucial and non-privileged.
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`Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327, 1330 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Nguyen v.
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`Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 209 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1999); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,
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`267 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir. 2001). Maxell cannot come close to meeting this high bar. Far
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`from exhausting other means of discovery, Maxell noticed Apple’s in-house litigation counsel,
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`Mr. Andrew Stein, as the first individual fact deposition in this case—a clear indication that
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`Maxell is again using discovery not as means to address the merits of this case, but as a weapon
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`to “add[] to the already burdensome time and costs of litigation.” Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.
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`And Maxell cannot identify any non-privileged testimony that Mr. Stein could provide that is
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`crucial to this case. The only reason Maxell has demanded Mr. Stein’s deposition, despite
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`whatever thinly veiled excuse it may concoct, is to harass Mr. Stein and Apple.1
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`II. MATERIAL FACTS
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`Mr. Andrew Stein is Senior Litigation Counsel at Apple. Simmons Decl. at ¶ 2. He is
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`responsible for supervising Apple’s outside counsel in this litigation. Id. That work includes
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`setting and directing litigation strategy and representing Apple at hearings and depositions. Id. at
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`1 This is just the latest in a series of discovery abuses by Maxell, which include: (1) rushing to
`Court, with no precedent whatsoever, on the theory that every document relevant to the case
`must have been produced on the initial disclosure deadline of July 10; (2) moving the Court, in
`the face of unambiguous precedent from this Court, that Apple provide non-infringement
`contentions in response to interrogatories; (3) moving the Court to compel Apple to fill out a
`10,000-cell spreadsheet as a single “interrogatory response”; and (4) refusing to provide
`substantive infringement contentions identifying allegedly infringing source code with
`specificity, as is clearly required by the local Patent Rules and this Court’s precedent.
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`1
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`¶¶ 2-3. Mr. Stein has also attended all three hearings held to date in this case. Dkt. No. 67; Dkt.
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`No. 80; ECF Entry dated June 19, 2019.
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`For its first individual deposition, noticed for November 7, 2019, Maxell served a Rule
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`30(b)(1) notice of deposition for Mr. Stein. Simmons Decl. at ¶ 5. Apple promptly requested
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`that Maxell withdraw it on the grounds presented in this motion. Maxell refused. On November
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`4, Apple conferred with Maxell and Maxell again refused to withdraw its notice. Id. at ¶¶ 5-9.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`In the Fifth Circuit, efforts to depose opposing counsel, absent a showing of crucial and
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`unique testimony, are routinely rejected. See Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., No.
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`CIV.A. 6:07-CV-559, 2009 WL 2174925, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 2009) (applying
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`Shelton/Nguyen to quash deposition of counsel); Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v.
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`Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 4:14-CV-371, 2016 WL 242801, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2016). The
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`Fifth Circuit has held that “depositions of opposing counsel are disfavored generally and should
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`be permitted in only limited circumstances.” Nguyen, 197 F.3d at 209. Indeed, courts have
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`condemned this practice with particularly harsh language:
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`Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the adversarial
`system and lowers the standards of the profession, but it also adds to the already
`burdensome time and costs of litigation. It is not hard to imagine additional
`pretrial delays to resolve work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as
`delays to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney’s testimony. Finally, the
`practice of deposing opposing counsel detracts from the quality of client
`representation.
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`Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327; see also Nguyen, 197 F.3d at 209 n.26 (5th Circuit quoting Shelton).
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`A request to depose opposing counsel provides good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to
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`issue a protective order unless the party seeking the deposition can demonstrate both the
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`propriety and the need for the deposition. Nguyen, 197 F.3d at 209. To determine whether a
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`party meets the high burden required to justify deposition of opposing counsel, courts in this
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`2
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`District employ the three-factor test set forth in Shelton. See Davis-Lynch, 2009 WL 2174925, at
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`*2. Under this test, Maxell must show shows that (1) no other means exist to obtain the
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`information, (2) the information sought is relevant and non-privileged, and (3) the information is
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`crucial to the preparation of the case. Id. (applying Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327). It is the party
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`seeking the deposition that must show all three factors are met to justify a deposition of opposing
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`counsel. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Nat. Life Ins. Co., No. A-09-CA-711 LY, 2010 WL
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`5174366, *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2010). Maxell cannot show any of these elements.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A. Maxell’s Attempt To Depose Apple’s In-House
`Litigation Counsel Is Squarely Prohibited By Shelton.
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`The Shelton test applies to in-house counsel. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1330; see also Nat’l W.
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`Life, 2010 WL 5174366, at *3. “[T]he critical factor in determining whether the Shelton test
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`applies is . . . the extent of the lawyer’s involvement in the pending litigation.” Id. at *3;
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`Angelicare, LLC v. St. Bernard Par., No. CV 17-7360, 2018 WL 1172947, at *7 (E.D. La. Mar.
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`6, 2018) (applying Shelton to reject efforts to depose in-house litigation counsel actively
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`managing the case). Here, there can be no question that Mr. Stein is an integral member of
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`Apple’s trial team. Mr. Stein supervises Apple’s outside counsel in this litigation, attends
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`regular meetings where Apple’s litigation strategy is planned, and has attended all three hearings
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`held before this Court to date. See Simmons Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3. Mr. Stein’s active role supervising
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`this litigation implicates each of Shelton’s reasons for prohibiting his deposition. First, the time
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`and effort spent preparing and sitting for a deposition would detract from Mr. Stein’s
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`representation of Apple. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. Second, any such deposition would result
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`only in voluminous “work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve
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`collateral issues raised by the attorney’s testimony.” Id. Third, even if Apple’s counsel objects
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`3
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`to the questions to preserve the privilege, Mr. Stein would still be required to sit through
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`potentially hours of objectionable questions and resulting objections. Condoning such a
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`deposition “disrupts the adversarial system and lowers the standards of the profession.” Id.
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`B.
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`Shelton Factors 2 and 3: Maxell Cannot Show That Mr. Stein Has Non-
`Privileged Information That Is Relevant And Crucial To Its Case.
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`Mr. Stein’s knowledge of this case arises from his work as Apple’s in-house litigation
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`counsel. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1330 (quashing deposition of in-house counsel who “had nothing
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`to do with this lawsuit except to represent her client”). Maxell cannot show that Mr. Stein has
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`unique non-privileged information that is relevant and crucial to any issue in this case.
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`Maxell apparently contends that it is crucial to question Mr. Stein regarding the offer of
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`Apple’s outside counsel for Mr. Stein to address the Court at the September 17 hearing on
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`Maxell’s motion to compel. After the Court questioned whether Apple has a central database
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`that stores component information, Apple’s outside counsel offered the Court the opportunity to
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`hear from Mr. Stein as to the undue burden imposed by Maxell’s a 10,000-cell spreadsheet
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`incorporated by Maxell’s Interrogatory No. 6:
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`Simmons Decl. at ¶ 4 (9/17/19 Discovery Hearing Unsealed Tr. at 84:3-7, 98:3-15).
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`The offered argument—supporting the undue burden associated with responding to
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`Maxell’s oppressively compound interrogatory—is far from “crucial” to any element of Maxell’s
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`patent infringement claims or Apple’s defenses in this case. See Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals,
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`4
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`Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the information sought “to determine
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`whether the defendant had in fact truthfully complied with his document requests and
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`interrogatories” was not “central to the litigation”); Asarco LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No.
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`2:12-CV-00283-EJL-REB, 2016 WL 1755241, at *9 (D. Idaho May 2, 2016) (finding
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`information to be “crucial” where “the case turns in part upon this issue”). Tellingly, the timing
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`of Maxell’s deposition notice—served three weeks after the Court heard arguments on Maxell’s
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`motion to compel—belies any credible claim that testimony sought is somehow “crucial” to
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`Maxell’s case or to Maxell’s motion. If explaining an undue burden is a proper basis for
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`deposing counsel, one would expect such depositions to occur routinely. Indeed, the Court did
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`not accept counsel’s offer, demonstrating that no further explanation is necessary to the Court’s
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`adjudication of Maxell’s motion to compel. Thus, cross-examining an offer by one attorney to
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`have another attorney give further argument at a hearing cannot be “crucial” to this case.
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`Maxell mischaracterizes Apple’s statement as offering fact testimony on Apple’s efforts
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`to collect discovery in this case. But as Apple explained to Maxell during the meet and confer,
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`Mr. Stein would have explained the heavy burden associated with tracking down component-
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`level information based on his experience attempting to do so in a different Apple litigation.
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`Maxell’s reliance on Pamida, 281 F.3d 726, to argue that no heightened standard exists to protect
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`Mr. Stein’s knowledge of a different litigation fails. Pamida had hired the same counsel to
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`defend a patent infringement litigation and a subsequent suit seeking indemnities. Id. As a
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`result, information “peculiarly within counsel’s knowledge”—i.e., whether the attorney fees in
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`the infringement litigation were reasonable—was “centrally relevant to the issues in the
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`indemnification action.” Id. at 730-731. The Court explained that the requested deposition was
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`justified “in this case where [a party] seeks relevant information uniquely known by [opposing
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`5
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`party’s] attorneys about prior terminated litigation, the substance of which is central to the
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`pending case.” Id. (emphasis added). Pamida’s outcome “is not meaningfully different from the
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`Shelton formulation for when opposing counsel may be deposed.” Vazquez v. Cent. States Joint
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`Bd., No. 04 C 1798, 2009 WL 1530709, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2009); Secure Energy, Inc. v.
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`Coal Synthetics, No. 4:08CV01719 JCH, 2010 WL 199953, at *1-3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2010)
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`(distinguishing Pamida for statements made in other litigation because the information sought
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`can be obtained by other means). Pamida is inapplicable here because the information Maxell
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`purports to seek is neither uniquely known to Mr. Stein, nor central to the pending case.
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`C.
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`Shelton Factor 1: Maxell Cannot Prove That Any Non-Privileged
`Information Known To Mr. Stein Cannot Be Obtained By Other Means.
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`Even if Maxell can demonstrate that the information it seeks from Mr. Stein is non-
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`privileged, relevant, and crucial to the issues in the case, Maxell cannot show that deposing Mr.
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`Stein is “the only way to acquire” that information. Nat’l W. Life, 2010 WL 5174366, at *3. The
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`standard for permitting deposition of litigation counsel requires “that [the requesting party] has
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`exhausted all other options for discovering the information it seeks . . . .” McKinney/Pearl Rest.
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`Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-2498-B, 2016 WL 3033544, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
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`May 26, 2016). Maxell has not even attempted—let alone exhausted—other means of discovery.
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`Maxell cannot show that Mr. Stein is the only source of that information for Apple’s
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`efforts in responding to Maxell’s written discovery requests. On the same day Maxell noticed
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`Mr. Stein’s deposition, Maxell also noticed a corporate deposition of Apple with 84 identified
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`topics that cover, among other things, information it apparently seeks from Mr. Stein, including
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`1) the identification of relevant components, 2) how Apple maintains information relating to
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`those components, and 3) Apple’s efforts in responding to discovery requests. Simmons Decl. at
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`6
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`¶ 6. Maxell does not dispute that these topics overlap with the information it seeks from Mr.
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`Stein. Maxell nevertheless alleges that it should be permitted to depose Mr. Stein.
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`Maxell’s position is baseless because any non-privileged information Mr. Stein can
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`provide about Apple’s burden to collect information in a different case would be either irrelevant
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`(if specific to facts in the prior case) or cumulative with Maxell’s 30(b)(6) topics (if related to
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`how Apple maintains component information and the individuals who might have relevant
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`information).2 Without having taken any depositions in this case, there is no basis for Maxell to
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`contend that it has exhausted all other avenues of discovery. The availability of less disruptive
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`alternatives warrants a protective order to prevent the deposition of Apple’s in-house litigation
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`counsel. Murphy v. Adelphia Recovery Tr., No. 3-09-MC-105-B, 2009 WL 4755368, at *3
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`(N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2009) (quashing deposition of counsel where a corporate representative may
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`have relevant information); Imperium, 2016 WL 242801, at *2 (same).
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`D. Maxell Lacks A Good-Faith Basis To Seek Mr. Stein’s Deposition.
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`For reasons set forth above, Maxell’s attempt to depose Mr. Stein is highly improper and
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`is a clear violation of Local Rule AT-3(h). Maxell knows Mr. Stein’s role in this case, and it has
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`not identified any non-privileged information crucial to its case that could not be obtained
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`through other means. Thus, Apple respectfully requests that the Court award Apple its costs and
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`fees incurred in bringing this motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3) and 37(a)(5).
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Apple respectfully request that the Court issue a protective
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`order preventing the deposition of Apple’s in-house litigation counsel, Mr. Stein.
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`2 Maxell relies on a statement from Apple’s counsel that “
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`” As explained above, this exemplary “test case” relates to a different
`litigation and was intended to demonstrate Apple’s burden in responding to Maxell’s discovery
`requests. It does not show that Mr. Stein is the only person who can testify to such burden.
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`7
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`November 5, 2019
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`/s/ Luann L. Simmons
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`
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`Luann L. Simmons (Pro Hac Vice)
`lsimmons@omm.com
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`Two Embarcadero Center
`28th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: 415-984-8700
`Facsimile: 415-984-8701
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`Xin-Yi Zhou (Pro Hac Vice)
`vzhou@omm.com
`Anthony G. Beasley (TX #24093882)
`tbeasley@omm.com
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`400 S. Hope Street
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: 213-430-6000
`Facsimile: 213-430-6407
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`Laura Bayne Gore (Pro Hac Vice)
`lbayne@omm.com
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`Times Square Tower, 7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Telephone: 212-326-2000
`Facsimile: 212-326-2061
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`Melissa R. Smith (TX #24001351)
`melissa@gilliamsmithlaw.com
`GILLIAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
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`Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 119 Filed 11/07/19 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 5288
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have
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`consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court's
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`CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on November 5, 2019.
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
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`CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
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`On November 4, 2019, pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), counsel for Defendants met and
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`conferred with counsel for Plaintiff, and counsel for Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff is opposed to
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`the relief sought by this Motion.
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
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`9
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